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Feature in the current The Devils' Blast. LCol (Retd) Norm Donogh participated in the battle. Posted in seven parts.
THE RHINELAND CAMPAIGN
By
Lieutenant-Colonel Norman R. Donogh
AUTHOR’S NOTES
In September 2008 I was invited to Europe to deliver three lectures and to participate in British Army on-site battlefield studies of the German Rhineland campaign of February-March 1945. It was centred, as far as the Royal Winnipeg Rifles were concerned, on the Battle of Moyland Wood.
This was a great, cleverly-designed and fiercely-fought battle by our Regiment. It was cited for its planning and execution but above all for the determination and courage of members of the Regiment that made the plan work. The casualties were heavy: we lost 44 percent of our rifle companies’ strength in killed and wounded in one short day.
The editor of The Devil’s Blast, Rifleman62, firmly requested “a detailed report” on this.
Fifteen years ago I had written a monograph on the battle, largely based on an excellent memoir of Brigadier-General George Aldous, MC, plus my own recollections, some extensive research, a good after-action report by 7 Canadian Infantry Brigade, and a weekend meeting with General Aldous and Sergeant Fred Bragnalo of Thunder Bay. This, plus some updated material by historian Lieutenant-Colonel Brian Reid, formed the basis of my three lectures. Two of these are reproduced verbatim (plus certain additions in parenthesis relating to Regimental people), with a lead-in section on OPERATION VERITABLE. I have omitted PART TWO – the second lecture – involving 2nd Division’s operations from Winnipeg lines at Louisendorf to the Goch-Calcar Road.
So here goes … !
BACKGROUND
On 8 February 1945, OPERATION VERITABLE – that opened the great battle for the Rhineland – commenced.
For the First Canadian Army it involved breaking out of its winter position in the Nijmegen-Groesbeek area of The Netherlands and attacking through the northern end of the Siegfried Line to destroy all German formations on the west bank of the Rhine river opposite Wesel.
The U.S. Ninth Army was to strike from the south to reach the junction point near Wesel. But this part of the plan was heavily delayed. The Germans released water from the Roer dams, flooding the areas in front of the Ninth Army, successfully keeping it out of the operation until 22 February – a day after the fierce Battle of Moyland Wood was completed.
This critical time gap enabled the Germans to move several additional divisions north against the First Canadian Army sector.
One essential area in the Canadian Army advance was a ridge of high ground just short of the Goch-Calcar Road, the final Canadian Army objective of VERITABLE. The conifer-covered ridge was called Moyland Wood, and south of it was a vital piece of hilly ground at the village of Louisendorf.
Around midnight 7/8 February, as a prelude to VERITABLE, the German town of Cleve – the first major centre behind Germany’s Siegfried Line – was virtually destroyed by some 700 RAF bombers.
Five hours later – at 0500 hours 8 February – VERITABLE commenced as Canadian and British artillery undertook an unbelievably heavy concentration of fire in a deafening 5 ½ -hour cannonade. One planned 10-minute stoppage in the fire plan for the 1,034 guns and rocket launchers – in which smoke was used to draw, and spot, defensive fire – was the only break in the heavy fire that rained 2,500 tons of explosives on enemy positions and supply routes.
At 1030 hours 8 February, 2nd Canadian Division and British forces launched an attack in the Reichwald Forest area, a northern anchor of the Siegfried Line. Later that afternoon and early the next morning, 3rd Canadian Division attacked to the north of the Reichwald Forest and Nijmegen-Cleve Road.
For the next three days the Royal Winnipeg Rifles fought both enemy and rising flood waters as the Germans blew holes in dykes and deliberately flooded areas, including the Nijmegen-Cleve Road, along the line of advance. First on foot, then in lightly-armoured buffaloes (amphibious tracked vehicles) the battalion took objective after objective; towns and outposts above the water.
In this action the attacking companies boarded the buffaloes at Wyler Meer and were carried across flooded land toward Keeken and the Custom House at Alter Rhein. Dismounting on dry ground “A” and “B” Companies surged forward to take Keeken; “C” Company took the Custom House and “D” Company held the area between. A number of prisoners were taken at no cost to the Regiment.
But throughout the action rising floodwater finally poured into the houses and, mission accomplished, the Regiment was ordered back to Nijmegen when buffaloes became available for house-to-house pickup. In “D” Company, the withdrawal order was carried from platoon to platoon by the Company Commander, Major L.H. Denison, who rode bareback through the flooding on a commandeered farm horse.
