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"Too Few Hilliers: The general goes where Ottawa mandarins fear to tread"

MarkOttawa

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A post at The Torch on the recent Lang/Stein article in The Walrus:
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2008/04/too-few-hilliers-general-goes-where.html

Mark
Ottawa
 
Mark,

In my opinion the comment regarding the lack of debate or off-setting opinion by the mandarins reflects not on General Hillier's ability to sieze control of the agenda, but on the weakness in the upper ranks of the public service. Those with more experience in the upper echelons of Ottawa may argue, but this vacuum was probably developed by the centralization of power and decision making in the central agencies, and not solely in the PMO.

The next CDS may not enjoy the power that Rick Hillier had, but if he is a wise man, and I suspect all of the usual suspects are, he will have a policy advantage at least in the new term. In the longer run, I fear there will be some controls put on the CDS by the senior public servants for no other reason than a manifestation of their desire to run things.
 
Old Sweat said:
Mark,

In my opinion the comment regarding the lack of debate or off-setting opinion by the mandarins reflects not on General Hillier's ability to sieze control of the agenda, but on the weakness in the upper ranks of the public service. Those with more experience in the upper echelons of Ottawa may argue, but this vacuum was probably developed by the centralization of power and decision making in the central agencies, and not solely in the PMO.

The next CDS may not enjoy the power that Rick Hillier had, but if he is a wise man, and I suspect all of the usual suspects are, he will have a policy advantage at least in the new term. In the longer run, I fear there will be some controls put on the CDS by the senior public servants for no other reason than a manifestation of their desire to run things.

If I may comment on the upper echelons of the public service, from first hand experience.  What is valued in a senior official is collegiality, i.e. everyone singing from the same hymnbook, not outspokenness.  The people who've reached the ranks of the Deputy Ministers did so by playing nice, not rocking the boat, by learning not to make policy in public so as not to create controversy, etc, etc, etc.  Outspoken, hard-charging senior managers generally never get beyond the lower executive levels.  Therefore, you will never find Hilliers in the top ranks of the Public Service because the environment is toxic to that kind of character.  Previous Chiefs conformed to that mould precisely.  Whether or not Hillier is sui generis or the first of a new breed remains to be seen.  But don't ever expect the Public Service to cough up guys like him.
 
The referenced article in The Walrus is, indeed, worth a read.

I would like to make a few comments – each ‘tied’ to an introductory phrase from the article:

” Traditionally, the army, navy, and air force shared cuts and rare budget increases roughly equally. To Hillier, this balance deprived Canada’s military of strategic focus ...”

This was a tradition that did need to be put aside. Too many people in Ottawa remain, even after 40 years, committed to the 5:5:2 model – which reflects the relative weight of the three services based upon their regular force strengths circa 1965. It is a silly, even outlandish concept but, while I served, it was still gospel and I have heard little if anything to tell me that, pre-Hillier, it was not still gospel after I retired.

The fact is that we face a new strategic situation and the height of the Cold War model is not right for 2010.

” To some extent, Hillier’s heightened visibility is a consequence of the CF being at war for the first time in decades. Under such circumstances, the military leadership has a duty to keep the public informed ...”

This is the primary, but too often misunderstood, raison d’être for Hillier’s high public profile. He has a duty to speak to Canadian military members, heir families and Canadians at large about ongoing combat operations. The change, since Guy Simmonds was CGS during the Korean War, is the nature of the medium, not the nature of the message. Gen Hillier is using the tools available – and using them well and, in the process, he is upsetting the tradition of quiet, decorous, behind the scenes bureaucratic work.

Successive Chiefs of the Defence Staff will, so long as we have troops in action, need to do something similar. We, all Canadians, including politicians and bureaucrats, must hope that the next CDS will also be an able communicator – able to do his duty.

” Robert Fowler, a former deputy minister of defence, illustrates the challenge of speaking truth to power privately ...”

If senior officials failed to fully and properly inform politicians then they failed, miserably, in their duty and some – admirals, generals and bureaucrats alike should have been tossed out of their comfortable offices.

”There is a case where Hillier played a central role in crafting defence policy, but not as a rogue officer who challenged the civilian leadership. Rather, he did so at the request of a prime minister frustrated by the absence of policy ideas ...”

This illustrates a huge problem in Ottawa – a bumbling, second rate civil service.

