The CF Bloated Rank Structure

[tabernac]

This has been discussed before.   Many occupy positions equivalent to senior Civil Service positions, so arguably they need the rank.   Many are in scientific, research, public relations and other types of jobs and not in command positions (obviously, given our low number of formations, as pointed out by Infanteer).   Scaling back the military would mean scaling back the equivalent senior civil service jobs - good luck getting that to happen short of a Depression.

Thanks for clarifying that, I should have done a search.

One thing I did notice when I visited the HR site for DND, was that they are cutting back on all the Senior ranks(at least it appears that way).

 

[GGboy]

While I'm the last person to defend the number of generals in the CF, it was explained to me (by a Brigadier, no less) that there are a number of positions that require a certain rank of general to fill. Deputy Commander of Norad for one example, or deputy C.O. of the U.S. Army's III Corps for another ...

 

[Infanteer]

PPCLI Guy, most of the relevent stuff you bring up is related to my conception of Fighting Power (as Van Crevald proposes), which along with equipment would make up the combat power of a unit or the Army as a whole.

Why do we have MFRCs (the one in Toronto is basically the most expensive day care in NATO)?

Many of the functions of an MFRC should be handled by the Regiment; perhaps a bureaucracy like the MFRC indicates a further slide towards a occupational outlook by the Army (we are a Federal department) as opposed to

Anyways, military initiatives to support the families of soldiers would fall under the category of Maintenance of Combat Efficiency - perhaps as a psychological measure; soldiers need to know their home is in good order so they are not distracted with regards to the mission.

Why do we have PMQs?

See above.

Should DRDC get more than $200M of the defence budget?

What's that?

Why are we getting a pay raise?

Goes under the Pay aspect of Fighting Power; professional condotierri like us need to be suitably compensated if we are to dedicate our lives to the profession of arms.

What about maternity/paternity leave?

This would go under the aspect of Leave, although ultimately, the needs of a fighting force must take precedence over one's personal preferences.

What do Cadets have to do with combat power?

Nothing, that's why I disagree with the concept.

Can we afford Skyhawks / Ceremonial Guard / those acrobatic aircraft whose name I can't remember right now?

If recruiting wants to pay for, then sure; except Ceremonial Guard, which could be classified under Social Status of Armed Force.

What does DHH have to do with combat power?

What is that?

And SAR (not CSAR)?

Should be a Coast Guard duty.  It is inappropriate for a military focus on rescuing hikers and not it's own pilots.

What does the Army mascot have to do with combat power?

We have a mascot?

Do we really need all of those Reserve Units for the generation of combat power?

Not if we want them for an Industrial Age, 1940'ish, mobilization.


Anyways, we could peck the issue to death.  I am not implying that administrative functions need to be eliminated, only that these functions must ultimately be subordinated to the output of combat power.  I fear that the bureaucratic process has led to self-sustaining growth of administrative functions that exist not for the sake of the Forces, but for the sake of the bureaucratic administration.  I'll use a quote from before by Van Crevald to emphasis my outlook:

Above all, an organization should ever keep in mind the purpose for which it was created; this involves striking a balance between productive (output-related) and administrative (function-related) tasks, the latter to be adequate but limited to the minimum possible.  Under no circumstances should function-related tasks be allowed to equal, much less exceed, the output-related ones in importance.  This should be reflected in the organization's doctrine and structure."

One final thought - why are 72 positions out of 62.021 so emotive?  I am sure that we have more than 72 pers that are not fit enough to be seen in public, let alone do the BFT or EXPRES test.  I am sure that we have waaay more than 72 Social Workers or Padres - in fact I am sure that we, the CF, pay for at least ten times as many child care workers as that.

Because these prestige and responsibility behind these positions usually means that for each General, there is a some sort of department, complete with pers on ERE, civilian staff, budget, diffusion of command to the NDHQ bureaucracy, etc, etc.  It is not that a position of General represents one person; it is that the position, with its inherent roles and responsibilities, implies a large amount of resources for that General to administer - ultimately I feel this leads to bloated inefficiency and a loss of combat power.  Does this make sense?

Like I said before, 3 Brigades, 2 Fleets, and 1 Air Division don't really need 72 Generals to administer.  "Too many Chiefs and not enough Braves", or something to that effect.  Anyways, that is my concern with the numbers.

The imbalance must be at NDHQ.

That's been my general conception all along.  Any look at reforming the Officer Corps must not only look to reducing the ratio, but to distributing them properly.  CBG Comds).

