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Anyone have a read of this article when it came out? I am not saying that I agree or disagree - I'm just providing this as a source of information.
I have cherry picked pieces of the story and listed them below, note that it is NOT the complete article.
Why the F-35 Fighter is Wrong for Canada’s Air Force but Right for Its Navy
moderndiplomacy.eu
We had proposed, in our Canadian Forces expansion plan, to have an enlarged Air Force of 32,500 personnel by 2031. We predicate this vision on the RCAF basing its purchase decisions on economically and operationally smart choices. Aircraft designed around efficiently and effectively fulfilling core mission requirements in training and operational availability as well as making perfect supply chain and maintenance cost sense. In other words, the most bang for the buck. This means returning or selling the 16 F-35As committed to and instead buying an RCAF fighter fleet consisting of Gripen E/Fs for the NORAD air defense role, Eurofighter Typhoons for the NATO/strike role, and the Korean TA/FA-50 Golden Eagles for the advanced trainer role and as a light strike fighter to complement and enhance the interceptor and strike squadrons.
All three of these chosen aircraft fly with or can accommodate the Eurojet EJ200 and its single-engine derivative, the EJ230. To be clear, the Gripen E and Golden Eagle do not currently offer that engine option for sale, given the initial certification with the GE engine. To replace the engine would require airframe modifications, testing, and flight certification, not an inexpensive or quick proposition. But the EJ200 has been offered as a direct replacement for both types, being almost identical in size, performance, and airflow specifications. It would mean Canada would bear those upfront modification costs, but in the environment and tensions we face with the US, we judge the costs worthwhile to bear to remain ITAR and veto free. Economically and efficiency-wise, having a single common engine type across the fighter and advanced trainer fleets saves money on maintenance training, repairs, and services and allows for greater aircraft availability through commonality of parts. Only one type rating would be required for engine maintainers, which means fewer personnel are ultimately required. It makes perfect logistical sense, allowing for a simplified supply chain and improved cost-effectiveness by purchasing in greater quantity. Quantity also justifies setting up local manufacturing as well. All three aircraft use or can use similar Leonardo radars, which again would save costs and supply chain issues, improve readiness rates, reduce training time needed, and finally, address ITAR issues.
Granted, the Typhoon is not stealthy, but it can carry more weaponry, outturn and outfight the F-35, and even give the F-22 a good run for the money in a dogfight. Simply put, Canada doesn’t do the deep penetration, preemptive, or nuclear strike missions of the F-35A, so why waste tax money on buying it? The Typhoon can easily carry multiple Storm Shadow and other long-range missiles like Airborne LORA to do any deep strike mission, launching them safely from several hundred miles away. As to the Korean TA/FA-50 Golden Eagle trainer and light strike fighter, it is a versatile supersonic advanced trainer and light strike aircraft that can be fitted with the same EJ200 engine as the proposed Gripen and current Typhoon. It also can use similar Leonardo AESA radars as the Typhoon and Gripen.
This combination would allow seamless pilot and maintenance training with the TA-50 into the Gripen and Typhoon fleets and, by also equipping each operational fighter squadron with several FA-50s, allow operational pilots to fly their simpler mission training profiles on the lower-cost plane they are also familiar with. These light fighters have similar overall performance, allowing pilots to build their realistic mission skills and flight time at reduced overall ongoing operational training costs. A large buy would also definitely facilitate having Canadian assembly, given our suggested order size. The government’s and RCAF’s primary goal needs to be to buy a fleet of aircraft that is highly serviceable and available, performs the required missions effectively, and is affordable to own and upgrade. This allows the Air Force to maintain an experienced and proficient pilot pool to fight and win with them. Based on their known capabilities and economics, this combination of aircraft allows the RCAF to fit the bill to a tee.
The F-35B is the perfect aircraft for Canada to order instead, facilitating the RCN getting back into the carrier game that it gave up in 1970 with the scrapping of HMCS Bonaventure. NATO partners Britain, France, and Italy all recently sent their own aircraft carriers into the Indo-Pacific region to show the flag and project power and help foster better partnerships with allies, a sorely missed Canadian capability. We have similarly proposed that the Canadian government expand the RCN and purchase Italian Cavour-class aircraft carriers and Trieste-class amphibious assault ships to similarly restore the RCN’s ability to project power and protect the greatly expanded Asian trade this government is pursuing to mitigate and reduce the outsized Canadian trade dependence upon the United States.
