The Manouvre Officer: Combining MOCs 21 and 23

[Lance Wiebe]

Yes, I would be interested in reading your summary of his thoughts as well.

The only thing I can see him getting at is a basic infantry type training for all, then a breakdown in specialties.  But, that, basically is what we have now.

I'll wait for your post.........my head hurts.

 

[Kirkhill]

From YardApe

Quote from: Kirkhill on August 16, 2004, 12:28:02
I believe the Americans got it right with their armour forces.  But they screwed up royally on the infantry side, too much specialization and just not enough numbers.
By splitting light infantry & mech infantry into unique MOCs, would we not be doing the same to ourselves?

I think what I was trying to get at was that in a 10 division army they fielded 6 Armored Divisions that carried about 4-6000 rifles with them, all designed to support the Tank.  No problem with that.  As I said I believed they had the Manoeuvre side sussed.

The problem was with the Infantry, Rangers, Airborne, Air Assault and a couple of light divisions and separate brigades trying to justify their existence.  No commonality of role, structure, training, equipment -- anything.

Shinseki's Medium Brigades (actually light brigades with wheeled transport to repel bullets) and the current chaps infantry centric units of action are attempts to clean up the infantry side.

I think we are (or maybe were is a better statement) not to bad on the infantry side.

We used to have 36 commonly trained infantry companies that could transition from light to M113s relatively easily.  We are now down to 27 companies, 3 airborne, 6 light and 18 dragoons.  The LAVIII has imposed a different style of fighting.  Something different to light or light/M113 and yet not quite Bradley/Warrior.

My suggestion is that our current 27 companies be reallocated as follows, 3 airborne, 3 dragoons and 18 light.

The dragoon companies would be enough to supply riders to a brigade (or Unit of Action) of Cavalry mounted in LAVIIIs.  One US battalion of Mech Inf only has about 180 rifles in it (Bolger, Death Ground: Today's American Infantry in Battle) and a Unit of Action (Armored) comprises a Tank Battalion, an Infantry Battalion (3 coys) a Cavalry Squadron (US) and an arty Battalion (2 Btys).

Interesting Link to 3rd Inf Div web site.  3ID has been re-orged to the new structure
http://www.stewart.army.mil/Display.asp?Page=519F0559-BB39-492A-BF6D-7AAF2FBE0CE7

The other 18 companies (possibly the airborne too) would all be trained to common standards and be largely interchangeable.  While they would be familiar with the LAVIII and may have them assigned to their Battalion/Battle Group as a support Squadron/Coy they would train primarily on their feet.

The dragoons by contrast would train solely for mounted manoeuvre warfare.

Before anyone says can you keep skills alive with 3 coys (540 PYs or so) Assault Troops never counted more than 200 PYs , Pioneers, Anti-Armour and Mortars about 360 PYs apiece and none of them concentrated in one place.

I guess it is just which syLLABle you choose to emPHASize.

Cheers.

 

[McG]

Ape,
Looks like you have a little more support.

I see one Officer MOC: Close Combat Officer. His training would be be grounded in Infantry initially, but just as the Inf officer has traditionally done, he would master suffiicient understanding of how to use all the combat systems in the branch. Note that I do not say 'use of the other Arms" because they would no longer exist as separate arms. Instead, a Close Combat unit would be like a tool box: we would train officers to select and employ the right tools to get the required effect. The "nuts and bolts" knowledge would be in the hands of the WO grades and NCOs.(If you are interested, see my letter in the latest issue of the Canadian Army Journal, in which I laid this concept out). Cheers.

 

[pbi]

I do not see that the Artillery has any grounds on which to escape the merger. Artillery fire control is becoming less complex, not more, as it is increasingly digitized. For at least 50 years we have trained Infantry Officers as mortar platoon commanders and Inf NCOs as MFCs: it is a question of skill sets and training, coupled with advances in technology, not of the dire need to have a separate branch to shoot big bombs at things the shooters can't see.   Infantry is already doing this, up to 120mm mor.

