Supporting The Call For More Development

[ruxted]

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Supporting the call for more development

Recently the Senlis Council’s Norine MacDonald presented its position to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development.

The Senlis Council is not a newcomer to the Afghanistan debate. Until now however, with Senlis moving beyond their traditional focus on global drug issues, Ruxted has seen little common ground with this group. We are pleasantly surprised with, and strongly support, the opinions in their presentation

First: Ms. MacDonald understands that development only starts when security is in place.  This quite obvious fact is obscured in Canada because some high profile, national political leaders and some institutes are spreading disinformation to the effect that we can cease combat operations and switch to development, aid and traditional peacekeeping – that’s unadulterated rubbish.  Ms. MacDonald affirms that the Canadian Forces are doing good and essential work in Kandahar – work which cannot be subject to simple-minded “out now’ or, more stupidly, “out in Feb 09” slogans such as those offered by irresponsible opposition  parties.

Second: Ms. MacDonald understands that development, accomplished through visible and visibly Canadian development projects, is vital to the success of Canada’s aims in Afghanistan – aims defined by successive Canadian governments.  If Canada is failing in Afghanistan it is not attributable to Defence efforts, but in the Development and Diplomacy arms of Canada’s 3D strategy.

One of Ms. MacDonald’s key recommendations is to get CIDA (the Canadian International Development Agency) out of the business in Afghanistan and replace it with something that will get the job done.  In this she echoes previous parliamentary recommendations that  CIDA be disbanded based  on its abysmal African failures.  While foreign aid delivery is beyond Ruxted’s scope our BS detectors rang loud and clear when International Cooperation Minister Josée Verner appeared on CBC Radio following the Senlis' charge of CIDA ineffectiveness.  Verner's litany of Afghan "accomplishments" were primarily military (PRT) projects for which she grabbed the credit because they were ‘development,’ hence CIDA.

Yes, development money flows through CIDA’s hands, but providing accounting services hardly equates to doing anything useful for the mission in Afghanistan.  The Ruxted Group believes that CIDA needs to be booted out of Afghanistan.  The money needs to flow through the Ambassador in Kabul and the PRT commander in Kandahar, to support projects identified by the local Afghan leaders and then delivered quickly and visibly by Canadian personnel - Canadian-advised contractors, NGOs, and soldiers.  With security continuing to be extended, increased development funding will be necessary, but maximizing the return demands an efficiently not possible with CIDA in place.  The key is that the diplomats must take ownership of the development project, find the money in Ottawa, and shepherd it through the system to Afghanistan.

Third: Ms. MacDonald understands that ‘winning’ requires winning the hearts and minds of the Afghan people.  Burning their only cash crop (marijuana and opium poppies) is counter-productive.  Maybe there are better ideas than those offered by Senlis, but the current drug eradication policy is not one of them.  Canada should tell ISAF: keep your drug eradication programme off our turf; the drug trade obviously harms both Afghanistan and Canada, but there has to be a way to reduce the flow of drugs without hurting the people we are trying to help – the local farmers.

Canadians need to understand that drug eradication is not Canada’s policy or programme.  While US-supported, it is a Government of Afghanistan project. And although well within the Afghan leadership's ambit, Ruxted recommends that our Ambassador and advisors in Kabul persuade President Karzai to try other solutions, particularly in Kandahar province.

A final point raised by Senlis, with which Ruxted sympathizes, is that extensive aerial bombing, often compensating for the limited number of troops on the ground, harms local support.  The solution, however, is not to simply stop using it. Given the realities of troop strength on the ground, combat commanders have to balance risk to troops in contact with risks to the mission's aim  -- and they are, each and every day . Our military leaders are well aware of the impact of firepower on the hearts and minds issue; this was one of the factors for deploying the Leopard tanks, which can provide accurate fire support, especially where non-combatant civilians are present.  But we must be very, very clear: less air support means more flag-draped coffins returning to Canada.

The Senlis Council’s brief to the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs deserves a good, serious read by Canadians and a good, serious debate should follow.

The Ruxted Group affirms: troops should stay until Canada’s national aims are accomplished; accomplishing our aims will happen only when ‘development’ is bigger and better than now – CIDA is part of the problem, not part of the solution; and winning against insurgents involves a bargain, of sorts: we must offer the ordinary Afghan people something better than what they have now and something better than what  is on offer from the insurgents.  Burning their best cash crops and bombing their villages doesn’t make things ‘better.’  The Senlis Council’s solutions may not be the best but Ruxted supports the thrust of their views.

