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Time to Send CF Fast Air to AFG?

If a village containing enemy is considered fair game, ie those 'sheltering' Taliban are legitimate targets...

And it's a pretty big 'if' too, given the nature of the region.

"Last week Mohammed Mir packed up his home, left his mulberry orchards and wheat fields in Panjwai district on the outskirts of the city, and moved his family back into Kandahar.

He no longer knew who the enemy were: the police who ransacked the village houses for valuables, or the Taliban who asked for food and shelter at gunpoint.

“One night the Taliban is coming, the next the police are coming. Both of them are asking for food and bribes and if there is a fight the government will blame me for sheltering the Taliban or vice-versa,” he explained.


http://news.ft.com/cms/s/4119ec22-ec46-11da-b3e2-0000779e2340.html

 
There's no point in bothering with all this--the war is already lost.  Read this piece in the Globe, May 27, by Geoffrey York, "Taliban rising":
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/LAC.20060527.AFGHAN27/TPStory/International

Excerpt:
'...
Just like the U.S. troops in Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s [See! it is a quagmire!] , the coalition is trying to prop up a corrupt and unpopular government. Local governments are dominated by so many warlords and gangsters that many Afghans express nostalgia for the Taliban regime of 1996 to 2001, which at least was not perceived as corrupt and immoral.

"The Afghan population is throwing up its hands," a veteran aid worker in Kandahar said. "The disorder today is coming from the government itself. Its mandate was to clean out the warlords, but instead it's engaged in an endless dance with them. Everyone says that the Taliban regime, if nothing else, at least stopped the corruption and created law and order."'...

By the way in this article, May 23, by  Mr York, "Bombs kill Afghan villagers", he called the B-1 a "stealth bomber".
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/LAC.20060523.AFGHAN23/TPStory/TPInternational/Asia/

Mark
Ottawa
 
Isn't it nice to see a positive attitude? He could have just as easily taken another tack, but I guess that might bolster support on the home front.
 
Well, Gosh... I guess we should just....get out!!!

Why he has "visited" 4 times (at company expense no doubt) and well, gee, things aren't getting better, so why not go back to only losing a few malcontents who refuse to wear a burka, agitate about this freedom stuff, and such.
 
Globe&Mail is a declining paper anyways. Mostly because of things like this. And mostly because I read somewhere that their readers were the least likely to vote on average. Students and drunks who need to keep warm is my guess. So like who cares. I talk to 'normal' people....they are misinformed, true, but even they see beyond this "WE KILLED PEOPLE" hype on the part of this paper.

CTV has seemed to take a more positive view. CBC seems to mercifully keep their attention elsewhere. The Globe seems to be on the 'warpath' though. They seem to have a definite single-mindedness to their brand of crap.

.
 
There's no point in bothering with all this--the war is already lost.  Read this piece in the Globe, May 27, by Geoffrey York, "Taliban rising":

Ah yes...written by Geoffrey York...nothing more needs to be said...
 
Not to cause too much fuss but I was the originator of the Milnews opinion on having Canada and NATO supplant US fast-air and support fire resources in areas we are to operate in. While there was some emotional reactions based I think on trampled feelings and misconceptions rather than listening to what I had to say, that was not my intent. It was to point out that OUR ROEs and OUR responsibility for implementing them based on OUR Operations in the area would go a long way to preserving our good work and effort in the Kandahar region. I think that some only heard what they wanted to out of it, and not the intent.

I’ll state it again: I think we need to be the ones directing all operations in our AOR. If the Yanks have intel, have targets and want something done, they why aren’t they asking us to do it? This goes to the relevance of our mission, and if we need to change our Mission parameters to be the masters of our AOR then we should. We have the capability and the tools, in conjunction with our NATO ISAF partners, to support our own troops. Or do we not? If anyone can voice a factual opinion on this than they should share it, much as it has already been stated in this thread.

The methodology of the US regular forces deployed in Iraq is not winning them anything. Civilian casualties promote the enemy’s agenda, not ours. We need to avoid what Tomahawk6 promotes, killing for the sake of it alone, even though he doesn’t say it directly. Making the Kandahar region a free-fire zone is wrong. If this is debateable then bring more facts than the ever-persuasive “You just don’t lead ‘em so much” mentality. It didn’t work in the war it was coined in and it isn’t working now. Don’t tell me my assessment of the situation is ridiculous. Prove it. And proving it isn’t quoting WW2’s mistakes. You could quote your successes in the Iraq campaign, as an example, if there is any.
 
warpig,

Wow quite a stir for your third post, glad to see you're not some nameless troll though.

