The Defence Budget [superthread]

[Edward Campbell]

It's the endless "a war" or "this war" argument. I don't dispute Prof Byer's premise ... IF we are "all in" for a long, drawn out, drag out, full scale war. But, for the kinds of wars that have been most common since 1945, Prof Byers (and PPCLI Guy) are so full o' s__t that their eyes are brown.

 

[PPCLI Guy]

It's the endless "a war" or "this war" argument. I don't dispute Prof Byer's premise ... IF we are "all in" for a long, drawn out, drag out, full scale war. But, for the kinds of wars that have been most common since 1945, Prof Byers (and PPCLI Guy) are so full o' s__t that their eyes are brown.

I will assume that you are having bad day and let that one slide.

 

[Edward Campbell]

You're right, and I apologise,  and thanks for the pass ... but Prof Byers is wrong.

He's right that "Inflation — which is higher in the defence industry than in the general economy — means that these deferred purchases will further increase final costs and, with that, pressure for reduced orders and lowered capability requirements. Failing to recapitalize the military in a timely manner has created a veritable procurement abyss, as rusting-out equipment becomes increasingly expensive to replace." No one should ever misunderstand that fact. But he's wrong, just a paragraph or two later, when he says that "The fact of the matter is, nobody knows how much these delayed procurements will actually cost. All we know for certain is that the expenses are being offloaded on future governments — and future generations of taxpayers. And, that the men and women of the Canadian Armed Forces are on course to end up with less equipment — and in some cases less capable equipment — than they need." In fact the costs are fairly easy, albeit unpleasant to calculate, and there is nothing to suggest that deferred procurement must, somehow, equal less equipment or less capable equipment.

Prof Byers says, "Our less-than-full-service military is made up of a small peacekeeping- and counterinsurgency-capable army organized around 550 newly refitted LAV III light armoured vehicles; a small navy organized around twelve middle-aged frigates; and a small air force organized around new transport aircraft and old but capable fighter jets." I think that's a gross misrepresentation of even the NDP's wet dream of a defence posture.

I disagree, vehemently, with Prof Byers when he says: "Ideally, the missions should determine the equipment and not the other way around." That's drivel. Ideally, or not, the mission must be decided by the (ever changing) strategic situation. No one, not Sir Wilfred Laurier in 1899, not Sir Robert Borden in 1914, not Mackenzie-King in 1939, not Louis St Laurent in 1950 and not Paul Martin in 2006, sent Canadians to war based on the equipment in the inventory ... Canada went to war despite the wonders and blunders of politicians, civil servants and military managers; it was only after we knew what the war was all about that we decided how to equip the military to fight it.

I will not dispute his "six core mission" (page 16) as long as he agrees that "Surveillance" embraces a multitude of tasks including SIGINT.

I believe Prof Byers strays from simple cloud cuckoo land into outright nonsense in Part IV. A Plan for Rebuilding the Canadian Armed Forces.. This is the kind of overly detailed rubbish that we would not tolerate from a junior staff school syndicate (because they haven't the resources to make such a detailed analysis) and we ought not to tolerate it from a university professor, either. It's fair and good to say that the F-35 is wrong because of A. B. and C. ~ even if we're not sure qualified to measure B ~ but it's not fair to say that Canada should "extend the CF-18 fleet with 30–40 new F/A-18 Super Hornets." I call BS. Prof Byers has no basis for that recommendation ... none other than pure, partisan, propaganda. His arguments for the rest, even the ones which I think might have some merit, are equally unfounded.

I have argued at length that the Canada First Defence Strategy is deeply flawed, as a strategy, but I suspect that Prof Byers doesn't really grasp the impact of inflation ... despite getting it right in the early going.

There is some merit in some of his recommendations ~ especially about buying proven equipment and (although he doesn't go anywhere near far enough) his notion (Recommendation 20) to Un-tie industrial regional benefits. My problem is that the recommendations, even the not bad ones, rest on a foundation of intellectual quicksand.

In summary, I still believe that Prof Byers is so full of s__t that his eyes are brown. His report is a piece of election propaganda and should be treated as such, in its entirety.

