The State of Army Doctrine

[daftandbarmy]

And just because no discussion on Doctrine is complete without a message from Doctrine Man:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IuVc2SDZd9Q

You can like him on Facebook now!

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

What was the state of the digitization on the last FTX in Pet? Was the HQ using Battleview, digital fire missions, etc?

2 CMBG was going through high readiness training from fall 2011 until spring 2012. During that period the Bde HQ and reporting BG HQs were on LCSS (Battleview etc). Ex Maple Resolve 11, two CAXs and Ex Spartan Bear were digital at the Bde level. BG HQ talked to its sub-units with radio and used paper maps/talcs (digital divide). At BG level we planned with maps and then a BV duty officer turned it into BV graphics to send up.

I'm out of the Bde now, but I imagine they will start using LCSS again now that they are re-entering the road to high readiness.

 

[Haligonian]

Sounds like some interesting training.  I'm sure I'll have my chance to experience this once I get back to Canada.  Now back to the doctrine/drills conversation!

As I've stated I don't think there is anything wrong with the drills, or having them in the publications.  My issue is with only having drills in doctrine or over emphasizing them, which I would suggest we do.  From Cpl to Maj we assess our leaders on the execution of the hasty attack drill.  The limitations of this have been discussed in other places on this form.  The drill becomes more complex as you move from sect to platoon to coy/cbt tm but it remains a drill nonetheless.  When executing a drill the thought process swings towards executing the steps in the correct order in the correct timing and the conditions to be achieved for follow on actions are usually friendly centric.  I think a more effective means of conducting operations is to approach things from a conditions based approach but our drills don't lend themselves to such an approach. 

All combat tm drills take the framework of Warning, Security, Recce, Plan, which is a solid way to ensure that those basics get covered off but I think a better one might be Suppress, Assess, Move, Kill, at least in terms of an attack.  The focus needs to be on the enemy.  My experience with our offensive training at sect, platoon, and cbt tm, is that the enemy is just a place holder for the attack which goes on around it.  Now, with us getting back to some of the larger exercises perhaps we'll see some force on force activities where my thoughts will be put to the test and I look forward to that, but I'll point out again, and please someone tell me if I've got this wrong, our cbt tm hasty atks are designed to be executed in an enemy security area where he has posted platoon reinforced sized combat outposts. Speed is emphasized as we are trying to maximize momentum and prevent the enemy from delaying us.  Outside of this or a similar enemy situation, the cbt tm will have to operate more deliberately and while the drills may still provide the framework for execution they will have to be adjusted to the prevailing conditions.

 

[Infanteer]

I've always seen "Warning, Security, Recce, Plan" as an Armoured Corps thing - they are the only folks I've seen using it.

but I think a better one might be Suppress, Assess, Move, Kill, at least in terms of an attack.

What about the core functions?  Find, Fix, Strike, Exploit?  Those work well in all phases of war and there is a reason they are quite universal.

Now, with us getting back to some of the larger exercises perhaps we'll see some force on force activities where my thoughts will be put to the test and I look forward to that, but I'll point out again, and please someone tell me if I've got this wrong, our cbt tm hasty atks are designed to be executed in an enemy security area where he has posted platoon reinforced sized combat outposts. Speed is emphasized as we are trying to maximize momentum and prevent the enemy from delaying us.  Outside of this or a similar enemy situation, the cbt tm will have to operate more deliberately and while the drills may still provide the framework for execution they will have to be adjusted to the prevailing conditions.

If you are thinking in terms of the Combat Team Commander's Course, then yes, the "DS Scenario" tends to be a pesky Motorized Platoon with a tank and a few obstacles.  But you'll find that the CTCC is quickly breaking that mould.  When you move to actual BG/Bde training, it is far more dynamic.  Tango2Bravo and I were involved with a previous MAPLE RESOLVE serial which saw a Bde (-) going head on with a BG (-) and resulted in an excellent, dynamic, force-on-force environment that saw all phases of war executed and significant lessons learned.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

The Combat Team manual uses Warning, Security, Recce, Plan as the framework when a situation is encountered (roadblock, defile, enemy position). This does indeed come from the Armoured Corps where it has been used for Troop level drills forever. You meet something - you  report it to avoid blundering in (Contact Report). You array your force to allow for security (lead troops and recce get on line). You check out the problem (either from the troops in contact or ISR or both). You make a plan (the estimate). Is the combat team quick attack a drill? Parts of it certainly are. Perhaps the framework is a drill, but the plan remains a decision-making process as opposed to a condition reaction to an order or situation.

