The Defence Budget [superthread]

[Good2Golf]

...But the problem is: there IS an established, constitutional split between the civil and military realms. We, followers of the British tradition, have been working at this for 400+ years and we've been taking it seriously since Walpole clashed with the king and the military notables (and won) in the 18th century. Defence policy IS the domain of civilians, just as the conduct of military operations is the domain of soldiers (as Roosevelt knew and Churchill didn't)...

Concur, fully.

However, the civilian structure conflictingly expects Defence to write/update "it's own" national strategy...

(From the Embassy 'Scotch' article)...National Defence’s ability to plan has been partially handicapped by its ongoing overhaul of the Canada First Defence Strategy and multiple cuts and deferrals to its capital budget in recent years, Mr. Perry said...

Darned if you do, darned if you don't...

 

[McG]

Another article presenting the idea that the government's professed love for the military is not substantiated by the support actually given.  Generally, it seems to be the same arguments we have heard from other sources recently.

I don't buy the argument that TB policies make it impossible for DND to manage a budget.  I have not doubt there are frictions, but managing the budget must be possible.  Capital equipment purchases fall behind because we have trouble defining our requirements ... Sometimes we even throw things to the front of the priority list before even thinking about the requirements.

The military may be underfunded now, but not all fingers should be pointed outwards when it comes to the department's financial health.  There is still plenty of internal waste that could & should be brought to heel.

Canada doesn't have the military to back up its foreign policy
COLIN KENNY
Published on: July 31, 2014
Updated: August 2, 2014
Ottawa Citizen

Stephen Harper likes to poke the bear – a.k.a. Vladimir Putin.

The Canadian prime minister has slammed Putin’s “expansionism and militarism” and called the Russian president a “throwback” to the evil mindset of the Soviet Union.

In terms of the words Harper uses, I appreciate his forthright condemnation of Putin’s behaviour in Ukraine. The 20th century was an ugly one for Europe, and the world can’t afford leaders colouring outside the lines when it comes to annexing territory or messing with the internal affairs of its neighbours.

Historians J.L. Granatstein and William Kaplan co-authored an article in the Globe and Mail, applauding the Canadian prime minister for being ahead of the pack in identifying Putin’s nasty behaviour in Ukraine, exposing him as “a Stalinist using Nazi big lie techniques and Soviet-era disinformation tactics to camouflage his government’s actions and shift blame.”

They commended Harper’s exhortations to Canada’s allies to mobilize to counter Russian expansionism – to activate NATO and to impose economic sanctions to make Putin think twice about throwing his weight around. All good.

But these words are fluff unless Canada is willing to put its money where its mouth is when it comes to standing up to the Putins of this world.

This government – which swaggers around in fatigues, pretending to be a friend of the Canadian Forces – has a lot to answer for when it comes to maintaining a military that can play its role in the world when these kinds of crises arise.

Canada’s defence budget as a percentage of GDP peaked at 2.0 percent under the Trudeau government. It went into steady decline under the Chrétien Liberals, looked like it would expand long-term  when the Harper government came to power, then plummeted. According the World Bank, it dropped from 1.4 per cent in 2009 to 1.0 per cent in 2013. Based on a number of signals that the government is going to keep tightening its military spending, that downward spiral is just going to continue.

Canadians don’t expect their governments to spend as much on their armed forces as countries like Russia (4.2 per cent of GDP) and the United States (3.8 per cent). But when non-combative countries like Norway (1.4 per cent), Denmark (1.4 per cent) and Sweden (1.2 per cent) are spending more, you know you have a government that’s putting the squeeze on our military.

The Department of National Defence is currently being hounded by Treasury Board, which had designed a system that makes it impossible for DND to manage its budget. As a result, the military keeps falling behind in equipment purchases and capacity keeps declining. The government could put an end to this stalemate if it wished to, but instead seems delighted that it is pocketing the unspent money to meet and exceed its deficit-fighting targets.

Canadians already have a small military and it just keeps shrinking. Not in numbers, because the government knows the optics of reducing personnel – when juxtaposed with repeated failures to replace essential equipment – would confirm that the government isn’t much interested in the military at all. But when you maintain personnel numbers and order cuts of 20 per cent in operations and maintenance expenditures, you’re creating a dysfunctional organization that can’t do what it is supposed to do.