If the argument is that we need Artillery officers in order to plot and control WWII-legacy "Div Shoots"   I suggest that idea   is also OBE. I doubt we will engage in such activities again, and if we ever do, I suspect it will be by the digital coordination of fires observed by UAVs, striking with more precision from fewer systems, rather than flattening a grid square with hot steel. Nothing that cannot be taught to any officer who has mastered a Mortar Platoon CP operation, with modern   fire control equipment. Further, I think that to separate fire effects from manouevre, at the level we are likely to function at, is a mistake. The two are intimately connected and in fact "fires" should really be extended to "effects" to take in the full range of lethal, non-lethal and electronic systems we may employ on different types of ops.

Apart from the "specialist" skills of the C2 element of the Artillery branch(mainly officers but with a few NCOs), the jobs performed by the great majority of the soldiers are IMHO of a limited mechanical nature that could easily be taught to infantrymen (or to anybody else, for that matter).

We are so married to the rice bowls we have now that I fear we cannot envision anything different. Unless the Armour or Artillery are going to be equipped in a manner that they bring a "value added" that only they can do, and could not be performed by a more flexibly employable soldier MOC in the Close Combat Branch, then I see no reason to keep them as separate, stand-alone entities in an Army as small and lightly equipped as ours. Cheers.

 

[Lance Wiebe]

Interesting point, PBI.

Just too add to your argument, at one time Armour Officers and NCO's were taught how to use their tanks as artillery.  We conducted indirect fire shoots, controlled by a forward observer.

If the Armour could do it, it obviously is not rocket science!

This skill set has been dropped from Armour training, not because of complexity, but because of ammunition costs.

 

[Bruce Monkhouse]

Much as I hate to admit it, it does make sense, even though it is hard to swallow.
I'm sure it will be a bloodbath though trying to square away " who does what with whom?"

 

[bossi]

Not sure if the irony is apparent to anybody else, but ...
At the higher level, it is both beneficial and necessary to command infantry, tanks, arty ...
(i.e. unless you've got a real arty bde or div, you don't have "arty generals" - ditto for "infantry generals", and so on).

Perhaps the precedent already exists (and is irrefutable) for combining Armd 21, Arty 22, and Inf 23 ... and we're merely revisiting the rank level at which it happens ...?

On my Cbt Tm Comd crse I saw two universes colliding ... and it was enlightening
(as an aside, my CO at the time was Arty, and as preparation he sent little old infantry me on ex with the RCDs ... hmmm ...).
Ditto for my time at Fort Frontenac and Staff College in Toronto - everybody had to learn how to employ "everything".

However, from a "bottom up" viewpoint, how best to begin training?
I've always been fond of the USMC model - everybody starts out as a ground-pounder, before moving on to whatever MOC they'll specialise in.

So, without mowing the lawn of our absolutely superb TDO's (without whom it's a wonder our Army ever was able to survive through two World Wars, etc.) ... maybe the first building block is still the "lowest common denominator" in the sense that we'd crawl/run/walk our way through the equipment/tactics inventory, too?  (i.e. fists, bayonet, small projectiles launched on foot, big projectiles launched on wheels, huge honkin' projectiles outa the sky ... ?)

But, coming back to reality ... can we achieve "generalist" excellence fast enough, or by necessity are we still stuck with different streams feeding into a common pond?
And, when you care enough to send the very best, isn't it still handy to have specialists in certain MOCs (or can specialisation be achieved after generalisation)?
Hmmm ... ya never know - it might just work ... as long as "Col Blimp" can be side-stepped ...

 

[McG]

I propose a career progression where a Lt would still lead a rifle platoon, and a junior Capt would still lead a Sr platoon. However, senior platoons would now include any in a Recce Sqn or an MGS Pl (and the traditional TOW Pl & Recce Pl).

If Arty is included in the mix, would GPO become another option for Jr Capt?  Would it be before, after, or instead of a Sr Pl Comd?

 

[ArmyRick]

I like this thread. Alot of thinking outside the box stuff going on here..
Do you all think that the powers that be (generals) would consider implemting such change or would old regimental/corps loyalties ties stop that?

 

[Bruce Monkhouse]

Maybe start it with that 5000 man[cough,cough] peace-keeping brigade and see how that works out?

 

[muskrat89]

So, are these concepts truly progressive, or just the best possible silk purse that we can make from the sow's ear?