Find, fix, strike and exploit are found in Land Ops and Battle Group in Ops (as well as the new Act manual). This certainly works as a conceptual framework in any situation. 

When our only collective training is the Combat Team Commander's Course we can get some fairly stylized tactics. CTCC is indeed good for getting basic drills down, but we need fairly free-play force on force to really learn lessons. CMTC has been doing that since the shift from Afghan Maple Guardian to the "full spectrum" Maple Resolve series.

 

[daftandbarmy]

The Combat Team manual uses Warning, Security, Recce, Plan as the framework when a situation is encountered (roadblock, defile, enemy position). This does indeed come from the Armoured Corps where it has been used for Troop level drills forever. You meet something - you  report it to avoid blundering in (Contact Report). You array your force to allow for security (lead troops and recce get on line). You check out the problem (either from the troops in contact or ISR or both). You make a plan (the estimate). Is the combat team quick attack a drill? Parts of it certainly are. Perhaps the framework is a drill, but the plan remains a decision-making process as opposed to a condition reaction to an order or situation.

Find, fix, strike and exploit are found in Land Ops and Battle Group in Ops (as well as the new Act manual). This certainly works as a conceptual framework in any situation. 

When our only collective training is the Combat Team Commander's Course we can get some fairly stylized tactics. CTCC is indeed good for getting basic drills down, but we need fairly free-play force on force to really learn lessons. CMTC has been doing that since the shift from Afghan Maple Guardian to the "full spectrum" Maple Resolve series.

I wonder if one of our main problems is that we don't have something like this... http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm100-2-1.pdf

...to prepare against, hence we may be suffering from some 'doctrine drift'?

 

[Kirkhill]

But they don't exist.... and nothing similar exists.

That solution, task oriented training, worked when the number of tasks were limited.  Now the range of possibilities are limitless.

How can you expect to manage today's problems with organisations and structures that were designed to defeat the Kaiser's siege lines with 90 day wonders?

Forget the OBG/ABG debate.  Forget even the doctrinal battle group as a whole.  Go back to "pure" units with well defined skills and drills and then permit free form training that allows the leadership to create ad hoc solutions to meet the need of the day.

2 cents and an apology for stepping outside my bounds.

 

[daftandbarmy]

But they don't exist.... and nothing similar exists.

That solution, task oriented training, worked when the number of tasks were limited.  Now the range of possibilities are limitless.

How can you expect to manage today's problems with organisations and structures that were designed to defeat the Kaiser's siege lines with 90 day wonders?

Forget the OBG/ABG debate.  Forget even the doctrinal battle group as a whole.  Go back to "pure" units with well defined skills and drills and then permit free form training that allows the leadership to create ad hoc solutions to meet the need of the day.

2 cents and an apology for stepping outside my bounds.

Swarming it is then! Everyone's already telling me to buzz off all the time anyways, so I should be qualified  ;D


Military swarming is a behavior where autonomous, or semi-autonomous, units of action attack an enemy from several different directions and then regroup. Pulsing, where the units shift the point of attack, is a part of military swarming. Swarming is not limited to the human military realm. As the name suggests, it comes from insect behavior, although social insects, such as bees, wasps and ants, also use its principles in nest building, food gathering and reproduction.

Military swarming involves the use of a decentralized force against an opponent, in a manner that emphasizes mobility, communication, unit autonomy and coordination or synchronization.[1] Historically military forces have used the principles of swarming without really examining them explicitly, but there is now active research in consciously examining military doctrines that draw ideas from swarming. In nature and nonmilitary situations, there are other various forms of swarming. Biologically driven forms are often complex adaptive systems, but have no central planning, simple individual rules, and nondeterministic behavior that may or may not evolve with the situation.[2]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swarming_(military)

 

[Kirkhill]

Funny you should mention swarming as an alternative to the WW1 counter-siege construct.

If you look back at the Field Service Regs and General Service Orders promulgated between 1915 and 1917 you can conclude that "swarming" was the game plan. 

