• Thanks for stopping by. Logging in to a registered account will remove all generic ads. Please reach out with any questions or concerns.

The Defence Budget [superthread]

Eye In The Sky said:
Bases have already been shrunk down enough, fighters are operational every day of the year, submarines sail operationally without 99% of the CAF knowing and tanks were used operationally in the sandbox.

Sorry but the "tooth" has been reduced and crippled enough already.  What needs to be reduced is any and all things "tail" starting with HQs.  We need to change the way we think and prioritize.  Commanders at all levels who don't get with the program to reduce the tail, as directed, should be replaced.  Full stop.

I would argue that we keep bases for the sake of keeping the bases. Take Shilo- a base for 2 units of 1 CMBG. Why not just put those units in Edmonton to train out of Wainwright (or Suffield when BATUS isn't in play) or move the Edmonton garrison (with no real training area) to Shilo and let the reserves train out of Wainwright.

I should digress somewhat in that I used fighters and subs as basic examples, not neccessarily as THE examples. Subs would seem to have a low priority for a small navy like Canada, but at some point we have to look at our manning and say, "what can we do well", "what do we really need", and "how can we best accomplish our mission". If those questions mean that niche capabilities such as subs, GBAD, AT, etc go away to put bodies and money into the key enablers that we're looking for than agree.

Finally, I agree that we need to trim the tail. I just suggest that we figure out what military we want (based on a realistic and not emotional rationale) and than tailor the support to that force. We can't meet PY numbers as is for the wide range of capabilities we field, so it's not ALL the tail's fault.
 
Bird_Gunner45 said:
I would argue that we keep bases for the sake of keeping the bases. Take Shilo- a base for 2 units of 1 CMBG. Why not just put those units in Edmonton to train out of Wainwright (or Suffield when BATUS isn't in play) or move the Edmonton garrison (with no real training area) to Shilo and let the reserves train out of Wainwright.

I would disagree with this, as closing any more bases would hurt Dom Ops response time in the various provinces if you start axing bases, as well both bases used as example (edmonton and Shilo) have room to expand if the CF does. It's a lot easier to close a base then it is to open one.
 
Kirkhill said:
I guess what I am saying is, starting from the Front Line Own Troops, when can you start feeding civilians into the mix so as to leave as many trigger pullers as possible up front.
This is not necessarily a clean-cut question.  Domestic garrison work that could be provided by civilians may be provided by service personnel who are needed when we deploy.  Base kitchens could be all civilian cooks, but it is the military cooks in those kitchens who end-up also following units to the field or on operations. 

We have been through the experiment of out-sourcing services [Google "Most Efficient Organization (MEO)"]. In some cases, the in-place DND assets entered the public ASD solicitation to continue providing the service and it was the DND assets that would win.

I think much of what could be pruned has been pruned at the service provider end.  What could be civilianized was civilianized ... then when other cuts came in years later it, it was the civilianized positions that were cut to return SWE money.

Halifax Tar said:
I would agree with what you are saying.  I did two tours NSE in Afg.  There were a good number of people in my organisation that wouldn't, couldn't or didn't want to go OTW.  There were a great many "Static" positions that could have been given over to a contractor with our main focus being on CLPs, FLGs and FP.  This all ties into my point about operational roles and what is basically IBTS.
That was one very specific theatre.  If we design our force exclusively to fight that war again, then we will have committed to being irrelevant in any future peer or near-peer conflict.  This is much the same as how we first suffered in Afghanistan for capabilities allowed to atrophy because they were not required for Bosnia.

Eye In The Sky said:
Sorry but the "tooth" has been reduced and crippled enough already.  What needs to be reduced is any and all things "tail" starting with HQs.  We need to change the way we think and prioritize.  Commanders at all levels who don't get with the program to reduce the tail, as directed, should be replaced.  Full stop.
Yes.  HQ bloat is the place to start for big savings or reinvestment.
 
No one has mentioned that these civilian workers will be in a union. Possibly not at the start of a change, but eventually.
 