Finally, The Ruxted Group reaffirms its call for the Government of Canada to, as Senlis says, “articulate its goals” in Afghanistan.  Canada’s mission in Afghanistan is, as we have said, a ‘good war’ – a just cause - part of our ‘Responsibility to Protect.’  Canada’s mission is, as we have also said, ‘winnable’ if we use the best tactics in the field and if we have support at home.  It is the responsibility of the Government of Canada to tell Canadians, to convince Canadians of the worth of the mission.  Thus far it has failed to do so.

 

[McG]

I like this message.  Those who advocate more reconstruction are right.  Those who advocate less security are wrong.  However, it seems that both messages are preached together & that is only a prescription for failure.

We need to maintain our security efforts while increasing our reconstruction efforts.

 

[KevinB]

As a stakeholder in security  -- I would argue for more security in addition to more reconstruction...
  Or at least not to try to divert military assets to providing security for reconstruction.

 

[Jed]

What the military needs to do is increase their infrastructure engineering capacity that can be used immediately and in the future for Force Protection capability as as well as developmental and reconstruction capability as long as Canada sees the requirement. You can never have enough engineers to do all the jobs required. Too bad we had to cut the the capacity down in the cost cutting years when the CF needed to protect the core "Bayonets" in the lean years.

 

[McG]

No.  The solution to more deveopment is not more military (though it is not less military either).  The diplomats need to be more engaged.  Local construction capabilities need to be employed.  Local vocational training capacity needs to be established.  Local industry needs to be given life.

Using our own engineers would only be a small band-aid on a big sore.

 

[KevinB]

Huge +1 to MCG -- the old adage of you give a man a fish...

The Military is there to push the Taliban out.  Once the military forces have done that -- your best served with other entities both GO and NGO coming in to help the people help themselves.

 

[Jed]

To MCG:

Yes I agree with you that the miltary should not take on the developmental engineering work on behalf of Canada. In my opinion, however, we could take on a greater leadership role, especially as we trasnsition from the obvious "Security emphasis" stage to one of ongoing sustainable development. It is very difficult to ask the traditional organizations from Canada, such as CIDA and various large NGOs, to come in and work on large, long term sustainable infrstructure projects.

Allow me a small sidebar to illustrate my point: From several years many people in the instatutional Canadian military have been saying " the Tank is dead, we can not afford it, drop the subject. WE CAN NOT AFFORD IT. Well look were we are now at this minute. We have tanks all for very good and necessary reasons: We need it for a completely capable military to do the job asked of us by Canada, money will just have to be found to cover the cost.

In my opinion, the Canadian government and the military are in a similar position wrt needing construction engineering capability. At the same time as the military reduced their capacity drastically in the CE sections and in the greater ADM IE civilian departments, all levels of government federal, provincial and municipal, did the same thing. Hence why engineers and tradesmen are in high demand no matter where you go and can pretty much write their own ticket. The same thing has happened with the Health Care system with the complete lack of nurses and other key medical staff, by the way.

I do not advocate decreasing "Bayonet Capacity" in the military to enable increasing infrastructure construction capacity; what I am saying is that as Canadians, we should think bigger picture and increase our construction capability in the military AND the Federal government. I also think that as Canadians we should undertake any increases in capability jointly between the Military and the Federal government departments that are currently in this line of business to garner economy of effort. My observation was that if today we had the old ADM IE organization of old, the DPW department of old, the CE sections of old, the Construction branch of PFRA that build the Gardiner Dam, etc. undertaking the leadership of "Development" in Afganistan would have been a much more simpler and smoother process.

 

[KevinB]

I'd like to offer my rationale as to why I beleive that NGO's are better settup for this sytle of reconstruction.
  *keep in mind I am a security contractor doing PSD - so I will admit a biase to my method as it ensure me work
I've been in Afghanistan as both a CF member and a Contractor, and now work in Iraq.
  A large amount of the NGO personnel have been in position for years -- they get to know the community and can much better liease with it due to the familiarity, and the fact that they are not really involved in the conflict.  Due to the nature of the military units and personnel rotate in and rotate out.  Secondly the military has force protection measures that hamper community involvement -- an NGO that lives in the community -- employes local nationals as both local guard force for their worksite/living area - as skilled office workers, and developers is truly more involved in setting up a sustainable community than the CF ever could.