Battalions were organised into All-Arms Divisions to control them but technology, in particular comms, worked against that organization.  The solution was to turn the Division into a swarm of "All-Arms Platoons", point them in the general direction and have them report in when the shooting stopped.

(NB - I Simplify  :nod: )

I think it can be argued that Fuller and Liddel-Hart (and Guderian) merely - and perhaps counter-productively - codified a singular and particular way of war,  a way of war that has likely run its course as of the Gulf Wars.

Now, like a fencer that no longer sees avenues of attack to exploit, it may be appropriate to recover to the en garde and centre and prepare for anything and everything.

Edit: I must be up to a nickel now - and further out of bounds ( or should I say piste off)

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

I  agree that comms were primitive and not very effective, but those divisions in WW1 still had a structure and a plan. Using the attacks of 1917/18 as an argument for swarming is a huge stretch. Swarms don't have rehearsals and complex fire plans laid out ahead of time.

In any case, a swarm risks defeat in detail by a smaller but more coordinated force.

 

[Old Sweat]

I  agree that comms were primitive and not very effective, but those divisions in WW1 still had a structure and a plan. Using the attacks of 1917/18 as an argument for swarming is a huge stretch. Swarms don't have rehearsals and complex fire plans laid out ahead of time.

In any case, a swarm risks defeat in detail by a smaller but more coordinated force.

Very much so. The offensives of 1917 and especially 1918 (on both sides in the latter year) were carefully planned with tailored forces and were not a mob effort. Given the circumstances and the poor communications, the attacks were highly sophisticated and well orchestrated, within the limitations of the technology. It is interesting that in the Spring of 1918 during the last great German offensive in the West, the Canadian Corps was not involved in the defensive battles; instead it was practicing offensive operations. The much maligned Haig saw an opportunity to end the war in 1918, while just about every other member of the high priced help was looking forward to a massive offensive in 1919. Huge over simplification here on my part, but the unit tactics in the last two years of the war were not based on swarming as much as they were based on fire and movement tailored to the ground, at least in the better Allied formations.

Swarming went out with Culloden, or maybe the 1898 River War in the Sudan.

 

[54/102 CEF]

Great thread all

My take - having done not bad on AOC Res pre Kingston and finishing with a shredded butt post Final Drive is as follows:

1. Its not rocket science - Reg Army has a tough job just staying ready to start deployment trg.
2. Future enemy likely to be able to disperse at will with western ROE favoring them vs us after an initial phase of us using mass forepower to force the other side to a standstill as in B52 in Bosnia/early Afghan. Then the protected sanctuary comes into play that we can't cross except with drones.
3. Any supposed allies won't force their ethic linked family miscrants into a caldron battle like Falaise Gap or Sri Lanka.
4. So small is good - Small Wars are the way to go. These will be on foot / light vehs / helo driven if they are aval, or some sort of Force in Deep to beat the enemy, (because our allies or Host Nations can't or won't) into the KZ.
5. Repeat for about 5 years until the eqpt craps out again as it will and did in Bosnia / Afghan - not to mention you can't use Reg Force indefinitely. Political support will last maybe 2 or three years. That's the effects on the ground side of things in my view - perhaps through a straw but we have modern historical records that show we never deploy indefinitely like say - Brits in Malaya.
6. Unfortunately there is nothing like hitting the books. So no time off for AOC students. Perhaps we need a Coles Notes primer on doctrine as it affects ground and air ops in the Battle Gp. Getting the screen play into the soldier's heads and his leaders is the supposed question above. I see a company given a contract to produce simple multi media graphics to illustrate the many variations of the Mission Verbs with their Logistic and Support side implications. Can`t be done you say? I see plenty of kids playing multi player Playstation Games far adavnced to what the Pucksters were producing just 2 years ago. Marry hi tech movie techniques with the Puckster Mindset and perhaps you have a way forward to show them a Youtube movie clip - TTPs on IED recovery procedures come to mind. So a series of see do training followed by field practical ex's to confirm. But we are not confirming the soldier in the corps - its the soldier in his team and the officer in his leadership role in his Arm or Service - which leads us to the Battle Group. And that`s the AOC product. Even then - the AOC training takes a while to sink in for the full time staff - as it does in any professional field - new medic offrs can set broken arms - surgeons rebuild the effects of trauma. Are we medics or surgeons?
7. I suggest we can only aspire to be medics because the high intensity armies of days gone by were there to do a job - be it get to Dunkirk from the Ardennes in 1940 - or run for Berlin in 1942. (if thats an obscure reference see below)  The rest is the General Staff who will never be trained except those seniors who go to War Colleges.
8. So! Once again - work hard and enjoy your great postings to follow.

