'Taliban surrounded' outside Kandahar

[Dog Walker]

Update

http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20071102/arghandab_blast_071102/20071102?hub=TopStories

Canadian soldier recovering after Afghan blast
Updated Fri. Nov. 2 2007 4:05 PM ET
CTV.ca News Staff
A Canadian soldier was wounded in southern Afghanistan on Friday when a Leopard tank hit an improvised explosive device in the Arghandab district, where Afghan and coalition troops have been waging in a fierce battle with the Taliban.
The soldier, who has not been named, has been airlifted to a Kandahar military hospital with a leg injury, the Canadian military said Friday. He is said to be in fair condition.
He was able to talk to his family in Canada and is expected to return to active duty after treatment, CTV's South Asia Bureau Chief Paul Workman reported.
The Arghandab area had been the scene of heavy fighting between the Taliban and coalition and Afghan troops.
On Thursday, Canadian and Afghan troops in the main southern city of Kandahar said they had halted a Taliban offensive close to the city.
The insurgents were forced to retreat and pull out of Arghandab, Maj. Eric Landry told reporters.
However, a strong contingent of troops remains in the area.
Afghan officials said 50 Taliban fighters had been killed in the clashes and described the Taliban withdrawal as a major government victory.
Mullah Naqib, a pro-Canadian veteran of the 1980s resistance to the Soviet occupation, had been in charge of the area but died several weeks ago.
The clashes between the Afghan and coalition troops took place about 26 kilometres from the city, making it the closest the Taliban had been to Kandahar since 2001.
Thousands of local residents fled south to Kandahar when heavy fighting began on Monday. Those families are expected to start returning in coming days.
Mullah Naqib, a pro-Canadian veteran of the 1980s resistance to the Soviet occupation, had been in charge of the area but died several weeks ago.
Meanwhile Mullah Mansour Dadullah, the Taliban's military commander in southern Afghanistan, promised to keep up the fight.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

You can find the area using

http://www.flashearth.com/

Select the layer in the upper left corner marked: Microsoft VE (labels)
You will see the town to the NW of Kandahar

 

[JAWS228]

To all our soldiers in Kandahar: kick some butt and take some names!!
and most of all stay safe. 

Meanwhile Mullah Mansour Dadullah, the Taliban's military commander in southern Afghanistan, promised to keep up the fight.

In that case, better scratch some 50 or so more fighters off of your list buddy.


Hopefully none of our soldiers will get injured this time though.
Bonne Chance to all of them!

 

[Journeyman]

I would disagree with Piper with regards to the Taliban fighting capabilities....

Add my name to that list.

Regardless, in this rare type of head-to-head combat (in Kandahar this season, not so much in Helmand) only reinforces the faulty mindset of those stuck in the Ft Frontenac simulator....you know, where if only we had Leopards with bigger guns, the troops would be home by Christmas. Check the logic of that with the 12eRBC kid in the Role 3 hospital with the broken leg/hip.

Being better at all-arms, conventional warfighting will likely prove completely irrelevant. The centre of gravity isn't in Arghandab.

To quote from Thomas Barnett's blog "Underdogs Play 'Dirty' ".....

....reminds me of the apocryphal conversation years after the Vietnam War where the U.S. officer brags to his Vietnamese counterpart that America never lost a battle in Vietnam and the Vietnamese equivalent agrees, noting that that fact was completely irrelevant to the war's outcome.

 

[Kirkhill]

This may seem bizarre but the most hopeful signs I have detected out of the Middle East recently is the lack of signs.  By that I mean that there doesn't seem to be much news on Iraq, or Afghanistan at all.  Presumably "no news is good news".  Does this exercise make Mullah Omar more relevant?  Or does it just make his supporters think he is still relevant?

If Omar, Osama and Al Zawahiri aren't getting air time can they win the only game that counts - the one that the Vietnamese won?

 

[PPCLI Guy]

Being better at all-arms, conventional warfighting will likely prove completely irrelevant. The centre of gravity isn't in Arghandab. ...

Amen brother.  Anti-insurgent and countering the insurgent are NOT the same thing. 

Sigh - we are never going to get it, are we?

 

[Infanteer]

You can fight a guy with a gun, not some much IEDs.
I'd rather be shot at than worry about the spineless IED attacks.

Is calling in an airstrike spineless as well?  I'm having trouble seeing the difference between a bomb dropped from 10,000 feet and one triggered from below.

