The New Strategy

[Fishbone Jones]

This was taken from the LFRR Board

A MESSAGE FROM THE COMMANDER

The Army is a vital national institution. Its purpose is to defend the nation and protect its interests. Given the increasing complexity of the world and the many new global
risks that we see emerging, such a task in particularly demanding. If we are to ensure that the Army can continue to meet the nation‘s needs, the work to transform our
Army to meet the challenges ahead must begin now.

The Army does not exist in isolation. It works alongside the Navy, the Air Force and the emerging CF Joint capability as part of Canada‘s overall defence capability. The Army‘s
strategy has been developed in the context of the departmental strategy, Shaping the Future of the Canadian Forces: A Strategy for 2020."

We have already begun the transformation, a process which is at one difficult and exciting for all who wear our uniform. If we are to prevail on the battlefields of tomorrow, if
we are to operate effectively with our allies, particularly the U.S. Army, we must become a more aginle, more lethal and knowledge-based Army with equipment, doctrine and
training suited to a force which is strategically relevant and tactically decisive.

The strategy we are announcing is a balanced approach to preparing the Army for the future while continuing to perform the tasks that Canadians expect today. It explains
how the Army will advance with purpose by capitalizing on its strengths and overcoming its weaknesses to develop the Army for the challenges of tomorrow.

The primary target audience of the strategy is the broad Army leadership. But because it provides a blueprint for our way ahead, all soldiers should be familiar with its major
themes. The material on these pages provides an abbreviated summary of these themes. I hope you will read the strategy itself, and that you will find it useful as a guide to
our future.

M.K. Jeffery
Lieutenant-General
Chief of the Land Staff

THE ARMY STRATEGY

The Army‘s strategy, Advincing with Purpose, is the result of extensive consultation, discussion and debate across the Army. It sets out the broad principles and direction for
sustaining the Army of Today while transforming it to the Army of Tomorrow in 5 to 10 years. It also provides the intellectual framework for exploring new challenges and
concepts through the Future Army.

The strategy begins by describing the strategic context, including a summary of key deductions about the direction the Army must take. The document notes that along
with more traditional threats to peace and security, "threats of international terrorism, asymmetrical attacks and violations of our national sovereignty have all become far more
complex and dangerous in recent years." The strategy states that central to the Army‘s purpose and role "is its capability to apply force across the spectrum of conflict and
continuum of operations." This continues the long-standing Army philosophy that to be truly effective in peace support operations, soldiers must be proficient in combat skills.

The document deals frankly with the Army‘s current strengths and weaknesses. It praises the overall quality and motivation of Canadian soldiers and notes the acquisition of
superb new equipment such as the Coyote and LAV III. But it also lists problems such as the toll exacted by a high personnel tempo, significant shortfalls in Intelligence,
Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR), both direct and indirect firepower and a reduction in opportunities for collective training.

The document then describes building the Army of Tomorrow, including the Commander‘s vision and intent. The third part of the strategy deals with implementation.

The 30-page document does not describe Army transformation in great detail; it is designed to provide overall guidance. Soldiers will see the key components of the strategy
in the four objectives for building a more effective and relevant Army of Tomorrow:
- Objective 1 - Connect with Canadians
- Objective 2 - Shape Army Culture
- Objective 3 - Deliver a Combat-Capable, Sustainable Force Structure
- Objective 4 - Manage Readiness

THE ARMY INTERIM MODEL

The Interim Model will serve as the transition between teh Army of Today and the Army of Tomorrow. It provides unity and direction to staff initiatives and transfers
resources to build new capability, especially in the areas of command support, battlefield sensing and communications. Building that capability around systems such as the
ISTAR, will lead to the Army of Tomorrow about a decade from now.

As the Interim Model evolves, the Army will transform from the present three symmetrical brigades to three more specialized brigades. It will become more plug-and-play from
a manoeuvre and firepower perspective; sub-units will become the basic building blocks for generating more flexible groupings for tactically self-sufficient organizations.

During this 10-year period, the Army‘s structure and doctrine will start focusing more on operations in complex terrain such as urban or large wooded areas, without
precluding the more traditional open manoeuvre concepts. The Interim Model will geographically concentrate heavier combat capabilities such as tanks, medium guns and
supporting armoured engineer elements. This will assist the organizational preparation for the shift to the open terrain, extended range assets of the Army of Tomorrow.

Other like capabilities will be grouped together for force generation. The Army plans to transfer the infantry pioneer tasks to the engineers. It is also the intention to transfer
infantry mortar capability to the artillery. The current light infantry battalions will be developed as true light infantry, optimized for strategic mobility and operations in complex
terrain. They anre envisaged to offer some special operations capability.

The Army leadership who developed this model at the direction of the Commander listened carefully and weighed all arguments from the various Corps and Army
communities. The Commander considered the strategic position of the Army and how it can use its resources more effectively while making the transition to the Army of
Tomorrow. A final implementation plan is not yet completed but the infromation below provides a broad overview of the Interim Model, the bridge between the Army of
Today and the Army of Tomorrow. It is a model that will continue to change and evolve.