The F-35B is the perfect plane to equip these ships, giving the RCN a needed tool to project power and defend Canada’s interests and our allies in the Pacific, countering the naval threats in the region. We had advocated in our plan for the RCN to buy 2 Cavour-class CVLs and 2 Trieste-class LHAs, all based in Esquimalt, as part of this new expanded and muscular navy. These ships are optimal choices to create an RCN carrier force and establish an amphibious landing ability to support our Pacific allies. These two classes of vessels have efficiently sized ship complements compared to similar American ships. They are also less expensive to build and maintain, can employ fairly significant air wings, and are already designed to support the F-35B.
Showing you are willing to project hard power to assist an ally by committing an aircraft carrier or amphibious forces in support builds immense goodwill. These ships would be mobile sovereign territory in which to project your influence for hundreds of miles in every direction, and Canada needs that capability again, especially in the Indo-Pacific. Australia, India, Taiwan, Korea, and Japan are all significant trading partners; we can build better, stronger relationships by tangibly supporting them. The RCN operated aircraft carriers before, and the Canadian government knew well what they brought to the table in geopolitical power and credibility. The RCN needs to get back into that business of real power projection to showcase and defend Canada’s economic and geopolitical interests.
To summarize our position, cancel the RCAF F-35A buy entirely and sell the 16 already being built, as they are entirely the wrong aircraft for the RCAF today. Order 65 F-35Bs instead for the RCN and the Italian-designed carriers to fly them from, and order 86 Gripen E/F and 128 Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft as well as 81 TA and 90 FA-50 Korean Golden Eagles for the RCAF, all being built in Canada. Sure, it will cost much more, but it will restore to the RCAF and RCN the now needed expanded combat capabilities they possessed just before the defense disaster that was unification in 1968 and into the 1970s. Please don’t buy the F-35A simply because you want to placate an unreliable ally or Air Force people who have a vested interest in wanting to be able to perform a mission that you will never realistically ask it to do. Buy aircraft that perform what the actual tasked missions require well and further enhance our sovereignty by being built and upgraded locally, by Canadians. Buy aircraft that will be available to fly reliably in significant numbers while still being affordable to maintain and fly. This combination will allow Canada to get the best military and economic value out of its very significant defense dollar commitments.
I have cherry picked pieces of the story and listed them below, note that it is NOT the complete article.
Why the F-35 Fighter is Wrong for Canada’s Air Force but Right for Its Navy
Why the F-35 Fighter is Wrong for Canada's Air Force but Right for Its Navy
Today the debate rages over whether to cap the RCAF buy at 88 F-35As and 16 aircraft and purchase Swedish Gripen E fighters to operate a mixed fleet
moderndiplomacy.eu
We had proposed, in our Canadian Forces expansion plan, to have an enlarged Air Force of 32,500 personnel by 2031. We predicate this vision on the RCAF basing its purchase decisions on economically and operationally smart choices. Aircraft designed around efficiently and effectively fulfilling core mission requirements in training and operational availability as well as making perfect supply chain and maintenance cost sense. In other words, the most bang for the buck. This means returning or selling the 16 F-35As committed to and instead buying an RCAF fighter fleet consisting of Gripen E/Fs for the NORAD air defense role, Eurofighter Typhoons for the NATO/strike role, and the Korean TA/FA-50 Golden Eagles for the advanced trainer role and as a light strike fighter to complement and enhance the interceptor and strike squadrons.
All three of these chosen aircraft fly with or can accommodate the Eurojet EJ200 and its single-engine derivative, the EJ230. To be clear, the Gripen E and Golden Eagle do not currently offer that engine option for sale, given the initial certification with the GE engine. To replace the engine would require airframe modifications, testing, and flight certification, not an inexpensive or quick proposition. But the EJ200 has been offered as a direct replacement for both types, being almost identical in size, performance, and airflow specifications. It would mean Canada would bear those upfront modification costs, but in the environment and tensions we face with the US, we judge the costs worthwhile to bear to remain ITAR and veto free. Economically and efficiency-wise, having a single common engine type across the fighter and advanced trainer fleets saves money on maintenance training, repairs, and services and allows for greater aircraft availability through commonality of parts. Only one type rating would be required for engine maintainers, which means fewer personnel are ultimately required. It makes perfect logistical sense, allowing for a simplified supply chain and improved cost-effectiveness by purchasing in greater quantity. Quantity also justifies setting up local manufacturing as well. All three aircraft use or can use similar Leonardo radars, which again would save costs and supply chain issues, improve readiness rates, reduce training time needed, and finally, address ITAR issues.