MilEME09 said:
I would disagree with this, as closing any more bases would hurt Dom Ops response time in the various provinces if you start axing bases, as well both bases used as example (edmonton and Shilo) have room to expand if the CF does. It's a lot easier to close a base then it is to open one.

Domestic response time is a bit of a red herring. There is only one IRU on standby for all of LFWA/3 Div-- it is supposed to deploy in support of either JTF West or Pacific, and the largest cities in the west are Vancouver and Calgary, which already don't have Army bases. The standby IRU will launch, if required, out of either Shilo or Edmonton, and it's already a long way from Shilo to Vancouver.

I remember that 2 Bde exercised deploying by airlift the IRU HQ and Vanguard Coy from Petawawa to Thunder Bay a few years back. Similarly, the LFAA/5 Div IRU is always staged out of Gagetown -- if there's an issue in Newfoundland, then it's off to the airhead. It's been done before.

Now, I do agree that we shouldn't be closing any more bases. I think that the environmental cleanup costs alone would bankrupt us. We're stuck with what we have until cleanup technology becomes much much cheaper. Oh, and whenever the Brits get tired of using Suffield, we'll have to find a use for it. Cleaning up that place and turning it into a park just wouldn't be an option.
 
MilEME09 said:
I would disagree with this, as closing any more bases would hurt Dom Ops response time in the various provinces if you start axing bases, as well both bases used as example (edmonton and Shilo) have room to expand if the CF does. It's a lot easier to close a base then it is to open one.

Perhaps the "DOMOPS" task could be part of a rationalization of the role of the reserves, leaving the regular force for expeditionary ops as a primary and domestic ops as a secondary task? This would allow for a base closure or two (and associated savings on O&M costs) which could allow for the purchase of a stronger "real" support structure, including C-17s, trucks to move pers, etc, etc.

In reality close to 50% of the budget goes to personnel costs (I know it was 49% a couple years ago- if someone knows the 2014/2015 FY figure feel free to correct me), so the majority of savings will come from the O&M budget. Reducing HQs would be a great start in lowering costs and must happen, but I dont believe that it alone will come anywhere near creating the savings we believe it will without a rational lowering of O&M costs.

Further, we can't get/retain enough people to come close to meeting our PY allotment. Cutting 1000 HQ (and yes, its important) positions doesn't necessarily mean that there will magically be 1000 PYs in front line units. Retention of front line personnel is critical if we are really going to increase the teeth as well as rational cuts to front line capabilities not 100% required and cuts to "base-side" type positions that are keeping combat arm/hard sea/hard air personnel from their primary duties. Admittedly, retention is not a simple issue, so the elimination of the nice to have positions is the easiest target.

Finally, I believe that part of the problem with gaining and retaining front line pers is the same reason why Maple Leaf foods in Brandon has to bring in foreign workers- Canadians prefer office type jobs (in our case, HQs) to physical labour jobs.

 
Bird_Gunner45 said:
Perhaps the "DOMOPS" task could be part of a rationalization of the role of the reserves, leaving the regular force for expeditionary ops as a primary and domestic ops as a secondary task? This would allow for a base closure or two (and associated savings on O&M costs) which could allow for the purchase of a stronger "real" support structure, including C-17s, trucks to move pers, etc, etc.

The last briefing I had from ARCC and others about a year ago said exactly this, and I've said it a few times on this forum that the army want's to shift 90% of dom ops to Pres, and Reg force doing 90% international operations, the other 10% being picked up by the other side for various reasons (such as specialized equipment needed for a dom op). Problem is DND seems to not want to execute this vision properly because it means more money to the reserves to give them kit like bridging equipment for example during floods. The structure of the reserves also doesn't support it well because if I said to my employer I need an unknown amount of time off to do disaster relief in BC or Manitoba. I'd probably get told to take a hike, you want reserves deploying on mass? training us to be a deployable sub-unit not just a force multiplier to augment the reg force. then give us the job protection so we feel comfortable with leaving our jobs for days/weeks to do these ops.
 