Never has a government talked such big talk about investing in its military while allowing it to erode so dramatically. Canada’s navy, for instance, is going to be without a lot of essential ships after this government has left the scene. The same applies to key aircraft for the air force.

It’s nice to hear strong words condemning Putin’s perfidy in Ukraine. But they ring a bit hollow when they mask not-so-nice weakness in this country’s capacity to back them up.

http://ottawacitizen.com/news/politics/canada-doesnt-have-the-military-to-back-up-its-foreign-policy

 

[MilEME09]

While i do agree with you MCG that we should be looking inward first and fix our massive overhead issues, I also agree with the article that there are times when DND's arm is twisted by the TB, and they are unable to spend money due to bureaucratic in fighting

 

[Edward Campbell]

MilEME09 is correct in part, but we must remember that TB is an arm of the cabinet so the "infighting" isn't necessarily bureaucratic: TB enforces the diktats of the cabinet; DND is, in  that respect, just another line department.

MCG has most of the problem in his sights: DND and especially the CF is lousy, repeat lousy at administration and financial management. There is no excuse for that, every other agency of government manages, most better than DND. Either we hire (recruit) stupid people or our military culture is ill suited to managing in government. I think it's a bit of both, overwhelmingly the latter. Admirals and generals are poor bureaucrats and they oughtn't to be allowed to wield much bureaucratic authority.

My  :2c:

 

[Good2Golf]

Mr. Campbell, perhaps there is room to increase the jointness of Departmental procurement planning, with an aim to reducing the inter-service tribalism that contributes significantly to the lack of harmonized definition of overall military requirements?  While General Hillier was a great proponent of jointness, projects like Leopard 2, while good for the RCAC, may not have been the best use of the Department's capital procurement envelope.

As well, is the issue just Departmental?  DND's current CFO, previously of TBS itself, has had half a decade in his position.  Would not one expect there to have been greater fiscal soundness with the cross-pollination of Mr. Lindsay's experience?  As well, Mr. Fonberg, until of late replaced by Mr. Fadden as Deputy Minister, was widely regarded as one of the more influential DMs in the machine of Government, and while by many external appearances demoted from DM of DFAIT to Senior Associate Secretary of Treasury Board before his tenure at Defence, was well regarded for his efforts in Treasury to set in place PM Harper's fiscal accountability model.  Was it the military leadership these kinds of professional bureaucrats were unable to influence to be better stewards of Defence's assigned resources? Was it the Department's own cadre of senior bureaucrats who have contributed to the fiscal managerial malaise?  Is it the nature of military leadership coming and going on relatively short cycles compared to their civilian bureaucratic colleagues that stymies good governance?  Is it relatively unseen influence by politicians with regional or other non-operational exigencies that renders less efficient the military's stewardship of resources?  Does the degree to which Public Works may or may not collaborate with Defence during tendering and in-service management of complex contracts affect efficient and effective stewardship of huge sums of procurement monies?

Is it time for a Royal Commission on Defence spending to get to the bottom of why DND is, or at least is perceived to be so bad at spending money?  Or for as much as Government says it is displeased with how DND performs, does it itself not want the details of such performance to really be known?

Regards
G2G

 

[McG]

Mr. Campbell, perhaps there is room to increase the jointness of Departmental procurement planning, with an aim to reducing the inter-service tribalism that contributes significantly to the lack of harmonized definition of overall military requirements?

Wasn't CFD supposed to achieve exactly this?

 

[Edward Campbell]

My highly personal point of view is: policy, finance, liaison with government, public affairs and procurement are, almost exclusively, the domain of the civil service - military officers should be few and far between and, generally, in 'observer' type appointments. The control and management of the forces in being and the conduct of operations and training are, equally, almost exclusively the domain of military people. Civil service advice, much less direction, is not applicable.

I agree with joint requirements and funding by a joint staff, project by project, rather than service 'slices' of the fiscal pie.

I'm not sure a Royal Commission would do any good but the Clerk of the Privy Council should convene a tiger team of DMs too reform defence procurement and while that tiger team should give a courteous hearing to admirals and generals it should, broadly and generally, ignore 99% of what 99% of them say.