para 7 ref ---- "Lost Victories by German Field Marshall Eric Von Manstein" about how they had few cutting edge troops but trained up as they went into France - screened off the French by troops well below what we would call pros. Same as they pushed into Russia and SE Ukraine. A great story except for the conveniantly overlooked use of his CSS to tpt unfortunates SS death squads, and his subsequent conviction as a war criminal. There is also a book called Field Marshal Von Manstein, a Portrait: The Janus Head http://www.amazon.ca/Field-Marshal-Von-Manstein-Portrait/dp/1906033021

 

[PPCLI Guy]

Great thread all

My take - having done well on AOC Res pre Kingston and finishing with a shredded butt post final drive is as follows:

1. Its not rocket science - Reg Army has a tough job just staying ready to start deployment trg.

Ummm....okay

2. Future enemy likely to be able to disperse at will with western ROE favoring them vs us after an initial phase of us using mass forepower to force the other side to a standstill as in B52 in Bosnia/early Afghan. Then the protected sanctuary comes into play that we can't cross except with drones.

One of many possible scenarios, and by no means the only one

3. Any supposed allies won't force their ethic linked family miscrants into a caldron battle like Falaise Gap or Sri Lanka.

I have no idea what an ethic-linked miscrant is - but I sense they are neither white nor Western

4. So small is good - Small Wars are the way to go. These will be on foot / light vehs / helo driven if they are aval, or some sort of Force in Deep to beat the enemy, (because our allies or Host Nations can't or won't) into the KZ.

Hmm.  Thucydides said a lot of things about why nations go to war (okay, three actually), but the size of the war wasn't one of them.

5. Repeat for about 5 years until the eqpt craps out again as it will and did in Bosnia / Afghan - not to mention you can't use Reg Force indefinitely.

So we obviously did not go to the same wars with the same people and equipment.

Political support will last maybe 2 or three years. That's the effects on the ground side of things in my view - perhaps through a straw but we have modern historical records that show we never deploy indefinitely like say - Brits in Malaya.

So it is a small war that doesn't last very long that we need then?  Got it.

6. Getting the screen play into the soldier's heads and his leaders is the supposed question above. I see a company given a contract to produce simple multi media graphics to illustrate the many variations of the Mission Verbs with their Logistic and Support side implications. So a series of see do training followed by field practical ex's to confirm. But we are not confirming the soldier in the corps - its the soldier in his team and the officer in his leadership role in his Arm or Service - which leads us to the Battle Group. And thats the AOC product. Even then - the AOC training takes a while to sink in for the full time staff - as it does in any professional field - new medics can set broken arms - surgeons rebuild the effects of trauma. Are we medics or surgeons?

I understand the meaning of every word in this paragraph, but that did not help me one bit.

7. I suggest we can only aspire to be medics because the high intensity armies of days gone by were there to do a job - be it get to Dunkirk from the Ardennes in 1940 - or run for Berlin in 1942. (if thats an obscure reference see "Lost Victories by German Field Marshall Eric Von Manstein" about how they had few cutting edge troops but trained up as they went into France - screened off the French by troops well below what we would call pros. Same as they pushed into Russia and SE Ukraine. The rest is the General Staff who will never be trained except those seniors who go to War Colleges.

Ummmm....???

8. So! Once again - work hard and enjoy your great postings for all high achievers.

What?

There is only so much gravy to go around in the full time big base Army paid for by the tight fisted taxpayer who has certainly done his bit over the last ten years.

Again, what?

Thanks for coming out.

 

[Bird_Gunner45]

Swarming went out with Culloden, or maybe the 1898 River War in the Sudan.

Not so, if you are to believe the tenets of Adaptive Dispersed Operations. Utilizing data links and "information superiority" we are going to overwhelm the enemies OODA loop, utilizing dispersion to counter against increased precision and fire power.

That said, these tactics worked well in the initial invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, but failed to win a strategic victory. Iraq in particular suffered from lower numbers of troops which weakened the US COIN efforts. And a Canadian BG in Kandahar province, in retrospect, seems doomed to succeed in a COIN environment.