 

[Kirkhill]

Whew, thank gawd for that.  I hate it when Mummy and Daddy fight.  ;D

 

[Brad Sallows]

>“The mission should define the equipment that we choose to acquire, rather than the equipment defining the mission,” said Michael Byers

Byers confused something along the lines of "forward-looking threat and capability analysis" with "mission".  Maybe it's an easy mistake to make - "operation" and "mission", for example, being terms of art - but it risks grossly misleading people.

Once the inventory is established and procurement is set in motion, then yes: the equipment to an extent does "define the mission" if we are (inevitably) part of a multinational effort and each contributor is searching for a job which fits capabilities, expertise, and political exigencies.

I find he was wrong twice in one sentence.

 

[a_majoor]

Perhaps the good Prof forgot a rather profound truth of warfare:

"As you know, you go to war with the army you have, not the army you might want or wish to have at a later time."

In fact, we do most jobs with "what we have", rather than what "we might want or wish to have at a later time", and generally make it work (with the occasional trip to Home Depot or Canadian Tire for the things which have no substitutes). The Armed Forces is no different.

 

[PPCLI Guy]

You're right, and I apologise,  and thanks for the pass ... but Prof Byers is wrong.

Thank you Mr, Campbell.  I believe that you know the high esteem in which I hold you, both personally and professionally.

In fairness, I should explain what resonated with me.

1)  The single greatest cost of any program is the one least understood by the military.  It is not start up costs, life cycle costs or what have you.  It is opportunity cost - and Mr Byers alludes (albeit very briefly) to this fact.  In a military without anti-tank weapons, integral air defence, trucks, machine guns, a SAR platform, ISR, a ship that can fed our other ships, close air support or even attack aviation, I am not certain that the F35 fits our holistic needs, given its extraordinary opportunity costs.  We have expended enormous capital (intellectual, human, fiscal, and most importantly small "p" and big "P" political capitol) on a premise of dubious intellectual and professional honesty, and then doubled down on a ludicrously large HQ overhead that is, frankly, indefensible.

2) COTS and MOTS.  He got this one right.  We need to convince our political masters that "industrial regional benefits" and "domestic off-sets" may make good announcements and petty politics, but they make for horrific national security strategy costs in a medium sized country with substantial commitments, large aspirations and a small industrial base.  How is it possible that the requirement for a truck led to the MSVS?  How hard is to to buy an MLVW or 2 1/2 ton basic truck, without air brakes, computer sensors, and expensive third party maintenance contracts?

3)  Which brings me to the third point.  We own the problem.  There is no sense blaming the "government of the day".  They don't know a 3rd generation fighter from a 5th generation fighter, an AOR from a BHS, a CCV from a LAV.  They know what we pitch them.  We have created this problem with our own lack of discipline, leadership, and failure to identify whole-of-force opportunity costs.

I am the first to admit that there are many more on this site and countless others in the wider CF who are much more knowledgeable about the Borg and all that it takes to get a program from conception to combat than I am.  I am, however, losing my patience with efforts to cast the responsibility for all our problems on <insert your personal demon here: liberals, conservatives, think tanks, academia, commie pinkos, the CBC, or the great LBGT / Ontario / BC Consensus> vice taking ownership of the problems ourselves.  Much as voters get the government they deserve, the military (generally) gets the equipment and structure that they deserve.

With respect,

PPCLI Guy

<< edit: small spelling error>>

 

[Harrigan]

I am not a fan of Dr.Byers, but I think it is a useful document if only to show an alternative perspective on national defence policy.  This is not a bad thing.  I will comment per Mr.Campbell's points, as I am not sure how to individually quote each line sequentially:

Costs of Procurement: there is nothing to suggest that deferred procurement must, somehow, equal less equipment or less capable equipment.