 

[dapaterson]

On top of the revolving door of military postings, there's another more foundational problem in the current defence management scheme.

We place, for example, a Lieutenant Colonel pilot in the chair as an analyst of the RCAF's procurements.  This individual must speak truth to power - in other words, his or her role is to challenge the assumptions and desires of the commander of the RCAF.

Given the influence over future career prospects of that LCol that the commander of the RCAF holds, it can be extremely difficult to properly execute an appropriate level of that challenge function.

In a perfect world the Commander RCAF would be open and receptive to this, and the LCol would feel no institutional pressures to push things along regardless of their readiness.  Tragically, we live in a less than perfect world.

 

[Good2Golf]

Wasn't CFD supposed to achieve exactly this?

MCG, CFD for the most part validates the policy basis for and coordinates integration of the capability and structure requirements of the activities identified and analyzed by the services, then executed by the material group.  I was thinking more along the lines of full out identification and options analysis being fully conducted by a joint structure as CFD, with advisorial functions provided by the services, but true "sponsorship" of the projects being the Chief of Force Development, accountable though the Vice Chief of Defence to BOTH the CDS and DM.  This would be in contrast to the current method wherein sponsorship (and by functional exigency 'Championship') is carried out by the head of the elemental service.  Perhaps that would create a necessarily more integrated procurement space, where the joint nature of the development body held "resource demand tie-breaking" as a function isolated from the parochial view of the services. 

My highly personal point of view is: policy, finance, liaison with government, public affairs and procurement are, almost exclusively, the domain of the civil service - military officers should be few and far between and, generally, in 'observer' type appointments. The control and management of the forces in being and the conduct of operations and training are, equally, almost exclusively the domain of military people. Civil service advice, much less direction, is not applicable.

Concur, on the understanding that the definition of the operational requirement (based on the capability that the Government must clearly define by Policy) must remain the responsibility and purview of the military.  The challenge is that Government must: a) provide enough granularity in defence policy to the military to support development of the operational requirement, bounded with reasonable resource constraints; and b) clearly state when it is 'overriding' pure operational requirements with other considerations that normally occur, but are not identifiable as a nonmilitary constraint enforced upon procurement activities.

I agree with joint requirements and funding by a joint staff, project by project, rather than service 'slices' of the fiscal pie.

I'm not sure a Royal Commission would do any good but the Clerk of the Privy Council should convene a tiger team of DMs too reform defence procurement and while that tiger team should give a courteous hearing to admirals and generals it should, broadly and generally, ignore 99% of what 99% of them say.

This might well work, although the challenge would to ensure that such tiger teaming of DMs (and perhaps key ADMs from participating departments) included an associated "team accountability structure" wherein these senior bureaucrats were judged/assessed as to their effectiveness in deriving appropriate results from their directive work.  As it is now, one hears in the news how Defence procurement is broken, but very little either of the degree to which military leadership, or civilian bureaucrats were held to account for their decisions which affected billions of dollars.  Perhaps one could argue that at least in the case of previous Defence DM Robert Fonberg, there was institutional accountability in that he was demoted from DM of DFAIT to a Senior Associate Secretary at TBS when he failed to effectively separate the two primary functions of foreign affairs and international trade as tasked by the Clerk of the Privy Council.  Other examples show less accountability, in fact their performance of duties of the day seems confusing, particularly when contrasted against the reality today (e.g. Mr. Alan Williams [DND Associate Deputy Minister (Material) at the time] and his ardent defence of participating in the JSF program, but for industrial participation only he says now, not to actually buy the aircraft that the program was to deliver).

On top of the revolving door of military postings, there's another more fundamental problem in the current defence management scheme.

We place, for example, a Lieutenant Colonel pilot in the chair as an analyst of the RCAF's procurements.  This individual must speak truth to power - in other words, his or her role is to challenge the assumptions and desires of the commander of the RCAF.

Given the influence over future career prospects of that LCol that the commander of the RCAF holds, it can be extremely difficult to properly execute an appropriate level of that challenge function.

