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Haligonian said:
Sounds like a Cbt Tm to me.
The CCV and the Infantry
- Thread starter Kirkhill
- Start date
Sounds like a Cbt Tm to me.
Haligonian
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Tango18A said:
Well that is just it. This confusion could quite possibly be due to my ignorance. I guess another question would be, do traditional Armoured Cavalry units, such as the American 11th ACR, contain infantry or armoured troopers acting in an infantry role or dragoons to clear tranches, etc? My understanding is that the Bradley used by US Cavalry units are Cavalry variants that carry far fewer troops. Thereby making them a cavalry fighting vehicle vice an infantry fighting vehicle.
TangoTwoBravo
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A traditional "Cavalry" unit in modern US parlance is essentially manned by Armor. The scouts in the M3 Bradleys are not infantrymen. They provide an integral dismounted reconnaissance capability to the scout platoons in the cavalry troops.
A Cavalry unit can execute security missions that do involve more fighting than a pure reconnaissance unit. You would leave decisive fighting, especially holding or assaulting terrain to tank/infantry units.
A Cavalry unit can execute security missions that do involve more fighting than a pure reconnaissance unit. You would leave decisive fighting, especially holding or assaulting terrain to tank/infantry units.
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I am somewhat of a fan of Richard Simpkin, and his works suggest that airmobile formations like US Air Cavalry or Soviet era Air Assault Regiments would serve the functions of Cavalry due to their superior speed over ground formations.
CCV's serve a specialized function in accompanying tanks, and are thus part of the combined arms team (some sort of SP gun and tracked engineer vehicles wold be needed to fill out the team).
CCV's serve a specialized function in accompanying tanks, and are thus part of the combined arms team (some sort of SP gun and tracked engineer vehicles wold be needed to fill out the team).
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“close with and destroy”
Without qualification. Unlimited.
Unlimited by time of day. Unlimited by season. Unlimited by terrain.
CFP 165 Conduct of Land Operations 1976 as issued in 1983
Chapter 2, Section 4 – Infantry,
Dismounted Infantry, motorized, mechanized, airborne and air-transported.
Pistols, grenades, rifles, machine-guns, mortars and anti-tank weapons (to which should probably be added hands – if not knives and bayonets).
Section, Platoon, Company, Battalion operations – not to mention Combat Team, Battle Group and Brigade Group.
Administrative movements, retrograde movements, defensive operations, attack, pursuit, reconnaissance, raiding.
Airborne, airmobile, riverine, amphibious operations.
Mountain, jungle, bush, desert, arctic warfare (and let’s not forget urban)
Internal security, counter-guerilla (Co-In), peace-keeping, high intensity warfare.
And if that list isn’t enough to keep the average Battalion commander engaged in preparing a training plan there is the constant change in personnel and the need for individual training and advancement.
To that list is added the need to maintain, operate and fight a fleet of vehicles – sometimes wheels, sometimes tracks, sometimes turrets, sometimes boats.
The Canadian Army’s infantry branch seems to have an awful lot expected of it. Especially when the operational decision matrix can mix and match any and all of the above in a multitude of combinations:
Airmobile, riverine, internal security operations in an arctic desert city for example – dispersed sections with riot sticks.....
“close and destroy” ......
Apparently that is also the role of the Royal Australian Armoured Corps and, as McG notes, used to be the role of the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps.
As Technoviking points out, and as I noted at the beginning, there are no qualifiers to that statement when it comes to the infantry. The application is therefore unlimited. The role of the infantry is to close with and destroy the Queen’s enemies: regardless of time of day; regardless of season or weather; regardless of terrain. And by inference, from an old and not nearly well enough thumbed copy of CLO, regardless of vehicle and regardless of weapon.
My inference from CFP 165 is that all can be ignored or abandoned if it furthers the effort to destroy the enemy. If the infanteer’s vehicle, if the infanteer’s rifle, hinders his ability to “close with and destroy” the enemy then the infanteer is expected to discard them and take on the competition in “hand to hand combat”.
That is an extraordinary undertaking.
Nobody expects that of the Gunners of the Ordnance. Their weapons are considered too valuable in terms of crown treasure to just discard them. They are too valuable in their effect to leave them unemployed. They are too dangerous to be allowed to fall into the hands of the enemy. Consequently the Gunners job is to serve the guns to get full benefit out of Her Majesty’s investment and keep them from the enemy at all costs.
Under no circumstances could a gunner contemplate abandoning his gun. Conversely the infanteer is expected to abandon everything, including his “gun”, if it will permit him to close with the enemy. (And before anyone thinks that is too extreme perhaps GAP could fill them in on Tunnel Rats).
I would argue that the modern fighting vehicle is at least a valuable war machine as the gunner’s gun and therefore the vehicle’s crew is similarly charged to keep their vehicle “safe” at all costs. Nobody expects the crew of a Leo, when the enemy runs out of the range of their guns, to leave the vehicle and go haring after the bad guys on foot.
When the infantry is tasked with operating with fighting vehicles of that class it finds itself having to decide whether to pursue the enemy “a l’outrance” as the French would have it or, call it a day and decide to look after Her Majesty’s investment.
