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The War in Ukraine

Finding this to be an interesting read - specifically the parts that I'm snipping out and adding below:


The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD), citing data from the Ukrainian General Staff, reported on December 5 that the average daily Russian personnel casualties reached a new all-time high of 1,523 casualties per day in November 2024.[1] The UK MoD noted that Russian forces suffered just over 2,000 casualties in a single day for the first time on November 28, 2024. Russian forces suffered an estimated 45,690 total casualties throughout November 2024, and the UK MoD noted that November 2024 was the fifth consecutive month that Russian casualties increased.

Russian forces have thus suffered an estimated 125,800 casualties during a period of intensified offensive operations in September, October, and November 2024 in exchange for 2,356 square kilometers of gains. (Or approximately 53 Russian casualties per square kilometer of Ukrainian territory seized.)
US officials reportedly estimated in late October 2024 that Russia's current recruitment rate was between 25,000 and 30,000 new soldiers per month.[3] Ukrainian military observer Petro Chernyk stated on December 3 that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) would have to increase its monthly recruitment rates from 40,000-42,000 recruits to 50,000 recruits in order to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast while maintaining their current casualty rate.
Additional efforts to increase Russian force generation rates risk further destabilizing the Russian economy as Russia continues to grapple with domestic labor shortages and rising inflation.[5] Russians can either serve in uniform in Ukraine, or work in Russia’s domestic economy, but they cannot do both simultaneously. The Kremlin is unlikely to sufficiently meet its needs for labor in both the military and Russia’s domestic economy in the near future, and additional months of intensified offensive operations in Ukraine in 2025 and beyond will only further compound Russian resourcing dilemmas. US President Joe Biden's commitment to providing the remainder of available US aid to Ukraine and the continued, regular provision of Western military assistance to Ukraine remains crucial to Ukraine's ability to continue defending against Russian offensive operations and inflicting unsustainable losses on the Russian military in 2025

This piece here is also of great interest I believe -

US officials confirmed that Gerasimov called US Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Charles Q. Brown Jr. on November 27.[7] The New York Times (NYT) reported, citing unspecified officials, that Gerasimov told Brown that Russia had planned the Oreshnik missile launch well ahead of the US decision to allow Ukraine to strike military targets in Russia with US-provided ATACMS.[8] Western media noted that Gerasimov also warned Brown about Russian military exercises in the Mediterranean Sea, but that Gerasimov did not "explicitly mention" that Russian forces would launch hypersonic missiles during the exercises.
 
Finding this to be an interesting read - specifically the parts that I'm snipping out and adding below:


The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD), citing data from the Ukrainian General Staff, reported on December 5 that the average daily Russian personnel casualties reached a new all-time high of 1,523 casualties per day in November 2024.[1] The UK MoD noted that Russian forces suffered just over 2,000 casualties in a single day for the first time on November 28, 2024. Russian forces suffered an estimated 45,690 total casualties throughout November 2024, and the UK MoD noted that November 2024 was the fifth consecutive month that Russian casualties increased.

Russian forces have thus suffered an estimated 125,800 casualties during a period of intensified offensive operations in September, October, and November 2024 in exchange for 2,356 square kilometers of gains. (Or approximately 53 Russian casualties per square kilometer of Ukrainian territory seized.)
US officials reportedly estimated in late October 2024 that Russia's current recruitment rate was between 25,000 and 30,000 new soldiers per month.[3] Ukrainian military observer Petro Chernyk stated on December 3 that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) would have to increase its monthly recruitment rates from 40,000-42,000 recruits to 50,000 recruits in order to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast while maintaining their current casualty rate.
Additional efforts to increase Russian force generation rates risk further destabilizing the Russian economy as Russia continues to grapple with domestic labor shortages and rising inflation.[5] Russians can either serve in uniform in Ukraine, or work in Russia’s domestic economy, but they cannot do both simultaneously. The Kremlin is unlikely to sufficiently meet its needs for labor in both the military and Russia’s domestic economy in the near future, and additional months of intensified offensive operations in Ukraine in 2025 and beyond will only further compound Russian resourcing dilemmas. US President Joe Biden's commitment to providing the remainder of available US aid to Ukraine and the continued, regular provision of Western military assistance to Ukraine remains crucial to Ukraine's ability to continue defending against Russian offensive operations and inflicting unsustainable losses on the Russian military in 2025

This piece here is also of great interest I believe -

US officials confirmed that Gerasimov called US Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Charles Q. Brown Jr. on November 27.[7] The New York Times (NYT) reported, citing unspecified officials, that Gerasimov told Brown that Russia had planned the Oreshnik missile launch well ahead of the US decision to allow Ukraine to strike military targets in Russia with US-provided ATACMS.[8] Western media noted that Gerasimov also warned Brown about Russian military exercises in the Mediterranean Sea, but that Gerasimov did not "explicitly mention" that Russian forces would launch hypersonic missiles during the exercises.