Is it really a "gun to gun" fight when he brings 4 mags in his AK rig and maybe a larger piece left behind by the Soviets and we have LAV III's, M777's, and coalition airpower and support (especially starlight).

Let's not fool ourselves on the capabilities that either we or our foe bring to the table.

Add my name to that list.

Amen brother.  Anti-insurgent and countering the insurgent are NOT the same thing. 

Sigh - we are never going to get it, are we?

+1 to these comments - chasing a body count means nothing as the madrassas of Pakistan can easily replace the losses - we must ask ourselves; are we closer or farther from achieving our overall goal after this?  I read to today that Afghan officials are stating that the Taliban forces escaped the cordon, but the the performance of the ANA seems to be promising.

 

[pbi]

Comment from a REMF sitting behind the levers at the "Fort Frontenac simulator". I have to admit to sharing some uneasiness about the "apparent" emphasis on body counts and kicking *** in conventional fights, if we are actually engaged in a COIN operation. I parenthesize  "apparent" because if you look at the Army as a whole, there are definitely some very mixed messages.

On the one hand, we are all justifiably proud of the outstanding performance of our troops in combat: no questions asked about that, nor should there be. We don't stand in anybody's shadow. I hear and read comments, reports and analysis (primarily from officers at various rank levels, little or nothing from NCOs and troops) that we have validated many good old lessons such as the value of the combined arms team, the integration of CAS and other fires with manoeuvre, and the importance of a good capable echelon system. All good, especially if we remember that Afghanistan is just one war: there will be others against enemies yet to be identified in places unknown, and these basic skill sets may be even more useful. Roger so far. But are we focusing too much on the "kinetic?", out of a renewed sense of pride in ourselves as reborn warriors? Are we lured by body counts that brief well but mean little in COIN? A question, definitely NOT a judgement. And, anyway, if the enemy threatens to surround K-har or take some other key point, it's clear that he is presenting himself for a whacking and that Canadians will do so.

On the other hand, I regularly hear and read just as many officers saying good and intelligent things about COIN, about the "long fight" and about military force being just one tool in the box and not necessarily the most important tool. I hear about the successes of the PRT, about the SAT, the OMLT, and the slowly growing "whole of government" approach. ("Slowly growing", I said...) Here at Kingston we have introduced COIN into the curriculum (a bit late to need, I'll agree...) and we will be increasing that emphasis, I'm pretty sure. We try very hard to instill these good and intelligent things, to an audience that is about 60% Afghan veterans who can easily wave the BS flag (and they do...) All of the exercises and problems now consider the "complex operating environment" and several have a clear COIN flavour, etc. It takes a while to change an institution, especially when we can't just train officers for "the war": we have to impart the skills for "a war" since we don't have a crystal ball about what's next. So, does this mean that in fact as an Army we do "get it?", and there are just a few individuals who don't? I'm not sure about this either, but I'm more positive about this one than I am the first question.


I think we have two good things going for us in our corporate experience. First, we were once an army that focused on COIN. When I joined as a Militia soldier in 1974, the Regular Army based in Canada (NOT 4 CMBG...) was configured as a light, airportable force to fight what in those days we were calling "brushfire wars". There was heavy emphasis on patrolling, ambushing, etc. The SSF (remember that?...)was conceived as a force for this type of fighting (indeed its first major exercise, GEORGIAN STRIKE, was a COIN-type scenario). We have the ability to configure and train to fight like that, if that is what we need to do. We did it once.

Second, as much as I shudder at some of the wider damage done by the peacekeeping experience, it did teach us as an Army that things can take a long time to achieve, and that by getting down to ground level and dealing with people, eyeball to eyeball, we can make local progress. Unfortunately those ops we participated in were generally characterized by an utter lack of any higher concept of operations approximating a "campaign plan": we sometimes pushed things too hard looking for quick results instead of realizing that there may be certain underlying similarities between COIN and PSO, if you want to achieve significant and lasting results.

I think we can adapt to COIN ops, and adapt very well, and I think that we actually are, but in an uneven way. It takes only one CO of a BG to decide that he will make a big splash during his six months, instead of taking the gradual approach, to wreck a carefully developed COIN campaign. My impression is that we don't have too many of those kind of people, anecdotal evidence aside. I hope not.

Cheers

 

[Jarnhamar]

Is calling in an airstrike spineless as well?  I'm having trouble seeing the difference between a bomb dropped from 10,000 feet and one triggered from below.

Well said.

There isn't much of a difference IMO.