TAPV-APC-IFV-MICV-Lt Tank-Med Tank-Hvy Tank-SPATG-SPH-SPRL(ATGM, AA, LRPRS) on wheels or tracks. We all know the differences until we try to determine where one vehicle type stops and the other starts.
It is easily agreed that they are all surface bound vehicles.
Perhaps it is not so easily agreed that the only difference amongst them beyond that is the nature of the projectiles carried and therefore their target sets.
Prior to World War One Admiral Fischer described the British Army as a “projectile launched by the Royal Navy”.
Equally if is possible to see the infanteer as a projectile to be launched: a smart projectile, possibly even a brilliant projectile and one that engages with other infanteers in co-ordinated swarming attacks, but still a projectile. How he is transported to the “place of slaughter” (as the bard of the Battle of Brunanburh would have it) is immaterial.
When an infanteer is locked up in the back of a vehicle he is a wasted resource. Just like a round of 5.56mm ball in inventory. And just like a poorly stored round his effectiveness declines with the time spent in inventory – when released from inventory it is harder to predict if the round will act as intended, misfire or cook-off. Consequently it makes sense to keep the minimum inventory on hand and keep the majority of your stock in a controlled environment. An infanteer not in the back of a vehicle can be resting, eating, training or conducting another operation somewhere else. It doesn’t make sense to me to have the very small number of infanteers at Canada’s disposal tied up riding around in the back of the truck. Infanteers and trucks should be married on an operational basis as close to the point of use as possible. Economy of Effort and Concentration of Forces would demand it.
Her Majesty’s current Canadian Government has engaged in a military policy that I believe can be paraphrased thusly:
1. We will ensure we have the resources to secure our home;
2. We will engage with the rest of the world to the best of our ability.
At home, in Canada, we have few existing external threats, limited prospects of such threats and a geographical location that limits the risk of a mass invasion. We have the treasure to buy the technology to disrupt any large scale invasion force at sea or in the air before it arrives. (Not to mention a really big buddy who shares our desire to limit access to our treasures).
Internationally we engage when and as we choose. We don’t have to engage everywhere.
We are a treasure rich, manpower poor society. Most places that need or want our assistance are manpower rich and treasure poor. They need what our treasure can buy. They need the technology that we can afford but they can’t. They need our ISTAR systems, our communications, our vehicles, our guns. Equally they need our expertise – our expertise as operators, planners and trainers.
Infantry is a manpower rich capability. We will always be short of infantry.
Cavalry on the other hand (Armour, Rangers, MI, Lt Horse, Dragoons, what-have-you – only in Canada apparently is it impossible to conflate the historic roles of Cavalry with the modern Armoured Branch or Corps – all the rest of our ABCA cousins seem to have no difficulty with it), Cavalry on the other hand leverages the available manpower to a greater extent than infantry.
In the hands of the PPCLI 4 LAVs or CCVs will be transport for 40 infanteers. The infanteers must be expected to abandon their vehicles when the terrain becomes unfavourable to continue their pursuit, or even just when they are training to continue the pursuit.
In the hands of the LdSH those same vehicles will be considered an effective force with as few as 12 troopers. Similar forces are fielded successfully by the LdSH now (Coyote), Australian 2nd Cavalry Regiment (ASLAV), USMC Lt Armoured Recce Battalions (LAV25) and find gainful employment. The LdSH Troopers, like Gunners, will have one job in life: To serve Her Majesty’s investment; to train on it, to supply it, to maintain it, to fight it to the utmost of its capabilities and, above all, to defend it.
When fielded, when deployed, they, like the infantry would be required to “close and destroy”. But unlike the infantry they would be expected to exploit forward only as far as their vehicles can take them. The enemy may escape their pursuit but that is not their problem. It then becomes an infantry problem.
In foreign interventions, in Cabinet wars of choice, this is not an issue. Canada’s Cavalry would have done what it could to the best of its ability. From that point on the problem would devolve to the Host or Allied nation forces. In those types of war, no matter what Canada does it will never be able to solve the problem on its own. This is the situation the RCAF finds itself in while in Libya.
Given Canada’s resources, to make the greatest impact in the world stage, I would be inclined to transfer all LAVs (all 651) as well as all future CCVs in to the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps and join them to the tanks.
651 LAVs only require some 2000 troops to fight effectively and would field 6 Regiments equivalent to the ASLAV 2nd Cavalry. Joining 138 CCVs with 114 Leo 2s would create a force equivalent to a US Cavalry Regiment (or 3 RCAC Regiments). The manpower bill for that force would be on the order of 1500 in the 3 Regiments (including Line 1 and 2 support).
Sending expeditionary forces of this nature abroad would continue the precedent of Laurier where he despatched mounted forces to assist in the quieting of state (not so much a failed state as a potentially troublesome state). It would also continue the tradition of Sir John A. MacDonald’s Mounted Rifles (aka the RCMP) who were sent to quiet the wide open spaces of Canada’s southern North West.
Those types of mounted troops (previously known as rangers or dragoons) were invaluable because a mounted man could see farther, travel farther, travel faster, carry more supplies and carry more weapons – consequently could react effectively to a greater variety of situations – than a man on foot.
