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The Defence Budget [superthread]

I could see them cutting 2 or even 3.  One from each.

PPCLI has manning issues to begin with.  Going to 2 battalions would be pretty effortless.

2 RCR would remain as it has the only footprint in Atlantic Canada. But 1 or 3 would likely be the targets.

And cutting the 22eme is easier when you cut everywhere else as well.

Beef up CSOR, Primary Reserve units.

And tehn 10 years from now when we can't do anything we'll experience another recruiting surge.
 
Once you cut something, it is almost impossible to get it back.  Better to leave the shell for when that surge comes.  450 Sqn required a war.
 
Infanteer:
Once you cut something, it is almost impossible to get it back.  Better to leave the shell for when that surge comes.  450 Sqn required a war.

Does that thought process go for the Reserves also??  :P





 
I thought the symbol represented "tongue in cheek".

Whole Reg F units Army units disappeared at the same time: The Black Watch, QOR of C, to the Militia: Cdn Guards, Cdn Airborne, 4 RCHA, etc, gone.

Both "sides"have been hit. I spent 1962 to 2007 in the Molitia watching it happen.

I do agree with Infanteer's statement, but lets not start the Reg F vs P Res kerfuffle again.
 
Crantor said:
I could see them cutting 2 or even 3.  One from each.

...

Beef up CSOR, Primary Reserve units.

And then 10 years from now when we can't do anything we'll experience another recruiting surge.

During the Chretien cuts wasn't one of each a 10-90 BN 10% RF and 90% PR ?How did that play out?

I have a strong hunch the answer is not well.

Comment. Given the cuts I find it odd that the INF BNs are not retaining core cadre capabilities such as 81 MM mortar, TUA, Assault pioneer etc. These are skill sets that add capability and take a long time to acquire. Also with life in garrison add additional challenge. Back in the 70's the BN's had these posn's manned. They could add on militia riflemen to fill gaps on fairly short notice.

Just my .05

 
Inquisitor said:
During the Chretien cuts wasn't one of each a 10-90 BN 10% RF and 90% PR ?How did that play out?

I have a strong hunch the answer is not well.

Comment. Given the cuts I find it odd that the INF BNs are not retaining core cadre capabilities such as 81 MM mortar, TUA, Assault pioneer etc. These are skill sets that add capability and take a long time to acquire. Also with life in garrison add
additional challenge. Back in the 70's the BN's had these posn's manned. They could add on militia riflemen to fill gaps on fairly short notice.

Just my .05

It wasn't our choice to not retain those capabilities.
 
Inf Bns were stripped of mortars and pioneer elements a long, long time ago.  Not even on the table.
 
Jim Seggie said:
It wasn't our choice to not retain those capabilities.

It was the choice of the Army (writ large) not to maintain those capabilities.  In the analysis at the time, it was decided that they were lower priorities than others, and thus were divested.
 
Apparently "UBIQUE" translates to 'We'll be ther for you!'

;)
 
If we need to find money to make the F-35 initial procurement feasible, then kill the CCV project.  The Army could invest the CCV money in itself in hundreds of better ways but, since that will not be happening, it makes more sense to sacrifice the CCV project than a battalion upon the alter of F-35.

CombatMacguyver said:
In chats with some of the VanDoos about this article the response was generally something akin to: 'we have three half-empty battalions but when one deploys it magically becomes a full batallion.  So if they cut, for example 1R22R, we'll just have two slightly-more-than-half-full batallions without losing any guys from the regiment'
There is an argument to be made for closing the third battalions and rolling the personnel and positions into the first and second battalions.  Unfortunately, that is not what is being suggested in the article.  The article suggested that the battalion would be closed and the positions (PYs as they are called) would be harvested.  Some of the personnel could move to other battalions where vacant positions exist (in some cases requiring re-bading), but most would redundant and offered release or remuster.  In the Army, we have a pretty good idea what in Infantry battalion should look like, and many people assume the difference between that and reality is just that the people are missing - in fact the battalions are underestablished and the positions do not exist for people to be hired into.  Some battalions may even be over established, but to the troops in those battalions it still looks like there are spaces.  The truth is hidden in the mechanics and bureaucracy of how we establish and build our organization.  The hollow battalions are hollow by design, and in the west this is exacerbated for positions gone unfilled.