I also agree with the observation that distinguishing between Cpls and Ptes when doing these calculations is false. A Cpl is an NCM, but not really an NCO, although perforce we use them as Sect 2ICs if we have to. In truth, they are more qualified Ptes-closer to what USA calls a "Spec". Cheers.

Yup.

 

[Kirkhill]

Quote
And SAR (not CSAR)?
Should be a Coast Guard duty.  It is inappropriate for a military focus on rescuing hikers and not it's own pilots.

I thought the reason the Air Force and CF wanted this job was two-fold - firstly it kept the CF in the Public Eye, a not inconsiderable benefit I would think, and secondly and more importantly it gave their pilots an opportunity to work in real world, hazardous situations where decisions have consequences - the crews are not just running "safe" exercises.

Many of the points raised have similar dualities associated with them.  MFRC. You suggest handling that in the Regiments, what about those folks that will spend their entire career never being near a fighting element?

You may argue that, like the "surplus" Generals, they should not be allowed, but much of the support necessary to maintain the force is supplied by people who have spent a lifetime at becoming proficient at one aspect of maintaining the system or fulfilling the need.  Is someone that spent 2 years with an F-echelon element  some 20 years ago that much more clued in to the needs of F-echelon just because of the time-in?  Should he/she sacrifice their building of necessary maintenance and support skills by constantly breaking their career focus and sending them back to F-echelon?

As to the notion of "surplus" Generals.  There is a need for those people that represent you to the outside world to have rank.  The need for operational forces to have rank is clear.  It establishes command and control responsibilities.  But rank also denotes something else.  It denotes trust.  In the words of my parchment "Her Majesty......reposing especial TRUST in you...".  Rank indicates to the rest of the world that you are trusted.  And the greater the rank then the greater the amount of Trust the "system" (in this case embodied by Her Majesty but actually being the sum of you,  your army and your government) reposed in the holder.

Brigade Commanders have (or should have) a downward, operational focus. Same goes for Area, CLS and CDS.  However if they are to do their jobs they need other people they trust to get you the things you need.  People to argue your case.  The people they are arguing with need to know that they are trusted to speak on behalf of CDS and the CF.  They most obvious indicator of that trust is Rank.

With all due respect to the many brilliant privates, sergeants, captains, colonels (and even dumb civilians) on this board.  Bill Graham and Paul Martin are a whole lot less likely to take the CF seriously if CDS send Private Bloggins over to argue the case for the CF.  Likewise a US Four Star is going to listen more carefully to a Canadian Three Leaf than a Canadian Captain even if the Canadian force under his control is only a Company.

I can understand the frustration at seeing all these "hangers on" but I honestly don't see a reasonable alternative. In a world where communication is as important as it ever was, but where there are many more paths to manage and many more decisions to be taken (largely resulting from a societal tendency to specialize to handle the complexities of many arcane areas) it needs bodies. Those bodies need Responsibility, Authority and Budget to conduct there tasks.  The system needs to demonstrate to all and sundry that these bodies are trusted.  And in the military system the measure of the level of trust is the rank.

 

[PPCLI Guy]

Because these prestige and responsibility behind these positions usually means that for each General, there is a some sort of department, complete with pers on ERE, civilian staff, budget, diffusion of command to the NDHQ bureaucracy, etc, etc.  It is not that a position of General represents one person; it is that the position, with its inherent roles and responsibilities, implies a large amount of resources for that General to administer - ultimately I feel this leads to bloated inefficiency and a loss of combat power.  Does this make sense?

I am not so sure that is necessarily correct.  I would prefer to believe (as well as being an optimist, I am also a little naive) that the function or output necessitated the directorate, and the positions were created to fulfill that, rather than vice versa.

I can understand the frustration at seeing all these "hangers on" but I honestly don't see a reasonable alternative. In a world where communication is as important as it ever was, but where there are many more paths to manage and many more decisions to be taken (largely resulting from a societal tendency to specialize to handle the complexities of many arcane areas) it needs bodies. Those bodies need Responsibility, Authority and Budget to conduct there tasks.  The system needs to demonstrate to all and sundry that these bodies are trusted.  And in the military system the measure of the level of trust is the rank.