“How did you go bankrupt?"
Two ways. Gradually, then suddenly.”

- Ernest Hemingway
 
Contrary to what seems to be the common understanding that Russia's defeat/retreat from Syria will be good for Ukraine it is my belief that in about 3 weeks +/- we will see another surge in Russian attacks. The next 2 weeks will be used to restrategize and reconstitute as well as to deploy/equip the troops from Syria and their hardware to eastern Ukraine and Kursk.

The failure of the North Korean troops to materially affect the battlespace notwithstanding, this could be very un-good for Ukraine. Never mind trying to get Taurus (although that would help) they need a few hundred Tomahawks and a squadron (including ground support) of F16's manned by civilian contractors enlisted on short contracts into the Ukrainian Air Force.

Another thing that would help is a long range sea drone with launchable ISR and attack drones of various types. Essentially a drone 'carrier' with a couple of dozen FPV etc and a sat repeater for distant control. Take it into the Caspian and operate it from a few miles offshore. Finish off the rest of the Russian Black Sea fleet and hit other juicy targets.
 
... The next 2 weeks will be used to restrategize and reconstitute as well as to deploy/equip the troops from Syria and their hardware to eastern Ukraine and Kursk ...
"Don't like the heat, troops? Let us send you someplace a bit cooler, then ..."

Meanwhile, POTUS47's latest after meeting with FRA, UKR leaders ....
 
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Contrary to what seems to be the common understanding that Russia's defeat/retreat from Syria will be good for Ukraine it is my belief that in about 3 weeks +/- we will see another surge in Russian attacks. The next 2 weeks will be used to restrategize and reconstitute as well as to deploy/equip the troops from Syria and their hardware to eastern Ukraine and Kursk.
Did they leave with their weapons and equipment or abandon most of it in their bases? My guess is the later as they left too quickly to be able to pack
 
Not sure what the Russian forces in Syria were, but expect at least something of a cut above the usual: some sort of thinking, career troops.

I'm sure that, having somehow bailed out of Syria, these fellows will be keen on being sent to face a much better-organized and -equipped enemy.
 
Couple of options being thrown out there: NATO troops in UKR until membership ....
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... while a USAF officer/military academic suggests a demilitarized zone, Korea-style:
... The idea of the Russian forces eventually making it to Kyiv or farther west over the next three to five years would compel the Europeans to do that, along with the Americans telling the Europeans, "You have to do this."

And there is a model for this; it is basically how North Korea and South Korea had to be essentially split up. Is that a best ideal outcome? No, of course the best ideal outcome is all Russian forces leaving the entirety of Ukraine. But we have to go back to being realistic. How much are the Americans and the Canadians and the Europeans willing to fight and die for every centimeter of Ukrainian territory? And that becomes a question of political willpower and domestic politics. I think it's just an easier sell having to lock this in place.

And you essentially create a huge DMZ [demilitarized zone], essentially between Ukraine and Belarus, Russia, and the occupied parts of Ukraine. And that would just basically be millions of land mines and Ukrainian defense bases, with probably European Union-flag forces essentially as observers, peacekeepers, and as a part of that sort of deterrent line. It would essentially become just one big trip-wire deterrent, if you will. That would be an ideal outcome for a lot of countries, especially in Europe. It's really depressing and unfortunate, but it's hard to make that case to the average American or average European, that this war is worth actually fighting and dying for ...
In the words of this guy ...
... I guess this would be yet another Russian "ceasefire", but with some NATO/EU eyes on it.
 
Contrary to what seems to be the common understanding that Russia's defeat/retreat from Syria will be good for Ukraine it is my belief that in about 3 weeks +/- we will see another surge in Russian attacks. The next 2 weeks will be used to restrategize and reconstitute as well as to deploy/equip the troops from Syria and their hardware to eastern Ukraine and Kursk.