In a perfect world the Commander RCAF would be open and receptive to this, and the LCol would feel no institutional pressures to push things along regardless of their readiness.  Tragically, we live in a less than perfect world.

dapaterson, one would expect that staff officer, or any other such officer in similar position, to look beyond the colour of his or her uniform and to conduct the 'challenge function' in a manner that best supports the interests of the Department's overall goals (amongst them accountability and good governance in the use of the citizens' resources).  Whether his or her respective affiliated service agreed with the staff officer's departmentally-aligned advice or not, it should at least be respected.  Yes, this could conceivably make such an officer less popular within their respective service, but one would hope that pursuit of one's duties and loyalties to the sound management of departmental procurement activities would be seen as a good thing.


Regards
G2G

 

[Edward Campbell]

I think that going back for 20ish years or more several DMs and a few Clerks have had a "defence procurement reform plan" in the top drawers of their desks. The fact, and I believe it is a fact, is that no cabinet, and no prime minister, not Chrétien, not Martin and not Harper, has had the stomach for the sort of machinery of government 'reorg' that such a "master plan" requires. I think that David Emerson (the political turncoat) may have proposed such a 'reorg' but it would have been too disruptive for a minority government. Prime Minister Harper does not, I suspect, see a pressing political advantage in reform ... some minister and some constituencies are happy with the current bugger's muddle. Making defence "better" is not a vote getter.

 

[Kirkhill]

Additionally PM Harper may, belatedly, have discovered there is political advantage in NOT having a readily deployable force.  If your force is at NTM you have fewer excuses for not using them.  Putting it another way - if you had them your allies might expect you to use them.  If you don't have them you can't send them.

Canadians aren't much in the sending mood these days.

 

[Old Sweat]

Jack Granatstein predicts that the army is not going anywhere soon in this piece from the Globe and Mail reproduced under the fair dealings provision of the Copyright Act.


No Canadian boots on the ground
J.L. GRANATSTEIN
Special to The Globe and Mail

Published Tuesday, Aug. 19 2014, 3:00 AM EDT
Last updated Tuesday, Aug. 19 2014, 4:53 AM EDT

Last week, Ottawa announced that it was sending two Royal Canadian Air Force transport aircraft to ferry supplies to Kurdish forces in Iraq battling the Islamic State advance. The Royal Canadian Navy has a frigate in the eastern Mediterranean watching the Russians who threaten Ukraine, and the RCAF has fighter aircraft in Romania patrolling the skies to reassure our NATO allies. While the government has sent a few handfuls of soldiers on training exercises in eastern Europe, there are no troops for a long-term deployment. Ships, yes. Aircraft, yes. But no boots on the ground.


Two weeks ago, the World Federalist Movement-Canada issued a report calling on Canada to do more peacekeeping, suggesting a deployment in the Central African Republic. The organization pointed out that the Canadian Forces currently has only 34 members on peacekeeping service. Again, no boots on the ground.

Why? There are reasons that must seem compelling to the Prime Minister and his government. When he was first elected in 2006, Stephen Harper was markedly pro-military, promising more equipment and support for the Canadian soldiers fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan. But as the casualties increased, the government’s commitment to the mission waned. After 158 dead, after hundreds wounded, and uncounted numbers suffering from post-traumatic stress, the zeal is gone. Defence spending is at its lowest level since the Second World War, a mere 1 per cent of GDP. The Canadian Forces are running on fumes, its equipment aging rapidly, and new procurements are stuck in endless meetings, re-evaluations, and bureaucratic processes. Apparently, there are no votes in supporting the troops.

But ships and aircraft might be provided. In 1950, as the war in Korea began, the United States pressed Canada for a commitment. “We’ve sent destroyers,” then foreign minister Lester Pearson reportedly said. “That’s just a token,” the U.S. envoy replied. “But it’s three destroyers,” Pearson plaintively said. “Okay, it’s three tokens.” Pressured, Canada duly sent a brigade of infantry. Boots on the ground mattered in 1950.

They still matter in 2014, but this Canadian government – and likely any future government in the near-term – will not send soldiers abroad in any number. We have become casualty averse, and the sight of body bags arriving at Trenton and being convoyed to Toronto loses votes and weakens ministerial will.

But this does not mean – and cannot mean – that Canada will never deploy its military again. We have national interests, and they need to be defended if they are threatened. The state has the obligation to protect the Canadian people and territory against invaders. It must protect Canadian unity, our economy, and those with whom we are allied by treaty. We must work with our friends to protect and advance democracy and freedom, a lesson we surely learned in the terrible wars of the 20th century and the conflicts of the 21st. Will we fight to keep our national interests secure? We must – to the limits of our strength.