There have been a number of allusions to the fact that our Senior Officers have increasing levels of both operational and command experience.  It is only in the most recent incarnations of Army Council for instance that the members have predominantly been prior Bde Comds.  Gens Hillier, Macdonald, Lessard, Leslie, Beare et al all have operational or senior command/staff experience, much of it with our Allies.  Gen Hillier would not have been acceptable to NATO as a 3 star Comd  in ISAF without his experience with 3 Div (I think I have the Div right).  This suggests that you need a critical mass of Generals in order to get that level of experience - and once you do, your Allies listen when you talk, and your commanders have real operational and command experience to bring to our own domestic table.

 

[Infanteer]

I would prefer to believe (as well as being an optimist, I am also a little naive) that the function or output necessitated the directorate, and the positions were created to fulfill that, rather than vice versa.

I don't know.  I just can't see how 72 Generals/Admirals = the Force we can field today.  Something is askew.

Perhaps we need to do some more digging; I remember seeing a list that showed all the positions that General Officers held, is something like that available?  Maybe an explanation of each position would help instead of us just generalizing about a number.

 

[Kirkhill]

Great idea Infanteer

 

[Infanteer]

PS: Kirkhill, I agree with you that we should have positions not directly related to our own operational forces that may require a high ranking position (eg: Deputy Commander of NORAD).  However, that real fancy caveat in the figures PPCLI Guy gave us does not include these guys.  I am making the assumption that the 72 that are shown deal with our own Forces.

 

[PPCLI Guy]

Perhaps we need to do some more digging; I remember seeing a list that showed all the positions that General Officers held, is something like that available?   Maybe an explanation of each position would help instead of us just generalizing about a number.

Here ya go.

Edited out link.  Info was available on the net, but had phone #s etc.  I will post a scrubbed down list

82 total.   10 overseas, 1 in Privy Council Office, 7 are Reservists, one chaplain, one lawyer.

 

[Spartan]

Is it just me or - while looking at that list in terms of title alone - I'm not sure about their responsibilities etc,
that there could be a lot of simplification and realignment of general responsibilities?
for example - difference between Director  Generral of the Reserves & cadets AND the Chief of reserves and caadets
or SENIOR AIR RESERVE ADVISOR  and the DIRECTOR GENERAL AIR PERSONEL
or PROJECT MANAGER - LAND FORCE RESERVE RESTRUCTURE  and Director General of the Reserves AND the Chief / 2ic of Reserves

the list could go on... to me its not making sense. Anyone?

 

[PPCLI Guy]

OK - here is the cropped list.  The first ones are deployed with allies - remainder in order of rank.

LGen CHIEF OF STAFF OF NATO's HQ SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER TRANSFORMATION SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER ATLANTIC
MGen ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS NATO IMS CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE MILITARY COMMITTEE IN PERMANENT
MGen DIRECTOR OPERATIONS NORAD HEADQUARTERS
RAdm LIAISON OFFICER TO NORTHCOM  NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENCE COMMAND
RAdm DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS & STRATEGIC PLANNING FOREIGN & DEFENCE POLICY SECRETARIAT PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE
RAdm COMMANDER - CANADIAN DEFENCE LIAISON STAFF (WASHINGTON)
BGen COMMANDER SHIRBRIG
BGen COMMANDER CANADIAN DEFENCE LIAISON STAFF (LONDON) 
BGen VICE COMMANDER  CHEYENNE MOUNTAIN OPERATIONS CENTER
BGen DEPUTY COMMANDER CONAR SENIOR CANADIAN OFFICER CONUS NORAD REGION
BGen DIRECTOR OF STAFF SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED POWERS EUROPE