I agree with the earlier statement that we'd be best to maintain "pure" units. The nature of the future war "should" determine our response to it, not how we want/hope to fight it. Assuming Network Centric warfare will always work negates the will of the enemy and how he/she wants to fight... swarming vs an insurgency has been ineffective.

 

[Kirkhill]

Somebody round here, I recall, said something about us not playing football, but playing rugby. 

Compared to football rugby is a swarming game.  The play develops on the field in real time.  Yes the players are trained, and they run drills, away from the field.  But on the field the game is not just a series of drills. It is a free-flowing game that depends on individuals making their own decisions, based on their own appreciations.

This is the way that I see WW1 - to quote a chap name of Byng, after a RMAS paper by a Dr. Christopher Pugsley:

The largest unit that, under modern conditions can be directly
controlled and manoeuvred under fire by one man is the Platoon.
The Platoon Commander is therefore in most cases, the only man
who can personally influence the local situation. In fact, it is not too much to say that this is the Platoon Commander’s war.

Realizing this, it becomes the duty of the Company Commander to
see that each Platoon is trained by its leader to act either with
independence or as a component of the Company

My inference from that is that, like the rugby coach, the primary role of the higher officers to prepare their junior officers to cooperate with each other the same way they did on the rugby field (or the soccer field) and to handle their small all-arms formations (the platoon) so as to overrun the objective.

This is swarming.  It is not mobbing.  There is intelligence in swarming.  There is none involved in swinging a claymore and yelling at the top of your lungs.

Certainly there was training and preparation, as SS109 states :

1. The time available for divisions when out of the line to train as divisions is short. It
is necessary that the utmost use should be made of it, and that the object of the
training should be clearly understood by all concerned.
Success depends on preparations for all the phases of an attack, viz.:
a. The organization of our trenches for the assembly of the attacking force;
b. The artillery bombardment;
c. The crossing of the area between our front trenches and the enemy's;
d. The capture of the enemy's defensive systems and artillery positions, and
the consolidation against counter-attack of ground won;
e. Exploitation of success.
The training ground must be carefully reconnoitred, beforehand, and a detailed
programme of the whole period must be prepared. If possible, every brigade
should be exercised in each form of training.
2. The training of the division can be conveniently divided into two categories:
a. Training for the attack from trenches against a hostile system of trenches
and strong points, including the consolidation and occupation of the system
won;
b. Training for exploiting a success when the hostile systems of defence have
been broken through.

At the same time "Instructions for the Training of Platoons for Offensive Action" says this:

The organization of a platoon has been decided in G. H. Q.
letter O. B./1919, dated February 7, 1917. The guiding prin-
ciples of this organization are that the platoon shall consist of
a combination of all the weapons with which the Infantry are
now armed, and that specialist commanders for Infantry are
undesirable.

In O. B./1919/T, dated February 14, 1917 (S. S. 144), a nor-
mal formation for the attack, of which the platoon is the unit,
has been laid down. The adoption of a normal formation for
the attack has been necessitated partly by the shortness of the
time which is available for training, and partly by the lack of
experience among subordinate commanders.

This pamphlet has been drawn up with a view to assisting
platoon commanders in training and fighting their platoons.
It is not possible to lay down a correct line of action for all
situations which may arise on the battle field, but it is hoped
that a careful study of the instructions herein contained may
assist subordinate commanders to act correctly in any situa-
tion.

Emphasis added is mine.

My sense of the platoon structured as an all arms grouping, as effective as it is in many situations, is not necessarily the right solution for all occasions,  and the people that drafted the instructions that generated the modern platoon seem, in my opinion, to have been of the same view.

Their doctrine was generated to solve one particular problem.  Breaking the siege lines.

Their doctrine was largely generated between July 1916 and April 1917 in the face of the enemy.

 

[Haligonian]

I've always seen "Warning, Security, Recce, Plan" as an Armoured Corps thing - they are the only folks I've seen using it.

What about the core functions?  Find, Fix, Strike, Exploit?  Those work well in all phases of war and there is a reason they are quite universal.

