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The "new normal:" a return to the 19th century?

Thucydides said:
Demographic changes could determine "who" owns the territory in question.

Kosovo is the historic heartland of the Serbs, but Serbs have drifted into modern day Serbia over the centuries, while Albanians have drifted into Kosovo, which explains why the Serbs were keen to expel the Albanians in 1999, and also why most other people rejected the Serbian claim to Kosovo. Your ancestors may have been living there in 1366, but if you aren't there today, then tough luck.

I do not disagree with your high quality assessment except to say that the Serbs drifted out of Kosovo at the end of a Turkish sword wielded by the ancestors of the Albanians in Kosovo.  But as you say who really has a true homeland, not even the Scots of today can lay 100% claim to Scotland.

Edited:  no talka the English too good!
 
Thucydides said:
Demographic changes could determine "who" owns the territory in question.

Kosovo is the historic heartland of the Serbs, but Serbs have drifted into modern day Serbia over the centuries, while Albanians have drifted into Kosovo, which explains why the Serbs were keen to expel the Albanians in 1999, and also why most other people rejected the Serbian claim to Kosovo. Your ancestors may have been living there in 1366, but if you aren't there today, then tough luck.

Russia may lose Siberia to Chinese immigration, as well as the more southerly parts of the "Near Beyond" as it depopulates while the Muslim peoples of Chechnya and other places rise.

And the Southwestern US may informally be transformed into "Alta Mexico" as the Hispanic population grows to overshadow the other Americans living there. Spanish is already the "second language" in many places, to the point that there are Spanish only media outlets, stores without any English signs and entire neighbourhoods without any English presence. While I suspect many people in "Alta Mexico" would wish to remain Americans on economic grounds, culturally and linguistically Alta Mexico would be quite distinct from the rest of America.

I'm sure readers can bring up examples in many other places as well.

As ERC says,  :goodpost:

The thing with nations is that it's always fluid. 
 
jollyjacktar said:
Hey!!!  You got any??  I'm game. ;D  Nekked pic's of SP?

As long as it is only pics.

As soon as she opens her mouth, the magic disappears.

Wink Wink. You Betcha
 
tomahawk6 said:
Very troubling situation where one country can lay claim to territory it had given up.What would stop Russia from taking Alaska ? Or Mexico much of the southwestern US ?Extreme examples but still possible.

The risk level. Those actions you propose would mean war, with no questions asked. They are staying inside an area that, while it might bother people in the West, isn't an "existential" question for most countries outside those immediately bordering the USSR...ooops, sorry, I mean "Russia".
 
Thucydides said:
...And the Southwestern US may informally be transformed into "Alta Mexico" as the Hispanic population grows to overshadow the other Americans living there. Spanish is already the "second language" in many places, to the point that there are Spanish only media outlets, stores without any English signs and entire neighbourhoods without any English presence. While I suspect many people in "Alta Mexico" would wish to remain Americans on economic grounds, culturally and linguistically Alta Mexico would be quite distinct from the rest of America...

Interesting scenario. If I'm not mistaken, the Hispanic demographic is the fastest growing in the entire US (not just the SW). When I lived in Virginia in 97-98, bilingual signs were in the supermarket we shopped in: a suburban area about 30 min S of DC. What if that continues to the point of creating pluralities and then majorities in the voting population of the SW states? What would happen if the Hispanic votes in those states were to lean toward a union with Mexico? (don't ask me why anybody in their right mind would actually seek that, but just go with me on this...).

If it's the democratic wish of those Hispanic Americans to separate and join Mexico, what happens?

If history is any indicator, the act of states separating to pursue their political agenda would be met by force by the US government.  But this wouldn't really be the same as what Russia did to Crimea: it would be suppressing an insurrection or sedition, not invading a previously sovereign state.

I think demographic change in the US is a huge elephant in the room, that neither party really knows exactly how to come to grips with.
 