 

[Jed]

I appreciate your comments pbi. I hope the instatutional Army can continue with the appropriate courses of action.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

I look for word that Taliban leaders and commander are killed or captured, cannon fodder they can replace (to a point) But good leaders are hard to find. Most of the guys who fought the Soviets are to old for extended combat in the field.

Also was important in my mind is how quick word got out about their actions and that ANA forces were able to respond as well as NATO forces. the Taliban were not able to exploit the death of a leader, they have been quickly pushed out and now have to move quickly to avoid being surrounded again. Not a fun place to be as an insurgent, they will need to go to ground soon as the weather will turn and life in the hills will be no fun.

As Mao said a guerrilla is a fish in the sea, if the people stop helping the Taliban and continue to increase reporting their movements, the swamp gets shallow pretty quickly.

 

[geo]

From what I have been able to find in the press (yeah I know ) the TB depend extensively on cellular communication to pass on intellignece & orders throughout their cells. 

With NATOs EW experience and the Echelon global eavesdropping network, Virtually no satellite-bounced communication - e-mail, phone or fax - is immune to the US-run Echelon global spying network.  It's only handicap is that the extremely high volume of traffic makes exhaustive, detailed monitoring of all communications impossible in practice.  The globe-girding Echelon system involving the US, Canada, Britain, Australia and New Zealand -- a quasi alliance dating to World War II -- sucks up airborne data "much like a vacuum cleaner," then it uses search engines that filter for key words relevant to intelligence services.

It is possible to monitor the communications from the TB & AQ leaders in Pakistan to their soldiers in the field.  If we know what they are doing, we can nail down their operations... lonewolf kamikaze bombers on the other hand have no need for phones - and we will never get a complete handle on the problem.

 

[Kirkhill]

It is possible to monitor the communications from the TB & AQ leaders in Pakistan to their soldiers in the field.  If we know what they are doing, we can nail down their operations... lonewolf kamikaze bombers on the other hand have no need for phones - and we will never get a complete handle on the problem.

Patrick Bishop, Daily Telegraph, 12/03/2004

Addressing the Commons in 1932, Baldwin made an astonishingly frank admission. "I think it is as well for the man in the street to realise that there is no power on earth that can protect him from being bombed," he said. "Whatever people may tell him, the bomber will always get through." That observation, as yesterday's attacks in Madrid demonstrate, is equally valid today. Even with every nerve and sinew of the state strained to counter the threat, the bombers still got through.

Although widely applied to the notion of aerial bombing I believe that the line "the bomber will always get through" was intended to be more widely interpreted than the Airpower crew would have it.  It certainly seemed to be amongst Brit Army types of that era judging from conversations.  There was considered no defense against the man in the crowd with the bomb under his coat a la Gavril Princip in 1914 (3 bombs and a gun) or, more convincingly the assassination of Alexander II of Russia in 1881.  The latter event in particular shook up the establishment - everyone from Liberal reformers to the Pope.

As Infanteer has stated there isn't much difference in the how the bomb is delivered, what the platform, the effect is the same.

It is an ongoing threat as Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair can both attest - and I would argue there is not much difference between a bomb and snub-nosed revolver in the hands of someone like Princip or Sirhan Sirhan who killed Robert Kennedy or Mehmet Ali Acga who tried to assassinate Pope John Paul II.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

One day we will be able to detect the bomber and teleport them into space before they blow up!  >

Back on Earth, I am sure the Taliban know their signals are tapped, and they send as much misinformation as they can on those means, using coded benign words to indicate real intentions. For really important stuff they have to use personal messangers. Slow but effective.

Once the Afghans can take over more of the burden and build an effective counter-terrorism unit and begin to infiltrate the various groups they can sow mistrust and suspicion amongst the enemy. an effective tactic that did a huge amount of damage to the CT's in Malaysia who executed many of their own people on false charges.

Once we begin to disrupt their communications and keep them off balance it makes it very difficult for them to maintain good operational security, also by killing off large numbers of BG including low and middle rank commander, it opens up the possibility of inserting/recruiting double agents into the operations. Actually this is what caused the CT's in Malaysia to fail, their top commander for many years was a double agent working for the Brits, amazing the damage it caused them.

 

[vonGarvin]

Being better at all-arms, conventional warfighting will likely prove completely irrelevant. The centre of gravity isn't in Arghandab.

I would disagree with the first point, but I will clarify.  As for the second point, I whole heartedly agree, and I will clarify my points on that as well.