By 12 February, the now-dubbed “Water Rats” reached Cleve, and prepared for the next major advance through the Rhineland.
In the next stage of battle, the 15th (Scottish) Division, advancing on the Cleve-Calcar Road, met stubborn opposition. Two of its brigades – 13th and 46th – had difficulty moving from the Bedburg area southeast of Moyland, two miles away.
Because of flooding between Moyland and the Rhine, the advance had to be through high-ridged Moyland Wood that ran from Bedburg to a point south and east of Moyland. Fighting was bitter indeed, and for the 46th Brigade was “the worst experience they had endured since the campaign began”, according to its divisional history. The brigade managed to reach a lateral road which ran from the village of Moyland southwest through the forest. It could go no further.
On 15 February the 3rd Canadian Division took over the 15th (Scottish) Divisional front. So narrow was the front between the flooded Rhine flats and the corps on its right moving toward Goch that only one brigade could be fed in at one time. The brigade was the 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade – the Royal Winnipeg Rifles, Regina Rifle Regiment and 1st Canadian Scottish.
PART ONE: RHINELAND CAMPAIGN
(First Battlefield Lecture, September 2008)
May I please be permitted some general comments before dealing with the subject at hand.
At the outset I want to thank you for inviting me to join in these battlefield studies. I also want to bring warm regimental greetings to all participants and to those gallant United Kingdom units with which our Regiment served in the 1884 Nile campaign, the South African war around the turn of the last century, the two World Wars, the Korean conflict, NATO operations in Germany during the Cold War and peacekeeping duties in various areas, including the Balkans and, currently, Afghanistan.
Also, when my band director learned that members of a Gurkha regiment would be involved in these studies, I was asked to give them a salute to pass on to the Band of the Brigade of Gurkhas. At the Quebec International Military Music Festival in August of last year, the two bands, plus the green-clad Voltigeurs, formed a natural and close association including marching at the proper rifle rate of 140 paces to the minute. I wouldn’t recommend it for the kilted 15th Scottish. The Gurkha band, as befits the bold and active Gurkha tradition, sometimes pushed it to 150 paces. This left our band with only one counter-measure, to double-past at 160 paces while lustily playing The Keel Row on their brass and reeds. I understand the Gurkhas first earned their green jackets in the mid-19th century while serving alongside the 60th Rifles in India.
I also want you to excuse my constant referral to my text. What prompted it was that when I wanted to pay tribute to Lieutenant-General Sir Brian Horrocks, whom our division highly esteemed when we served in 30 Corps, I found I had to grope for several minutes before his name came to mind … a fading 85-year-old memory.
As you know, there were constant shufflings in the first Canadian Army, reminiscent of the couplings and partner-trading in a free-love hippie commune. Our involvement with 30 Corps is one example. And, just before the action I am about to describe, the 15th Scottish Division returned to 30 Corps while its 46th Brigade remained under command of 2 Canadian Corps.
The ferocious fighting undertaken by the 15th Scottish from the Bedford area southeast to Moyland was surely a top example of courage and endurance. In taking two-thirds of the three-mile-long Moyland Wood down to a lateral road that cut northeastward through the forest to the village of Moyland, the bitter fighting by its 46th Brigade, was described in the division’s history as “the worst experience they had endured since the campaign began”.
On 15 February 1945 the 3rd Canadian Division took over the 15th Scottish front. So narrow was the front between the flooded Rhine flats and 30 Corps to our right that only a single brigade could be fed in at one time. That brigade was the 7th Canadian, consisting of the Royal Winnipeg Rifles, the Regina Rifles, and the Canadian Scottish of Vancouver, all from Western Canada.
For 7th Brigade the Battle of Moyland Wood began the next day, 16 February. The task: a two-pronged attack to open the road to Calcar. The Regina Rifles, supported by a squadron of Churchill tanks from 3rd Scots Guards, were to pass through 46th Brigade, cross the lateral road, and clear the southeastern section of Moyland Wood, a heavily-defended pine ridge some 1,800 yards long. The Royal Winnipeg Rifles, on the right, were to capture the hilly feature of Louisendorf two miles south of Moyland. 1st Canadian Scottish, in reserve for the initial action, were to attack along the southern edge of Moyland Wood towards the farmsteads at Rosskamp and Heselerfeld.