We have real domestic and international obligations, and we maintain the Canadian Forces to meet them. We are in NATO, and if Russia or any other power attacks NATO members, we have a legal and moral obligation to assist in repelling invasion. We are in NORAD, and we have the obligation to work with the U.S. to protect the air approaches to North America. Will we fight to honour our treaty obligations? We must, but as an independent nation we can decide the scope of our contribution.

We are in the United Nations, and we should – when we are able and when the conditions are right – participate in peacekeeping operations. But we need to be selective. Peacekeeping in Africa is probably best accomplished by African states, not Canadian troops dependent on good roads and airfields for movement and support. We can contribute more than 34 peacekeepers, for sure, but no Canadian government is likely to send a large contingent into the coercive, violent peace enforcement missions that the UN is dealing with today, as in the Central African Republic. Casualty-averse Canadian governments simply will not do this, nor should they.

Certainly Prime Minister Harper will not deploy a battalion or brigade anywhere abroad before a 2015 general election, however tough his rhetoric sometimes sounds.

Thus, no boots on the ground today, and likely few in the future. It’s better to send a navy vessel or a half-squadron of CF-18s to troubled areas where there are few real risks of casualties. But the army will stay at home, training for the uncertain future.

 

[Edward Campbell]

I think Prof Granatstein is willfully, and very, very incorrectly, minimizing the danger that warships in e.g. the Mediterranean and Arabian Seas face. There are plenty of people out there, often in small, fast, explosive laden wooden boast who are willing and able to mount a suicide attack against a major warship.

To his main point: Canadians, not governments, "have become casualty averse," because they cannot understand (because governments refuse to explain?)* why we should send troop into harm's way.

The great military historian John Fortescue famously said of Elizabeth I that "she hated straight dealing for its simplicity, she hated conviction for its certainty, and she hated war for its expense." Rings true today, in Ottawa, London and Washington, doesn't it? Elizabeth was finally pushed and dragged and coerced (mostly by Burghley and Walsingham) into a necessary but extremely risky war with Spain.

I don't think there are any "necessary" wars right now .... certainly there is no prospect of one anywhere in the Middle East: the Israelis have the power to deter their enemies or to punish them horribly if they attack. but I'm not certain Israel can survive and I'm even less sure if we (or the USA and Germany, and, and, and ...) can do an anything much to help them (they, the Israelis, can nuke Damascus and Tehran and Riyadh and so on).

I know that innocent civilians are dying in great numbers in all sorts of dark, dirty corners of the world ... I'm not sure that matters enough to justify sending Canadian troops to fight and die anywhere.

_____
* Back in 2002, when we first send troops to Afghanistan I thought the the government of the day (Jean Chrétien, Prop) was clear and direct in the "why." There were three reasons listed on the DFAIT web site:

    1. To do our full and fair share in countering a direct and explicit threat against Canada - Osama bin Laden had named Canada as one of his next targets - by defeating the Taliban and denying them a firm base in Afghanistan;

    2. To be seen to be doing our fair share and more in the Western world's response to global terrorism; and

    3. To help Afghanistan ... in some undefined ways.

 

[Halifax Tar]

I know that innocent civilians are dying in great numbers in all sorts of dark, dirty corners of the world ... I'm not sure that matters enough to justify sending Canadian troops to fight and die anywhere.

ERC, I think this statement of yours sums up the the great divide in western military and international dealings. 

Many want to help, no one wants to pay the bill; be it in hard currency or blood.

I personally take a isolationist stance.  Freedoms and social directions must be gained and earned by the people who want them, not imposed by an outside force.  It is sad but in order for a society/culture to progress and develop sometimes violence must ensue, innocence will be violated and we should stay the fudge out.

 

[Kirkhill]

ERC, I think this statement of yours sums up the the great divide in western military and international dealings. 

Many want to help, no one wants to pay the bill; be it in hard currency or blood.

I personally take a isolationist stance.  Freedoms and social directions must be gained and earned by the people who want them, not imposed by an outside force.  It is sad but in order for a society/culture to progress and develop sometimes violence must ensue, innocence will be violated and we should stay the fudge out.