Gen CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF -
VAdm VICE-CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF
VAdm COMMANDER MARITIME FORCE ATLANTIC
VAdm ASSISTANT DEPUTY MINISTER (HUMAN RESOURCES-MILITARY)
VAdm CHIEF OF THE MARITIME STAFF
VAdm DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF
LGen CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF
LGen DEPUTY COMMANDER NORAD HEADQUARTERS
LGen CHIEF OF THE LAND STAFF -
LGen SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF FOR DEFENCE POLICY REVIEW AND HOMELAND SECURITY ISSUES
MGen - CHIEF OF STAFF  ASSISTANT DEPUTY MINISTER (HUMAN RESOURCES-MILITARY)
MGen COMMANDER 1 CANADIAN AIR DIVISION
MGen ACTING CHIEF OF THE LAND STAFF -
MGen ASSISTANT CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF 
MGen DIRECTOR GENERAL STRATEGIC PLANNING -NATIONAL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS
MGen PROJECT MANAGER - LAND FORCE RESERVE RESTRUCTURE -
MGen J2/DIRECTOR GENERAL INTELLIGENCE 
MGen DIRECTOR GENERAL FINANCE -
MGen COMMANDER CANADIAN DEFENCE ACADEMY
MGen CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER  CANADIAN FORCES PERSONNEL SUPPORT AGENCY
MGen CANADIAN FORCES BASE/AREA SUPPORT UNIT KINGSTON  (ATL)
MGen COMMANDER LAND FORCE DOCTRINE AND TRAINING SYSTEM
MGen COMMANDER DIRECTOR GENERAL HEALTH SERVICES OTTAWA, ON K1A 0K6
MGen JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL
RAdm COMMANDER MARITIME FORCES PACIFIC
RAdm CHIEF OF STAFF - ASSISTANT DEPUTY MINISTER (INFORMATION MANAGEMENT) -
RAdm DIRECTOR GENERAL INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY -
RAdm COMMANDER MARITIME FORCE ATLANTIC HEADQUARTERS
RAdm CHIEF OF STAFF JOINT FORCE GENERATION
RAdm CHIEF OF RESERVES AND CADETS -
BGen DIRECTOR GENERAL JOINT FORCE DEVELOPMENT -
BGen COMMANDER  LAND FORCE WESTERN AREA 
BGen DEPUTY COMMANDER LAND FORCE QUEBEC AREA - RESERVES -
BGen DIRECTOR GENERAL LAND STAFF
BGen CHAPLAIN GENERAL -
BGen A1 PERSONNEL
BGen CHIEF OF STAFF J3 
BGen SENIOR AIR RESERVE ADVISOR CHIEF OF THE AIR
BGen DIRECTOR GENERAL AIR PERSONEL
BGen COMMANDER LAND FORCE QUEBEC AREA HEADQUARTERS
BGen A3 OPERATIONS 1 CANADIAN AIR DIVISION HEADQUARTERS
BGen DEPUTY COMMANDER LAND FORCES WESTERN AREA HQ
BGen COMMANDANT CANADIAN FORCES
BGen DIRECTOR GENERAL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS
BGen DIRECTOR GENERAL LAND EQUIPMENT PROGRAM MANAGEMENT
BGen DIRECTOR GENERAL REALTY POLICY AND PLANS/J3 ENGINEERS -
BGen SURGEON GENERAL
BGen DIRECTOR GENERAL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT STRATEGIC DIRECTION -
BGen J4 MATERIAL/DIRECTOR GENERAL LOGISTICS -
BGen COMMANDANT -ROYAL MILITARY COLLEGE OF CANADA
BGen COMMANDER LAND FORCE CENTRAL AREA HEADQUARTERS
BGen DIRECTOR GENERAL - AEROSPACE EQUIPMENT PROGRAM MANAGEMENT
BGen DIRECTOR GENERAL AIR FORCE DEVELOPMENT CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF
BGen A4 -1 CANADIAN AIR DIVISION
BGen J2 INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES AND CSE/DIRECTOR GENERAL MILITARY SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE
BGen DEPUTY COMMANDERLAND FORCES ATLANTIC AREA HEADQUARTERS
BGen DIRECTOR GENERAL RESERVES AND CADETS -
BGen DIRECTOR GENERAL LAND COMBAT DEVELOPMENT
BGen COMMANDER LAND FORCE ATLANTIC AREA 
BGen DIRECTOR GENERAL MILITARY CAREERS
BGen DIRECTOR GENERAL LAND RESERVE -
BGen COMMANDER LAND FORCE DOCTRINE AND TRAINING SYSTEM
BGen DEPUTY COMMANDER - LAND FORCES CENTRAL HEADQUARTERS
Comm COMMANDER CANADIAN FLEET PACIFIC
Comm DIRECTOR GENERAL MILITARY HUMAN RESOURCES POLICY AND PLANNING -
Comm COMMANDER CANADIAN FLEET ATLANTIC HEADQUARTERS
Comm DIRECTOR GENERAL MARITIME PERSONNEL AND READINESS
Comm ASSISTANT CHIEF OF THE MARITIME STAFF
Comm CHIEF OF FINANCE
Comm DIRECTOR GENERAL - MARITIME EQUIPMENT PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

Why are the Airforce staff principles (A1, A3 and A4) BGens?  The Army gets away with Cols...