THE RHINELAND CAMPAIGN
By
Lieutenant-Colonel Norman R. Donogh
AUTHOR’S NOTES
In September 2008 I was invited to Europe to deliver three lectures and to participate in British Army on-site battlefield studies of the German Rhineland campaign of February-March 1945. It was centred, as far as the Royal Winnipeg Rifles were concerned, on the Battle of Moyland Wood.
This was a great, cleverly-designed and fiercely-fought battle by our Regiment. It was cited for its planning and execution but above all for the determination and courage of members of the Regiment that made the plan work. The casualties were heavy: we lost 44 percent of our rifle companies’ strength in killed and wounded in one short day.
The editor of The Devil’s Blast, Rifleman62, firmly requested “a detailed report” on this.
Fifteen years ago I had written a monograph on the battle, largely based on an excellent memoir of Brigadier-General George Aldous, MC, plus my own recollections, some extensive research, a good after-action report by 7 Canadian Infantry Brigade, and a weekend meeting with General Aldous and Sergeant Fred Bragnalo of Thunder Bay. This, plus some updated material by historian Lieutenant-Colonel Brian Reid, formed the basis of my three lectures. Two of these are reproduced verbatim (plus certain additions in parenthesis relating to Regimental people), with a lead-in section on OPERATION VERITABLE. I have omitted PART TWO – the second lecture – involving 2nd Division’s operations from Winnipeg lines at Louisendorf to the Goch-Calcar Road.
So here goes … !
BACKGROUND
On 8 February 1945, OPERATION VERITABLE – that opened the great battle for the Rhineland – commenced.
For the First Canadian Army it involved breaking out of its winter position in the Nijmegen-Groesbeek area of The Netherlands and attacking through the northern end of the Siegfried Line to destroy all German formations on the west bank of the Rhine river opposite Wesel.
The U.S. Ninth Army was to strike from the south to reach the junction point near Wesel. But this part of the plan was heavily delayed. The Germans released water from the Roer dams, flooding the areas in front of the Ninth Army, successfully keeping it out of the operation until 22 February – a day after the fierce Battle of Moyland Wood was completed.
This critical time gap enabled the Germans to move several additional divisions north against the First Canadian Army sector.
One essential area in the Canadian Army advance was a ridge of high ground just short of the Goch-Calcar Road, the final Canadian Army objective of VERITABLE. The conifer-covered ridge was called Moyland Wood, and south of it was a vital piece of hilly ground at the village of Louisendorf.
Around midnight 7/8 February, as a prelude to VERITABLE, the German town of Cleve – the first major centre behind Germany’s Siegfried Line – was virtually destroyed by some 700 RAF bombers.
Five hours later – at 0500 hours 8 February – VERITABLE commenced as Canadian and British artillery undertook an unbelievably heavy concentration of fire in a deafening 5 ½ -hour cannonade. One planned 10-minute stoppage in the fire plan for the 1,034 guns and rocket launchers – in which smoke was used to draw, and spot, defensive fire – was the only break in the heavy fire that rained 2,500 tons of explosives on enemy positions and supply routes.
At 1030 hours 8 February, 2nd Canadian Division and British forces launched an attack in the Reichwald Forest area, a northern anchor of the Siegfried Line. Later that afternoon and early the next morning, 3rd Canadian Division attacked to the north of the Reichwald Forest and Nijmegen-Cleve Road.
For the next three days the Royal Winnipeg Rifles fought both enemy and rising flood waters as the Germans blew holes in dykes and deliberately flooded areas, including the Nijmegen-Cleve Road, along the line of advance. First on foot, then in lightly-armoured buffaloes (amphibious tracked vehicles) the battalion took objective after objective; towns and outposts above the water.
In this action the attacking companies boarded the buffaloes at Wyler Meer and were carried across flooded land toward Keeken and the Custom House at Alter Rhein. Dismounting on dry ground “A” and “B” Companies surged forward to take Keeken; “C” Company took the Custom House and “D” Company held the area between. A number of prisoners were taken at no cost to the Regiment.
But throughout the action rising floodwater finally poured into the houses and, mission accomplished, the Regiment was ordered back to Nijmegen when buffaloes became available for house-to-house pickup. In “D” Company, the withdrawal order was carried from platoon to platoon by the Company Commander, Major L.H. Denison, who rode bareback through the flooding on a commandeered farm horse.