I am a bit more proactive than isolationist but I firmly require a Plan B.  Maybe I just misheard my classes or maybe I just remember what I want to have heard but I have a firm and unchanging planning principle:  What do I do when the plan fails?  How do I painlessly withdraw, reassess and reset?

In the world of diplomacy I firmly believe that the Navy plays the key element in controlling the length, depth and scope of any commitment and that is why I was a pleasure to be informed the Navy is standing up a full time Boarding Party-Small Boats Unit.  I believe that that will drive ship construction that  is more compatible with launching other troops towards shore.  That then allows the Canadian Government to send in a couple of ships and launch some JTF2, CSOR and even Lt Infantry Troops ashore - and to withdraw them expeditiously. 

The depth of the penetrations will necessarily be limited and their durations - but that is exactly as it should be.

Building Big Honking Ships to support invasions may not sell.

But building a Helpful Navy could have all sorts of benefits - and nobody would argue against the need for a ship operating far from home to be protected.

 

[observor 69]

You don't suppose Mr Granatstein is thinking of Gwynne Dyer's new book in this article ?

Military historian Gwynne Dyer on why Canada fights

http://www.cbc.ca/thecurrent/episode/2014/08/06/military-historian-gwynne-dyer-on-why-canada-fights/

http://www.amazon.ca/Canada-Great-Power-Game-1914-2014/dp/0307361683

 

[MarkOttawa]

In response to Granatstein piece James Cox
http://ca.linkedin.com/pub/jim-cox-ph-d/6/257/82b
https://www.facebook.com/jsc11a

takes on PM Harper:
http://cdfai3ds.wordpress.com/2014/08/19/j-l-granatstein-no-canadian-boots-on-the-ground/comment-page-1/#comment-7493

Dr. Granatstein, as always, accurately identifies an important central issue. After their initial, shallow jingoism in 2006, about how Canada would not ‘cut and run,’ the government did just that, principally because they did not have, and still do not have, any real leadership ability to lead our country in a real fight.

Mr. Harper never did try to ‘rally the troops’ or motivate Canadians to stay the course and bear the burden needed to prevail on the battlefield. If Mr. Harper had been PM in 1917, we would never have been in France, let alone fight at Vimy Ridge. Had he been PM in 1942, Canada would probably have sent only best wishes and foodstuffs to allies fighting in Europe. Even Mackenzie King has a better record in conflict than Mr. Harper.

The Islamic State is a brutal, medieval and unmoral group of thugs who need to be eliminated. They are a threat to normal people everywhere. True, early efforts to eradicate this despicable group should fall on Iraqis, aided by other regional forces, but developed western nations should not ignore the need to get involved, perhaps decisively at the first opportune moment. We let the Nazis fester and grow. Let’s not commit the same mistake again.

As always, the US, and to a certain extent the UK, seems to be the only other states with enough gumption to take the fight to the the bad guys. If there was ever an issue that could unite NATO and Russia, the growing infection of the Islamic State is it.

Canada’s weak backstage contribution impresses no one, but it does allow Mr. Harper to once again avoid the requirement to (heaven forbid) actually talk with Canadians and explain why the Islamic State must be destroyed as quickly as possible.

As with Canada’s fight against militarism in the First World War, against Nazism during the Second World War, against Communism during the Cold War, and recently against the Taliban in Afghanistan, Canadians will fight, when needed and when well led, no matter the level of casualties. Regrettably, Mr. Harper does not provide that kind of leadership today. He would rather argue with Canadians at home than fight real enemies abroad. He really has no guts for anything beyond harmless domestic political fights. He seems to be afraid to get out front when the bullets are flying and people are dying. He reigns by fiat, not through real leadership.

Good luck to those fighting to eliminate the Islamic State. If you need help, don’t bother calling. If you need some maple syrup, give us a shout. We’ll fly it in, to a neighbouring country, but you’ll have to come and get it.