The CF is there for its roll.  Its is a VASTLY important one -- since without the military forces removing the Anti-Gov't elements the NGO's would nto be able to do their job, and in most cases to move effectively the NGO's must still hire professional security forces for their individuals.

In both Afghanistan and Iraq there are plenty of bright and ambitious people, who need varying degrees of support and guidance in order to become a flourishly and self sustaining entity.  Going in and building a school is nice, but assisting the locals in the design, and offering instruction so they can build it themselves gives them a sence of ownership and pride (very important in a tribal society) and secondly training teachers etc is a requirement -- as a school without an education system - is an empty building awaiting vandalism from a frustrated populace.

 

[Jed]

I fully understand and agree with your point of view as stated, Infidel-6.

As Canada champions Security, Development and good Governance within Afghanistan, and brings various resources to bear in these areas; we want to maintain the momentum on all three avenues of approach. I feel that the development efforts are lagging behind and need to be reinforced by the Canada and for that matter the other NATO ISAF partners.

I personally do not have confidence in the existing Canadian Government departments or in any of the major NGO players to take an overview and somehow get all the various players moving on the Development approach.

My wish is that the Canadian people would ask the Canadian politicans to logically and effectively push the Development in Afghanistan.  (Without hindering the efforts or restricting resources needed to provide security.)

 

[KevinB]

Jed -- I agree with you on the bit about 

I personally do not have confidence in the existing Canadian Government departments or in any of the major NGO players to take an overview and somehow get all the various players moving on the Development approach.

I'm not a big fan of DFAIT - as I dont think its a system that is setup well to support Gov't or NGO operations.

  That said I have much more experience with the American side of things. 
I do beleive that the Canadian Forces could teach a LOT of entities about financial control and inventory control methods...

I think a medium needs to be found where the PRT (both Military and Civilian sides) can work with NGO's to expand the "ink blot" concept that was the founding reason of the PRT's.  I also believe that DFAIT needs to loosen the purse strings - and provide dedicated $ for security of Cdn NGO's who are willing to work in the Kandahar area.  Ideal this could be run thru a Cdn PSD company (keep the money in Canada - and tax the companies earnings).  However in my own experience I have not had impressive dealings with Cdn NGO's either -- as the colour of the sky in their world was definitely not blue...  Which leads to frustration in dealign with them from a gov't side of things.
  I beleive that the CF side of the PRT has been forced to do more and more of the roles intially envisioned for DFAIT and NGO's (and as are done both other countries Department of State/Foriegn Office and NGO's)

 

 

[sandyson]

The Ruxted group has made a strong presentation.  Certainly the progress of Canadian assistance to development is wanting, and therefore CIDA capability is questionable.  However the comment that Canada's military role is to push the Taliban out of Afghanistan is not acceptable.  I think the role is to help the Afghan PEOPLE push the Taliban out of their country--and us soon after.  Therein lies the reason for development of not just the Afghan Army but the people as a whole.

I extend from the Ruxted's argument that the role of NATO in Afghanistan might be to find an art of war that can defeat the guerrilla form of warfare. I suspect that a successful strategy is some mix of "secure development". That development must be in terms of the host society, not some imposed definition by the developed helpers. The notion of tolerating the poppy agriculture is consistent with the tolerance preached by Machiavelli and practiced by Alexander.  Nevertheless, I suspect that the development budget in a winning art is at least equal to the military one. Perhaps there is a bias in the media reports I see, but I do not perceive a directing hand by NATO as a command or form of allied government.  The collective of NATO must resolve to defeat this form of aggression using Afghanistan as the first theater of operations.  The commander of a winning strategy must not only be military, but must also direct civil resources albeit in the context of the host nation.  This will truly be political warfare.  Therein lies the key dimension: but how it merges to support a democratic regime I do not see.  They seem contradictory.

 

[CF_Enthusiast]

Ms. MacDonald affirms that the Canadian Forces are doing good and essential work in Kandahar – work which cannot be subject to simple-minded “out now’ or, more stupidly, “out in Feb 09” slogans such as those offered by irresponsible opposition  parties.