I am skeptical that there ever was official talk of closing down a full battalion.  Maybe.  If we need ways to reduce the force, it will require deep analysis and hard decisions to do it in a way that does not wreck the organization.  We have been trimming quietly from everywhere for years, and we are at the point now just a little bit more from everywhere will start to result in failings all over the place.  The waffer thin mint if you will.  An aggressive position-by-position review of the whole CAF will turn up a number of redundant or wastefull positions hidden away in organizations, but the fiefdoms will bitterly defend themselves.  If we really do need to reduce the force and in relatively short time, someone will have to decide which capabilities, bases, and/or units were are prepared to be done with ... and maybe that will be some portion of our infantry.  Perhaps it is time to abandon promises of new battalions (or at least 500 more service members) for particular places on the map.  I don't know.  But maybe it is not force reduction that we need to achieve.  Maybe we just need to find more money.

If we need ways to save money, this thread is full of ideas.  Page 12 compiled a few lists of them:
[quote author=MCG]
Here are a few ways that I see to immediately cut costs while protecting capability:
  • Reduce/Stop the use of “tactical infrastructure” in field exercises
  • Do not bring kitchen appliances to the field (with the exception of in field kitchens)
  • Maximize the use of local training areas before traveling
  • Teleconference to avoid TD for meetings and working groups
  • Prohibit the deployment of pers into positions requiring WSE (We do not need to pay guys above their rank when there are other sitting at home already collecting pay at that level)  - exceptions only for in-theatre casualty replacement
  • Deploy the next Op ATTENTION as 100% Reg F (again, Reg F pay is a sunk cost while a year of Class C pay for a Sr NCO of Jr Offr to train & deploy could instead added another training day for a Class A unit) (too late for this)
  • No new “buttons & bows” announcements
  • Do not rebadged any more units for the sake of resurrecting old regiments
  • Stop any unannounced plans to rebrand/rebadged/rename any branches, corps or organization for the purposes of historical sentimentalism
  • Stop using rented civilian vehicles when military patter vehicles are available and serve the purpose
  • Tie pay incentives for all ranks to performance and conduct.  If you are on a remedial measure (IC through to C&P) then the pay incentive is delayed by the duration of that remedial measure.  If you receive an unsatisfactory PER, then the pay incentive is delayed until you receive a satisfactory one.
  • Rebalance officer enrollment paths to reduce the number of ROTP entrants while increasing the number of DEO entrants
  • Stop the practice of sending new CF buttons & fasteners with all new DEU coats ordered on the Logistik Unicorps site (these buttons typically go straight to the garbage as most soldiers already have the buttons which are removable from the old coat, and most soldiers wear branch/regimental buttons) - if someone needs buttons they can spend more points to get them.
  • Remove the recently introduced Army DEU parka from Logistik Unicorps issue - it duplicates a function already provided by the gabardine.
  • Allow only one IPR move per service couple.  Instead, a reunification move will bring the first retiring member to live with the mbr continuing to serve, or if both retire at the same time then a reunification move will bring the mbr without F&E to the mbr with F&E.

And here are some options options for long-term savings (though most will cost money upfront prior to the savings being achieved later):
  • Consolidate all of NDHQ and appropriate other NCR units on the Nortel Campus
  • Move CFC from Toronto to Ottawa (Nortel Campus) or Kingston (RMC or the closing prison)
  • Divest unnecessary niche vehicle micro-fleets (if required, increase size of standard fleets to maintain platform numbers)
  • Smash LFDTS & CTC into a single layer of HQ, transfer capability development functions from LFDTS to COS Land Strat
  • Re-close CMR and consolidate ROTP back into RMC
  • Consolidate all of 1 CMBG in Edmonton to reduce future steady-state cost moves
  • Procure more training simulators for fuel guzzling equipment (like aircraft, Engr Hy Eqpt and MBT) – include this in the initial acquisition of future systems
  • Reevaluate rank levels in HQ establishments – the goal is to reduce where unnecessary inflation has occurred
  • Replace military ID cards, PKI cards, and military driver's licences with a single universal military identification

In the current climate, we need to look at more than just where to cut.  We also need to look at where to get better mileage from the same resources.  Here are a few thoughts to that end:
  • Replace SDA, LDA, dive pay and parachute allowance with enhanced casual allowances – the current systems reward posting messages as opposed to rewarding/compensating for the behaviour that we want: going to sea, going to the field, diving, and jumping out of aircraft.
  • Reduce the number of PRes unit HQs in the Army.  Individual sub-units can retain unique regimental identities, but they will be grouped under a single stronger battalion HQ.
  • Revisit the requirement for Reg F bands.  There are 71 musicians from Sgt to CWO on Army Ref F establishments alone.  That is a lot of PYs that could be put to better purpose (especially when we have been cutting from operational units to put PYs in new capabilities)
[/quote][quote author=dapaterson]
A few more contentious suggestions:

* Top to bottom compensation and benefits review to eliminate duplication and overlap
* Revisit posting policy to reduce annual move requirement (excluding off-BTL)
* Revisit IPR move policy to eliminate same-location moves (eg a paid move from Orleans to Kanata on release)
* Replace CANEX with private suppliers (who will pay market rents for CF facilities)
  * Retain small deployed NPF expertise to surge for deployments if required (hint: this does not include a Tim Hortons trailer)
* Return to annual TOS boards, particularly at ranks of LCol and above and MWO and above, to determine whether continued service meets a military requirement
* Enforce limits on GOFOs as ordered in the 1997 MND report (roughly a 1/3 reduction)
* Return to performance pay for GOFO and Capt(N)/Cols
  * Make PMAs and performance info per above public
* Make PMAs and performance information for all Public Servants public
* Restructure establishment to differentiate between Lt and Capt
* Return to competitive promotion to Capt
* Revisit Degreed Officer Corps decision
  * Permit short engagements with no promotion beyond Capt without a degree
* Eliminate full-time second language training
  * Individuals may elect to pursue SLT on their own time; a decision not to get a language profile will limit future promotion possibilities

For IM/IT

* Migrate from MS Office to Open Office to reduce IM/IT licensing costs
* Migrate from Outlook to open-source web-based DWAN email to reduce IM/IT licensing costs
* Dissolve ADM(IM), putting IM/IT support into CANOSCOM, IM/IT procurement into ADM(Mat), and comms and ISTAR systems under CJOC[/quote]

 
Migrating to a completely different office suite is neither easy, or cheap. We'd spend far more than we'd save with all the helpdesk headaches and migration headaches for very little gain.
 
John Ibbitson, in this article which is reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from the Globe and Mail, takes a look at the defence budget and, as I read it, Conservative indifference t the defence of Canada:

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/globe-politics-insider/warship-collision-shows-not-everythings-shipshape-with-canadas-military/article14076905/#dashboard/follows/
gam-masthead.png

Warship collision shows not everything’s shipshape with Canada’s military

SUBSCRIBERS ONLY

John Ibbitson
OTTAWA — The Globe and Mail

Published Tuesday, Sep. 03 2013

The two damaged warships that limped into Esquimalt, B.C. on the weekend offered a painful reminder of the fragility of the Canadian Forces at home and abroad.

The Conservative government has committed to a slow, steady modernization of equipment over the course of the next 30 years. But the emphasis is on slow, and on any given day, any given mishap can expose the inherent weakness of Canada’s military.

“If everything goes smoothly, we’re okay,” said Anthony Seaboyer, a political scientist at Queen’s University who specializes in national security issues. “But if things like this happen, we’re less and less able to react to them than we were in the past.”

A recent wave of defence budget cuts – expected to reach $2.5-billion by 2015 – is one reason for the decreasing ability to react, as the Harper government struggles both to retain a functioning military and to balance the budget before the next election.

The destroyer HMCS Algonquin and refuelling vessel HMCS Protecteur collided during a training exercise in the Pacific Ocean on Friday, damaging both ships.

A press spokesman for the Pacific fleet on Monday said both vessels had returned to port and were being examined. A fuller update is expected later this week, but the Algonguin, which received the brunt of the damage, is likely to be laid up for a while.

And until the damage to the Protecteur’s bow is repaired, the Pacific fleet will have no refuelling capability.

That operational gap highlights the price the navy is paying as Ottawa drags its heels on the promised renewal of the fleet. The National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy – which commits $33-billion over 30 years to replace and upgrade core naval assets – remains, for the most part, all paper, no keels.

The navy is not alone. The army is at risk of losing the intelligence and combat skills it acquired in Afghanistan through lack of training. And the fate of the F-35 fighter jet, intended to replace the aging CF-18s, remains uncertain.

The problem is threefold. The first is the government’s commitment to balance the budget in 2015, which has led to spending cuts across all departments, including National Defence.

The second is the time lag between a committment to replace something as large as a plane or a ship, and actually replacing it. Plans to replace the Protecteur, for example, were announced as far back as 2004, but a new vessel won’t be ready until 2018, at the earliest, and the armed forces has never seen a procurement deadline it couldn’t miss.

Third, there is the constant examination and re-examination of priorities. The Canadian Forces has a mandate to protect the national borders while also being ready at any time to deploy overseas on either a short-term or extended mission, in concert with allied forces.