Byers comments are clearly a shot at the systematic lowballing of costs that the federal government has insisted on parroting in the F35 and NSPS situations. 
I agree that it is not actually that difficult to know the long-term costs to anyone who looks into it, but to purposefully hide those costs from the public and pretend that they are less than they KNOW they are is irresponsible government, IMHO.  That blame should lie with all previous federal governments, but the present one isn't exempt.  As for the costs of deferred procurement, there seems to me to be MUCH suggesting exactly that - the longer it slides to the right, the less aircraft/ships etc are received as costs go up.  It happened with AOPS, I believe it happened with the F35 as well (weren't we supposed to get 90 originally, now it is 65), and has the CSC not gone from "15 ships" to "up to 15 ships"?  I have taken "deferred procurement" to include delayed procurement - I know they are two separate things, but the end result is the same I would think, with increased per unit costs even if the per-year costs are reduced due to spreading out the timeline.

Byer's stated defence posture: "Our less-than-full-service military is made up of a small peacekeeping- and counterinsurgency-capable army organized around 550 newly refitted LAV III light armoured vehicles; a small navy organized around twelve middle-aged frigates; and a small air force organized around new transport aircraft and old but capable fighter jets."

I am not sure what portion of it is incorrect?  I would agree with that characterization.  That is more or less what we are at the moment, and that is the tense that he uses.  I would also add that if a party decides that is the defence posture that it recommends for Canada in future, and Canadians vote them in, then we get on with making it happen and providing the best service that we can.  Some of us may have joined up to drive tanks, drop bombs behind enemy lines, and engage in hand-to-hand combat, but if the country prefers us to conduct SAR, humanitarian assistance, and peacekeeping moreso than the "hard power" aspects, they have the right to make us do so.  We work for them.

Missions defining Equipment:  I disagree, vehemently, with Prof Byers when he says: "Ideally, the missions should determine the equipment and not the other way around." That's drivel. Ideally, or not, the mission must be decided by the (ever changing) strategic situation.

This seems a bit like splitting hairs.  I think he is saying: "I believe it is Apples before Oranges instead of Oranges before Apples."  You are saying "no, no, no.... It is Bananas before Apples!".  You are both right.  Ideally.....it is Strategic Situation ---> Mission ---> Equipment (or Bananas before Apples before Oranges).  You are also absolutely correct that governments don't tailor the mission to the equipment on hand, we respond with whatever we have at the time to make the mission work.  (That said, I also don't believe that the govt is completely ignorant of the equipment on hand - I trust the CDS informs the MND of this, even if the MND doesn't feel like listening).

Also, your list of PM's sending the CF off to major conflicts doesn't seem right to me.  It should say "Chretien in 2001" vice "Martin in 2006".  Some units were deployed to Afghanistan continually from 2001-2011, and others "since 2001...." I would guess. 

Part IV. A Plan for Rebuilding the Canadian Armed Forces

It is not fair to criticize an alternate view, particularly from an opposition party, based on "you don't have all the information".  Of course they don't.  NOBODY does, except the government.  By that logic, nobody should be allowed to offer alternate visions on any subject unless the government has given "all the information".  If this were the case, Opposition parties would never be able to articulate their proposed policies.  All incumbent governments would like this to be the case, of course.  But it does not serve the public, it serves only the incumbent.  On the subject of F35's, an open and transparent competition would have provided this information.  However, the F35 has not been subjected to an open and transparent competition against its industry competitors (the XF-35 vs XF-32 competition wasn't against its industry competitors - Typhoon, Rafale, etc)

------

Should a potential NDP government take Byers report as a baseline to develop their defence policy off of, it would have to adjust as required once they had "seen the books" and knew the true costs/capabilities/equipment etc.  Would it survive first contact with the "enemy"?  No, of course not.  No plan does.  But at least it is a plan from which to deviate!    I agree completely that it is partisan, and unfairly lays all the blame on the current government, with some shots at the Liberals too.  But, if we are to assume that this is some sort of a trial balloon to propose an alternate vision for defence policy that is not "official" NDP policy (thereby allowing deniability), what would one expect?  Did the opposition Conservatives refrain from blaming the Liberal government in their vision of defence policy?

There are a few nuggets in the report that I agree with, others I an neutral on, and some I disagree with entirely.  But I don't think the whole thing should be disregarded in its entirety.  It is an alternative vision, and anything which stimulates a debate in the public about defence policy is a good thing IMHO, even if the end result of it is different from what some of us on here might prefer to see.