Brasidas said:
Someone's not a fan of Calian?

Didn't we layoff most of the double dippers Calian staff when the budget crashed? There's sure as heck not many walking around CFSCE anymore, only few I saw were running the EMBL (there's some money savings for you).
 
MilEME09 said:
The last briefing I had from ARCC and others about a year ago said exactly this, and I've said it a few times on this forum that the army want's to shift 90% of dom ops to Pres, and Reg force doing 90% international operations, the other 10% being picked up by the other side for various reasons (such as specialized equipment needed for a dom op). Problem is DND seems to not want to execute this vision properly because it means more money to the reserves to give them kit like bridging equipment for example during floods. The structure of the reserves also doesn't support it well because if I said to my employer I need an unknown amount of time off to do disaster relief in BC or Manitoba. I'd probably get told to take a hike, you want reserves deploying on mass? training us to be a deployable sub-unit not just a force multiplier to augment the reg force. then give us the job protection so we feel comfortable with leaving our jobs for days/weeks to do these ops.

Agree with your sentiments. If the reserve was rationalized, understrength units merged or eliminated (ie- Reserve Arty bty in Yarmouth, NS), and protection for reservists granted (which seems like a relatively simple political thing, though in politics nothing is simple) than I believe we could see more efficient structures, freeing up the money for training. To me, this would mean going all in on the concept, minimizing/eliminating reserve combat training above a Coy level (reserve Bde exes), and purchasing the required equipment. I also believe that it would be easier for reserve units to keep pers in this role as they would feel more appreciated, as it were, than being treated as a second fiddle to reg force units.

 
PuckChaser said:
Didn't we layoff most of the double dippers Calian staff when the budget crashed? There's sure as heck not many walking around CFSCE anymore, only few I saw were running the EMBL (there's some money savings for you).

Its been years since I've been back at CFSCE. Saw a few over at the LTF in Edmonton a couple weeks ago. I remember gripes about them when I was in Kingston.
 
MilEME09 said:
The last briefing I had from ARCC and others about a year ago said exactly this, and I've said it a few times on this forum that the army want's to shift 90% of dom ops to Pres, and Reg force doing 90% international operations, the other 10% being picked up by the other side for various reasons (such as specialized equipment needed for a dom op). Problem is DND seems to not want to execute this vision properly because it means more money to the reserves to give them kit like bridging equipment for example during floods. The structure of the reserves also doesn't support it well because if I said to my employer I need an unknown amount of time off to do disaster relief in BC or Manitoba. I'd probably get told to take a hike, you want reserves deploying on mass? training us to be a deployable sub-unit not just a force multiplier to augment the reg force. then give us the job protection so we feel comfortable with leaving our jobs for days/weeks to do these ops.

I agree. When I served on RSS the unit was full of experienced, motivated soldiers -- all of whom had day jobs. When the next October Crisis/Red River Flood hits, I don't expect that the RCMP and the city police will be keen to let their guys go into uniform on short notice. It was even worse with my soldiers that were DND civilians -- their skill overlap with their day jobs was of fantastic value to both organizations, but their day job supervisors weren't keen on letting them down tools instantly in a time of crisis.

Now, given 6 to 12 months notice, can their organizations spare them for a tour in Iraq or Afghanistan? Absolutely. With enough advance notice, it's not  much more disruptive than parental leave. The reserves remain a fantastic manpower pool for extended (Roto 2+) expeditionary operations.

I'm not sure who came up with the idea that reservists should be a short notice local response force, but the idea doesn't jive with the reserve unit that I served with. Plus, the IRU tasking itself (4 Bns on standby, no special equipment, minimal training bill, deploying very occasionally) doesn't seem to be that much of a burden on the regular field force, so even in the long term if it is divested entirely to a growing TBG/ARCG capability, I don't think the regular field force would see much of a savings.
 