Since much of Alta Mexico was forcibly removed from Mexico in the 1840's, there is a real historic grievance that Hispanic rabble rousers and politicians could use to whip up fervour for their cause. A certain political party in Canada has raised this into an art form, so we have first hand knowledge of this (even if the circumstances are rather different). As a matter of fact, "La Raza" is a movement which is based exactly on that premise.

Since one of the fundamentals of the American/Anglosphere political culture is flexibility and allowing for a certain amount of accommodation, I suspect that Alta Mexico in the 2060's will still be politically "American", but linguistically and culturally distinct, and home of political parties which speak to different issues to their constituents than the current two parties. If there still is a Democrat and Republican party in 2060, one of the defining features of American politics in that era might well be courting the votes of the "swing" party in the House and Senate. If you thought the "log rolling" for Obamacare was disgusting, just think what our children and grandchildren will be reading about.

I'll have to find "The Next 100 Years" in the library, but I know the author has devoted the concluding chapters of the book on exactly that issue. I will admit I didn't pay as much attention to that part, being focused more on the 2020 to 2040 timeline where I might still be around to see things develop, but readers of Army.ca should look it up.


 
Thucydides said:
Since much of Alta Mexico was forcibly removed from Mexico in the 1840's, there is a real historic grievance that Hispanic rabble rousers and politicians could use to whip up fervour for their cause. A certain political party in Canada has raised this into an art form, so we have first hand knowledge of this (even if the circumstances are rather different). As a matter of fact, "La Raza" is a movement which is based exactly on that premise.

Since one of the fundamentals of the American/Anglosphere political culture is flexibility and allowing for a certain amount of accommodation, I suspect that Alta Mexico in the 2060's will still be politically "American", but linguistically and culturally distinct, and home of political parties which speak to different issues to their constituents than the current two parties. If there still is a Democrat and Republican party in 2060, one of the defining features of American politics in that era might well be courting the votes of the "swing" party in the House and Senate. If you thought the "log rolling" for Obamacare was disgusting, just think what our children and grandchildren will be reading about.

I'll have to find "The Next 100 Years" in the library, but I know the author has devoted the concluding chapters of the book on exactly that issue. I will admit I didn't pay as much attention to that part, being focused more on the 2020 to 2040 timeline where I might still be around to see things develop, but readers of Army.ca should look it up.
I admit I didn't think about the historical facts you bring up: that makes it more plausible than I thought. I guess that by the idea of a "culturally and linguistically distinct" region you are thinking of something more "distinct" than what might currently exist in the US: more like a Quebec situation.
The idea of more than two political parties (of significance...) in the US is also an interesting one: while it would require a major change in US political culture, it might also represent a positive move away from confrontational "black or whitw", "Us or Them" politics that has been the norm in the US.

I read the "Next 100 Years" a while ago: the part you refer to was interesting, although I recall that overall I wasn't completely impressed with the book.
 
So when Davy and Daniel were rabble rousing at the Alamo was Santa Anna suppressing an insurrection or were the Yanks destabilizing a neighbouring country? 

>:D

Jus' curious.
 
Kirkhill said:
So when Davy and Daniel were rabble rousing at the Alamo was Santa Anna suppressing an insurrection or were the Yanks destabilizing a neighbouring country? 

>:D

Jus' curious.

The 1836 Texas revolution was a breakaway movement by settlers from the United States who had moved into what then was part of Mexico to act as a (largely unsuccessful) bulwark against the Comanches. They were Mexican citizens who had sworn allegiance to the central government or had been born in Mexico. There also were a large number of Mexicans who joined the revolution and supported the Anglos. Crockett and the like were not a majority of the defenders of the Alamo. Also they did not have support of the US Federal government, but for that matter the hunters etc who tried to liberate Canada at about the same time did not either.

If Santa Anna had been willing to compromise, the settlers could well have remained Mexican, and who knows how the history of the Southwest would have developed.
 
I demand that the US gives us back all of Washington State and part of Oregon down to the Columbia river, at the very least we want the San Juan Islands back, pig or no pig.
 