Fifty years ago the Canadian diplomatic service was admired, albeit not much liked, world-wide because of the near universal excellence of the people in it. They were a small, elite and highly cohesive group. Forty years ago they were the same. Thirty-nine years ago that all began to change.

Pierre Trudeau detested the foreign service. He saw it, correctly, as an insular, self preserving gang of Oxbridge educated Anglos who had a distinct anti-Québec bias. He decided to change all that; and so he did; and the foreign service has never recovered.

Today it is a second rate and second tier department. The power resides in another small, elite and highly cohesive group that is insular, self preserving and if not totally Oxbridge still predominantly Anglo and resides in the PCO and the Department of Finance. There’s nothing wrong with e PCO doing the deep thinking for Foreign Affairs but the Foreign and Defence Policy Secretariat in PCO is waaaaay too small.

We need a half dozen ‘foreign services” – all coordinated, to some degree, by PCO. The first amongst equals ought to be the ‘real’ foreign service in DFAIT, but DND needs one of its own as do the Departments of  Finance, Industry – which ought to include Trade and Commerce, Fisheries and Oceans, Transport and even Health.

” The balance between civil servants inside DND and military leaders is the fulcrum on which good policy rests. National Defence Headquarters was created in 1972. Over time, its structure and organization have evolved so that today civilians and military officers work side by side ...”

And it is still poorly organized. As Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang point out, “the role of the deputy minister and the civilian defence bureaucracy is not outlined precisely in statute, leaving it open to interpretation.” Their roles and responsibilities and duties need to be spelled out, as they are for the CDS. The civilian bureaucracy is the mechanism through which ministers exercise civilian control. If ministers want to do that well – as they must in a proper liberal democracy – then they need to tell their ”tools” what to do on their behalf.

” Paul Martin has acknowledged that the slashing of the public service during the 1990s contributed directly to the erosion of policy expertise across the government ...”

That’s cold bloody comfort for an ill-served nation. Martin had and Stephen Harper has a duty to undo Trudeau’s policy vandalism and rebuild or foreign and defence policies and our foreign and defence services and forces. Now!


Edit: sundry typos

 
E.R. Campbell: Indeed.  One interesting thing about PCO generally is that it runs a self-selecting and self-perpetuating elite for the public service as a whole.  A tour of three/fours years in PCO before becoming an EX is almost essential for a "high flyer" career in "policy" jobs--the ones that have the clout.  A further tour then vastly aids the jump to ADM ranks.

What is curious is that PCO jobs are very rarely advertised for public service competition.  Hence my second sentence above.

Mark
Ottawa
 
What mechanism exists to develop senior public servants in a challenging intellectual environment that considers the development of public policy in a framework of national and international affairs? Since NDC bit the dust a decade or more ago, I am not aware of any such place, but I am prepared to be corrected. It is not generally known that NDC, the National Defence Colege, actually functioned as a senior school for public servants, certain business and academic leaders, RCMP and military, both Canadian and foreign. In fact, despite its title and location in Fort Frotenac, the majority of the students on its roughly year long course were civilian.

DND set up a program for developing senior officers as part of the CFC, but I am unaware of any parallel activity by the public service. We have a well educated and cosmopolitan senior officers corps who are not afraid to present and defend their positions. While this is against the traditions and attitudes of the public service, perhaps the mandarins felt this was unnecessary in the past, as their policy aspirations tended to be relatively consistent and mirrored those of the 'natural governing party.'

Could this account, in part, for the vacuum?
 
cavalryman said:
If I may comment on the upper echelons of the public service, from first hand experience.  What is valued in a senior official is collegiality, i.e. everyone singing from the same hymnbook, not outspokenness.  The people who've reached the ranks of the Deputy Ministers did so by playing nice, not rocking the boat, by learning not to make policy in public so as not to create controversy, etc, etc, etc.  Outspoken, hard-charging senior managers generally never get beyond the lower executive levels.  Therefore, you will never find Hilliers in the top ranks of the Public Service because the environment is toxic to that kind of character.  Previous Chiefs conformed to that mould precisely.  Whether or not Hillier is sui generis or the first of a new breed remains to be seen.  But don't ever expect the Public Service to cough up guys like him.

Exactly, criticizing things and pointing out the obvious flaws will quickly have you designated as a non-team player. Anyone remember the Fiasco of UCS? I am guessing a billion dollars down the drain because people at the top were to afraid to speak out.
 