Bird_Gunner45 said:
Perhaps the "DOMOPS" task could be part of a rationalization of the role of the reserves, leaving the regular force for expeditionary ops as a primary and domestic ops as a secondary task? This would allow for a base closure or two (and associated savings on O&M costs) which could allow for the purchase of a stronger "real" support structure, including C-17s, trucks to move pers, etc, etc.

That's about as ass backwards as you can get.  If you're paying someone 24/7, they are the logical ones to respond to short-notice tasks - like domestic emergencies.  For deployed ops where there is a longer ramp-up time for roto 1 and beyond, leverage the Reserves.  Indeed, since a large chunk of such missions tends to be the combat arms, which are the lower-training skillsets, it makes more sense to vest them in the Reserves with a small Reg F that can do roto 0 unsupported, roto 1 augmented, and roto 2+ with 30%+ from the Reserves, saving those 68000 positions (not really that many - read on) for the high-skillset personnel needed.

As for 68000: there ain't no such animal.  Historic attrition is 7% (surges and down, year over year, but the long-term plan should be based on 7%).  Current training times average about 2 years to the OFP (that's the point where someone can be employed in their military occupation.  This varies greatly between occupations, and between officers and NCMs.  It is heavily weighted by the long time it takes to train ROTP officers - they are pre-OFP throughout their university studies and for whatever time it takes them to be trained in their occupation after graduation).  Thus, at any one time, we have two years worth of attrition in the training pipeline - that's 14% of our 68000, or about 9500, leaving 58500 trained strength.  There's usually about 500 ending their careers and thus on final leave, and another 1000 or so with long-term medical conditions.  Thus, you're left with 57000 of 68000 who are employable; and about 1000 of those are on advanced training of some sort, meaning our 68000 are now winnowed down to 56000.


(EDIT: expanded on OFP a bit)
 
dapaterson: I think this just shows again DND doesn't have it's priorities correct. If done properly CFRG should be one of the most effective and efficient parts of the CF filled with people that would be great at recruiting people. If you were to include the reserves in your math, then the numbers would just get worse, we just held an open house, about 70 people in the door, 30 application packages were taken, of that we expect to get five actual applications to the CF, one might get past BMQ.
 
dapaterson said:
That's about as *** backwards as you can get.  If you're paying someone 24/7, they are the logical ones to respond to short-notice tasks - like domestic emergencies.  For deployed ops where there is a longer ramp-up time for roto 1 and beyond, leverage the Reserves.  Indeed, since a large chunk of such missions tends to be the combat arms, which are the lower-training skillsets, it makes more sense to vest them in the Reserves with a small Reg F that can do roto 0 unsupported, roto 1 augmented, and roto 2+ with 30%+ from the Reserves, saving those 68000 positions (not really that many - read on) for the high-skillset personnel needed.

As for 68000: there ain't no such animal.  Historic attrition is 7% (surges and down, year over year, but the long-term plan should be based on 7%).  Current training times average about 2 years to the OFP (that's the point where someone can be employed in their military occupation.  This is heavily weighted by the long time it takes to train ROTP officers).  Thus, at any one time, we have two years worth of attrition in the training pipeline - that's 14% of our 68000, or about 9500, leaving 58500 trained strength.  There's usually about 500 ending their careers and thus on final leave, and another 1000 or so with long-term medical conditions.  Thus, you're left with 57000 of 68000 who are employable; and about 1000 of those are on advanced training of some sort, meaning our 68000 are now winnowed down to 56000.

I disagree that it's *** backwards as it gets.

Your comments on a Roto 0, Roto 1 scenario are entirely correct and that's why I stated that Reserve training could be up to a Coy level (not because a Coy will deploy, but because it would expose Pl Comds/Pl WOs to a larger op before augmenting a regular force unit. There is no requirement to train reserves any higher than this in a COMBAT role as the days of industrial age warfare that would require a Reserve bde to deploy whole are gone. There's no task, no equipment, and no desire for it, so why waste money training for no need?