OK - now we can have a reasoned discussion.  In response to the question about ORBATS, this is not the best way to review an ORBAT - get on teh DNet and havea look at the NDHQ ORBAT...

 

[Infanteer]

Looks like one big bureaucracy.  How come, as PBI pointed out, a field unit can run itself with a minimal amount of top dogs but NDHQ requires a glut.  It seems that a General can no longer say "I am commander of 1st Divison" or "I am the Army Staff Operations Officer".  Now it is "I am the DIRECTOR GENERAL INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY".

Here are a few that stood out as confusing:

LGen SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF FOR DEFENCE POLICY REVIEW AND HOMELAND SECURITY ISSUES

MGen CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER  CANADIAN FORCES PERSONNEL SUPPORT AGENCY (So, Generals are CEO's now?)

BGen SENIOR AIR RESERVE ADVISOR CHIEF OF THE AIR (What the hell is this?)

RAdm CHIEF OF RESERVES AND CADETS (Aren't the Areas responsible for the Reserves?)

VAdm COMMANDER MARITIME FORCE ATLANTIC (Why do we have this guy when we also have RAdm COMMANDER MARITIME FORCE ATLANTIC HEADQUARTERS and Comm COMMANDER CANADIAN FLEET ATLANTIC HEADQUARTERS???)

This big list has only further confirmed my suspicions that we are unwieldy and top heavy.  However, I have a feeling that somehow all these positions are justified within the paradigm of a large, centralized headquarters in Ottawa.  Paring down these numbers requires transformational change in how we as an institution view the role, orientation, responsibly, and organization of higher Headquarters and commands.

 

[PPCLI Guy]

Here are a few that stood out as confusing:

LGen SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF FOR DEFENCE POLICY REVIEW AND HOMELAND SECURITY ISSUES

Ya got me there...

MGen CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER  CANADIAN FORCES PERSONNEL SUPPORT AGENCY (So, Generals are CEO's now?)

Don't even get me started...

BGen SENIOR AIR RESERVE ADVISOR CHIEF OF THE AIR (What the heck is this?)

Air Force Equivalent to Dir Gen Land Res (DGLRes)

RAdm CHIEF OF RESERVES AND CADETS (Aren't the Areas responsible for the Reserves?)

Nope.  VCDS is.  Reserves includes the Naval Res, Air Res, Rgrs, Jr Rgrs, Cadets and Militia.  Area Comds are just responsible for Milita (and Cadets - this is new and evolving)

VAdm COMMANDER MARITIME FORCE ATLANTIC (Why do we have this guy when we also have RAdm COMMANDER MARITIME FORCE ATLANTIC HEADQUARTERS and Comm COMMANDER CANADIAN FLEET ATLANTIC HEADQUARTERS???)

Ummmm?

This big list has only further confirmed my suspicions that we are unwieldy and top heavy.  However, I have a feeling that somehow all these positions are justified within the paradigm of a large, centralized headquarters in Ottawa.

 

Yep.  Army sucked it up, closed St Hubert, scaled down Land Staff, and made do.  Air Force stayed in Winnipeg in shiny new building and got bigger.  Navy is split between Right and Left coasts, and so have twice the infrastructure.

Paring down these numbers requires transformational change in how we as an institution view the role, orientation, responsibly, and organization of higher Headquarters and commands.

Yup

 

[Infanteer]

Yup

Thanks, it's good to know I'm not alone (or crazy).

 

[Bruce Monkhouse]

LGen CHIEF OF THE LAND STAFF -
MGen ACTING CHIEF OF THE LAND STAFF -

Explanation?

 

[Infanteer]

General Hillier, the Chief of the Land Staff, is currently the Commander of ISAF in Kabul, so someone has to wear his other hat (and MGen Leslie is probably one of the best candidates to do so, IMHO).

 

[Bruce Monkhouse]

Thanks,  So this person would be like a "General Floater" than.

 

[PPCLI Guy]

General Hillier, the Chief of the Land Staff, is currently the Commander of ISAF in Kabul, so someone has to wear his other hat (and MGen Leslie is probably one of the best candidates to do so, IMHO).

Gen Hillier is back.  The Acting (MGen Caron) will revert to Assistant.  MGen Leslie is on ATL doing his doctorate - for now.  BGen Benjamin is now Director General Land Staff (COS of the Army - the guy that runs the place day to day)

 

[Infanteer]

Doh!!!  I should have read the fine print on the bios....

 

[Pikache]

I'm wondering what the heck do all those colonels/captains (N) do?