To address your suggestion that Canada take over the AOR with OUR ROE's and make it all OUR responsibility, my response would be to simply question whether or not Canada actually has this capability?

It is my understanding that before deployment on Archer the CDS considered sending CF-18's to the region. The argument at the time I believe went that if we want to have air support whenever we need it, we need to have our own.

While this is indeed true, and I should mention that I am in fact I am very in support of Canada having it's very own AOR, I would like to point out a few things..

The planned deployment of the CF-18's was scrapped due to, from my understanding at least, a virtual inability to sustain their operations in theater. If something has significantly changed to alter this and make it a distinct possibility, then I am all ears.

As well Canada would also need to send a much larger groundforce in if we were to completely remove other NATO partners from the AOR, as we rely on them for a variety of services as it is.

Canada would also need to pull out of the CJTF-76 and establish our own "sovereign" command over the AOR free from any higher authority - the reason being it is my understanding that the decision to launch the support mission in question was made above the local commanders. This brings into question the stability of our supply line, IMO.

Finally, though I agree that causing civilian casualties is a very bad thing, and have in fact vehemently argued on these very forums that even the simple action of killing insurgents can lead to the creation of more insurgents, and that if civilians are a part of these casualties, and their brethren see their death as an example of an abuse of power by the western nations, then that in particular will create even more insurgents.

However, at the same time we have some undeniable facts. They are the enemy. They will and at that particular instance were trying to kill the men on the ground. The only reasonable option at this point is to kill or capture them in the most expedient manor. Yes indeed considerations need to made for collateral damage, and quite possibly the deaths of these civilians and the resulting uproar did not justify that particular action .

However that should not lead us, both as allies and active participants on the ground, to blindly say "we would not have done the same thing, our fast air should be there instead." - it is very possible that given the situation that was emerging (from the reports it seems like a SF group found itself faced with an unexpectedly large and aggressive enemy) we would in fact have ordered that bombing.

As well take into consideration that, at least from what the Commanders are telling the media, we believe the local insurgency to be a fairly small group - taking out this many at one time could represent a major victory that overshadows even the resulting mess.
 
We don't need any more fast air. Too much Ordnance flying around already. Collateral damage in a COIN op isn't an error, it's a military defeat.
 
This thread has left me shaking my head, so I find myself posting.  A couple of points:

1.  We ARE operating under our own ROE in Afghanistan - issued and approved by the Government of Canada, so any thoughts of us following US direction in that regard are completely erroneous.  The US does not have operational command of Canadian forces and major Canadian operations are undoubtedly approved in Ottawa (by a process that I will not discuss here).

2.  What makes anyone here think that Canadian CAS would be any different than US CAS?  Are our pilots more "sensitive"?  Are our munitions more precise?  Bollocks.

3.  The decision to employ CAS is typically up to the commander on the ground, who well could be a Canadian, Brit, Dutchman or American.  ROE have very little to do with it, the decision does; either one is authorized CAS or one isn't.

4.  Canada has deployed FACs into Afghanistan for several years.  The FAC is critical to the effective use of CAS and to the avoidance of "collateral damage".    It is entirely possible to have a scenario where a Canadian FAC is directing US CAS on to targets - as identified by the commander on the ground.  The fact of the matter is (as KevinB has hinted at) that US FACs are very experienced and very, very good.

Again, deploying Canadian CF-18s wouldn't make any difference at all to the rate of civilian casualties.  In the final analysis it is the decision of commanders on the ground to employ air power as they see dictated by the tactical situation that is the critical step.  US commanders have traditionally been quicker to use air power - based partially on their military history, but that isn't to say that a Canadian couldn't or wouldn't make exactly the same decisions under similar circumstances.
 
If the enemy is hiding amongst the population, bombardment of any kind (no matter how precise) is likely to result in civilian casualities, including these peoples babies. You might imagine what the local population is going to think.  they're not going to care if you say : "we were after the Taliban.." for them the price will be too high.  We should not fall into the trap of using airpower in these situations. The enemy wants us to. The whole point is to sucker us into doing that. I don't think this mission was protecting Canadian troops. If anything they're likely to suffer the payback. There is an endless supply of Pashtun Taliban coming over the border from Pakistan. It's not worth the damage to us just to knock off a couple more. It's not a war of attrition. No offence, but your position on airpower smacks of fighting the last war.  This is not a contest of firepower.
 
I don't think this mission was protecting Canadian troops.

How do you know?  Were you there?  I for one am extremely reluctant to second-guess tactical decisions made by commanders on the ground.

If anything they're likely to suffer the payback.