 

[dglad]

So, are these concepts truly progressive, or just the best possible silk purse that we can make from the sow's ear?

Maybe some of both.  But I think there's some really progressive ideas here, that recognize the way the battlespace is evolving.  We are generally recognizing a continuum of conflict that includes the close battle, but also incorporates rear, deep and even less "traditional" dimensions (air, sea, space, EM spectrum, media, public perception).  The idea of "combining" these isn't all that new, but the way we're integrating them as components of a whole is evolving.  To function effectively in a complex security environment that simultaneously includes attributes of war-fighting, peace-support, humanitarian efforts and information ops requires leaders who can think multi-dimensionally.  The discussion so far, about rolling together the attributes of our current close cbt leaders into one, or anyway fewer MOCs, is a fundamental evolution in that direction.  The more we promote integrated thinking, the more likely we are to produce leaders who can thrive in the extremely complicated military-political-social-cultural-economic whirlwind of today's operations.

Now, having said all of that, we are, as an army, obviously faced with some fundamental constraints.  I can't see us maintaining a general war-fighting capability with our present approach the army's basic structure.  Change is difficult, and we all love our cap-badges, but combined-arms must give way to integrated-arms if we're going to maintain any sort of general war-fighting capacity in our army.  We're just too small, and not high enough on the government's resourcing "radar" for it to be otherwise.

 

[pbi]

Hi dglad: good to see you on here again. I am only sorry that I won't be COS long enough to see you in as Bde Comd: it would be interesting! If you take a look at my recent letter in CAJ, you'll see my thoughts laid out a bit better. I haven't received any letter bombs yet so maybe nobody's read it yet....

So, are these concepts truly progressive, or just the best possible silk purse that we can make from the sow's ear?

Why are these two things mutually exclusive? I give you the Reichsheer "plywood tank" experiments of the 1920's and early 30s. Cheers.

 

[Steel Badger]

If my more learned comrades would allow me to add something:


A good example of the level of interoperability which can be obtained by "maneuver" officers can be seen in the example of the 4th Cdn Armoured Div 44-45....

As the campaign in North-West Europe progressed , Officers were switched between Armoured and Infantry Regiments based on their ABILITY, not capbadge....

Thus Bert Coffin of the SAR took command of the Argylls after Col Fred Wigle was killed.
Having met the Gentleman; I can say that he still makes a great impression on me as an Infantryman.

Col Coffin demonstrated the ability to command Armour AND Infantry....to the point where he was the best choice to command an INf Bn, despte being a black-hat.

 

[dapaterson]

Question:  Is it time to abolish the "Infantry" and "Armour" branches, and replace them with a "Soldier" branch - where both skill sets would reside, mixed and matched as required?  So one could become a Recce specialist across the spectrum of recce; one could become a armoured vehicle combat specialist; or any number of combinations.

Is the Armd/Inf division still worthwhile?

 

[George Wallace]

I do beleive all battalions have moved their coyotes back to the armour corps.

Done a long time ago, due to the shortages of Coyotes in the disappearance of the Tank and all Armour switching solely to the Recce Role.  Even now with the token Leo 2's, there are not enough Coyotes to equip Armd units. 

 

[ArmyRick]

Tactically, infantry and armour work together in "ideal situations".

Administratively, its better to keep our units seperate or at least seperate at sub unit level.

The individual training and equipment handling is far different for infantry and tankers.

 

[Infanteer]

Is the Armd/Inf division still worthwhile?

Consider the case of the Armoured Officer and the Infantry Officer - the only two courses they take apart are Phase III and Phase IV.  Everything before (Ph I and II) and everything after (ATOC, AOC, CTCC) is the same and - if you're working in a square combat team setting during your time in battalion - you're pretty much doing the same on exercise.

 

[George Wallace]

Does this also apply to the Arty and Engr Officer Candidates?

 

[dapaterson]

Gunner and Sapper officers have to be able to count past 10 without taking off their boots, and past 20 without dropping their trews.

There are also more detailed courses they may take as part of their careers; the fit isn't quite as good.

We often speak of the need for the Reserves to get beyond capbadges; does the Reg Force also need to go beyond beret colour and capbadge?