At the moment, the CF is not resourced adequately to meet its mission sets.  There are only two ways to fix this:  Increase resources to meet the existing mission sets, or reduce the mission sets to meet the resourcing level (or some sort of combination of both).  Byers' report seems to suggest the latter, with some major changes in defence focus away from warfighting and back to the CF being peacekeeping-centric.  Must of us on here don't agree with this, but we would ignore or disregard that perspective at our own peril, as it is consistent with a significant portion of the population.

Mr.Campbell, please don't take this email as a criticism of your views.  I have a great respect for the information and perspective you provide (I may be only a recent poster, but am a long-time lurker), and I dare say your take on Byers' report is probably the majority view on this forum.  I've interpreted it slightly differently, and while I do not agree with Dr.Byers on very much, I believe there are some policy nuggets there that may very well form planks of a potential NDP defence policy.  Obviously, "NDP defence policy" is a bit of an untrodden path that the military has not really had to pay much attention to, but in 2015 that is no longer the case.  The public clearly is not as scared by the "doomsday scenarios" as opposing partisans would have them believe, and barring some major unforeseen event, it is hard to imagine them fading to irrelevance in just 109 days.  My guess is that Byers' may reflect some (though not all) of the NDP's defence policy thoughts, and this report may be a "trial balloon" to see what portions resonate (or not) with the electorate.  They would then presumably release their actual defence policy prescription during the campaign, which may include some of these ideas.  (To that end, it is entirely possible that the Liberals would be watching the reaction as well and may lift some ideas from Byers' report too)

No doubt the next 3.5 months will be interesting.

Harrigan

 

[dapaterson]

Thank you Mr, Campbell.  I believe that you know the high esteem in which I hold you, both personally and professionally.

In fairness, I should explain what resonated with me.

1)  The single greatest cost of any program is the one least understood by the military.  It is not start up costs, life cycle costs or what have you.  It is opportunity cost - and Mr Byers alludes (albeit very briefly) to this fact.  In a military without anti-tank weapons, integral air defence, trucks, machine guns, a SAR platform, ISR, a ship that can fed our other ships, close air support or even attack aviation, I am not certain that the F35 fits our holistic needs, given its extraordinary opportunity costs.  We have expended enormous capital (intellectual, human, fiscal, and most importantly small "p" and big "P" political capitol) on a premise of dubious intellectual and professional honesty, and then doubled down on a ludicrously large HQ overhead that is, frankly, indefensible.

2) COTS and MOTS.  He got this one right.  We need to convince our political masters that "industrial regional benefits" and "domestic off-sets" may make good announcements and petty politics, but they make for horrific national security strategy costs in a medium sized country with substantial commitments, large aspirations and a small industrial base.  How is it possible that the requirement for a truck led to the MSVS?  How hard is to to buy an MLVW or 2 1/2 ton basic truck, without air brakes, computer sensors, and expensive third party maintenance contracts?

3)  Which brings me to the third point.  We own the problem.  There is no sense blaming the "government of the day".  They don't know a 3rd generation fighter from a 5th generation fighter, an AOR from a BHS, a CCV from a LAV.  They know what we pitch them.  We have created this problem with our own lack of discipline, leadership, and failure to identify whole-of-force opportunity costs.

I am the first to admit that there are many more on this site and countless others in the wider CF who are much more knowledgeable about the Borg and all that it takes to get a program from conception to combat than I am.  I am, however, losing my patience with efforts to cast the responsibility for all our problems on <insert your personal demon here: liberals, conservatives, think tanks, academia, commie pinkos, the CBC, or the great LBGT / Ontario / BC Consensus> vice taking ownership of the problems ourselves.  Much as voters get the government they deserve, the military (generally) gets the equipment and structure that they deserve.

With respect,

PPCLI Guy

<< edit: small spelling error>>

Or, to summarize, "We have met the enemy, and he is us."

 

[Edward Campbell]

I agree, pretty much across the board, with PPCLI Guy's comments which I am going to try to synopsize as: The main problem with defence procurement is inside the Department of National Defence and, primarily, within the uniformed, military establishment.