Granted, the Typhoon is not stealthy, but it can carry more weaponry, outturn and outfight the F-35, and even give the F-22 a good run for the money in a dogfight. Simply put, Canada doesn’t do the deep penetration, preemptive, or nuclear strike missions of the F-35A, so why waste tax money on buying it? The Typhoon can easily carry multiple Storm Shadow and other long-range missiles like Airborne LORA to do any deep strike mission, launching them safely from several hundred miles away. As to the Korean TA/FA-50 Golden Eagle trainer and light strike fighter, it is a versatile supersonic advanced trainer and light strike aircraft that can be fitted with the same EJ200 engine as the proposed Gripen and current Typhoon. It also can use similar Leonardo AESA radars as the Typhoon and Gripen.
This combination would allow seamless pilot and maintenance training with the TA-50 into the Gripen and Typhoon fleets and, by also equipping each operational fighter squadron with several FA-50s, allow operational pilots to fly their simpler mission training profiles on the lower-cost plane they are also familiar with. These light fighters have similar overall performance, allowing pilots to build their realistic mission skills and flight time at reduced overall ongoing operational training costs. A large buy would also definitely facilitate having Canadian assembly, given our suggested order size. The government’s and RCAF’s primary goal needs to be to buy a fleet of aircraft that is highly serviceable and available, performs the required missions effectively, and is affordable to own and upgrade. This allows the Air Force to maintain an experienced and proficient pilot pool to fight and win with them. Based on their known capabilities and economics, this combination of aircraft allows the RCAF to fit the bill to a tee.
The F-35B is the perfect aircraft for Canada to order instead, facilitating the RCN getting back into the carrier game that it gave up in 1970 with the scrapping of HMCS Bonaventure. NATO partners Britain, France, and Italy all recently sent their own aircraft carriers into the Indo-Pacific region to show the flag and project power and help foster better partnerships with allies, a sorely missed Canadian capability. We have similarly proposed that the Canadian government expand the RCN and purchase Italian Cavour-class aircraft carriers and Trieste-class amphibious assault ships to similarly restore the RCN’s ability to project power and protect the greatly expanded Asian trade this government is pursuing to mitigate and reduce the outsized Canadian trade dependence upon the United States.
The F-35B is the perfect plane to equip these ships, giving the RCN a needed tool to project power and defend Canada’s interests and our allies in the Pacific, countering the naval threats in the region. We had advocated in our plan for the RCN to buy 2 Cavour-class CVLs and 2 Trieste-class LHAs, all based in Esquimalt, as part of this new expanded and muscular navy. These ships are optimal choices to create an RCN carrier force and establish an amphibious landing ability to support our Pacific allies. These two classes of vessels have efficiently sized ship complements compared to similar American ships. They are also less expensive to build and maintain, can employ fairly significant air wings, and are already designed to support the F-35B.
Showing you are willing to project hard power to assist an ally by committing an aircraft carrier or amphibious forces in support builds immense goodwill. These ships would be mobile sovereign territory in which to project your influence for hundreds of miles in every direction, and Canada needs that capability again, especially in the Indo-Pacific. Australia, India, Taiwan, Korea, and Japan are all significant trading partners; we can build better, stronger relationships by tangibly supporting them. The RCN operated aircraft carriers before, and the Canadian government knew well what they brought to the table in geopolitical power and credibility. The RCN needs to get back into that business of real power projection to showcase and defend Canada’s economic and geopolitical interests.
To summarize our position, cancel the RCAF F-35A buy entirely and sell the 16 already being built, as they are entirely the wrong aircraft for the RCAF today. Order 65 F-35Bs instead for the RCN and the Italian-designed carriers to fly them from, and order 86 Gripen E/F and 128 Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft as well as 81 TA and 90 FA-50 Korean Golden Eagles for the RCAF, all being built in Canada. Sure, it will cost much more, but it will restore to the RCAF and RCN the now needed expanded combat capabilities they possessed just before the defense disaster that was unification in 1968 and into the 1970s. Please don’t buy the F-35A simply because you want to placate an unreliable ally or Air Force people who have a vested interest in wanting to be able to perform a mission that you will never realistically ask it to do. Buy aircraft that perform what the actual tasked missions require well and further enhance our sovereignty by being built and upgraded locally, by Canadians. Buy aircraft that will be available to fly reliably in significant numbers while still being affordable to maintain and fly. This combination will allow Canada to get the best military and economic value out of its very significant defense dollar commitments.