Mark
Ottawa

 

[CougarKing]

A scathing article against the Tories by Murray Brewster of the Canadian Press via Reuters:

Canada talks tough on Ukraine, but cuts $2.7-billion from defence in 2015

OTTAWA - Stephen Harper has been one of the toughest-talking leaders throughout the Ukraine crisis, yet newly released figures show National Defence is expected to face an even deeper budget hole in the coming year than previously anticipated.
The ongoing reductions come as the prime minister is expected to resist pressure from allies at this week's NATO summit to spend substantially more on the military.

Annual spending on the military, when compared with 2011, is slated to shrink by a total of $2.7-billion in 2015, according to a briefing note prepared for the deputy defence minister.

That would be almost $300-million more than earlier internal estimates, and roughly $600-million higher than the figure defence official acknowledged last fall when they rolled out the department's renewal plan.

(...SNIPPED)

Those pressures include, among other things, severance for laid off civilians at defence; the bill for the Harper government's pledge to sustain newly trained Afghan forces; and the cost of operating the Public Works secretariat that is picking a replacement for the CF-18s.

National Defence has repeatedly said that it — like other government departments — is expected to contribute towards the government's drive towards a balanced budget next year.

The issue of how much allies fork out for their militaries will be among the major closed-door topics when NATO leaders meet this week in Wales

(...SNIPPED)

According to the latest NATO figures, the Harper government spends one per cent of GDP on defence, just slightly ahead of financially-troubled Spain, the Slovak Republic, Hungary, Luxembourg, Lithuania, and Latvia.

(...EDITED)

 

[McG]

Terry Milewski is making a similar argument that the government is talking a game for which it is not prepared to write the checks.

Analysis: Stephen Harper takes big words, small stick to NATO summit
Meeting in Wales this week puts spotlight on the gap between Canada's words and deeds
Terry Milewski, CBC News
01 Sep 2014

Canada's modest military might has always made it hard for its prime ministers to strut convincingly on the world stage. Stephen Harper is only the latest to offer stirring rhetorical contributions to the Western alliance, without having much firepower to back them up.

When it comes to speeches, Harper has not pulled his punches, even comparing the predations of Russian President Vladimir Putin to those of Nazi Germany. He says that Putin's "aggressive, militaristic and imperialistic" activities threaten the "peace and stability of the world."

For domestic consumption, Harper's government claims to be leading the Western response. Foreign Minister John Baird has insisted that "no other government has stood up more forcefully and aggressively against the Russian aggression in Ukraine."

Really? Those are big words. But this week's NATO summit in Wales will expose a gap between words and deeds.

Faced with a pressing need to offer more than ringing denunciations of Russian aggression, NATO's 28 members are being challenged to increase their defence budgets.

Harper intends to do no such thing. As long as that's true, Harper will be speaking loudly, but carrying a small stick.

So far, Harper seems reluctant to mention the topic [of defence funding]. The official account of his pre-summit phone call with U.S. President Barack Obama states that it "focused primarily on preparations for next week's NATO Summit in Wales, where leaders will discuss, among other things, the coordinated response to Russia's efforts to destabilize Ukraine and undermine the country's sovereignty and territorial integrity." Nothing there about boosting defence spending.

By contrast, the White House account of the same call says this: "The president stressed that agreement on increased defence investment in all areas is a top priority at the NATO summit."

A "top priority?" For the U.S., maybe — but not for Canada, where the Conservative government is focused on balancing the budget before next year's election.

Instead, according to the account of the Prime Minister's Office, Harper's goal at the NATO summit is to emphasize what Canada has already done, especially with its fine rhetoric: "Canada's main objectives for the Summit include highlighting its contributions to the Alliance, notably the role it has played since the onset of the Russia-Ukraine crisis by stressing the need for a strong international response to Russia's aggression against Ukraine..."

So: our "main objective" is to "highlight" our role in "stressing the need" for a "strong response."

No doubt, other members of the NATO alliance will hasten to highlight the exemplary power of their own speeches.

But among NATO's key members, only the U.S. — which pays 70 per cent of NATO's bills — and the United Kingdom top the desired level of two per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) in defence spending.

Canada's spending is closer to one per cent of GDP. Greece and Estonia both do better.

Which leaves Canada with a challenge — which it is meeting rhetorically.

The PMO says that Canada's military is "one of the most engaged and responsive armed forces within the Alliance." Perhaps so — but it's one of the smallest.

Canada ranks sixth in spending among the allies and contributes just six per cent of NATO's budget. As a share of GDP, only five of NATO's 28 members spend less than Canada.