We could always throw our support for DC statehood, then push them to secede. We do have a claim on the territory, dating back to the War of 1812.

Only problem is the rest of the US would probably be all too willing to let them go as long as they had a guarantee that we took Congress with it.
 
Don't want DC.....

Unless...

Perhaps we can relocate Bytown to Foggy Bottom and give all the Pols and Bureaucrats their independence?
 
Kirkhill said:
In the same period France went through a monarchy, two republics and a dictatorship.... Got to love those lawyers and their constitutions. ::)

You gotta love the lawyers, they always make there money, lol..
 
"The first thing we do, let's kill all the lawyers".

Henry VI (Part 2)- (Act IV, Scene II)
 
E.R. Campbell said:
More on this in an interview with Margaret MacMillan (Oxford) which is reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from the Globe and Mail:

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/margaret-macmillan-how-today-is-like-the-period-before-the-first-world-war/article17626075/#dashboard/follows/
Margaret MacMillan: How today is like the period before the First World War

PETER SCOWEN
The Globe and Mail

Published Saturday, Mar. 22 2014

Margaret MacMillan is a historian and professor at Oxford University, and a leading expert on the causes and outcomes of the First World War. Her new book is The War That Ended Peace: The Road to 1914. The Globe spoke to her by phone in Oxford.

The War That Ended Peace is one of five books nominated this year for the $25,000 Shaughnessy Cohen Prize for Political Writing, which will be awarded April 2. The Globe and Mail will feature interviews with each nominated author during the week of March 17. Read an interview with Paul Wells on figuring out what Prime Minister Stephen Harper is thinking or Charles Montgomery on how to make cities that make people happy.

You make repeated and pointed analogies in your book between the period leading up to the First World War and today. What are the main similarities?

Living through times of rapid change can be exhilarating but it also can be very difficult. And not everybody wins when you have rapid globalization, which is what you had before 1914 and what you’re having today. The world since the 1990s has been knitted together in increasingly tight ways. That causes strains, and you get a lot of social change. You had a growing gap before 1914; you have a growing gap today between rich and poor, and the middle class is getting squeezed. Plus the fear of terrorism, the fear that society was going to the dogs. Perhaps every society has that, but I think sometimes more often than others.

You write that in Britain before 1914 “moral crusades to reinforce the family and its values picked up momentum” and ask parenthetically, “does that sound familiar?” Are you seeing that in Canada too?

Certainly with the people who came over from the Reform Party, there are some who take a highly moralized view of life and worry about present society and where is the family going and where are young people going; who are opposed to same-sex marriage because they see it as weakening the institution of marriage. You don’t get this in every society but there were worries before 1914 that values were changing, the young weren’t prepared to stand up for their countries, they didn’t have a sense of duty. It seems to me we’re getting it quite a bit now.

The Harper government has been pushing an idealized view of military sacrifice and duty, which was another common feature of Europe before 1914.

We are, but what I do think is different today is that society just isn’t responding in the same way. That may be because so few people today actually have experience of military service, whereas in Europe except for Britain all the armies were conscript armies, so an awful lot of people went through. It seems to have had in some countries the effect of making them more pro-military than less, funnily enough.

Turning to Crimea and Russia, you write about Russia’s longing for acceptance by Europe at the turn of the last century. Do you see that still happening with Russian President Vladimir Putin?

Absolutely. What you’ve got with Putin is a sense that Russia is a great country that is not living up to its own greatness. He lived through a time when Russia was deeply humiliated and made to feel powerless, and I think a great deal of his career since has been to say, ‘Look, we’re not powerless.’ That’s one of the reasons why Sochi was so important – the sense that ‘we’ve been pushed around and they don’t take us seriously.’

Your book tallies all the bad decisions made by politicians and monarchs that led to war in 1914. Is that still going on?

I still think you can get bad decisions. Look at the series of decisions to invade and occupy Iraq. You’re also getting nations confronting each other in worrying ways. China and Japan – you have to hope that they remain sensible but if they’re going to start moving military stuff in and declaring no-fly zones, that’s upping the ante always. The more you up the stakes, the more mistakes matter.