Old Sweat:  There is now a Canada School of Public Service; I have no idea how effective it is:
http://www.csps-efpc.gc.ca/corporate/tr/index_e.asp?id=5

Regarding CFC, a post at The Torch:

Canadian Forces College: CBC news video
http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/search?q=%22canadian+forces+college%22

I attended (as a civilian in Solicitor General Canada) a two-week course at NDC in the fall  of 1991.  Hard work, fun, and most worthwhile.

Mark
Ottawa

 
Mark,

Thanks for that. I had heard buzz of a public service college before I retired. Like you, I have no idea how well it is working. I would opine that its offerings are not in the same league as NDC, but that is a guess.
 
Old Sweat said:
Mark,

Thanks for that. I had heard buzz of a public service college before I retired. Like you, I have no idea how well it is working. I would opine that its offerings are not in the same league as NDC, but that is a guess.

The CSPS is more of a trade school than anything resembling a delivery mechanism for high-level schooling of the type NDC used to give.
 
cavalryman said:
The CSPS is more of a trade school than anything resembling a delivery mechanism for high-level schooling of the type NDC used to give.

I'd second that.
 
There are seminars, usually quite short and very topical, for senior civil servants but there is no 'room' for a senior staff college  à la the NDC.

The first problem – albeit less critical in the senior ranks – is the Public Service Commission which stifles professionalism (and elitism) in the public service by ensuring that real management talent is encouraged to find useful employment in the private sector. The PSC, at the behest of the Treasury Board, aims to ensure that the public service cannot do professional development because it needs none – all persons appointed to public service positions being 100% qualified for the job they hold and promotion being forbidden – by law.

The second problem is bureaucratic inertia. There is already waaaay too much to do. No one, well almost no one, ever asks if what is being done really needs to be done – the answer is: “Yes! About 20% of it is important work. Consequently about 80% is not important at all, to anyone.” There is great reluctance to accept the idea that one should take eight or nine months ‘off’ to go on a professional development course, there is even greater reluctance to send a senior subordinate – (s)he might actually learn something and then compete with you for the next job!

The third problem is flavour of the month. Out in the ‘real world’ most companies no longer send executives or potential executives away for months or even years for advanced education or training – they are expected to equip themselves for their next job; careers, as they were understood in the ‘50s, ‘60s, ‘70s and even ‘80s, are things of the past. What’s ‘good’ for GM must be good for Canada, right? The government ought to be run in a businesslike manner, right? Well, no, not really ... but that’s another subject.
 
Regarding a reluctance to rock the boat, U.S. SecDef Gates' recent remarks to both West Point cadets and officers attending Air University at Maxwell-Gunter Air Force Base are instructive.  The full texts are available at the following links:

http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1233

Excerpt:

More broadly, if as an officer – listen to me very carefully – if as an officer you don't tell blunt truths or create an environment where candor is encouraged, then you've done yourself and the institution a disservice.  This admonition goes back beyond the roots of our own republic.  Sir Francis Bacon was a 17th century jurist and philosopher as well as a confidante of the senior minister of England's King James.  He gave this advice to a protégé looking to follow in his steps at court:  “Remember well the great trust you have undertaken; you are as a continual sentinel, always to stand upon your watch to give [the king] true intelligence.  If you flatter him, you betray him.”  Remember that.  If you flatter him, you betray him.

In Marshall's case, he was able to forge a bond of trust with Roosevelt not only because his civilian boss could count on his candor, because once a decision was made, FDR could also count on Marshall to do his utmost to carry out a policy – even if he disagreed with it – and make it work.  This is important because the two men clashed time and again in the years that followed, ranging from yet more matters of war production to whether the allies should defer an invasion on the mainland of Europe.

http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4214

Excerpt:

Let me illustrate using a historical exemplar, the late Air Force Colonel John Boyd.  As a 30-year-old Captain, he rewrote the manual for air-to-air combat.  Boyd and the reformers he inspired would later go on to design and advocate for the F-16 and the A-10.   

After retiring, he would develop the principles of maneuver warfare that were credited by a former Marine Corps commandant and a secretary of Defense for the lightning victory in the first Gulf War.   

Boyd's contributions will resonate today.  Many of you have studied the concept he developed called the OODA loop, and I understand there's an “OODA Loop” street here at Maxwell, near the B-52. 

But in accomplishing all these things, Boyd, who was a brilliant, eccentric and stubborn character, had to overcome a large measure of bureaucratic resistance and institutional hostility.   