It is true that Canadian troops fought effectively in Afghanistan, although how successful the Western intervention there was will be another difficult question for the summit.

More recently, Canada has sent half a dozen CF-18s to Eastern Europe for patrols in response to Russia's Ukrainian adventure, and has also offered support and "non-kinetic" aid to the Ukrainian government. (Apparently, that means it won't hurt anyone. No bullets.)

But NATO wants something much more kinetic from all its members. It wants a more agile, muscular military deterrent to Russia, kept in a high state of readiness with a rapid-reaction force and pre-positioned supplies close to Russia's borders — notably in Poland. And the outgoing secretary general, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, says that members who want the "insurance policy" of collective defence must "pay the premiums."

Rasmussen will still be in the chair at this week's summit — he doesn't quit until the end of the month — and it's clear that the NATO alliance will, once again, urge its members to raise their defence spending to two per cent of GDP over 10 years — a pledge made before, without success.

The Harper government has not denied that it is resisting this latest proposal. Instead, a defence department statement implies that Canada's already doing enough: "Our government has made significant investments into the Canadian Armed Forces ... Following a decade of darkness under the previous Liberal government, we have increased the defence budget by over 27 per cent. We have also delivered on important procurement projects..."

These procurement projects, it says, include the frigate modernization program and the Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships — neither of which has, in fact, been delivered. Besides that, the 27 per cent increase takes no account of inflation.

But never mind; we still have plenty of rhetoric. The statement says: "Our government is delivering on its commitment to ensuring Canada's military is strong, proud and ready to defend Canadian interests at home and abroad."

Wrong, says the Conference of Defence Associations, a fiercely pro-military group whose experts concluded in a June report this year that, "adjusting for inflation, the defence budget is now smaller than it was in 2007."

In fact, the report found, defence cuts provided a quarter of all the current year's budget reductions. The CDA adds that, "in real terms, capital spending for major new equipment has declined four years in a row, and remains on a downward trend. DND [the Department of National Defence] has not spent 25 per cent of the amount allocated to replacing major equipment for four straight years. As a share of the defence budget, capital spending has dropped to the lowest level since 1977-78."

The CDA's conclusion was that "the Canadian Armed Forces' operational readiness is dropping, its purchasing power is being eroded, and future military capability is being reduced."

Is the "decade of darkness" over? Or is this just a new one? There's no sign that the trend will be reversed soon. But if words are needed, Canada stands ready.

"Canada will continue to work closely with its allies and partners," says the PMO, "and will take further economic steps if Russia continues down this reckless and irresponsible path. We will continue to support our allies in Eastern Europe and take the steps necessary to assist them to maintain their security and national territorial integrity."

Except, apparently, spending money.

But ...

It is difficult to blame all our problems on funding levels while at the same time we are inefficient or wasteful with the funding we have.  We continue to retain unnecessary layers of HQ/bureaucracy, we over-rank our higher establishments for unnecessary parity with foreign militaries,  we invest millions tinkering with fashion, we spend tens of millions on historical celebrations, we like to WSE guys for tours when pers of the correct rank are available, we like to use rental cars when DND vehicles are adequate, we like to stay in hotels when DND quarters are available, etc.

I am not saying there is enough money in the defence budget.  We certainly need more to deliver on all the promises being made as to our readiness.  However, getting our spending priorities better focused on military capability and readiness (training, maintenance, equipment) would see us in a much better position.  We need to do this regardless of more money coming or not (and more money is probably not coming).

... but anyway; the article seemed to imply we had a small military next to most NATO nations.  Our budget as a percent of GDP is certainly small, but I don't think the military itself is small.  If one believes Wikipedia (and at times that can be dangerous), then we are fairly middle of the pack as far as size goes.  Of course, there is another funding problem: mid-size armed forces on a compact -size budget.

 

[MilEME09]

I would tend to agree that its not all about that 2%,instead like the current German defense minister has said when he announced moderate increases to the budget months ago its about efficiently spending the money. You can spend over 2% all you want but if you have a very wasteful defense department just how good is that budget? That said I think if DND was able to spend all that unspent capital money it could go a long way to giving us sharper teeth, not dentures that keep falling out.