Do you not see any developments in modern diplomacy that keep countries away from the precipice?

We have better international institutions and more of them. And we do have the capacity now to talk quickly to each other. But what we don’t have are the experienced diplomats who used to really know a country. There’s been a tendency in most countries to downplay the role of the diplomatic corps and to say, ‘do we really need diplomats?’ You’ve got it in the Harper government: ‘Do we really need all these people? They just hang out and go to cocktail parties.’

By the same token, diplomats did not prevent the First World War.

No, they didn’t. But they did actually deal with quite a few crises before World War One. You could argue that they had shown their value. I think good diplomatic services are very very useful. It’s also worrying to me what’s happening to newspapers. The media generally are closing down their overseas bureaux because they’re too expensive. What that means is we’re getting huge amounts of information but we’re not really getting the analysis and expertise that we all need.

We mistake being able to get lots of information from everywhere very quickly with actually getting knowledge.

Two points:

    1. The War That Ended Peace: The Road to 1914 is a good read, I highly recommend it.

      2. Margaret MacMillan is not to be confused with Jennifer Welsh, she of the "global model citizen" (think Norway) theses, who, briefly, advised Prime Minister Martin. For women are Canadians and Oxford professors, but they are not, I think, of like minds.


And here is a rather reassuring piece, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from Canadian International Council, which suggests that this is not like 1914 nor, even, 1964:

http://opencanada.org/features/blogs/roundtable/wwi-the-cold-war-and-today/
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WWI, The Cold War, and Today

Steve Saideman

July 28, 2014

Today marks the 100th anniversary of the start of World War I with the declaration of war by Austria against Serbia. Much has been made of the centennial of this horrific conflict. A year full of international tension in which we are just more than halfway through have had many pondering if the world is now more dangerous since the Cold War (John McCain’s latest bit of hyper-hyperness). The answer is not so clear.

Yes, people who were calling for the end of conflict worldwide were over-reaching, but the reality is that there still remain fewer international wars than there used to be and less violence within states than there once was. There is also less violence in the world now than during the first decade of the post-Cold War Era. It may not seem that way given recent news coverage, but Syria, Gaza, and Ukraine have their matches and then some in Bosnia, Rwanda, Chechnya, Sierra Leone, Algeria, Armenia-Azerbaijan, the First and Second Congo War, Eritrea, and so on. Recency bias means that we pay far more attention to the latest events, but violence after the Cold War is hardly new.

The more obvious reality is that the world is more stable than before. That is, whatever conflicts there are will still be less likely to do what World War I did: start from a minor dispute between two middle (or lesser) powers to become a major conflagration among the most powerful countries in the world. Yes, the United States and Russia are squabbling over Ukraine, but there is no rush to war this time. Why?

Most importantly, this is because World War I (and World War II) happened. A century later, it still provides the lessons for conflict management and for wariness about being sucked into an ally’s war. In truth, World War I did not resolve much, but several trends starting then have slowly made an impact on the likelihood of war. In the years since WWI, self-determination has been both a peaceful and violent process, but it is now a widely accepted cornerstone of international relations that conquest is almost unthinkable (excepting the recent case of Crimea). We will never get to a point where the lines on the maps perfectly reflect the distribution of ethnic groups (nor should we), but colonization and wars over colonization are very much in the past.

Even with some back-sliding (Hungary), there are far more democracies now than there were in 1992. Even as some are symbolic, most of the new democracies are fairly functional. While the democracy and peace debate still goes on—whether democracies are less likely to fight other democracies and why—we do know that democracies have less civil war. Why? Because political change can occur within the system at a far lower cost than going outside the system. Yes, there is still some violence in some democracies, but Churchill’s line suggesting, “democracy is the worst form of government, except for all the others” applies here most strongly.