We, and I use "we" because, before I retired I did have some (briefly, rather a lot of) involvement at the bottom of the (uniformed) "executive" ladder with some aspects of procurement policy,* are the main architects of a big, fat, shambling system and I think we know it's our problem but we are too busy with pips and crowns and public relations to actually get down to the (admittedly very hard) task of cleaning up the system.

(We don't need ~ we should not try ~ to design any system that does not have intense political involvement. Our system has it origins in the 16th century, I like to trace it to a deal that John Hawkins, then (circa 1575) the Treasurer of the Navy) made a bargain with the shipbuilders at Chatham. The bargain included new ship designs, etc, and it was, essentially, a deal between the "operators" (Hawkins was, first and foremost, a combat commander doing a senior staff job) and the suppliers ~ just what many military folks would like. But William Cecil, Lord Burghley, the Lord Treasurer and de facto prime minister of England, would not allow the Navy to deal directly with suppliers without "cutting in" the Queen. We had, by the 1580s, the outline of the system we still use today: political ~ bureaucratic ~ military ~ industrial, but with political concerns always being predominant. That doesn't mean that the system cannot be much more efficient and effective, but it does mean that we cannot even try to "cut out" the politicians or the bureaucrats: they have (unwritten but very, very real) Constitutional rights and responsibilities for both the defence of the realm, including equipping the armed forces, and the people's money, and their roles need to be respected. I remember, faintly (I was only a subaltern at the time) in about 1968 when we heard about the new CFHQ. I do recall that Requirements were JOINT. As I recall, I may have the details wrong wrong, there was "chief" (a two star) and directors general (one stars) for combat requirements and support requirements but the first time one saw a 100% navy, or army, or air "requirements" team was at the lieutenant colonel level. (We were told that this was in, partial, response to the Avro Arrow fiasco when one service's requirement was, nearly, allowed to break the entire defence budget; a joint requirements staff, we were told, would seek to balance all our needs and get "just enough" of what everyone needed for the joint mission of defending Canada and home and abroad.)

"Requirements" are a mix of political direction, bureaucratic allocation of resources and military foresight. In an ideal world operational requirements arise when military officers "see" a deficiency in the CF's capabilities to meet the missions and tasks assigned by the government ... that assumes, of course, that one can detect some direction (some missions and tasks) in the government's policy statements.

"Procurement" is the process through which the resources, allocated by the bureaucrats, are used, within overarching government policy direction, to buy what's needed to meet the requirements in a timely manner.

It may well be that we, the uniformed military, have a valid, well defined, quite unassailable "operational requirement," grounded in clear government policy, but unaffordable within the existing resource envelope. What do we do, then? In practice, admirals and generals try to use their (limited) "political capital" to drum up public support for the requirement. It is, after, the people's country we are defending and their money which we want to spend ... if they, the people, don't agree with us then "we" need to try to change their minds: to inform them.

It may also happen than, as is the case in Canada today, the government has defined some strategies that are, in the main, limitations on spending, over time, to both create some jobs and be able to say "promise made, promise kept." What do we do then? Not much, I'm afraid: it is the government's right and duty to make those kinds of "strategies." It's not really good strategy but it is well within the remit of our elected governments.

But, there are some things that serving military officers can do, right now, that could help unplug the system:

    1. Close some unnecessary (there are many, Many, MANY of them) staff branches and, indeed, compete HQs and reassign very good people to a revitalized joint requirements staff that can bring some operational (and budgetary) balance to the whole process;

    2. Get procurement out of the requirements business and, conversely, ensure that the procurement system is open to and trusted by the "operators" so that they will not be tempted to intrude into areas in which they do not belong.

Point 1 means being "grownup;" understanding that the entire defence envelope must be supported not just one bit, here, and another there. I think that is a failing, right now, in the uniformed services. I do not believe that enough senior officers have a CF "field of view," too many, I fear, do not even have a full view of their own service's needs, or, if they do, they are submerging the needs of the service to the perceived needs of one small component.