INTERIM ARMY MODEL
Field Force

Command: 3 brigade HQs, with a digitized Command Support capability
Infantry: 6 mechanized battalions, 3 light battalions
Armour: 1 tank regiment, 2 recce regiments
Artillery: 1 medium regiment, 2 light regiments, 1 air defence regiment
Engineers: 3 combat engineer regiments
Aviation: 3 helicopter squadrons
Combat Serve Support: 3 close support battalions, 3 MP platoons
Other: 1 electronic warfare squadron, NBCD and other capability

SUMMARY OF MAJOR CHANGES

- Develop the capabilities of the three light infantry battalions, with potential special ops capability

- Consolidate tanks, medium guns and some heavy armoured engineer equipment

- Transfer infantry mortar tasks to artillery, assault pioneer tasks to engineers

- Build aviation ISTAR capability

- Increase resourcing and depth of the institutional Army in particular the Army Training System

 

[Jungle]

I heard just about the same thing yesterday from a very reliable source. Also, it will be announced shortly that all Leopards and M-109‘s will be transferred to 1 Bde, which will become Canada‘s "heavy" Bde. It is good news that the LIB‘s will finally be taken seriously, especially if they are to become "spec ops capable". These moves can only improve effectiveness and morale in the Army.

 

[portcullisguy]

It seems absolutely retarded to me - admittedly a bit of an outsider - to transfer mortar tasking to artillery and not leave it with infantry. Likewise, the pioneer platoon concept moving to engineers.

Sure, there‘s lots of cross-over, but I always thought of mortars as a close-support indirect fire weapon best suited to infantry, and pioneer platoons also better suited to supporting infantry on a smaller-scale or close support role.

Anyway, I dunno.. I‘m not an RMC military studies grad, so I don‘t know jack ... just seems silly to start changing things around.

Maybe I‘m a bit of a stick in the mud.

 

[rceme_rat]

In general, I have no problem with this proposal. In many ways, it must be applauded. I do question on concept:

"Transfer infantry mortar tasks to artillery, assault pioneer tasks to engineers"

This seems to me to be over-centralisation of critical resources. Mortars are there so that the infantry can get on with things without waiting for brigade or div level co-ord of indir fire sp. Same can be said for pioneers and their immediate defensive tasks.

Otherwise, I think this plan will be excellent for training, and economical and effective from a svc sp pt-of-view.

 

[Brock]

I am intrigued by this new strategy. Clearly it will allow the CF to rationalize training and equipment resources. Yet, I wonder if the Army--see Gov‘t--will support the strategy? Maybe, maube not, only time will tell.

The strategy will, if implemented save money because of the rationalisation of role. However, if the brigades do not have all their units and sub-units located at one base than much of the savings will not be realized. Transporting the equipment of an infantry battalion all the way from Shilo to Wainwright is not an effective way to conduct training. However, if it is only the light battalions that are split than the effect of not co-locating combat units will be minimalized. Yet, clearly colocating all units and sub-units is the way to go.

I agree that mortars and assault pioneers should remain infantry positions. However, I will concede that if artillery and combat engineer personnel are atached to the battalion in the mortar and assault pioneer platoons the loss to the battalions will be minimalized. Nevertheless, the loss of mortar and pioneer skills on behalf of the infantry will be substantial. First, of all infantry personnel will have two fewer direct infantry combat support trades to aspire to. This will reduce retention, because fewer soldiers will have the oppourtunity to rotate out of straight infantry roles to the more specialized combat support roles. Interest in the infantry will wane--lets face it the infantry can get pretty boring sometimes--and people will leave sooner and thus increasing attrition and thus training costs. Therefore any claim to savings made from giving mortars and pioneer posistions to the artillery and combat engineers will be deemed a very weak argument.

In addition, the regular--not the reserves--infantry--in Canada will be less effective than today or in the past. With fewer soldiers having a specialized combat support skill in addition to their basic infantry skills the Canadian infantry will be less capable in any future operation. An infantry battalion with 500 that has roughly 40% of all personnel equipped with a second skill is far more flexible than a battalion with only 20% with a second skill. During WWI and II the reason the infantry acquired mortars and pioneer personnel was, because artillery and combat engineer support wasn‘t always available or warranted for some missions.

To rehash, transferring mortars and pioneers to the artillery and combat engineers will not save substantial amounts of money, it will not increase combat effectiveness. Yet, it will increase attrition--therefore minimilize cost-savings earned by rationalization-- and boredom. The rationalization will also go against hard military lessons learned. I conclude that any minimal savings made will result in a less interesting trade and a less flexible military organization.

Personnally, I think if the army was trying to save money, they should rationalize the LAV III crews in the mechanized infantry rifle companies. The LAV III is a crewed vehicle not a M113 with a .50 Cal. in a simple ring turret. This is another discussion. For an excellent discussion go to http://www.ducimus.com/ and read the LAV III Company: A fifth option.

 

[Argyll_2347]

I found this website on how the Army will be changed:

http://www.army.forces.ca/strategy/English/strathome.asp