Canada’s very small infantry corps (or branch) is too valuable to tie down to the care and maintenance and service of the mechanized vehicles. There are too many tasks, in too many environments for which they are needed, both at home and abroad, to dissipate their numbers turning wrenches – and doing it poorly.
The infantry would be better served focusing on heliborne operations (suitable for all terrains and environments) and training for employment as platoon and combat team QRFs that would be equally valuable domestically and abroad when used in conjunction with the cavalry.
Equip them with heli-transportable light vehicles and boats for local operations with a maximum 72 hour operational limit. 72 hours and out – or at least located in a secure, defendable facility with good, secure lines of communication.
Not a rant – but a considered response to the firestorm of “schooling” that was being brought down on my head.
And Mike, my apologies for the bandwidth banditry.
Cheers.
Standing By......
Without qualification. Unlimited.
Unlimited by time of day. Unlimited by season. Unlimited by terrain.
CFP 165 Conduct of Land Operations 1976 as issued in 1983
Chapter 2, Section 4 – Infantry,
Dismounted Infantry, motorized, mechanized, airborne and air-transported.
Pistols, grenades, rifles, machine-guns, mortars and anti-tank weapons (to which should probably be added hands – if not knives and bayonets).
Section, Platoon, Company, Battalion operations – not to mention Combat Team, Battle Group and Brigade Group.
Administrative movements, retrograde movements, defensive operations, attack, pursuit, reconnaissance, raiding.
Airborne, airmobile, riverine, amphibious operations.
Mountain, jungle, bush, desert, arctic warfare (and let’s not forget urban)
Internal security, counter-guerilla (Co-In), peace-keeping, high intensity warfare.
And if that list isn’t enough to keep the average Battalion commander engaged in preparing a training plan there is the constant change in personnel and the need for individual training and advancement.
To that list is added the need to maintain, operate and fight a fleet of vehicles – sometimes wheels, sometimes tracks, sometimes turrets, sometimes boats.
The Canadian Army’s infantry branch seems to have an awful lot expected of it. Especially when the operational decision matrix can mix and match any and all of the above in a multitude of combinations:
Airmobile, riverine, internal security operations in an arctic desert city for example – dispersed sections with riot sticks.....
“close and destroy” ......
Apparently that is also the role of the Royal Australian Armoured Corps and, as McG notes, used to be the role of the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps.
As Technoviking points out, and as I noted at the beginning, there are no qualifiers to that statement when it comes to the infantry. The application is therefore unlimited. The role of the infantry is to close with and destroy the Queen’s enemies: regardless of time of day; regardless of season or weather; regardless of terrain. And by inference, from an old and not nearly well enough thumbed copy of CLO, regardless of vehicle and regardless of weapon.
My inference from CFP 165 is that all can be ignored or abandoned if it furthers the effort to destroy the enemy. If the infanteer’s vehicle, if the infanteer’s rifle, hinders his ability to “close with and destroy” the enemy then the infanteer is expected to discard them and take on the competition in “hand to hand combat”.
That is an extraordinary undertaking.
Nobody expects that of the Gunners of the Ordnance. Their weapons are considered too valuable in terms of crown treasure to just discard them. They are too valuable in their effect to leave them unemployed. They are too dangerous to be allowed to fall into the hands of the enemy. Consequently the Gunners job is to serve the guns to get full benefit out of Her Majesty’s investment and keep them from the enemy at all costs.
Under no circumstances could a gunner contemplate abandoning his gun. Conversely the infanteer is expected to abandon everything, including his “gun”, if it will permit him to close with the enemy. (And before anyone thinks that is too extreme perhaps GAP could fill them in on Tunnel Rats).
I would argue that the modern fighting vehicle is at least a valuable war machine as the gunner’s gun and therefore the vehicle’s crew is similarly charged to keep their vehicle “safe” at all costs. Nobody expects the crew of a Leo, when the enemy runs out of the range of their guns, to leave the vehicle and go haring after the bad guys on foot.
When the infantry is tasked with operating with fighting vehicles of that class it finds itself having to decide whether to pursue the enemy “a l’outrance” as the French would have it or, call it a day and decide to look after Her Majesty’s investment.
TAPV-APC-IFV-MICV-Lt Tank-Med Tank-Hvy Tank-SPATG-SPH-SPRL(ATGM, AA, LRPRS) on wheels or tracks. We all know the differences until we try to determine where one vehicle type stops and the other starts.
It is easily agreed that they are all surface bound vehicles.
Perhaps it is not so easily agreed that the only difference amongst them beyond that is the nature of the projectiles carried and therefore their target sets.
Prior to World War One Admiral Fischer described the British Army as a “projectile launched by the Royal Navy”.
Equally if is possible to see the infanteer as a projectile to be launched: a smart projectile, possibly even a brilliant projectile and one that engages with other infanteers in co-ordinated swarming attacks, but still a projectile. How he is transported to the “place of slaughter” (as the bard of the Battle of Brunanburh would have it) is immaterial.