Interestingly, one of the hidden requirements of democracy works far better now both in older democracies and newer ones—civilian control of the military. There are still coups today, but we no longer leave war to the generals and admirals. We learned from World War I not only that civilian leaders must question their militaries about their plans and capabilities, but also that we need expertise on the military outside of the military so that we can intelligently question their tactics and strategy. This has led to think tanks, research centres at universities, non-government organizations, bigger staffs on the civilian side of government, and more.

While the League of Nations proved quickly to be a bust, the lesson from World War I that we need to cooperate to manage the shocks and conflicts in international relations is an enduring one. There is no one way to do this. We have seen the creation of a veritable cornucopia of multilateral organizations to manage various elements of international relations from the United Nations to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the International Monetary Fund to the African Union to the European Union to the International Civil Aviation Office to the World Health Organization and on and on. There are also less formal organizations like the G-7/8 and others.

And there are nuclear weapons. It may not be pleasant that mutual hostage-taking may deter escalation, but it has been the reality for some time between the big powers of the world. World War III is far harder to imagine today than World War I was a hundred years ago precisely because we have gotten so much better at killing each other. War is very much something to be avoided. The attitudes before World War I were far different—that war was inevitable and perhaps noble, that social Darwinism meant that those who survived the fires would be stronger and better off.

As much as confirmation bias, ideology and politics often means that learning can be slow and that mistakes can be repeated, we have learned many of the lessons of World War I. It may have taken a second World War to really learn them, but the world is a better place now than before. There is actually less poverty. The big financial crisis did spread throughout the world, but the system worked in limiting how bad it got, so that we did not repeat the mistakes of the Great Depression.

To be sure, the problems we face today seem very, very hard to solve. Indeed, I am skeptical about our ability to fix most of them, but I do think that most can be managed. We need to have more humility about what we can accomplish in the short term, but we have accomplished a great deal over the past one hundred years. History’s progress is hardly smooth but it has been actually quite… progressive. We can look, for instance, at Russia’s behaviour and worry about its assertiveness (and we should). However, we should also note that Russia has used proxies and has not actually chosen to conquer Ukraine. That might be small comfort, but it is a big contrast from the international relations of 1914. So, on this anniversary of the start of the World to End All Wars (talk about hubris), I will take my solace where I can find it.

The Bill Graham Center and the University of Toronto’s Munk School of Global Affairs, with support from the Canadian Armed Forces, will hold a conference “1914-1918: The Making of the Modern World” on July 30 and a concert “1914-1918: In Memoriam” on July 31 to commemorate the centennial.


New century: new problems.
 
But, on the other side of the coin, we are in a particularly turbulent period.  A lot of comparison between the Ukrain crisis and Nazi Germany has been made, but I find as much (if not more) similarities with the world at the start of the 20th century than with the generation later.

What makes us think today's world leaders are any better than the ones that started WW1?
Rex Murphy
National Post
26 Jul 2014

History, said T.S. Eliot, has many “cunning passages, contrived corridors and issues.” He continues rather bleakly that what history might or could teach us emerges with “subtle confusions” offered only when our “attention is distracted.” Eliot’s is a necessary caution against seeking specific lessons from history; despite the maxim, it never “repeats itself.” Rather it is like the ancient oracles, speaking always in riddles, hiding its truths in ambiguities and perplexity. The only lessons we may draw are general ones. It will never speak to a single or particular event, but it has its maxims and morals which we cannot safely ignore.

From the First World War, most have taken the theme that (relatively) small events can spiral into a mighty combustion. Europe was a cat’s cradle of connections and alliances, its rulers abominably short-sighted and absurdly confident, no controlling mind overseeing or attempting to oversee what a single push on the chessboard might eventually precipitate. That war resulted from a cascade of misjudgements and misperceptions set in motion by the singular deed of a Serbian terrorist.

People looking at the world today are, I think rightfully, seeing something of a parallel with confusions of a century ago. In the last weeks and months, what a crowding and a tangling of events we have seen. And we have seen, too, how, just like a hundred years ago, an event in one place has its connection and impact in others. A jet shot down over Ukraine has a consequence for Israel a week later.

