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The RCAF's Next Generation Fighter (CF-188 Replacement)

I don't think it is an especially wise or financially prudent idea to look at a 6th generation fighter for the RCAF anytime soon, particularly if we do infact get a full F-35 order. That kind of fleet will be relevant and very capable for many decades, which is going to be required for all of these vapourware and troublesome 6th gen programs to prove themselves worthy of serious consideration by the RCAF. We should be focusing on the F-35 and domestically produced drone wingmen escorts to bulk the combat capability of the force.


I have no interest in Chunmoo because it is unsuitable for our requirements, hence it losing to the HIMARS. One of the primary selling points of HIMARS is its mobility and the ridiculous array of very capable weapons it currently has and is actively being developed, including items like increasingly capable guided munitions and especially anti-ship missiles. Chunmoo does not have access to these weapons and in all likelihood will not in the future, we'd be stuck with sub-par Korean systems that currently don't exist or are in development. Chunmoo also doesn't have the mobility we are looking for without taking into consideration the paper truck mounted version, which I am skeptical about. I personally don't really care about trying to force LM to build trucks and missile tubes in Canada, there really isn't much value in producing the systems themselves. If we were talking about the munitions I think that is different however, the build part of the contract isn't especially worthwhile.

I think actively scrapping the most capable system in its class with the best munitions options in favour of an alternative in a time of political tensions and a major trade negotiation is very poor political form, and actively hurts the CAF capability wise.

There has been talk about HIMARS being slow walked, but nothing has actually backed this up anywhere besides the rumour mill in a very anti-US political atmosphere.


I do not have an issue with producing torpedoes in Canada at all. I do have issues with producing K9 as presumably bringing in Hanwha to build a tracked system we have no interest in (or a slow, wheeled truck based system we also do not want) will be actively taking work away from GDLS Canada, who is already established with a substantial workforce, facility and capability in Canada who seems to be basically ear marked as the winner for the artillery procurement at this point. Given the largely European deployment focus for the program as well, I am not particularly moved by the idea we're going to be using these systems in the North and thus need to have them tracked?

I have issues just handing the contract off to Redback when we have a seemingly very competitive program that has a lot of platforms who are offering something similar to what the Koreans are giving us. Turning around and entirely opening our wallet to a single partner in Asia seems very sub-optimal to me, especially when we expect much of this equipment to be stationed in Europe and must be workable/interoperable with our allies forces there.
Valid counter-points. I appreciate your thoughts/experience/opinion.

I would add only 2 other points; 1) having a competitor to GDLS located in Canada wouldn't be such a bad idea and 2) we shouldn't box ourselves into a corner by thinking that we won't need a tracked set of IFV's or Artillery pieces in the future.
 
I would add only 2 other points; 1) having a competitor to GDLS located in Canada wouldn't be such a bad idea and 2) we shouldn't box ourselves into a corner by thinking that we won't need a tracked set of IFV's or Artillery pieces in the future.
I agree that having redundancy is good on paper however similar to our shipbuilding strategy, we have to be careful about creating too many mouths that we cannot feed in the medium to long term. If Hanwha goes through all of the trouble in setting up a facility for say K9 but loses the IFV contract, what are they going to do with this new facility? What if the same happens with the eventual tank replacement and they lose to a European system? I find it very unlikely Hanwha can maintain such a facility just on upkeep and retrofits, and I find it even more unlikely that they will divert work from their domestic Korean facilities to keep an unprofitable Canadian facility operational.

I'm going off the requirements and sentiments that the Army has seemingly expressed at the moment, I don't think its especially worthwhile to pine over potential capabilities when the Army has stated they aren't interested and want clear counterparts. Getting overly lost in the hypotheticals is fun for armchair commentators but I wouldn't confuse it for actual procurement or policy.
 
I agree that having redundancy is good on paper however similar to our shipbuilding strategy, we have to be careful about creating too many mouths that we cannot feed in the medium to long term. If Hanwha goes through all of the trouble in setting up a facility for say K9 but loses the IFV contract, what are they going to do with this new facility? What if the same happens with the eventual tank replacement and they lose to a European system? I find it very unlikely Hanwha can maintain such a facility just on upkeep and retrofits, and I find it even more unlikely that they will divert work from their domestic Korean facilities to keep an unprofitable Canadian facility operational.

I'm going off the requirements and sentiments that the Army has seemingly expressed at the moment, I don't think its especially worthwhile to pine over potential capabilities when the Army has stated they aren't interested and want clear counterparts. Getting overly lost in the hypotheticals is fun for armchair commentators but I wouldn't confuse it for actual procurement or policy.
Again, valid points, but I would say that having tracked options for Latvia would be a prudent thing, not hypothetical. IF things kicked off in Latvia, the lands east across their borders have few road options in Russia/Belarus, those lands look to be boggy, heavily forested and well suited for tracked vehicles.
 
I agree that having redundancy is good on paper however similar to our shipbuilding strategy, we have to be careful about creating too many mouths that we cannot feed in the medium to long term. If Hanwha goes through all of the trouble in setting up a facility for say K9 but loses the IFV contract, what are they going to do with this new facility? What if the same happens with the eventual tank replacement and they lose to a European system? I find it very unlikely Hanwha can maintain such a facility just on upkeep and retrofits, and I find it even more unlikely that they will divert work from their domestic Korean facilities to keep an unprofitable Canadian facility operational.
Secondary source in NA is a strategic assets for South Korea as well. It keeps it clear of any potential threats from North Korea.

If they did build a plant, the offsets for domestic manufacturing would give the K2 a massive leg up as a preexisting Canadian manufacturing site and limit risk as opposed to others proposing a plant in their proposal.


I'm going off the requirements and sentiments that the Army has seemingly expressed at the moment, I don't think its especially worthwhile to pine over potential capabilities when the Army has stated they aren't interested and want clear counterparts. Getting overly lost in the hypotheticals is fun for armchair commentators but I wouldn't confuse it for actual procurement or policy.
I suspect that the CA at 3.5% (and 1.5%) will look to a tracked fleet as well for an IFV. The LAV is not the be all and end all, especially if Canada plans on having a MBT equipped Mech/Armoured Division. At 2% there was already plans for a 2nd MBT Reg’t and I suspect that 3.5% may make planners look to a 3rd to give each Bde at MBT Reg’t (or a 4th as well if they want a 2 Armoured Reg’t Bde in the Div.). That would allow for the LAV fleet to be moved to the 2nd DoC Div, and give the PRes actual operational capability.
 
Again, valid points, but I would say that having tracked options for Latvia would be a prudent thing, not hypothetical. IF things kicked off in Latvia, the lands east across their borders have few road options in Russia/Belarus, those lands look to be boggy, heavily forested and well suited for tracked vehicles.
It is very clear that tracked vehicles, especially SPs, have an advantage in the form of tactical mobility. Wheeled are perceived as having an advantage for strategic and operational mobility. I personally consider the latter a false perception and, IMHO, one needs tactical mobility every day in real life while either operational or strategic mobility is something that maybe required occasionally or not at all.

That said, the Canadian Forces drank the Kool-Aid of strategic mobility decades ago and the army still favours that concept. The irrational semi-religious fervor against all things tracked remains strong in Canada.

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