As for the DOMOP task, I would argue that it makes sense that local units would be able to better react to local needs than to bring in Regular force units. Granted, this would require a significant modification of the current reserve charter and protection for workers, but having reserve/militia units called out "in support of the local power" is not unprecedented and was extremely common in the past (before we moved to our current reserve structure). Moreover, being engaged in DOMOPs would also be a legitimate task for a reserve Bde HQ and leadership.

As this thread is about budgets and how we can save money, my point is that we (the CAF and government) need a REALISTIC and not emotional valuation of what it is that the CAF will be expected to perform. In a perfect world Canada would have a division size army, including divisional force multipliers (real GS regiment, AH, etc) and a reserve structure fully equipped to move up to support the regular force. However, this is unfeasible under current funding and government direction. So, understanding that the reserves will provide 1 for 1 augmentation and rationalizing reserve capabilities/formations accordingly (perhaps up to disbandment of reserve armour for example) would be a way to focus resources on a task that the reserves could really be expected to do.

As for your numbers on the 68,000, I also track that we are usually -15% to -25% of effective strength due to various reasons, with the higher number being attributed to TCAT/PCAT pers. However, the CAF cannot come close to meeting the 56,000 that you state as a winnowed state, let alone the 68,000. So, as stated, we cannot meet our 68,000 PYs due to retention and recruitment shortfalls, regardless of their status in the force.

 
On a different note, I was looking on the Reserve Employment opportunity website, and I noticed the vast majority of positions open are clerks. It makes me wonder, do we even need clerks in the reserves? can these positions be filled by civilians for cheaper? or even in the reg force could it be done for cheaper? I'm sure you can find plenty of accountants looking for work that could be employed in finance roles.
 
MilEME09 said:
On a different note, I was looking on the Reserve Employment opportunity website, and I noticed the vast majority of positions open are clerks.
I suspect a large part of these were MATA/PATA backfills?

Every time I have deployed, there have been clerks that deployed with me.  I have never seen bandsmen, TDOs nor PSOs deployed anywhere.  Let's start with these if one is looking for whole occupations to cut.
 
MCG said:
I suspect a large part of these were MATA/PATA backfills?

Every time I have deployed, there have been clerks that deployed with me.  I have never seen bandsmen, TDOs nor PSOs deployed anywhere.  Let's start with these if one is looking for whole occupations to cut.

As a whole I wonder if there are any trades that can be safely divested to our civilian counter parts?
 
MCG said:
How about bandsman?

Chaplain, Cooks (in most cases), Dental officers?, Public affairs officers (this should really be a position not a trade, as according to forces.ca), Training Development Officer (again position not a trade).

this is just going off forces.ca
 
MCG said:
I suspect a large part of these were MATA/PATA backfills?

Every time I have deployed, there have been clerks that deployed with me.  I have never seen bandsmen, TDOs nor PSOs deployed anywhere.  Let's start with these if one is looking for whole occupations to cut.

The average Army Reserve unit will have three full-time Reserve clerk positions, plus one Reg F clerk.  Not excessive, given the work required (and the fact that people take leave, go on course etc).

TDOs were deploying regularly to Sierra Leone from about 2000 onwards.  Of course, there were no lessons to be learned; they were establishing training systems for a third world military that we and our allies were working to re-establish.  Where could that knowledge possibly have been applied.

PSOs deployed individually to Afghanistan doing a variety of studies as requested by the Army and force employers.


If we want to look at occupations to reduce in size, may I suggest MARE, RCEME, AERE and the various flavours of Sigs officers?  They infest NDHQ by the hundreds, working on projects.  Because they are frequently rotated, projects suffer.  Moving to civilian professionals in project management who would remain with projects for the majority of the project's life would improve performance.

Chaplains are extremely worthwhile.  Dentists could easily be outsourced (perhaps moving the military to the public service model of finding their own dental services on the economy, with contract dentists to confirm dental fitness for deployment).


And remember: in the 1990s, someone, somewhere, decided that musicians were more important than physical fitness instructors as trades in the CAF.
 
Back
Top