When an infanteer is locked up in the back of a vehicle he is a wasted resource. Just like a round of 5.56mm ball in inventory. And just like a poorly stored round his effectiveness declines with the time spent in inventory – when released from inventory it is harder to predict if the round will act as intended, misfire or cook-off. Consequently it makes sense to keep the minimum inventory on hand and keep the majority of your stock in a controlled environment. An infanteer not in the back of a vehicle can be resting, eating, training or conducting another operation somewhere else. It doesn’t make sense to me to have the very small number of infanteers at Canada’s disposal tied up riding around in the back of the truck. Infanteers and trucks should be married on an operational basis as close to the point of use as possible. Economy of Effort and Concentration of Forces would demand it.
Her Majesty’s current Canadian Government has engaged in a military policy that I believe can be paraphrased thusly:
1. We will ensure we have the resources to secure our home;
2. We will engage with the rest of the world to the best of our ability.
At home, in Canada, we have few existing external threats, limited prospects of such threats and a geographical location that limits the risk of a mass invasion. We have the treasure to buy the technology to disrupt any large scale invasion force at sea or in the air before it arrives. (Not to mention a really big buddy who shares our desire to limit access to our treasures).
Internationally we engage when and as we choose. We don’t have to engage everywhere.
We are a treasure rich, manpower poor society. Most places that need or want our assistance are manpower rich and treasure poor. They need what our treasure can buy. They need the technology that we can afford but they can’t. They need our ISTAR systems, our communications, our vehicles, our guns. Equally they need our expertise – our expertise as operators, planners and trainers.
Infantry is a manpower rich capability. We will always be short of infantry.
Cavalry on the other hand (Armour, Rangers, MI, Lt Horse, Dragoons, what-have-you – only in Canada apparently is it impossible to conflate the historic roles of Cavalry with the modern Armoured Branch or Corps – all the rest of our ABCA cousins seem to have no difficulty with it), Cavalry on the other hand leverages the available manpower to a greater extent than infantry.
In the hands of the PPCLI 4 LAVs or CCVs will be transport for 40 infanteers. The infanteers must be expected to abandon their vehicles when the terrain becomes unfavourable to continue their pursuit, or even just when they are training to continue the pursuit.
In the hands of the LdSH those same vehicles will be considered an effective force with as few as 12 troopers. Similar forces are fielded successfully by the LdSH now (Coyote), Australian 2nd Cavalry Regiment (ASLAV), USMC Lt Armoured Recce Battalions (LAV25) and find gainful employment. The LdSH Troopers, like Gunners, will have one job in life: To serve Her Majesty’s investment; to train on it, to supply it, to maintain it, to fight it to the utmost of its capabilities and, above all, to defend it.
When fielded, when deployed, they, like the infantry would be required to “close and destroy”. But unlike the infantry they would be expected to exploit forward only as far as their vehicles can take them. The enemy may escape their pursuit but that is not their problem. It then becomes an infantry problem.
In foreign interventions, in Cabinet wars of choice, this is not an issue. Canada’s Cavalry would have done what it could to the best of its ability. From that point on the problem would devolve to the Host or Allied nation forces. In those types of war, no matter what Canada does it will never be able to solve the problem on its own. This is the situation the RCAF finds itself in while in Libya.
Given Canada’s resources, to make the greatest impact in the world stage, I would be inclined to transfer all LAVs (all 651) as well as all future CCVs in to the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps and join them to the tanks.
651 LAVs only require some 2000 troops to fight effectively and would field 6 Regiments equivalent to the ASLAV 2nd Cavalry. Joining 138 CCVs with 114 Leo 2s would create a force equivalent to a US Cavalry Regiment (or 3 RCAC Regiments). The manpower bill for that force would be on the order of 1500 in the 3 Regiments (including Line 1 and 2 support).
Sending expeditionary forces of this nature abroad would continue the precedent of Laurier where he despatched mounted forces to assist in the quieting of state (not so much a failed state as a potentially troublesome state). It would also continue the tradition of Sir John A. MacDonald’s Mounted Rifles (aka the RCMP) who were sent to quiet the wide open spaces of Canada’s southern North West.
Those types of mounted troops (previously known as rangers or dragoons) were invaluable because a mounted man could see farther, travel farther, travel faster, carry more supplies and carry more weapons – consequently could react effectively to a greater variety of situations – than a man on foot.
Canada’s very small infantry corps (or branch) is too valuable to tie down to the care and maintenance and service of the mechanized vehicles. There are too many tasks, in too many environments for which they are needed, both at home and abroad, to dissipate their numbers turning wrenches – and doing it poorly.
The infantry would be better served focusing on heliborne operations (suitable for all terrains and environments) and training for employment as platoon and combat team QRFs that would be equally valuable domestically and abroad when used in conjunction with the cavalry.
Equip them with heli-transportable light vehicles and boats for local operations with a maximum 72 hour operational limit. 72 hours and out – or at least located in a secure, defendable facility with good, secure lines of communication.
Not a rant – but a considered response to the firestorm of “schooling” that was being brought down on my head.
And Mike, my apologies for the bandwidth banditry.
Cheers.
Standing By......
- Reaction score
- 1
- Points
- 430
Not sure where you were going with that so I will just hit the two points that stood out the most for me.
I don't see the comparison of an IFV to a gun.
IFVs/BG= approx 60 IFVs, they fire a 25-40mm bullet to a max range approx. 3000m line of sight and with very little HE capability.
Guns/BG= 6 guns, firing a 155mm bullet, to a max range of 30km non line sight, with a lot of HE, precision munitions and a few other munitions.
