The future of Light Arty (105 mm) (From: Mortars)

[Infanteer]

http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/2004armaments/DayII/SessionII/07Lindsey_Dragon_Fire_II.pdf

You can tow it, drop it, or load it into the back of a LAV to make it a self-propelled, armoured indirect fire system.

 

[Infanteer]

...and the counter-arguement within the Marines to move away from a Mortar and to a 105 ULWPH

http://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/article/expeditionary-fire-support-system

 

[a_majoor]

Since a lot of the argument revolves around expenses and PY's, would it not be more sensible to frame the requirement in such a way as to minimize the PY's needed?

This might move the argument away from "traditional" guns like the 105 (or whatever calibre is desired) and towards alternative systems like rockets (you can launch Hellfire or Brimestone ATGM's from a HMMVW sized vehicle), automated mortars like the Dragon fire or the FH77 Archer.

The named systems simply give an idea of what is available and what can be done, although compatibility with existing systems (the FH77 can also fire Excalibur guided shells) or providing a complimentary capability (a ground launched ATGM gives precision attack against hard targets, but also useful DF anti armour capabilities).
The Dragon fire is a bit of an outlier, but 120mm gives sufficient range, the ability to use PGM's and the option of towed or under armour deployments, so a system built along those lines has interesting capabilities and options for the commander.

Edit to add

The real advantage to these systems isn't so much the technical aspects of how they deliver fire; all are capable of being deployed into action with three man crews, and in the case of a ground launched rocket or the Dragonfire, they can be deployed using a relatively small vehicle like a HMMVW. So the PY footpring and potentially the purchase and O&M costs can be lower as well.

 

[daftandbarmy]

This is more like my idea of what 'light artillery' should be doing:

Their Dragon in Helmand

One-hundred and fifty miles to the north, at the most remote of the various British strongpoints scattered around Helmand province, one weapon strikes fear into the enemy.

It's not an Apache helicopter. It's not a Viking assault vehicle. It's not a Jackal armoured vehicle, It's not a Sea King helicopter. Nor is it a Lynx helicopter. It's a Dragon.

It's the Taliban's nickname for the Royal Marines 105mm field gun.

The Royal Marines gunners, 29 Commando Regiment Royal Artillery, hauled one of their howitzers to a hilltop outside Musa Qaleh in Northern Helmand.

The peak of Roshan Tower, a couple kilometres north of the regional centre, which dominates the town and surrounding terrain.

It took four days to get a gun from 8 Commando Battery to the top of the tower and prepare the peak as a gun platform, as gunners moved not merely the two ton gun, but also its ammunition boxes, each weighing one-hundred pounds.

http://www.modern-day-commando.com/29-Commando-RA.html

 

[Colin Parkinson]

The reserves need useful equipment to train on if they are going to attract and retain soldiers,which is how you generate good Officers and NCO's.  Not to mention a mission that does not change as often as people's underwear. We can't afford not to get equipment for all of the combat arms and support services in the Reserves. the key is to get equipment that allows them to train and feel that they are useful, all the while being as easy to maintain and support as possible.

 

[jeffb]

The reserves need useful equipment to train on if they are going to attract and retain soldiers,which is how you generate good Officers and NCO's.  Not to mention a mission that does not change as often as people's underwear. We can't afford not to get equipment for all of the combat arms and support services in the Reserves. the key is to get equipment that allows them to train and feel that they are useful, all the while being as easy to maintain and support as possible.

Maybe the problem is that artillery is just too expensive to keep as a reserve task. <hides> There is a proud and long tradition of reservist gunners but there really isn't a financially viable to replace the C3 that I can see with another 105 or 155 system. Maybe the task that makes sense is to have them concentrate on mortars (81 mm) with the task to provide the mortar platoons back to the infantry. That way mortars could be stood up for deployments and attached to Btns as the primary function of the reserve gunners. The downside of course is that there would be a large training delta that would need to be made up for reserve augmentation to gun batteries but that's maybe something we have no reasonable way of avoiding.

 

[dapaterson]

A project to acquire 60 new 105mm towed guns for the Reserves would cost at most (back of the envelope here) $200m.  Spread that over 6 years - $10M / $20M / $40M / $40M / $50M / $40M - almost a rounding error in the DSP.  I'd estimate we'd need three people, full-time, plus matrix support, to manage the acquisition for DND.

No new ammo natures, so no changes to ammo depots.  Existing infra should be usable with minor modifications.  No large training costs / conversion costs.  And reduced NP to support the fleet.


For a new platform that would last a good 25 years or more, I think it's a worthwhile investment.