By 12 February, the now-dubbed “Water Rats” reached Cleve, and prepared for the next major advance through the Rhineland.
In the next stage of battle, the 15th (Scottish) Division, advancing on the Cleve-Calcar Road, met stubborn opposition. Two of its brigades – 13th and 46th – had difficulty moving from the Bedburg area southeast of Moyland, two miles away.
Because of flooding between Moyland and the Rhine, the advance had to be through high-ridged Moyland Wood that ran from Bedburg to a point south and east of Moyland. Fighting was bitter indeed, and for the 46th Brigade was “the worst experience they had endured since the campaign began”, according to its divisional history. The brigade managed to reach a lateral road which ran from the village of Moyland southwest through the forest. It could go no further.
On 15 February the 3rd Canadian Division took over the 15th (Scottish) Divisional front. So narrow was the front between the flooded Rhine flats and the corps on its right moving toward Goch that only one brigade could be fed in at one time. The brigade was the 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade – the Royal Winnipeg Rifles, Regina Rifle Regiment and 1st Canadian Scottish.
PART ONE: RHINELAND CAMPAIGN
(First Battlefield Lecture, September 2008)
May I please be permitted some general comments before dealing with the subject at hand.
At the outset I want to thank you for inviting me to join in these battlefield studies. I also want to bring warm regimental greetings to all participants and to those gallant United Kingdom units with which our Regiment served in the 1884 Nile campaign, the South African war around the turn of the last century, the two World Wars, the Korean conflict, NATO operations in Germany during the Cold War and peacekeeping duties in various areas, including the Balkans and, currently, Afghanistan.
Also, when my band director learned that members of a Gurkha regiment would be involved in these studies, I was asked to give them a salute to pass on to the Band of the Brigade of Gurkhas. At the Quebec International Military Music Festival in August of last year, the two bands, plus the green-clad Voltigeurs, formed a natural and close association including marching at the proper rifle rate of 140 paces to the minute. I wouldn’t recommend it for the kilted 15th Scottish. The Gurkha band, as befits the bold and active Gurkha tradition, sometimes pushed it to 150 paces. This left our band with only one counter-measure, to double-past at 160 paces while lustily playing The Keel Row on their brass and reeds. I understand the Gurkhas first earned their green jackets in the mid-19th century while serving alongside the 60th Rifles in India.
I also want you to excuse my constant referral to my text. What prompted it was that when I wanted to pay tribute to Lieutenant-General Sir Brian Horrocks, whom our division highly esteemed when we served in 30 Corps, I found I had to grope for several minutes before his name came to mind … a fading 85-year-old memory.
As you know, there were constant shufflings in the first Canadian Army, reminiscent of the couplings and partner-trading in a free-love hippie commune. Our involvement with 30 Corps is one example. And, just before the action I am about to describe, the 15th Scottish Division returned to 30 Corps while its 46th Brigade remained under command of 2 Canadian Corps.
The ferocious fighting undertaken by the 15th Scottish from the Bedford area southeast to Moyland was surely a top example of courage and endurance. In taking two-thirds of the three-mile-long Moyland Wood down to a lateral road that cut northeastward through the forest to the village of Moyland, the bitter fighting by its 46th Brigade, was described in the division’s history as “the worst experience they had endured since the campaign began”.
On 15 February 1945 the 3rd Canadian Division took over the 15th Scottish front. So narrow was the front between the flooded Rhine flats and 30 Corps to our right that only a single brigade could be fed in at one time. That brigade was the 7th Canadian, consisting of the Royal Winnipeg Rifles, the Regina Rifles, and the Canadian Scottish of Vancouver, all from Western Canada.
For 7th Brigade the Battle of Moyland Wood began the next day, 16 February. The task: a two-pronged attack to open the road to Calcar. The Regina Rifles, supported by a squadron of Churchill tanks from 3rd Scots Guards, were to pass through 46th Brigade, cross the lateral road, and clear the southeastern section of Moyland Wood, a heavily-defended pine ridge some 1,800 yards long. The Royal Winnipeg Rifles, on the right, were to capture the hilly feature of Louisendorf two miles south of Moyland. 1st Canadian Scottish, in reserve for the initial action, were to attack along the southern edge of Moyland Wood towards the farmsteads at Rosskamp and Heselerfeld.