Point 2 is procedural ~ what a lot of important staff work is, really, all about ... it would be hard to do, but that's why staff officers get to work in air conditioned offices instead of being at sea, out in the mud and rain, or in a cramped cockpit.

It is, as PPCLI Guy says, our problem, we, the CF, own it. It is not beyond the wit of man to solve the military parts of the problem and, thereby, make major reforms to the system ... if enough senior officers want to do that. If the senior uniformed military leads then the senior bureaucrats will follow: they aren't any happier than we are.

Prof Byers hasn't helped: he may have gotten some of the symptoms right but he's identified the wrong disease, and his cure, therefore, will do more harm than good.

        "The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars,
          But in ourselves, that we are underlings."
                                            William Shakespeare
                                            Julius Caesar (I, ii, 140-141)

_____
* For example, in the 1980s I designed a small part of the process that aimed to ensure that the dividing line between the uniformed, military "sponsors" of a requirement and the mixed civil-military engineering and procurement staff was clear, but, in so doing, I probably made it harder for the "operator" to make his influence count ... I did that because I worked for the guy at the top of the engineering (projects) heap and he wanted to ensure that his power was protected. Later (1990s), with the best of intentions, I added yet another (thin) layer to an already overloaded process ... I did that because an operator had made a technically unsound (downright improper) decision and it made it into the media and it got the DM's attention. She (the DM was a she at the time) didn't want this to ever happen again and she, like many, Many, MANY managers believed that adding another regulation was always the right answer.


Edit: format (Mod edit also done on format)

 

[Underway]

His big push seems to be that because we haven't fought a war against a state actor with full spectrum military capabilities then we don't need a military that can take on these types of conflicts.

I haven't had a fire in my house or a car accident in over 15 years.  Perhaps I need to cancel my insurance to save $10'000 over the next 8 years.  I call it "Smart Insuring".

 

[McG]

His big push seems to be that because we haven't fought a war against a state actor with full spectrum military capabilities then we don't need a military that can take on these types of conflicts.

I haven't had a fire in my house or a car accident in over 15 years.  Perhaps I need to cancel my insurance to save $10'000 over the next 8 years.  I call it "Smart Insuring".

... and, of course, Canada is currently the most vigorously involved in rattling sabres in Russia's face.  If we want to be doing that, we should be investing commensurately in the resources to back-up the rhetoric. 

 

[MarkOttawa]

MCG: "most vigourously involved in rattling sabres in Russia's face"?

US confirms it will place 250 tanks in eastern Europe to counter Russian threat
Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Bulgaria, Romania and Poland will host equipment, says Ash Carter, the US defence secretary
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/11693497/US-confirms-it-will-place-250-tanks-in-eastern-Europe-to-counter-Russian-threat.html

4-star on Russia: 'The threat that has my greatest focus'
http://www.armytimes.com/story/military/pentagon/2015/06/26/gen-allyn-eastern-europe-greatest-focus/29329693/

Photos show B-52s loaded with mines for simulated massive naval mine drop outside Sweden
http://theaviationist.com/2015/06/14/photos-show-b-52s-loaded-with-mines-for-simulated-massive-naval-mine-drop-outside-sweden/

U.S. Army Begins Training Ukrainian Soldiers [we haven't]
http://wnpr.org/post/us-army-begins-training-ukrainian-soldiers#stream/0

US warship visits Georgia amid Ukraine crisis
http://news.yahoo.com/us-warship-visits-georgia-amid-ukraine-crisis-152656856.html

Don't be taken in by the Canadian media's relentless spin.

Mark
Ottawa

 

[Underway]

MCG: "most vigourously involved in rattling sabres in Russia's face"?

Don't be taken in by the Canadian media's relentless spin.

Mark
Ottawa

Oh the rattling is vigorous.  Its just that we only have one sabre. And we are rattling from far away.

 

[Humphrey Bogart]

"Speak Loudly, Wave a Small Stick!"

 

[Good2Golf]

But it is still polically biased.

These sentences of Byers report, for instance, give me great pause:

“The mission should define the equipment that we choose to acquire, rather than the equipment defining the mission,” said Michael Byers, a professor at UBC who wrote the study.