 

[Kirkhill]

In the case of the CCV project, would the capital cost difference between the 108 vehicle minimum buy and the 138 outlying option be in the same order of magnitude as procuring 60x M119s?

 

[Bird_Gunner45]

The last brief from the CIG stated that the 105mm in Canada was not even being considered.  The future was deemed to be A) 120mm mortars, B) 81mm mortars, or C) M777 in the reserves. 

That said, I would go the opposite and keep the 105mm capability. I've mentioned it before, but I believe that we would be best to put the M777 into storage, or centre them in 1 battery/Regiment and purchase a cheaper "training gun" for now until our next conflict.

The reality is that the M777 is prone to breaking, and are too expensive to be replaced.  This is exacerbated by the way that we train and the terrain we attempt to put guns into.  We would be better suited to go with a cheap 105mm training option with DGMS.

:2c:

 

[daftandbarmy]

The last brief from the CIG stated that the 105mm in Canada was not even being considered.  The future was deemed to be A) 120mm mortars, B) 81mm mortars, or C) M777 in the reserves. 

That said, I would go the opposite and keep the 105mm capability. I've mentioned it before, but I believe that we would be best to put the M777 into storage, or centre them in 1 battery/Regiment and purchase a cheaper "training gun" for now until our next conflict.

The reality is that the M777 is prone to breaking, and are too expensive to be replaced.  This is exacerbated by the way that we train and the terrain we attempt to put guns into.  We would be better suited to go with a cheap 105mm training option with DGMS.

:2c:

Or a hybrid 105mm/ Mortar?

Love these things... they're so cute, and lethal

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OTO_Melara_Mod_56

 

[GnyHwy]

I've always be partial to a 105 howitzer because if its flexibility, especially and ultra lightweight pack howitzer (ULWPH).  I also recognize some of the capabilities that a mortar brings, while still performing much of the tasks that a 105 can.  Interesting how the CIG, who got his info from DLR I assume, says that a 105 is not being considered.  Seems shortsighted to me, but perhaps DLR knows something we don't, maybe no one's building 105s in our numbers.  Or, are they just jumping on the 120mm band wagon with the rest of NATO.  I thought the reason we wrote requirements was to avoid buying equipment on the assumption that "it worked for them, therefore it will work for us".  I would think if requirements were written, that the both the 105 and 120 would pass the options analysis phase.

In the case of the CCV project, would the capital cost difference between the 108 vehicle minimum buy and the 138 outlying option be in the same order of magnitude as procuring 60x M119s?

The 119 lost to the LG1 in an evaluation we conducted in the early 90s.  Not sure why, or if improvements have been made since.  I do know that the 119 comes with networking much like the 777.

That said, I would go the opposite and keep the 105mm capability. I've mentioned it before, but I believe that we would be best to put the M777 into storage, or centre them in 1 battery/Regiment and purchase a cheaper "training gun" for now until our next conflict.

The reality is that the M777 is prone to breaking, and are too expensive to be replaced.  This is exacerbated by the way that we train and the terrain we attempt to put guns into.  We would be better suited to go with a cheap 105mm training option with DGMS.

:2c:

BG45, the 105mm is not a capability.  It is a piece of equipment.  A capability is the ability to hit a target from an indirect postion or provide fragmentation effects.  The requirements are hitting a target within x amount of time, or blowing up half a grid square in x amount of time, or x amount of bullets.  I suspect that those who are choosing for us maybe making the same mistake, and assuming a 105 does what it always has for the last 50 years, and a 120 does what it always has as well. 

I also wouldn't assume that beating up the 777s is too expensive.  Heck, we kept the 109s going for almost 40 years.  As long as they're still being built, I say bang away.


As for the topic at hand, unless we write the requirements and test the different weapons against them, we will never know.  Just for shits and giggles, what would be some of the requirements be?  Maybe we can get this done for DLR, and they can just cut and paste  ;D

My hypothesis - a ULWPH takes the prize.

 

[Bird_Gunner45]

The 119 lost to the LG1 in an evaluation we conducted in the early 90s.  Not sure why, or if improvements have been made since.  I do know that the 119 comes with networking much like the 777.

The LG 1 won the contract because it could fire HEER rounds while the M119 could not.  The LG 1 that the French brought for trials was also brand new, while the M119 the Brits sent was beat up and had a series of mechanical issues.  My understanding is that the HEER round issue was the key though.

BG45, the 105mm is not a capability.  It is a piece of equipment.  A capability is the ability to hit a target from an indirect postion or provide fragmentation effects.  The requirements are hitting a target within x amount of time, or blowing up half a grid square in x amount of time, or x amount of bullets.  I suspect that those who are choosing for us maybe making the same mistake, and assuming a 105 does what it always has for the last 50 years, and a 120 does what it always has as well. 