We draw too from the reckless drift into the First World War how small and underscale the actors of that day were, how little the rulers, whether czars, monarchs, presidents or revolutionaries, truly understood of the events they thought they were managing. The leaders then were tragically unequal to the times, but of course, as leaders unfailingly do, thought otherwise.

The few who did see — like Lord Grey, who looked out on the world at the eve of war and uttered the memorable prophecy “The lamps are going out all over Europe, we shall not see them lit again in our lifetime” — were destined as Cassandras have always been to see their judgements ignored and their laments unheeded.

“Put not your trust in princes” is not Eliot, but the Psalms. The “princes” of 1914 we now see for what they were — befuddled, arrogant and above all careless of consequences. Who has optimism that today’s leaders are any more wise or ready? Looking at events since the destruction of the twin towers in September, 2001, the inaugural deed of the current crises, who can draw coherence or logic from them. It has been a scramble and a tumbling from one event to the next since that awful day. And by one of history’s “subtle confusions,” as Eliot had it, Afghanistan and Iraq are tending now (and in Iraq’s case, is already there) to a condition more threatening than when the vast effort here in the West to confront terrorism began.

That Mr. Putin should be, even in a negative sense, the “strongest” leader on the scene, the one with a thought-out, calculated agenda, is a deep sadness

And in all of this, there is no voice that articulates the dangers potentially present, no leadership that has the reach of the globe that inspires. That Mr. Putin should be, even in a negative sense, the “strongest” leader on the scene, the one with a thought-out, calculated agenda, is a deep sadness.

The West has had some peace since the last great war, almost 70 years of it now. And we have had with that peace an astounding march of technological and material progress. Both tend to make people forgetful of worse times. It renders them careless of the foundations upon which peace is first secured and then maintained, and nourishes the delusion they are exempt from the horrors and perils that have been a constant in human affairs.

So it seems now to some, as it seemed to some a century ago, that there is a menacing scattering of events and conflicts, where a disturbance, an accident or misadventure (such as the shooting down of the passenger jet) in one arena could unwind into a chain of unforeseen events, a haphazard flow of unpredictable cause and effect. And here, despite Eliot’s cautions, we can draw another clear and unconfused message from history: Whenever full-scale war comes. it is always worse than the previous one. Not even the trenches of the First World War, or the terrible technologies of the Second, will carry the freight of conflict in our time. We, after all, as we like to say, have “mastered” the atom.

Eliot was right in his main assertion. Every period has to learn its own history, but we can so frame our minds and school our judgments on the permanent elements of human conduct as to be duly wary of the play of forces beyond our ability to grasp.

We may  start with the axioms that human affairs are always riddled with error, confusion, misjudgement and carelessness, and that all of those fallibilities and failings have had, and will have again, massively turbulent consequences.  The example of a century ago is ominous and necessary. History “deceives with whispering ambitions, guides us by vanities.” Eliot again.
 
I'd suggest 1920's war-weariness coupled with 1930's increasing political/military turbulence.
 
Dimsum said:
How recent are most of the diaspora though?  Are they 1st, 2nd (or more) generation?  How many of them self-identify as "Ukrainian" over "Canadian", at least enough to persuade Canada into doing something about it?

Here in Manitoba, there are plenty of 2nd or 3rd generation people who self-identify as "Ukrainian" and speak longingly of baba's perogies...Ukrainian could probably qualify as an official language here.

On a serious note, they are concerned of the events in the old country and feel the Canadian government is not being forceful enough.

Colin P said:
I demand that the US gives us back all of Washington State and part of Oregon down to the Columbia river, at the very least we want the San Juan Islands back, pig or no pig.

:goodpost:  MilPoints inbound!
 
and they vote here as well, so it's not surprising Harper's stance on the issue. I suspect Putin has more respect for Harper, than Obama, although he has no reason to fear Harper as there is little we can do.
 
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