But what is the right mix? How much should go to training special forces, providing air support for ground troops, and protecting the coasts? How important is it to defend the Arctic versus being able to assist NATO allies when the need arises? What is the nature of the terrorist threat and how can the military identify and respond to it?

What is the best ratio between purchasing, training and hiring? And why are there so many people at headquarters?

Among the democracies, governments everywhere struggle with these questions, while also balancing the needs of their militaries with domestic priorities.

Though critics abound, Prof. Seaboyer said he believes the Canadian government, overall, is taking the right approach. “The balance that has been struck … makes sense in terms of future needs that may arise,” he explained. “The problem is, who can see into the future?”

Billions of dollars of acquisitions could prove useless in conflicts that no one predicted. It’s another reason why it makes sense to go slow on procurement – except, that is, until a ship turns to starboard when it should have turned to port, and suddenly there’s a big hole in the Pacific fleet.

John Ibbitson is the chief political writer in the Ottawa bureau.


John Ibbitson says, at the beginning of the article, "The Conservative government has committed to a slow, steady modernization of equipment over the course of the next 30 years." That is not true. The Canada First Defence Strategy commits Canada to a slow, but steady decline in defence spending by any fair and sensible measure. Much was made of the $30 Billion "end state" but $30+ Billion inflated dollars, even at today's inflation rates, in 2027/28 will represent fewer real dollars for defence as a percentage of GDP (the best way to measure that sort of long range spending), as a share of government spending, as a share of your pay packet and so on. It is a strategy for unilateral disarmament ~ it was good politics but it was and is bad policy.

Ibbitson also says, at the end of the article, "Billions of dollars of acquisitions could prove useless in conflicts that no one predicted. It’s another reason why it makes sense to go slow on procurement," and that's not true, either. A well planned, sensible force structure and concomitant capital equipment programme will produce Adaptable forces that can cope with the unexpected, when it happens. That same well planned, sensible force strucrure and equipment programme will produce forces which are Appropriate for a G-8 nation and Available when required. Triple A armed forces, in other words - not in the big leagues, but able to what Canadians expect: to promote and defend Canada's vital interests in the world. But we really want TripleA+ forces: Adaptable, Appropriate, Available and Affordable. The Canada First Defence Strategy certainly does provide for Affordable armed forces, but I would argue that they cannot and will not meet Canada's requirements because giving Canadians what they want ~ spending less and less and less on national defence ~ is not the same as giving Canadian what we need. In my opinion a real strategy for Canada would result in budget growth to about 2% of GDP over the next 15 years.

The rest of Ibbitson's article makes sense; the Canada First Defence Strategy does not.
 
And there is some reinforcement, in an article in the National Post, for the idea that we need to figure out how many is enough warsips for "a G8 country with the world’s biggest coastline" and then budget for that requirement.

The article, speaking broadly about ships, tanks and aircraft, says, "we don’t have [enough] right now, because successive Canadian governments have gotten into the bad habit of replacing larger number of older military vehicles (of all kinds) with smaller numbers of more capable vehicles. The argument is, of course, that a smaller number of more advanced vehicles, be they ships, tanks or planes, can do the work of a larger number of older ones with greater efficiency. But there is a minimum number of vehicles and units that must be kept available if Canada is to maintain a proper, modern military. And right now, we’re well below that number." It goes on to conclude that, "Warships are also vital instruments of national policy, both at home and abroad. Having a Navy isn’t cheap, but if we’re going to do it, we may as well do it right." The author could have extended that to all three services and the many, varied and vital support functions, too.
 
E.R. Campbell said:
John Ibbitson, in this article which is reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from the Globe and Mail, takes a look at the defence budget and, as I read it, Conservative indifference t the defence of Canada:

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/globe-politics-insider/warship-collision-shows-not-everythings-shipshape-with-canadas-military/article14076905/#dashboard/follows/

John Ibbitson says, at the beginning of the article, "The Conservative government has committed to a slow, steady modernization of equipment over the course of the next 30 years." That is not true. The Canada First Defence Strategy commits Canada to a slow, but steady decline in defence spending by any fair and sensible measure. Much was made of the $30 Billion "end state" but $30+ Billion inflated dollars, even at today's inflation rates, in 2027/28 will represent fewer real dollars for defence as a percentage of GDP (the best way to measure that sort of long range spending), as a share of government spending, as a share of your pay packet and so on ...