If you are thinking in terms of the Combat Team Commander's Course, then yes, the "DS Scenario" tends to be a pesky Motorized Platoon with a tank and a few obstacles.  But you'll find that the CTCC is quickly breaking that mould.  When you move to actual BG/Bde training, it is far more dynamic.  Tango2Bravo and I were involved with a previous MAPLE RESOLVE serial which saw a Bde (-) going head on with a BG (-) and resulted in an excellent, dynamic, force-on-force environment that saw all phases of war executed and significant lessons learned.

Great point on Find, Fix, Strike, Exploit.

I worked the CTCC in April and it stuck pretty close to the mold.  There were 4 or 5 atks that were executed on some seriously compartmentalized terrain or were allocated aviation but that was it.

The Combat Team manual uses Warning, Security, Recce, Plan as the framework when a situation is encountered (roadblock, defile, enemy position). This does indeed come from the Armoured Corps where it has been used for Troop level drills forever. You meet something - you  report it to avoid blundering in (Contact Report). You array your force to allow for security (lead troops and recce get on line). You check out the problem (either from the troops in contact or ISR or both). You make a plan (the estimate). Is the combat team quick attack a drill? Parts of it certainly are. Perhaps the framework is a drill, but the plan remains a decision-making process as opposed to a condition reaction to an order or situation.

Find, fix, strike and exploit are found in Land Ops and Battle Group in Ops (as well as the new Act manual). This certainly works as a conceptual framework in any situation. 

When our only collective training is the Combat Team Commander's Course we can get some fairly stylized tactics. CTCC is indeed good for getting basic drills down, but we need fairly free-play force on force to really learn lessons. CMTC has been doing that since the shift from Afghan Maple Guardian to the "full spectrum" Maple Resolve series.

Any way I can get my hands on the new BG in Ops and Act manuals that we've been discussing while I'm down here?

Great to hear from both you and Infanteer that the Maple Resolve ex's really seem to be quite dynamic and result in solid lessons learned.  Look forward to being involved with those.

I think we're in agreement here. Cbt tm attacks certainly have an element of originality.  After my last post I was laying in bed thinking that there is defiantly some originality in there that I've probably over simplified!  Two separate commanders attacking the same enemy could have completely different plans.  There can be variances in form of maneuver, posns for attack posns, support by fire posns, task org for assault elements and the firebase, and differences in the fire plan.  It is the framework for the attack that doesn't really change and what allows it to be conducted so quickly with little coordination, which is also its strength. Having said that I *think* we both agree that they are not the best method of training but it appears that our Bde Ex's are pitting our units against thinking adversaries forcing us to come up with creative, unique, solutions to unique problems (this is what I would argue a hasty attack does not achieve.) So let's get back to the doctrine.

In my first post I mentioned the US' Operational Terms and Graphics pub.  No one has really commented on my assertion that we should have something similar.  I would argue that this would be our doctrine's greatest failing, for all the reasons I've laid out thus far, and probably the easiest to remedy.

Lets look at the concept of the main effort.  I've come to see the main effort as the natural expression of a force's Center of Gravity. At the tactical level my center of gravity should be a unit, not a phase, or action. This should cause the commander to conduct an analysis of both himself and the enemy to determine his CoG and his enemy's CoG and Critical Vulnerability (CV) and lead him to weight the ME to be able to take decisive action.  Weighting the ME can come in many forms such as attaching enablers or putting them is DS, giving priority of fires, or even giving enablers to supporting efforts allowing the ME to focus on their sole task while the SE's shape the battle space for the ME. We use an effects framework (Marines consider it a Battle Space framework akin to Deep, Close, and Rear) of Shaping, Decisive, and Sustaining operations. I will often overlay this on my phasing of the operation.  During the Decisive phase my main effort should be attacking the enemy's CV.  All other efforts are a supporting effort to the ME.

After reviewing Land Ops I had a look at page 4-28 on the Main Effort which emphasizes that the ME should be a an activity vice a unit. To me this seems to disconnect the concepts of the ME and the CoG as Land Ops on page 6-9 defines CoG's as tangible things.  Now before we start saying "who cares" in my experience this causes for some different ways for the two forces to operate.  Canadians like to put two units on the obj in the assault.  2 platoons on the cbt tm hasty attack, 2 sects on the hasty pl attack.  This works with the decisive event being the assault and the ME being the assault itself as opposed to one of those platoons on the assault.  For the Marines, in my time with them, you'll rarely see two units on the assault.  You'll see a single unit, it'll be the ME, and it will likely have been Task Organised in some way to ensure its success. This lines up with their perspective that the CoG is a unit and thus it should be the ME and all other units should support it.  I've struggled with this myself as my instinct is to think "I need to get some damn bodies up on that obj... two coys up!"

