In Afghanistan, the poppies are just a symptom
MIKE CAPSTICK Special to Globe and Mail Update August 30, 2007 at 12:01 AM EDT
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The United Nations Office of Drug and Crime's annual report on poppy cultivation has unleashed critics of the Afghan mission, with interest groups renewing calls for opium commercialization and licensing and columnists and commentators declaring the mission to be "hopeless." Coupled with recent casualties, the report has led many to declare Afghanistan beyond help. Canadian opposition leaders have threatened to topple the government unless it goes firm on a February, 2009, withdrawal date.
All of this means one thing: The Taliban strategy is working.
Insurgent leaders know that they cannot defeat Canadian and North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces on the battlefield, but they can beat our leaders on the moral plane.
The implication inherent in the criticism is that Afghan history and culture are at the root of the many issues still plaguing the country six years after the Taliban's fall. But nothing could be further from the truth. After a year in Kabul, I could only conclude that the real issue was the lack of international strategic vision, political will and unity.
In a recent New York Times article, three former U.S. ambassadors to Kabul acknowledged a lack of strategic vision and commitment to nation-building. The same article describes the international disagreements and recounts some of the major strategic-level failures to capitalize on the initial military successes in Afghanistan.
Both of these problems — lack of vision and international incoherence — bedevil the fight against poppy cultivation. But the poppy issue itself is just one difficult issue among many. Clearly, establishing and maintaining an Afghan-international strategic vision and implementing it coherently is the prerequisite for the mission's success.
The vision itself was, in fact, established at the London Conference in 2006. The Afghanistan Compact lays out an ambitious strategic vision agreed to by Canada and more than 60 other countries. The real issue now is the ongoing failure to make real progress in implementation.
In Kabul, there is no real "hammer" co-ordinating the work of the multiplicity of official development agencies, international organizations and donors. Co-ordination between NATO and the UN is ad hoc and Afghan state institutions remain weak.
All these problems can be attributed to weak governance. They could be solved by a renewed international commitment to the Afghan Compact, coupled with tough measures to ensure that President Hamid Karzai's government meets its commitments.
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MIKE CAPSTICK Special to Globe and Mail Update August 30, 2007 at 12:01 AM EDT
Article Link
The United Nations Office of Drug and Crime's annual report on poppy cultivation has unleashed critics of the Afghan mission, with interest groups renewing calls for opium commercialization and licensing and columnists and commentators declaring the mission to be "hopeless." Coupled with recent casualties, the report has led many to declare Afghanistan beyond help. Canadian opposition leaders have threatened to topple the government unless it goes firm on a February, 2009, withdrawal date.
All of this means one thing: The Taliban strategy is working.
Insurgent leaders know that they cannot defeat Canadian and North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces on the battlefield, but they can beat our leaders on the moral plane.
The implication inherent in the criticism is that Afghan history and culture are at the root of the many issues still plaguing the country six years after the Taliban's fall. But nothing could be further from the truth. After a year in Kabul, I could only conclude that the real issue was the lack of international strategic vision, political will and unity.
In a recent New York Times article, three former U.S. ambassadors to Kabul acknowledged a lack of strategic vision and commitment to nation-building. The same article describes the international disagreements and recounts some of the major strategic-level failures to capitalize on the initial military successes in Afghanistan.
Both of these problems — lack of vision and international incoherence — bedevil the fight against poppy cultivation. But the poppy issue itself is just one difficult issue among many. Clearly, establishing and maintaining an Afghan-international strategic vision and implementing it coherently is the prerequisite for the mission's success.
The vision itself was, in fact, established at the London Conference in 2006. The Afghanistan Compact lays out an ambitious strategic vision agreed to by Canada and more than 60 other countries. The real issue now is the ongoing failure to make real progress in implementation.
In Kabul, there is no real "hammer" co-ordinating the work of the multiplicity of official development agencies, international organizations and donors. Co-ordination between NATO and the UN is ad hoc and Afghan state institutions remain weak.
All these problems can be attributed to weak governance. They could be solved by a renewed international commitment to the Afghan Compact, coupled with tough measures to ensure that President Hamid Karzai's government meets its commitments.
More on link