I believe that being better at all-arms, conventional warfighting will likely prove completely relevant.  It is a necessary condition, but by no means is it sufficient.  When the "gauntlet is thrown down" by the Taliban, it is an absolute necessity that we defeat them in detail with as few losses as possible.  Imagine if you will if they won even just 10% of the battles against us?

In clarifying my second point, I'll expand on my first.  The centre of gravity, the Schwerpunkt, is not in one physical place as it would be in a conventional fight.  I would argue that given that this is a COIN op, then our CoG would be establishing certain conditions in the Afghan populace (for one), in the potential opponents for another, and in the citizens of Canada as well.  Part of those conditions would be how both the populace,  potential opponents and Canadians view us (eg: the CF) in terms of success.  Body counts add up to nothing and do nothing for COIN.  Perhaps we are collectively guilty of focussing on that, but so too are the press.  But we DO have to be better at all-arms, conventional warfighting, lest we lose the confidence of Afghans and Canadians, as well as to bolster our opponents, whoever they may be.  Arghandab, Khandahar City or any other piece of ground is, I would argue, irrelevant in terms of "vital ground" "key terrain" or what have you from the old Staff College models in conventional warfighting.  They ARE relevant in terms of the "vital ground" of the Aghans (without whose support we cannot win), and the "key terrain" (key audience?) of Canadians.  (Or, they too may be vital ground, vital persons, or whatever).  

Now, re-reading this post has me a bit confused, but I hesitate to change anything.  COIN is, by its very nature, confusing, so maybe my post is on the mark in terms of complexity?  That or its Monday....

 

[TheHead]

Infanteer and Kiwi very well said. 

Infanteer there is no difference at all between the two in my opinion and I've been almost blown up by both.  The Taliban have just adapted and are fighting with what they have.  If you call someone who plants IEDs cowards than call the Artillery, someone who calls in Airstrikes, hell call me a LAV gunner a coward.  We all have capabilities that allow us to kill without being seen (Ask Kiwi about that one )

I'll also agree with KIWI how seldom lessons learned are ever learned.  When we were replaced by 1RCR no one listened to any of us, we were told they would get the job done much better than us and more efficiently. We had NO AAR at my level and most of the troops at my level never even asked us questions or would brush us off when we tried to give advice.  This can go back to even the smallest things like the Tac Vest, we were stern supporters of our own chest rigs, we had proven the Tac Vest inferior to purchased chest rigs in Combat and the 1RCR CO would have NOTHING to do with it.  Even when I was home back in Canada I had friends telling me from 1RCR they still were not allowed to wear the chest rigs. Something small... yes........  but if something like this won't be taking into consideration who knows what else wont. 

 

[zipperhead_cop]

Okay, so now that we have solved modern warfare issues for the next decade, any updates on the actual battle that was going on? 

 

[Infanteer]

Okay, so now that we have solved modern warfare issues for the next decade, any updates on the actual battle that was going on?   

Well, the Taliban took off and - as usual, seemed to do a world-class job of policing the battlefield - and the reason for this attack is being debated; take advantage of the dead anti-Taliban dude, steal a weapons cache, disrupt operations in Panjwaii, etc, etc.  So, we've got a few dead guys from Pakistani madrassas and a insurgent force that is still able to launch offensives in the region.  Sounds like last year.

As I said earlier, the performance of the ANSF (ANA, ANP, etc) seemed promising; it appears (and I could be wrong) that we didn't need to hold their hand like this time last year.  That, IMHO, is a real victory.

 

[geo]

+1 Infanteer

 

[daftandbarmy]

This may sound, well, odd... and I don't mean to pick at wounds, but I'm glad to see the TB are trying the "head on" game again.  You can fight a guy with a gun, not some much IEDs.
I'd rather be shot at than worry about the spineless IED attacks.

Besides, we've learned that in a head to head battle, they don't stand a ice cubes chance in hell.  But they're so greased up on goofers that they don't care.
Let's hope they don't wise up, then we can keep handing them their asses on a white and yellow Toyota taxi all across Kandahar.

Our troops are giving it to them with both hands... Keep up the good work.

You are 100% right there Piper.

Nothing sucks more than bunches of 15-20 being killed all at once by 1000 pound RCIEDs with no chance of retaliating in a conventional way, as we saw in Northern Ireland too frequently.

If we do the right thing, and adopt a 'long war' approach, after we drive them out of the field and conventional combat, this may well become a more prevalent, unpleasant reality of future phases of the conflict. And that's going to take alot more discipline to handle well than the slugging matches at the meat grinder we are seeing now.