Again, I suspect that none of us were there.

It's not worth the damage to us just to knock off a couple more.

Hardly a couple.  Again, without a detailed assessment of this particular tactical situation and the decisions that were made on the ground, none of us are in a position to judge.  When the decision was made, it may well have seemed worth it.

No offence, but your position on airpower smacks of fighting the last war.  This is not a contest of firepower.

I assume that this blanket statement is directed at me.  Hey, all I'm saying is how business is typically done.  Read into it what you will.  You seem to be arguing that there are no situations in which the use of CAS is acceptable.  I would argue that it isn't quite that simple.
 
This thread has been the attempted education of someone with zero knowledge of how the military and military conflicts work, who does not care, and even when it is pointed out, will not listen.
:brickwall:
 
A few points:  I'm not sure you know what CandP's experience is, so let's refrain from idle speculation for now.  Stick to the content of the posts.

As for CandP's general idea on not winning an insurgency with firepower, I think nobody is going to dispute that.  We've read Lind, Poole and the 4th Generation Warfare stuff.  However, this does not mean that you can -never- use it as a tool to establish tactical dominance, which is why your criticism of the particular incident, coalition application of airpower or the quality of American FAC's is empty (unless, as Teddy points out, you know something we don't). 

Cheers,
Infanteer
 
Sorry to leave you in the dark troops, but I just saved up enough money for this computer and I'm new to the game. Tess directed me to modify my profile and I have.  As for the thread I'm sorry if I didn't show proper deference. I am just pissed off that US command orders an airstrike, and the people who I feel are my extended family may have to bear the brunt of payback. Meanwhile you fella's are arguing over the quality of the FAC's. Sorry for offence.
 
Having been in theatre and seen how CAS assets are tasked on the ATO, folks should not believe that CF18's would be a CF/TF Orion-only asset.  I would venture to say that our 18's would go onto the ATO as an available CAS asset just as would the Brit Harriers, Dutch F-16s and all the USAF assets.  Whether a GBU-12, JDAM or other munition comes from a B-52 based in Diego Garcia or a CF-18 potentially based in Kandahar doesn't matter to the FAC passing his/her 9-liner to the assigned CAS asset, or when things head South in a hurry, to a troop commander making an all-arms call for fire on the theatre command net.

The question of targeting and ROEs is another issue.  Not to discuss ROE specifically for OPSEC reasons, but in general, CAS would be called in to support troops-in-contact (TIC) for a very good reason.  As members of the profession of arms, we are bound by the Law of Armed Conflict and other conventions to avoid injury to non-combatants and ensure that collateral damage to civilian property is minimized.  That does not, however, mean that such injury or damage will not occur, as unfortunate as it is.  People should not think that troops on the ground are indiscriminantly calling in fires without due regard for the very citizens of the country we are there to support.

2 more ¢

Cheers,
Duey
 
C and P said:
If the enemy is hiding amongst the population, bombardment of any kind (no matter how precise) is likely to result in civilian casualities, including these peoples babies. You might imagine what the local population is going to think.  they're not going to care if you say : "we were after the Taliban.." for them the price will be too high.  We should not fall into the trap of using airpower in these situations. The enemy wants us to. The whole point is to sucker us into doing that. I don't think this mission was protecting Canadian troops. If anything they're likely to suffer the payback. There is an endless supply of Pashtun Taliban coming over the border from Pakistan. It's not worth the damage to us just to knock off a couple more. It's not a war of attrition. No offence, but your position on airpower smacks of fighting the last war.  This is not a contest of firepower.

C&P -- Judging by both your comments and your profile you have ZERO experience in the Afghan conflict.

Duey and Teddy R are VERY experienced in this manner -- and other us have have had/still have our boots on the ground.

 
Teddy Ruxpin said:
US commanders have traditionally been quicker to use air power - based partially on their military history, but that isn't to say that a Canadian couldn't or wouldn't make exactly the same decisions under similar circumstances.

I don't know if history has much to do with it - more like sheer availability of on-call tactical aircraft. When Canada has had direct access to same, we used them; I think Richard Rohmer would agree to that. See the use of cab ranks over Normandy. Is there any reason to believe that Canadian commanders on the ground anywhere in the world would decline to use air power if directly available?

If the suggestion is that US forces have historically relied on firepower, that is true enough, but a careful analysis will show that Canadian forces have done the same - when that firepower was available to them. In that regard, the last half of your sentence is correct.

 
during ops last week, Cdn troops did have available and did use CAS....

All in all, it's a question of the FAC and the local commander making judicious use of a resource it has available.
 
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