I also wouldn't assume that beating up the 777s is too expensive.  Heck, we kept the 109s going for almost 40 years.  As long as they're still being built, I say bang away.

Understood on the capability.  The big loss of capability for us if we go 120mm mortar ENTIRELY in the reserves is that we wont have the ability to force generate reservists to augment tasks and we will need a reserve only training system (IGs/AIGs wont have any experience on them so you would arguably require reserve IGs and AIGs).

Also, the M109 is significantly tougher than the M777 which is prone to mechanical issue.  The real concern on that is that we JUST have enough to man 6, 4 gun batteries.  When one goes down it's down.  The $$$ isn't there to buy new ones, especially considering the arty alone has to procure new digital suites for the OPVs, guns, and CPs, a new AD shooter, and replacements for the beat up STA equipment.  Procuring a cheaper gun akin to the C2 would be the optimal answer... something to drag around and kick the sin out of and can be repaired quickly and cheaply, including by reservists.

As for the 120mm mortar obsession... I can't answer that one.  For what it's worth the CIG was extremely specific when he said that 105 wasn't being considered.  The concept is that the 120 can do anything that a 105 can do, minus some range, is lighter, cheaper, requires less pers to man, etc.

 

[Old Sweat]

No matter how we cut it, the first question is whether there is a 105mm on the market that is inexpensive, robust and reliable? If the answer is no, then the artillery will have to pursue other options.

Regarding the serviceability and reliability of the M777, remember it is still a relatively new piece of kit. We also experienced the same issues with the M109 and especially the L5 when they entered service in 1968-1969. At one time the L5 was known as Mussolini's Revenge, primarily because of cracked barrels. There also was a belief that we were abusing the L5 by treating it as a field gun and galloping all over the ranges doing fire and movement. Having said that, the Australians had some equipment failures with their L5s in Vietnam that were serious enough that we sold them a large number of our C1 fleet at about the time the newer equipments were coming into service with us.

The challenge is that when one pushes the limits of lightness, there is a price to be paid in robustness. That, however does not detract from the issue of a new equipment for the reserves. What are our options? There are some smart people posting here, not necessarily including me as I am well past my best before date, aka CRA. Let us be pragmatic and hard-headed.

Edit to add: I wonder how much of the serviceability issue is based on our scaling of spares, especially of major components. This was a serious factor in the bad, old days and may well continue to this day. For an example, in 1963 I was in C Battery in Gagetown. We had had a C1 in 2nd line for a panoramic telescope sight mount for something like five months. We finally got it back, did the sight tests and took it to the field. As luck would have it the gun had the first of series of prematures over three or four months that virtually grounded the artillery. In this case an HE round detonated 15 metres outside the muzzle in high angle and wounded six of the seven members of the gun detachment. A splinter also knocked our new sight mount about 15 degrees out of kilter, so back into maintenance it went for another eternity.

 

[Shrek1985]

I'm confused; why does anyone think two different systems; a Mortar and a Gun (Howitzer? Gun-Howitzer?) are comparable?

A nail and a spear can both poke a hole in something, but they are obviously different.

Back in the 70s NATO tried to de-standardize 105mm as too small; okay sure, but it fits in a number of roles well and it's cheaper than 155, which is good for armies like ours.

But a mortar is a fish of a different colour. It's a light, mobile, high-angle weapon, but most mortars have shorter range than most gun systems.

Both systems have advantages in different conditions, I don't think you can replace one with the other and still be at your best. I feel the same way about the C16 CASW "Replacing" the 60mm mortar. It's like replacing your peanut butter with wood glue. Both are sticky and brown-ish, but obviously have different effects on the user.

Also; aren't mortars cheap and easy to make on a scale of industry we should be able to manage quite well?

 

[GnyHwy]

The $$$ isn't there to buy new ones, especially considering the arty alone has to procure new digital suites for the OPVs, guns, and CPs, a new AD shooter, and replacements for the beat up STA equipment.  Procuring a cheaper gun akin to the C2 would be the optimal answer... something to drag around and kick the sin out of and can be repaired quickly and cheaply, including by reservists.

I think the money is there, but there is no one to do the paperwork, or champion the project in order to get it up on the priority list.

No matter how we cut it, the first question is whether there is a 105mm on the market that is inexpensive, robust and reliable? If the answer is no, then the artillery will have to pursue other options.