There is no comparison. I am not saying this just because I am a Gunner, but there are many reasons guns are HVTs and IFVs are not.
Are you suggesting the Infantry walk everywhere or will every attack involve an air assault? Limiting to air assault would be one dimensional and if the enemy has any air defence capability, even HMGs, the attack could not happen.
I can see reasoning behind having Armd turret cmds and gnrs operating Inf CCV turret, but the Inf Sgt in the back is still overall IC and dismounts with his section. I doubt it will ever happen, but one could make an argument for it.
As well, you forgot, the Arty will need some of those CCVs also.
Last point for some common ground. I am fully aware and fully agree that our Armd Corps turret gunners are top notch and the other Cbt arms units can't compare to their gunnery skills. For the record, I would welcome and Armd Gnr in my turret anytime.
Kirkhill said:
I don't see the comparison of an IFV to a gun.
IFVs/BG= approx 60 IFVs, they fire a 25-40mm bullet to a max range approx. 3000m line of sight and with very little HE capability.
Guns/BG= 6 guns, firing a 155mm bullet, to a max range of 30km non line sight, with a lot of HE, precision munitions and a few other munitions.
There is no comparison. I am not saying this just because I am a Gunner, but there are many reasons guns are HVTs and IFVs are not.
Are you suggesting the Infantry walk everywhere or will every attack involve an air assault? Limiting to air assault would be one dimensional and if the enemy has any air defence capability, even HMGs, the attack could not happen.
I can see reasoning behind having Armd turret cmds and gnrs operating Inf CCV turret, but the Inf Sgt in the back is still overall IC and dismounts with his section. I doubt it will ever happen, but one could make an argument for it.
As well, you forgot, the Arty will need some of those CCVs also.
Last point for some common ground. I am fully aware and fully agree that our Armd Corps turret gunners are top notch and the other Cbt arms units can't compare to their gunnery skills. For the record, I would welcome and Armd Gnr in my turret anytime.
- Reaction score
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Short form:
Can't do everything. Shouldn't try.
Manpower is scarce.
Give available manpower all the tools you can afford.
On foreign service - send what you can. My suggestion send an ASLAV type Cavalry Regiment where and when you can as most diplomatic "bang" for the manpower "buck"
Don't send a manpower heavy Infantry Battalion. Add infantry QRFs to the Cavalry force as and when necessary.
Domestically - most places the Army is needed are places the police aren't. Generally speaking, if there are roads there are police. The Army needs to be able to go where the police can't.
If there are roads then troops can find local National Defence transport available to assist them. That could be MLVWs, TAPVs or even LAVs and CCVs. - Driven by the owners.
Can't do everything. Shouldn't try.
Manpower is scarce.
Give available manpower all the tools you can afford.
On foreign service - send what you can. My suggestion send an ASLAV type Cavalry Regiment where and when you can as most diplomatic "bang" for the manpower "buck"
Don't send a manpower heavy Infantry Battalion. Add infantry QRFs to the Cavalry force as and when necessary.
Domestically - most places the Army is needed are places the police aren't. Generally speaking, if there are roads there are police. The Army needs to be able to go where the police can't.
If there are roads then troops can find local National Defence transport available to assist them. That could be MLVWs, TAPVs or even LAVs and CCVs. - Driven by the owners.
- Reaction score
- 11,841
- Points
- 1,260
Kirkhill said:
Yeesh, ya gotta tighten up your Mean Point of Impact my friend.
I read your post (it took me two times) and all I can offer is that I believe you have some misconceptions about a few things and a completely incorrect outlook on what a vehicle implies for the Infantry, what it costs in terms of time and resources, and what it demands of the soldiers. I think you assume too much because the thing has a turret. I won't fence with all 38 of your paragraphs but I will respond to any points in detail (maintenance, training time, employment, etc) if you wish to hone in on them.
I'll start with this:
Kirkhill said:
A vehicle is not "everything", so I don't know why you characterize it as such. Domestically, we don't need the Army for places the police aren't, and the police can go where there are no roads. Domestically, we need bodies and we need command and control that can handle many moving parts over a large area with bad stuff happening. It's as simple as that, and almost any Army unit, regardless of trade, can provide those two things to some extent, although some are better than others.
In the end, if I didn't have 3 guys crewing a LAV III, they would be humping a GPMG with the section instead. In return for losing that GPMG team, I get 2 GPMGs and a stabilized 25mm cannon. Those guys also "hump" all of their section's marching order, taking much strain off their fellow bayonets. They also hump 72 hours food and water and a few loads of ammo, taking more strain off the bayonets and making things for the CQ a little easier. They also have some pretty advanced optics, saving their section mates from having to pack something like a NOD.
So, it is a pretty good trade-off for 3 guys, especially knowing I can dump the thing for a while in the rear area if I have to (with or without crew) or leave it in Canada for whatever reason and still take those 3 crew because they are trained Infantrymen. Believe it or not, IFV crews do not spend 100% of their time dealing with a vehicle and they are still quite adept as dismounted bayonets; at least mine were. If you go to a turretless I, it only costs you 2 guys at a loss of some firepower (not a big deal). It is going to cost the Army those 2-3 guys anyways, but the gains in administrative ease, flexibility and cohesion by having them integral with those who would live and fight with them are, in my opinion as a commander in a mechanized infantry unit in both training and operations, far better then any of the esoteric arguments about Cavalry and manpower bills I've seen to date.
My 2 cents,
Infanteer
Edit: spelling
- Reaction score
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- Points
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Kirkhill said:
I don't get this. In both Britain and the United States, Infantry own their vehicles, just like us. It is like this in most other NATO countries I've worked with. Australia is the wild card, not us.
- Reaction score
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Infanteer said:
Not arguing the ownership of the vehicle. I agree that infantry can own its own vehicles.
However, I think we can get better value for money by having the RCAC operate the vehicles we have as they operate them with fewer personnel.
The infantry we have, have many many demands placed on them. I am not convinced that we need them locked up in LAV Bns learning how to do what the RCAC already does.
The comment about Cavalry vs Armour was the result of comments trying to parse the differences amongst Armoured Regiments, Cavalry Regiments, Armoured Recconaissance Regiments, Lt Armoured Recconaissance Regiments and Mechanized Infantry Regiments, especially when all of the above are mixed and matched in Combat Teams, Battle Gps, Bde Gps and even Divs.
I was referring to the nomenclature and titles - which as has been pointed out to me - mean SFA. The definition is in the role.... but even there there seems to be a whole lot of the same words being used to different effect.
The Brits have their Royal Armoured Corps and Household Cavalry made up of Tank Regiments and old time Horse Cavalry Regiments all doing the same jobs they did on horseback.
The Yanks Armor Branch includes Tank Companies alongside Cavalry Squadrons in Cavalry Regiments serving alongside Tank Battalions. Their Cavalry includes Abrams and Bradleys operating in the same Sub-Unit (9 Abrams and 13 Bradleys). Other Cavalry operate from Strykers. Both conduct recce and "assault" missions as well as contributing to OOTW.
The Aussies RAAC, as noted cheerfully disregard terminology but includes any unit that ever rode a horse, including the Lt Horse - also known variously as Mounted Infantry or Mounted Rifles. The defining commonality then was the horse. The defining commonality between then and now was the ability of the units to range far and fast.
In Canada the RCAC is very much like the RAAC and incorporates Horse Regiments of various lineages and Tank regiments.
The reason for the "Crack" was in reference to a question, earlier on in the thread, about why I chose to call a similar formation a Cavalry formation.
What is the difference in capability (or burden) between a Mech Inf Coy (CCV) reinforced by a Half-Squadron of Leos and a US Cavalry Abrams-Bradley Troop reinforced by a Platoon of dismounted infantry?
I have difficulty seeing the difference.
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Kirkhill said:
They don't. The Armoured Corps fights from its tanks and armoured reconnaissance vehicles. The Infantry uses its vehicles to support all phases of its ground fight. There is a difference.
Again, many inaccuracies.
The Brits have an Armoured Corps that fights from its tanks and armoured reconnaissance vehicles. Their Infantry uses its vehicles to support its ground fight.
The Americans have an Armoured Corps that fights from its tanks and armoured reconnaissance vehicles. Their Infantry uses its vehicles to support its ground fight.
See a trend here; guys on horses and historical nomenclature have nothing to do with any of this. Fighting in modern warfare does. I think your attachment to the term cavalry is clouding your inability to realize this; it might prove useful to drop it from the discussion entirely.
The Aussies have an Armoured Corps that fights from its tanks and armoured reconnaissance vehicles; and yes, it also is the odd man out in that it operates APCs for the Infantry to support them in the ground fight. But, they do not have IFVs (their Infantry operate out of M113s and Bushmasters) and they have not, in the last 100 years, partaken in any serious and sustained mechanized warfare. I'll take that for what it's worth.
The difference is that a U.S. Cavalry Troop with dismounted Infantry would have a bunch of foot-soldiers with no transport trying to keep up with a reconnaissance organization. So you would have mechanized assets moving at the speed of marching soldiers.
Compare this to a Square Combat Team, where the infantry have the ability to keep up with the tanks and yet is still self-sufficient and mobile when the Armd Sqn needs to go somewhere else.
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R031button
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Kirkhill you realize that the joint Bradley / Abrahms units (Heavy Brigade Combat Teams) the Bradley companies are infantry right? And that the Recce units are actually using a different varient in a totally different role? The assault is done by Battalions operating two companies each of tanks and mechanized infantry... almost like a big square formation... Further more the Australians maintain 2 APC squadrons, both assigned to light brigades, I can only assume they function as a temporary battle field taxi, and are not expected to fight with the infantry they carry (keep in mind the Bushmaster is designated and "infantry mobility vehicle" not a proper fighting vehicle).
TangoTwoBravo
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Kirkhill said:
The US Heavy Cavalry Troop I trained for had M1s and M3s had tanks combined with scouts. Those M3s were carrying scouts - not infantrymen. Those scouts were a subset of the Armor branch. While a dismounted scout might look like an infantryman (although women naturally find the scouts more irresistable), they have different roles and associated training. The only infantrymen in the Cavalry Troop were manning the two mortars.
ArmyRick
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Kirkhill,
This really is not a slam but I think your arguing something with those that have far more experience than yourself.
CDN Army Armour= Tanks, Coyotes (soon to be TAPV), G-wagons.
US Combined Armoured Battalions=2 Coys Tanks + 2 Coys Bradley Infantry
---M2 Bradley 3 crew + 6 bayonets
---M3 Bradley 3 crew + 2 eye balls/TOW loaders
US Cavalry = Scouts (M3 Bradley) and Tanks combined
Brit Armour has Challenger Tanks or Scimitar Recce vehicles and one regiment is tasked as CRBN. The household cavalry do a "ceremonial Tasks" as well on horses
Austrlian armour has a Tank Regiment of MBT, 2 regiments of cavalry (ASLAVs) with a combination of aussied Coyote and Bisons. The Dismounts in these units are for little more than scout and security work. They are not intended to conduct major assaults.
Forget the historical roles of what armoured/mounted rifles/dragoons/light horses/hussars, etc, etc. Its an ARMOURED corps (branch really) that defeats the enemy through the aggressive use of battlefield mobility and fire power.
The CCV carries with it, as said, bayonets. The Infantry or the bayonets are the dismounted close combat fighting element.
Listen to what people say. No one is tied up for ever and ever to a LAVIII vehicle. Yes, Armoured Crewman are the best at gunnery in Leos, LAVs and coyotes (I do beleive they still design and come up with the training plans for all armoured vehicles? SMEs?)
However, as Infanteer said. If you ditch the LAVIII or CCV, there is 3 more grunts on the ground. If its crewed by armoured, then if a commander ditches the CCV/LAV, he DOES NOT get those 3 crewman for fighting.
I have noticed your very creative thinker but you have to be able to aply the practical experience as well (Good in theory but doesn't always work type principle?)
Off to Starbucks for a bold, black coffee (I can't get at Timmys) and then off to practice singing YMCA... A joke for those that were on that thread...
This really is not a slam but I think your arguing something with those that have far more experience than yourself.
CDN Army Armour= Tanks, Coyotes (soon to be TAPV), G-wagons.
US Combined Armoured Battalions=2 Coys Tanks + 2 Coys Bradley Infantry
---M2 Bradley 3 crew + 6 bayonets
---M3 Bradley 3 crew + 2 eye balls/TOW loaders
US Cavalry = Scouts (M3 Bradley) and Tanks combined
Brit Armour has Challenger Tanks or Scimitar Recce vehicles and one regiment is tasked as CRBN. The household cavalry do a "ceremonial Tasks" as well on horses
Austrlian armour has a Tank Regiment of MBT, 2 regiments of cavalry (ASLAVs) with a combination of aussied Coyote and Bisons. The Dismounts in these units are for little more than scout and security work. They are not intended to conduct major assaults.
Forget the historical roles of what armoured/mounted rifles/dragoons/light horses/hussars, etc, etc. Its an ARMOURED corps (branch really) that defeats the enemy through the aggressive use of battlefield mobility and fire power.
The CCV carries with it, as said, bayonets. The Infantry or the bayonets are the dismounted close combat fighting element.
Listen to what people say. No one is tied up for ever and ever to a LAVIII vehicle. Yes, Armoured Crewman are the best at gunnery in Leos, LAVs and coyotes (I do beleive they still design and come up with the training plans for all armoured vehicles? SMEs?)
However, as Infanteer said. If you ditch the LAVIII or CCV, there is 3 more grunts on the ground. If its crewed by armoured, then if a commander ditches the CCV/LAV, he DOES NOT get those 3 crewman for fighting.
I have noticed your very creative thinker but you have to be able to aply the practical experience as well (Good in theory but doesn't always work type principle?)
Off to Starbucks for a bold, black coffee (I can't get at Timmys) and then off to practice singing YMCA... A joke for those that were on that thread...
Haligonian
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Off topic: What do the M3's bring to the table in the US Cavalry Regiments? Why not just have the tanks? Is it for the scouts they carry? Make the formation cheaper by being lighter but still survivable? I don't think they carry a mast or anything specialized like the coyote does.
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Before I close my role in this discussion down....
US Infantry
- now organized in
20 Infantry or Light Brigade Combat Teams - 2 Battalions of 3 Rifle Coys and a Wpns Coy with a Light Cavalry Squadron. Vehicles - foot or administrative 21/45 Brigade Combat Teams
8 Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (2 reroled from Cavalry and 1 found from 1 Armd Div) - 3 Battalions of 3 Rifle Coys and a Stryker Cavalry Squadron
8/45 Brigade Combat Teams
Structure basically equivalent to Infantry with ADDITIONAL resources to man carrier vehicles.
The infanteers can dismount, leave their vehicles behind, along with their crews, and conduct operations in exactly the same manner as the other Infantry in the other 20 IBCTs.
16 Heavy Brigade Combat Teams - 2 Combined Arms Battalions of 2 Bradley Coys (14/Coy - 12 with 6 Dismounts) and 2 Abrams Coys (14/Coy) and a Cavalry Squadron of 3 Troops of 6 Bradleys with 2 Dismounts.
Brigade Total of 56+ Abrams, 74+ Bradleys with 288 dismounting "rifles" and 36 dismounting "scouts".