The failure of the North Korean troops to materially affect the battlespace notwithstanding, this could be very un-good for Ukraine. Never mind trying to get Taurus (although that would help) they need a few hundred Tomahawks and a squadron (including ground support) of F16's manned by civilian contractors enlisted on short contracts into the Ukrainian Air Force.

Another thing that would help is a long range sea drone with launchable ISR and attack drones of various types. Essentially a drone 'carrier' with a couple of dozen FPV etc and a sat repeater for distant control. Take it into the Caspian and operate it from a few miles offshore. Finish off the rest of the Russian Black Sea fleet and hit other juicy targets.
Literarily the number of troops out of Syria will equal a couple of days of causalities. It's likley they have to abandon much of their heavy equipment, possibly prioritising retrieval of the remaining AD systems.
 
Contrary to what seems to be the common understanding that Russia's defeat/retreat from Syria will be good for Ukraine it is my belief that in about 3 weeks +/- we will see another surge in Russian attacks. The next 2 weeks will be used to restrategize and reconstitute as well as to deploy/equip the troops from Syria and their hardware to eastern Ukraine and Kursk.
Russia had a negligible land presence (as far as ground war requirements for Ukraine go) in Syria, really just the VKS assets in theatre will be able to be repatriated.
The failure of the North Korean troops to materially affect the battlespace notwithstanding, this could be very un-good for Ukraine. Never mind trying to get Taurus (although that would help) they need a few hundred Tomahawks and a squadron (including ground support) of F16's manned by civilian contractors enlisted on short contracts into the Ukrainian Air Force.
Quite honestly Ukraine needs 3 Squadrons of F-16's at minimum to be operated by veteran pilots for them to be able to materially change any calculus on the battlefield.
Another thing that would help is a long range sea drone with launchable ISR and attack drones of various types. Essentially a drone 'carrier' with a couple of dozen FPV etc and a sat repeater for distant control. Take it into the Caspian and operate it from a few miles offshore. Finish off the rest of the Russian Black Sea fleet and hit other juicy targets.
IF I was the Ukraine and had access to something like that -- I would be hitting Polyarny/Murmansk, St Petersburg, Vladivostok, and other naval centers just to make them feel pain.
 
Russia had a negligible land presence (as far as ground war requirements for Ukraine go) in Syria, really just the VKS assets in theatre will be able to be repatriated.

Quite honestly Ukraine needs 3 Squadrons of F-16's at minimum to be operated by veteran pilots for them to be able to materially change any calculus on the battlefield.

IF I was the Ukraine and had access to something like that -- I would be hitting Polyarny/Murmansk, St Petersburg, Vladivostok, and other naval centers just to make them feel pain.


Perhaps they need to talk to Anduril - anything for a buck and they enjoy mucking around with new ideas.

Dive-XL is conceived as a modular uncrewed undersea vehicle (UUV) that can be purchased by both government and commercial customers and outfitted with payloads to serve various missions, whether that’s inspecting offshore oil rigs for energy companies or helping potential military users hunt down enemy submarines. A few sections of the vehicle are standard no matter the customer, including a nose section packed with avionics and sensing equipment that allows for autonomous movement, a tail containing the drive propulsor and a mast on top with communications gear such as acoustic and radio frequency systems.

The middle portion of the vehicle, however, can be customized by the customer to house whatever payload they need,
and can be configured either as a single extra-large container or up to three smaller ones.

The smallest version of the Dive-XL can be housed in a 40 foot shipping container
, which allows for it to be transported on roads or via a C-17 cargo plane, Arnott said. From there, it can be made bigger by adding additional payload compartments that stretch the size of the vessel, which Arnott said can be bolted on in a matter of hours.

The first test vehicle — a non-missionized version of the Ghost Shark robotic submarine in development for the Royal Australian Navy — recently wrapped up a voyage where it spent 100 hours underway, a precursor to an upcoming demonstration where the Dive-XL will complete a mission in excess of 1,000 nautical miles while fully submerged.

“That’s in the coming months — weeks, if you will


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What do you want to send?
 
Putin dream team?

'Putin couldn’t ask for more': Why 'America’s enemies' are celebrating Trump’s incoming administration​


Well if you're an enemy of America, and they vote in a guy who's first instinct isn't to drop bombs on you...I'd be celebrating too!
 
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