He had some advice that he used to pass on to his colleagues and subordinates that is worth sharing with you.  Boyd would say -- and I quote -- "One day you will take a fork in the road, and you're going to have to make a decision about which direction you want to go.  If you go one way, you can be somebody.  You will have to make compromises, and you will have to turn your back on your friends.  But you will be a member of the club, and you will get promoted and get good assignments.  Or you can go the other way, and you can do something, something for your country and for your Air Force and for yourself.  If you decide to do something, you may not get promoted, and you may not get good assignments, and you certainly will not be a favorite of your superiors, but you won't have to compromise yourself.  To be somebody or to do something.  In life there is often a roll call.  That's when you have to make a decision:  to be or to do."

***

As you graduate from your respective courses and leave Maxwell, you too will eventually face Boyd's proverbial fork in the road.  And you will have to choose to do something or to be someone.   

For the good of the Air Force, for the good of the armed services and for the good of our country, I urge you to reject convention and careerism, and to make decisions that will carry you closer toward rather than further from the officer you want to be and the thinker who advances airpower strategy and meeting the complex challenges to our national security.

If our civil servants (and even some military officers caught up in careerism) are more concerned with 'being someone' than with 'doing something', in Gates' terms, then I'd suggest we need to recruit more character and implement an organizational culture that shifts value to those who put service above self.

But that will be one hell of a long process...
 
The essence, the very centre of the modern public service is 450 years old. It is found in Elizabeth I’s charge to William Cecil:

"This judgment I have of you, that you will not be corrupted by any manner of gift and that you will be faithful to the State and that, without respect of my private will, you will give me that counsel which you think best."

It is confirmed in a letter he (then Lord Burghley) wrote to her, during one of their periodic disagreements on matters of policy, saying:

"I do hold and will always, this course in such matters as I differ from her Majesty, as long as I may be allowed to give advice, I will not change my opinion by affirming the contrary, for that were to offend God, to whom I am sworn first; but as a servant I will obey her Majesty's commandment, and no wise contrary the same."

There it is: the sovereign (by which we now understand to be the personification of ourselves, the People of Canada) must be able to trust her (our) civil servants and, therefore, to trust in the quality of the advice they offer. The civil service may disagree with the crown – the cabinet, today – and when (not if) it does it must be allowed to render its best advice before getting on with implementing the cabinet’s decisions. This is the essence of “speaking truth to power” and our system of government and public administration relies upon it.
 
However the key thing in today's public service, as Colin P. pointed out above, is to be above all a "team player".  In other words stfu when it's been made pretty clear which way the wind is blowing.

Mark
Ottawa
 
On a more personal note, I had the honour of serving under BGen Hillier in the mid 90's (2CMBG).  When he took over the Brigade, he held a one on one with our unit. We had been through a terrible 3 years and were the horror story of 2CMBG.  He spoke frankly and honestly (within 5 seconds into his off the cuff speech we were ready to follow him storming the gates of hell) in a manner that one could not help but respect.  The CF will suffer with  his loss.
*** for a free double/double *** can anyone guess what unit I was with?? First correct gets a toonie in the mail
 
armyguy62 said:
On a more personal note, I had the honour of serving under BGen Hillier in the mid 90's (2CMBG).  When he took over the Brigade, he held a one on one with our unit. We had been through a terrible 3 years and were the horror story of 2CMBG.  He spoke frankly and honestly (within 5 seconds into his off the cuff speech we were ready to follow him storming the gates of hell) in a manner that one could not help but respect.   The CF will suffer with  his loss.
*** for a free double/double *** can anyone guess what unit I was with?? First correct gets a toonie in the mail

2 CMBG HQ & Sigs?
1 RCR?
2 RCR?
2 RCHA?

You never said how many guess's  ;D (not that I need the coffee anyways)
 
Mark:

What is the difference between "stfu when it's been made pretty clear which way the wind is blowing" and a section commander, after taking questions at the end of an O-Group and hearing objections saying: "Right.  Carry on with the plan as briefed."?

A time and a place for everything.

And while I dispute the continuity of the impartial Civil Service that Edward cites I don't dispute that the instincts of both Elizabeth and Burghley were key in creating a successful government and have been key to all successful governments before and after.  And that includes not just Civil governments but all institutions including those that are Commercial and Military.

Dissent before the decision is required.  Dissent after the decision is intolerable.

 
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