“But unfortunately we’re in a situation today — because of nine years of incompetence — where the equipment is starting to define the mission.”

The first sentence (the set-up) states quite correctly the process that should be followed in any acquisition program. The second one, however, implies that this was done by the (liberal) government before Harper;'s conservatives took over, which we all know to be complete baloney. They were no better at setting equipment purchase priorities right (and in fact can be said to have been worse because, lets face it, they did not acquire much in terms of materiel in their years in government).

OGBD, I didn't read him that way.  I though the 9-years was a (not unreasonable) dig at the Cons...2006-2015 is nine years.  Libs were, as you know, 13 years, from 1993 to 2006.  I interpreted his statement to mean that, notwithstanding procurements of C-17s, Leopard 2s and Chinooks (which some will attribute more to Hillier's influence to get big honking helicopters, and tanks and big cargo planes than the Con's love of the CAF) [I'll write C-130J's off as their path being pretty much put in place during the last few years of Lib rule], the rest of the Con record has seen limited functionality...still no MLVW replacements (SMP, not the mil cots stuff), BHH (big honking ship), FWSAR, etc...  It would be somewhat of a challenge to disagree with him in that regard).

Then again, maybe I misread Byers.  :dunno:

G2G

 

[Eland2]

The only defence budget I personally support is one that provides for, and maintains general combat capability for the CF. Peacekeeping is all very well and good when there is a peace to keep, and the warring factions are willing to cooperate. But if you organize the military around peacekeeping missions as the dominant role and its raison d'etre, you deprive it of the capability to engage in much more demanding missions when required, and relegate it to being a more or less ineffectual constabulary. The same holds true of counter-insurgency missions.

When I talk about 'general purpose combat capability', I mean the ability to prosecute a major war, albeit on a smaller scale than some of our alllies are capable of, given that Canada lacks the manpower, wealth, and resources to be able to engage in such conflict entirely on its own.

To my way of thinking, it makes far more sense to have a military that has a mix of heavy and light weapons systems and capabilities, and scale them down accordingly if need be to fit lighter missions like peacekeeping than it does to have a peacekeeping military and try to scale its capabilities upwards using resources that are already inadequate.

Overall, a general purpose combat capability should rest on a pillar that supports three major aims: to the maximum extent possible, the defence of Canada and preservation of its sovereignty, and, the ability to project power beyond Canada's borders to advance Canada's foreign policy aims and protect Canadian citizens and assets overseas. The third aim should be ensuring that the CF have enough manpower and sufficient resources to be able to competently and effectively honour treaty obligations within organizations like NATO and NORAD.

 

[McG]

Sun Media is adding its editorial voice to the call for 2% GDP for defence funding and for the defence budget to be an election topic.  In the Ottawa, Toronto, Winnipeg Calgary and Edmonton editions of the Sun, the following has been published today:

Help vets by supporting active soldiers
The Calgary Sun
25 Aug 2015

If Justin Trudeau really wants to support our veterans he also needs to support our men and women in the military while they're still in service.

On Monday the Liberal leader announced a handful of campaign pledges involving veterans. These include hiring 400 new staff members at Veterans Affairs, budgeting $20 million to create two new veterans care centres and committing $80 million to build a new Veterans Education Benefit, which would pay for veterans' post-secondary education. These are all good measures. Every party should show a similar commitment to supporting our vets. They put their lives on the line for us and it's up to us to help them with their health and future once they return.

But that's not the full story. One of the main ways we can help them is by making sure they have the best equipment, training and resources they need while they're on the job. Right now Canada could do so much more for our men and women in uniform.

We agree with Sun Media columnist David Akin that defence spending needs to be an election issue.

Akin points out our equipment is behind the times: "The CF-18 fighter planes -now bombing ISIS targets in Iraq and Syria -- were acquired in the 1980s."

All members of NATO, including Canada, have committed to spending 2% of GDP on our military. But we fall short. Very short. We're on track to be at 0.89% of GDP.

The last time Canada spent 2% of GDP in our military was back in 1971-1972, when Pierre Trudeau was prime minister.