My guestimate is based on:

    2013: GDP ≈ $1.75 Trillion
    2013: Defence Budget ≈ $20.1 Billion ≈ 1.14% of GDP

    2013-2017: a slow recovery, GDP growth never reaches 3% annually
    2013-2028: modest to good GDP growth, no "great recession," but growth never reaches 4%

    2028: GDP ≈ $2.85 Trillion
    2028: Defence spending ≈ $32 Billion (Canada First Defence Strategy says over $30 Billion in 2028)
    2028: Defence Budget ≈ 1.12% of GDP which means a decline in real spending over the next 15 years.
 
I've always thought that calculating defence spending as a percentage of GDP is akin to the way religions demand a tithe from their adherents (or for that matter Chile's old Copper Law that dictated that 10% of all earnings from Chile's nationalized copper industry went to military equipment). You create some magic number (like 3%) and say that this is what you should commit every year to ensure that we (either God or DND) can provide you with a warm, fuzzy, secure life. I could never quite grasp why defence should get more just because the economy has gotten better (or the price of copper skyrocketed or alternatively why it should get less if the economy slides)

IMHO defence spending should run like any other budgeting process; first by critically analysing the organizations program needs (i.e. what are our defence/security objectives; what are the options for how they will be met; what is the cost); secondly, by reviewing income available for program delivery; thirdly, by comparing those costs against other program needs and setting priorities or making compromises.

A recent National Post graphic showed that in the last ten years our real dollars spending on defence has gone from just over 12 to just under 23 Billion (2012) dollars but stayed approximately steady at
1.2 to 1.4 to 1.2 % of GDP. GDP aside, that was a very serious commitment of cash.

The same graphic shows that we have increased our spending by +53% (the US by +59%, the UK by +18%, France by -0.6%, Germany by -3.6%). Yup others did way more and others did way less. What does this prove? It proves that there is no standard although one could make arguments that Russia and China are entering into a new arms race. Do we do a knee-jerk reaction?

http://news.nationalpost.com/2012/06/08/graphic-financing-canadas-armed-forces/

Long story short. I'm having a hard time getting excited about all this arbitrary up and down in the defence budget. I'm a Trudeau era guy. I've seen bad. I've seen arbitrary. What I have never seen (especially in the last ten years) is DND taking any serious steps to control its "tail" based expenditures. I don't expect I ever will.

:stirpot:
 
Fair enough, FJAG, but the last time we made defence decisions in the way you would prefer was back circa 1950.

By the 1960s the rate of inflation for the cost of modern weapon systems was soaring and still, I think, remains two or three times as high as the general inflation rate. It made defence spending more and more difficult. In fact, as I have said several times, I think that ~ the cost of defence ~ was the primary driver behind Mr. Hellyer's experiments back in the 1960s.

(An Ameican aerospace exec did a tongue in cheek paper many years ago demonstrating the inflating values of combat aircraft and showed that at some point in the future the nth generation fighter jet would consume the entire defence budget and it would be allocated to the USAF on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays, the USN on Tuesdays, Thursdays and Saturdays and the USMC on Sundays. Can anyone with really powerful google-fu find it?)

Dollars, big or small, are just numbers unless they relate to something: and relating them to GDP is a useful way to measure the national commitment to defence. As you point out, in a decade defence spending appears to have nearly doubled, but, in reality, relative to the nation's capacity, it remained stable.

I believe that the strength of the political will to defend Canada can only be measured by comparing it to the strength of the political will to provide good hospitals or prisons or symphony halls.
 
E.R. Campbell said:
(An Ameican aerospace exec did a tongue in cheek paper many years ago demonstrating the inflating values of combat aircraft and showed that at some point in the future the nth generation fighter jet would consume the entire defence budget and it would be allocated to the USAF on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays, the USN on Tuesdays, Thursdays and Saturdays and the USMC on Sundays. Can anyone with really powerful google-fu find it?)

From a footnote in the Black Swan concept we were just discussing:

As Norman Augustine, an aerospace industry executive, stated in his famous forecast of 1986 in reference to the
soaring prices: ‘In the year 2054, the entire defence budget will purchase just one aircraft. This aircraft will have to be
shared by the Air Force and the Navy three and one half days each per week except for leap year, when it will be made
available to the Marines for the extra day.’ His dire prediction of vanishing aircraft inventories equally applies to ships.
 
E.R. Campbell said:
In fact, as I have said several times, I think that ~ the cost of defence ~ was the primary driver behind Mr. Hellyer's experiments back in the 1960s.

Well, the stated objective definitely was the never-ending, chimerical pursuit of efficiencies in the face of rising defence costs.
But at the level of personal motivation, I don't think we can discount Hellyer's own unfortunate experiences struggling with inter-service inefficiencies while trying to enlist in WW2.
 
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