What are people's thoughts on this? I lean towards the ME being connected to the CoG concept and therefore it is a thing and not an event.  It is the thing that will achieve the decisive event but not the event itself. I would suggest considering the ideas of setting the conditions for the ME to do its work which will lead to a successful operation and more concretely, if we look at some of the stuff written in the past few years regarding the importance of suppression in combat, specifically infantry combat, what role does that play in how we task, task organize, and establish the ME.  Do we need two coy's on the obj if we have a heavy enough weight of fire to suppress the posn?

Sorry folks.  No idea why that is all underlined.

Thanks to dapaterson for sorting this fool out with his underlining.

 

[dapaterson]

To close the underline you need to use [ /u ] (without the spaces).  You used [ u ].

 

[Haligonian]

But they don't exist.... and nothing similar exists.

That solution, task oriented training, worked when the number of tasks were limited.  Now the range of possibilities are limitless.

How can you expect to manage today's problems with organisations and structures that were designed to defeat the Kaiser's siege lines with 90 day wonders?

Forget the OBG/ABG debate.  Forget even the doctrinal battle group as a whole.  Go back to "pure" units with well defined skills and drills and then permit free form training that allows the leadership to create ad hoc solutions to meet the need of the day.

2 cents and an apology for stepping outside my bounds.

I think that is an interesting idea.  I'm for whatever provides us an abundance of flexibility to react to the unexpected.

I have yet to hear a convincing description of what swarming might look like and more importantly how the units that would fight that way would be organized. Perhaps I need to read "Crisis in Zefra" or whatever the new one coming out is?  Until then it's all pie in the sky and I'd say our "old school" force on force exercises that the Bde's are apparently now executing are more important.

 

[Infanteer]

In my first post I mentioned the US' Operational Terms and Graphics pub.  No one has really commented on my assertion that we should have something similar.  I would argue that this would be our doctrine's greatest failing, for all the reasons I've laid out thus far, and probably the easiest to remedy.

Have you looked at B-GL-331-003 Military Symbols for Land Operations?  It is a list of all of our graphical symbology and mission task verbs.  There is a doctrine terminology database as well, but I can't find it off the top of my head.

Lets look at the concept of the main effort.  I've come to see the main effort as the natural expression of a force's Center of Gravity. At the tactical level my center of gravity should be a unit, not a phase, or action. This should cause the commander to conduct an analysis of both himself and the enemy to determine his CoG and his enemy's CoG and Critical Vulnerability (CV) and lead him to weight the ME to be able to take decisive action.  Weighting the ME can come in many forms such as attaching enablers or putting them is DS, giving priority of fires, or even giving enablers to supporting efforts allowing the ME to focus on their sole task while the SE's shape the battle space for the ME. We use an effects framework (Marines consider it a Battle Space framework akin to Deep, Close, and Rear) of Shaping, Decisive, and Sustaining operations. I will often overlay this on my phasing of the operation.  During the Decisive phase my main effort should be attacking the enemy's CV.  All other efforts are a supporting effort to the ME.

After reviewing Land Ops I had a look at page 4-28 on the Main Effort which emphasizes that the ME should be a an activity vice a unit. To me this seems to disconnect the concepts of the ME and the CoG as Land Ops on page 6-9 defines CoG's as tangible things.  Now before we start saying "who cares" in my experience this causes for some different ways for the two forces to operate.  Canadians like to put two units on the obj in the assault.  2 platoons on the cbt tm hasty attack, 2 sects on the hasty pl attack.  This works with the decisive event being the assault and the ME being the assault itself as opposed to one of those platoons on the assault.  For the Marines, in my time with them, you'll rarely see two units on the assault.  You'll see a single unit, it'll be the ME, and it will likely have been Task Organised in some way to ensure its success. This lines up with their perspective that the CoG is a unit and thus it should be the ME and all other units should support it.  I've struggled with this myself as my instinct is to think "I need to get some damn bodies up on that obj... two coys up!"