That's a scandal. How can we send our men and women into harm's way if they're not properly funded?

So while Trudeau's veterans announcements deserve applause, he's only addressing half of the issue.

Does Trudeau see the value in this? Perhaps not. He doesn't even support the mission against the Islamic State. Can he be trusted to properly fund it?

Trudeau, Prime Minister Stephen Harper and NDP Leader Tom Mulcair have so far avoided making any campaign statements on this issue. It's time they spoke out.

If you care about our vets, give them the funding they need to do their job successfully and safely.

 

[MarkOttawa]

Clearly a trial balloon from Dippers, who don't seem to have a firm grasp on some facts (or else it's the author):

Lawrence Martin
Military spending might be NDP’s secret weapon

...it would be rather strange to expect the New Democrats to propose higher military spending than the Conservatives. But don’t be dumbfounded if it happens.

“You might well imagine,” an adviser to Thomas Mulcair was telling me, “Tom coming out in September and saying Harper has driven down defence spending to one per cent of GDP. We’re going to raise it to 1.2 per cent. We have a military that’s being allowed to rust out and we’re going to fix it.”

Another adviser cautioned the level of support might not be that high – a 20 per cent increase – but significant enough to show Canadians the NDP is by no means soft on defence.

...the Conservatives, adept at military tributes and warrior-nation marketing, have created an image which belies the statistics. Their muscle-flexing is with itsy-bitsy biceps, but they have somehow projected an image of global tough guys. They defend their record, saying they have increased overall military spending by 27 per cent, a number which doesn’t factor in inflation. They plan on boosting outlays beginning in 2017.

The approach being considered by the NDP would abandon the Tory plan to purchase hyper-expensive F-35 fighter jets and aim for something more reasonably priced. Among the NDP’s other priorities are search and rescue helicopters [emphasis added, surely FWSAR], armoured [?] trucks for the army
[SMP contract now done https://cgai3ds.wordpress.com/2015/07/16/mark-collins-canadian-army-truckin-at-last-whiff-of-porc/ ],
supply ships for the Navy [lease more from Davie?], more spending on housing and health care for the troops.

A big emphasis would be put on cleaning up the procurement process. While the Tories like to boast of being prudent financial mangers, they have overseen one procurement debacle after another.

Michael Byers, a defence specialist and former NDP candidate, says that given the resulting shortfalls in military hardware “any government that is serious about completing necessary procurements would therefore incur higher costs.”..
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/military-spending-might-be-ndps-secret-weapon/article26076974/

Mark
Ottawa

 

[Edward Campbell]

You can plan to hire and employ as many reservists as you want, but the day the government tells the CF to cut xx millions from his budget, where do you think he's going to cut 1st....

Class A reservists payroll & field training budget is one of the only places the CDS can cut, without hamstringing his ability to field an effective fighting force.

The government cannot get defence budgeting straight unless and until it has a defence policy. My sense is that any defence policy is unwelcome because it is likely to be expensive.

Before you can have any sort of sensible, comprehensible defence policy you need to have a strategic survey to tell you why you need to defend Canada ... against who or what?

I am absolutely certain that we have more than one strategic survey. I'm sure there's on in DND and another in Foreign Affairs. There are, I am guessing, two problems with those two: first, they contradict one another, and second, no one in the political/policy centre in Ottawa (PMO, PCO, Finance and TB) really believes what either DND or DFAIT think about the big, wide world.

I am also certain that the Department of Finance has a detailed strategic survey ~ with its focus on economics, of course, but dealing with security and defence issues, too. I am equally cerrtain that PCO has its own strategic survey, also, that takes account of Finance's document and takes some note of DND's and DFAIT's views, too. I suspect the PMO has another and I fear that it is not consistent with what PCO, Finance and even DFAIT and DND think.

My view is that defence policy can go nowhere because there is no consensus between PMO and PCO about the problem. Without a defence policy DND cannot establish sensible spending priorities. Without decent priorities Prime Minister Harper's promises about reserves (or ships or fighter jets or anything else) are meaningless. (Ditto, by the way, for promises that might be made by Messers Muclair and Trudeau.)