16/45 Brigade Combat Teams
The HBCT Infantry Structure is unique and directly tied to employment with Tanks.
Of 80 infantry battalions in US service 16 of them have a unique organization optimized for operation of a turreted vehicle which is used in concert with Tanks.
Is our LAV, our CCV, with their turrets and 6 dismounts closer in concept to an Abrams or the Stryker?
Forget all my meandering through the weeds of nomenclature.....obviously that didn't help what I was trying to say.
Try this on for size
Why not use the HBCT/Combined Arms Battalion concept as a model for an RCAC Heavy force based on Leos and CCVs?
As to the LAVs - why not supply at least some of them to the RCAC to create Light Armoured Forces - maybe even eliminate the turrets on some of the rest of the LAVs to allow Light, Regular, Standard infantry to be carried when the situation requires.
Perhaps each infantry regiment could supply a small, permanent Armoured Co-Op battalion to work with the RCAC Heavies. The other two battalions would just be Infantry. The RCAC could reciprocate by supplying permanent LAV Recce Squadrons to cooperate with each of the 6 Infantry Battalions.
But .... as you say.....
US Infantry
- now organized in
20 Infantry or Light Brigade Combat Teams - 2 Battalions of 3 Rifle Coys and a Wpns Coy with a Light Cavalry Squadron. Vehicles - foot or administrative 21/45 Brigade Combat Teams
8 Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (2 reroled from Cavalry and 1 found from 1 Armd Div) - 3 Battalions of 3 Rifle Coys and a Stryker Cavalry Squadron
8/45 Brigade Combat Teams
Structure basically equivalent to Infantry with ADDITIONAL resources to man carrier vehicles.
The infanteers can dismount, leave their vehicles behind, along with their crews, and conduct operations in exactly the same manner as the other Infantry in the other 20 IBCTs.
16 Heavy Brigade Combat Teams - 2 Combined Arms Battalions of 2 Bradley Coys (14/Coy - 12 with 6 Dismounts) and 2 Abrams Coys (14/Coy) and a Cavalry Squadron of 3 Troops of 6 Bradleys with 2 Dismounts.
Brigade Total of 56+ Abrams, 74+ Bradleys with 288 dismounting "rifles" and 36 dismounting "scouts".
16/45 Brigade Combat Teams
The HBCT Infantry Structure is unique and directly tied to employment with Tanks.
Of 80 infantry battalions in US service 16 of them have a unique organization optimized for operation of a turreted vehicle which is used in concert with Tanks.
Is our LAV, our CCV, with their turrets and 6 dismounts closer in concept to an Abrams or the Stryker?
Forget all my meandering through the weeds of nomenclature.....obviously that didn't help what I was trying to say.
Try this on for size
Why not use the HBCT/Combined Arms Battalion concept as a model for an RCAC Heavy force based on Leos and CCVs?
As to the LAVs - why not supply at least some of them to the RCAC to create Light Armoured Forces - maybe even eliminate the turrets on some of the rest of the LAVs to allow Light, Regular, Standard infantry to be carried when the situation requires.
Perhaps each infantry regiment could supply a small, permanent Armoured Co-Op battalion to work with the RCAC Heavies. The other two battalions would just be Infantry. The RCAC could reciprocate by supplying permanent LAV Recce Squadrons to cooperate with each of the 6 Infantry Battalions.
But .... as you say.....
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Kirkhill said:
The CCV/LAV is like a Stryker. The Stryker has one significant thing that our current LAV and maybe future CCV will still require and that is networking. i.e. Blue and Red PA and quick exchange of orders.
As for the HBCT question. I believe, we are already somewhat like that, or at least as close as we are likely to get. Not as large as the US, but a fully fitted Bde would resemble that. To take it further, I believe the decision has already been made to move all Leos to 1 CMBG. 2 CMBG is emphasizing the light role, and I would think that would leave Le Cinquiem as a medium Bde.
I love the idea of a heavy Div/Corps recce, but that is not in the cards for our small but capable army.
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R031button
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I think Kirkhill is trying to say that the SBCT forces are less tied to vehicles then the infantry in a HBCT are, and that is carried to then ask if our CCV will be preforming a role closer to the Styker or Heavy force? Maybe? I'm at a loss. Are the infantry in a heavy formation some how less able to walk then other infantry?
The CCV is an AFV that's primary role is to deliver infantry onto or close to the objective and support their fight, exactly like the LAV. Across the world armies have realized that it makes the most sense to have these vehicles and dismounts permanently attached to each other. Since the CCV will deliver infantry, it should be part of an infantry battalion. But that point has been made, I'm not going to get my head around this obsession with giving the RCAC an infantry role. Doesn't make sense to me and smacks of somebody that's a bit out of touch or ignorant to how mechanized formations work.
The CCV is an AFV that's primary role is to deliver infantry onto or close to the objective and support their fight, exactly like the LAV. Across the world armies have realized that it makes the most sense to have these vehicles and dismounts permanently attached to each other. Since the CCV will deliver infantry, it should be part of an infantry battalion. But that point has been made, I'm not going to get my head around this obsession with giving the RCAC an infantry role. Doesn't make sense to me and smacks of somebody that's a bit out of touch or ignorant to how mechanized formations work.
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