What are people's thoughts on this? I lean towards the ME being connected to the CoG concept and therefore it is a thing and not an event.  It is the thing that will achieve the decisive event but not the event itself. I would suggest considering the ideas of setting the conditions for the ME to do its work which will lead to a successful operation and more concretely, if we look at some of the stuff written in the past few years regarding the importance of suppression in combat, specifically infantry combat, what role does that play in how we task, task organize, and establish the ME.  Do we need two coy's on the obj if we have a heavy enough weight of fire to suppress the posn?

1.  I've always thought the idea of a Centre of Gravity was played up by folks to sound smart.  Centre of Gravity is a concept that was pulled from Clausewitz and, in line with a lot of U.S. doctrinal discussions, dogmatized in the 1980s.  Clausewitz used the term Centre of Gravity throughout On War, but generally applied it in a strategic sense.  I don't think an OC or a CO should be sitting in a CP, staring at a map and trying to figure out "where is that dang centre of gravity?"

2.  Main effort is, to me, a control measure.  It's where the focus or weight of effort needs to be - it is a control measure that can shift the focus of a fighting element without having to give explicit orders to everyone.  As well, it is a control measure that, when combined with a proper statement of intent, gives subordinates a good idea of what needs to be done once everyone is in the thick of combat.  I've seen commanders often give main efforts for the sake of giving a main effort (and they know it is the third part of a Concept of Operations) without really understanding what they are communicating to their subordinates.  I can't remember where, but I once read a fascinating set of German Divisional orders which showed how the commander used the main effort, moving it as the battle progressed.  I generally try to couch my main effort in two parts.  The first is designating an effect as the main effort, the second is who lies on that effect. 

So, "my main effort is on the retention of the bridge, A Company is on the main effort".  My main effort is the effect of retaining the bridge, and A Coy's task is where the weight of everyone else's tasks should support.  This tells everyone that if something unexpected comes up that they should try to do things to support the A Coy and the retention of the bridge, even if it means straying from the original task I assigned them (the true essence of mission command).  Thus, if A Coy's retain task is under threat from an air assault, B Coy supports the main effort by launching a counterattack into the LZ, even if it means largely abandoning his block task to the south.

As a control measure, main effort can be used to reorient forces.  If "my main effort is on the clearance of Town, C Coy is on the main effort" is what I originally gave (for whatever reason), but then all of the sudden a large enemy guard appears to the east and starts seriously pressing my flank guard (threatening to bottle up C Coy in the town and destroy my whole force) I can give a quick Frag O orienting assets on the threat and indicating "my main effort is on the destruction of the enemy probe, B Coy is now on the main effort".  This should tell A Coy, who was holding a route to support C Coy (as my previous main effort) to start looking the other way to back up B Coy (who is my new main effort).  It should also tell C Coy to quit worrying about the town.

Here is one of my favorite articles on Main Effort (in its original German):

http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20070228_art014.pdf

 

[Infanteer]

I have yet to hear a convincing description of what swarming might look like and more importantly how the units that would fight that way would be organized. Perhaps I need to read "Crisis in Zefra" or whatever the new one coming out is?  Until then it's all pie in the sky and I'd say our "old school" force on force exercises that the Bde's are apparently now executing are more important.

Don't read Crisis in Zefra; it's silly fiction.

What Kirkhill is describing as "swarming" and what the military discourse understands as the concept of swarming are two different things.  What Kirkhill is calling swarming is simply freedom to conduct independent action due to organization and equipment.  I'd disagree with his assessment that this constitutes swarming as echelons were still used in a coordinated and synchronized manner, especially in the First World War where, even though platoons had the ability to conduct tasks independently, they were utilized in linear fashion.

Swarming in the modern sense is a concept with heavy ties to the "revolution in military affairs" and all that stuff.  It was first really enunciated by John Arquilla at Rand.  You can have a read of it here (click the PDF link for a free copy)

http://www.rand.org/pubs/documented_briefings/DB311.html

The broad premise with swarming is that technology will enable us to loosen the shackles of synchronization and reduce the need for coordination - units would become like a swarm of bees, circling an enemy and striking as opportunities arise.  Problem is, it briefs well but never really works - command and control has evolved the way it has for a very good (human) reason.  The US Marine Corps experimented with a form of swarming a few years back but it lost steam - look up Effects Based Operations (EBO) and how they tried change up the platoon and company to be more of a swarming organization.