The inexpensive part, definitely not.  For the requirements that we would likely write, titanium is the way to go, the same concept as the 777.  As for on the market, probably not.  I don't think industry is willing to research or stick their neck out too far with the way military purchasing will be going in the coming years.  Building a light and durable ULWPH is very doable, but at a significant cost.

I'm confused; why does anyone think two different systems; a Mortar and a Gun (Howitzer? Gun-Howitzer?) are comparable?

A nail and a spear can both poke a hole in something, but they are obviously different.

Back in the 70s NATO tried to de-standardize 105mm as too small; okay sure, but it fits in a number of roles well and it's cheaper than 155, which is good for armies like ours.

But a mortar is a fish of a different colour. It's a light, mobile, high-angle weapon, but most mortars have shorter range than most gun systems.

Both systems have advantages in different conditions, I don't think you can replace one with the other and still be at your best. I feel the same way about the C16 CASW "Replacing" the 60mm mortar. It's like replacing your peanut butter with wood glue. Both are sticky and brown-ish, but obviously have different effects on the user.

When you look at a gun and mortar from an effects and capability based perspective, they are almost identical.  It is only when you break down the requirements that they become segregated.  As for the C-16 and 60mm, the same could be said, but I disagree with the decision, and perhaps the requirements may have been written with the C-16 in mind.

 

[dapaterson]

Do we need an ultra light weight towed 105mm howitzer?  No.  Get away from Titanium and costs drop, and maintainabiltiy goes up.

If we view the 105mm as a gun for training and ceremonial, we can save a lot of money, and have only a small delta training bill when it's time to roll out the ultra gee whiz titanium 155mm.

It's not rocket science (unless you add in rocket propelled projectiles.  And even rocket science is just "plumbing on steroids" according to John Carmack)

 

[ArmyRick]

What is the obession with a 105mm Gun/howitzer? As a 81mm mortar, I can take a semi-educated guess as to the value of the 120mm mortar. Mortars are very effective weapons. Interesting to note that our USMC friends to the south have recently adapted 120mm mortars as well (although its different than the US Army M120 Mortar).

The Mortar offers
-High angle of fire
-120mm HE is more lethal than 105mm HE
-Quick to put into action
-Relatively light compared to 105
-Does better illum than 105

I realize 105 has more range and can do direct shoots, but me (speaking as a former mortar man) I say 120mm Mortar is fine.

Cheers

 

[Kirkhill]

An hour spent on some logistics numbers -

I have no particular bent towards Yamaha - its numbers are readily available and the Brits (and I believe you) have already used them.

Equally I have no particular bent towards ATV/LOSVs at all.

I just note that they can take the load off of foot borne infantry allowing them to run rather than waddle. 

 

[Old Sweat]

At the risk of  :deadhorse: let me mention the crazy aunt in the attic nobody wants to talk about. Actually we have to talk about auntie and Uncle Charlie who seems to spend too much time hanging around the school yard. Given the state of the defence budget, I submit it is folly to talk about buying a weapons system solely to provide the militia gunners with a training aid. This is 2012, not 1912 when the regular force was tiny and the militia was the source that would play the major role in the creation of a large expeditionary force. Today few people see more than a limited mobilization and perhaps the creation of a special force, although the fleshing out of the regulars with individual augmentation is a more realistic proposition.

Okay, so we decide we need a heavy mortar and someone suggests the reserves can become operationally proficient enough in its use to field a viable mortar battery as part of force generation. I am sure they can, but how do we compel individuals sub-units of various militia units to report for duty without a compulsary call up? The chances of any Canadian government being willing to pay the political price for resorting to compulsion in any situation sort of Armageddon is slim to say the least. The hard-eyed bean counters who scrutinize budget items would shoot holes in the plan in a heartbeat. So, if the army wants a heavy mortar, it is more likely that it will be manned by both regulars and reserves. Perhaps cooler heads will prevail and the FOO batteries will become heavy mortar batteries with the majority of the FOOs and FACs being distributed among the three "gun" batteries.

I am being a bit of a devil's advocate here, but the argument for a heavy mortar solely for the reserves, it seems to me, is weak.

The future of the reserve gunners is very much in doubt and while I wish it was not so, but I do not see an easy solution! 

 

[Journeyman]

..... but how do we compel individuals sub-units of various militia units to report for duty without a compulsary call up?

Compare with the decision to put 99% of "Influence Activities" in the Reserves -- similar logic, or simply most of us don't particularly care about IA?

In an either/or scenario, I know I'd opt for the mortars.....but the question raised is the reliability of Reserve FG, beyond individual/small party augmentation, for a niche capability.

I suspect that discussion will entail splitting the thread for the inevitable    :argue: