Top soldier hopes Forces can reduce overhead, increase efficiency

[Matt_Fisher]

Add in a Div (on the Army side) to command all of the Militia Brigades, and a re-invented DCDS that provides nowt more than overwatch and short hallway functions to CDS, I think that you are onto something very close to what the current Chief of Transformation wrote in his 1999 AMSC paper (which has disappeared from the net...)

Why add a layer of reserve leadership when the primary mission of the reserves is to provide individual augmentation to regular force units, usually within the same land force area. 

Why not have the reserve brigade groups brought into the fold of a reg force brigade group? That way you establish habitual relationships with the reg f units which the reservists are to be augmenting and working with for expeditionary and domestic operations.

 

[PPCLI Guy]

Span of Control

 

[Infanteer]

Why add a layer of reserve leadership when the primary mission of the reserves is to provide individual augmentation to regular force units, usually within the same land force area. 

Why not have the reserve brigade groups brought into the fold of a reg force brigade group? That way you establish habitual relationships with the reg f units which the reservists are to be augmenting and working with for expeditionary and domestic operations.

The last thing Commander 1 CMBG wants to do is take a trip out to Doolittle, Nowhere to see how his Fusiliers are doing.

It ain't adding a layer of leadership if you do away with Areas - roll 4 Areas into 2 Divs and push the support part of the Areas to the ASGs.

 

[Journeyman]

.... if over 50% of your occupation strength is in NDHQ, perhaps those functions are not core military..

Oh, you are so going to hell  op:

 

[dapaterson]

Oh, you are so going to hell  op:

Can you save me a good seat?

 

[Journeyman]

Oh, you are so going to hell 

Can you save me a good seat?

Sure. I know people  ;D

 

[daftandbarmy]

PS.  Much of the characteristics that PPCLI Guy mentioned seem very similar to the idea of the USMC MAGTF.  However, MAGTFs - MEUs, MEBs, and MEFs - are separate structures from the Marine Divisions and take command of them or their components when deployed on expeditionary operations.  I'm not sure we want (can sustain) HQs independant of field forces that are maintained simply for command and control?

Now you're talking. Create a Canadian Marine Corps, or something like that, and roll in the Navy and Airforce under one 4 star commander. Heck, the whole CF is already smaller than the USMC, so why should that be so hard? All joint, all the time!

 

[Osotogari]

If anyone's looking at efficiency, they should go through all the headquarters first and cut all the redundancy then, as stated previously, find out how much is being wasted re-furbishing rusted out equipment vs replacing it outright.  They're spending dollars to save dimes. 

There's also no doubt, in my repeatedly concussed brain, that now that the reserve force has proven its worth AGAIN in this current round of operations, that the focus on dismantling the regimental system will continue from where it left off on September 10, 2001 if for no other reason than to smack us back down.  Imagine all the HD flatscreen monitors they'll be able to buy for NDHQ with the all money saved from firing a half-dozen Class A commanding officers in each CBG. 

 

[Mountie]

The American's aren't moving away from Divisions at all - Divisions are still the primary large-scale tactical unit in their arsenal  and they currently have 3(?) in Iraq and 2 in Afghanistan.  The movement towards Brigade Combat Teams was an effort to push combat support/combat service support slices commonly found in US Doctrine at the Divisional level down to the Brigades to make them more independant; infact, if anything, this mirrors the Canadian practice of very robust Brigades.

I do agree with what PPCLI is getting at - we need a deployable, scalable structure.  In my view, the HQ should do three things:
1.  Provide a Division HQ for the 3 Reg Force Brigades, thus eliminating the need for the 4 Area Commands;
2.  Should train and be able to deploy as the Div Command for the 3 CMBGs in the event of a major regional contingency; and
3.  Should be able to provide, in conjunction with the CMBGs, the manning for expeditionary task force HQs.  Having this HQ will allow Task Forces to be fielded without completely depleting the CMBGs which usually still have at least half a brigade to run at home.  As well, it will allow the Div Command to work as a team so that, in the event that we are given such a command (as has happned in the past) we don't have to build from scratch.

I like calling it 1 Can Div not because it should mirror the old one, but because I'm nostalgic.

I think you hit the nail right on the head.

 

[Matt_Fisher]

Now you're talking. Create a Canadian Marine Corps, or something like that, and roll in the Navy and Airforce under one 4 star commander. Heck, the whole CF is already smaller than the USMC, so why should that be so hard? All joint, all the time!

Your name isn't Paul Hellyer per chance is it? 

 

[TimBit]

Now you're talking. Create a Canadian Marine Corps, or something like that, and roll in the Navy and Airforce under one 4 star commander. Heck, the whole CF is already smaller than the USMC, so why should that be so hard? All joint, all the time!

That would be a very land-centric architecture which doesn't equate well with our coastlines or northern air sovereignty concerns. The USMC and the RM's are designed as quick-deployment shock operations forces. That does not condition any knowledge or understanding of more "static" missions belonging to the AF and the Navy such as sovereignty patrols, air defence, fish pats, and so on. I doubt you would see the US recommend that Air Defence or Routine coastal ops be assigned to air or naval units belonging to the USMC.

 

[Edward Campbell]

I’m another who wants the CF to be joint, top to (nearly) bottom.

I favour fewer but larger HQs with minimum crossing of lines. For me, that means regional joint command which own and operate pretty much everything in their areas (there are few exceptions, like SOF units and CSE, but even they can be administratively supported by their ‘parent’ areas even as they receive operational direction from others in Ottawa): joint (naval/air and land/air and, maybe, eventually, even naval/land/air) task forces, reserve forces (formations and units) and support forces.

There would, of necessity be room for a few functional exceptions: Canadian NORAD Region and even a deployable, operational formation HQ. (1 Cdn Div, anyone?)

I would envisions units that are, currently, national, like AETE in Cold Lake, and the CFSDs, being owned and operated by Commander Xxxx Command. Even RMC would be owned and operated by its regional commander. Guidance, on a wide variety of issues – operational, professional, administrative and so on, would flow to the regional commanders from the CDS’ minions in a big, integrated HQ in Ottawa. The regional commands would also have big, integrated HQs being able to generate and employ forces (in domestic operations) and to support all forces in the region.

Some C2 overhead is necessary. I have no idea if we have too many staff officers in too many HQs but I am sure that clarity and simplicity (minimum overlaps of authority and responsibility) are essential elements of any C2 system.

I still see a need for professional heads of service (CMS, CLS, CAS) in Ottawa to lead on matters of doctrine, equipment and training and, perhaps, personnel.

I envision NDHQ as having several 'components:'

• The Joint Staff - planning and managing operations;

• The Defence Staff - managing DND and the CF on a day-by-day basis;

• The Departmental Staff - making policy and managing resources;

• The Service Staffs - as described above; and

• So on.

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

Now you're talking. Create a Canadian Marine Corps, or something like that, and roll in the Navy and Airforce under one 4 star commander. Heck, the whole CF is already smaller than the USMC, so why should that be so hard? All joint, all the time!

I hate to burst your bubble, but in the US, the Marine Corps answers to the Navy - not the other way around. The Commandant is a Marine general that is himself under the Chief of Naval Operations, an admiral. Considering that our navy is smaller than either the air force or the army, I very much doubt that putting everyone under the command of an admiral would go down well with the generals .

As to the ways to both "degrease" headquarters and save money, here is an easy solution (which I have offered before): De-link the military and civilian "pay-and-grade" scales that was imposed on us during the years of "civilianization" of the military under unification. Then, you can give officers in HQ's the appropriate ranks.

For instance (and I may become a traitor here to my navy), with the small flotillas we maintain on each coast, a Commodore would be sufficient rank for each coast's command, which would make CMS' rank that of rear-admiral. Similar downgrades would be appropriate for the other elements too. This would then permit us to cap the "specialist" top dogs to a reasonable rank (considering how few people they  "lead", why do we need general ranked officers as top JAG, Padre, Surgeon or Provost Marshall ???), say as four ringers max , better as three ringers in some cases.

 

 

[Infanteer]

I hate to burst your bubble, but in the US, the Marine Corps answers to the Navy - not the other way around. The Commandant is a Marine general that is himself under the Chief of Naval Operations, an admiral. Considering that our navy is smaller than either the air force or the army, I very much doubt that putting everyone under the command of an admiral would go down well with the generals

Incorrect.  The United States Marine Corps and the United States Navy are two services in the Department of the Navy - they both answer to the same boss - the Secretary of the Navy (and operationally to the CJCS, but I'm not sure of the legal details of that relationship).

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

I only have one question for you ERC: How do you geographically organize the world?

Yes, because the Navy does not operate in Canada. Our mission of protection of Canada's national interests means that the whole planet is our  OPAREA. And we do not split it by geography: The mission in the gulf of eden/somalia coast, for instance, can see a ship from either the West coast or the East coast fleet fulfill it. Also,  every time we slip the lines, we fall under a complex structure of NATO, SEATO oceanic areas of responsibilities and automatically integrate into the current joint CANUS structure for maritime defence of North America, which predates NORAD, by the way.

As a result, most of what the Navy does is neither area-centric nor joint. What you propose would either not work for these naval tasks or impose on admirals duties with regards to the army and air forces that they have little training or knowledge to carry out. Learning the naval trade is more than sufficiently demanding to preclude the simultaneous learning of land and air operations. 

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

You are partly correct Infanteer. My mistake on who answers to whom: they both do answer to the Secretary of the Navy. However, you are incorrect on the CJCS. He has no operational authority over any of the three departments (Navy, Army or Airforce). The CJCS job is co-ordination but he is not an operational commander. Each of the departments retains its operational independence. 

 

[Edward Campbell]

I only have one question for you ERC: How do you geographically organize the world?

Yes, because the Navy does not operate in Canada. Our mission of protection of Canada's national interests means that the whole planet is our  OPAREA. And we do not split it by geography: The mission in the gulf of eden/somalia coast, for instance, can see a ship from either the West coast or the East coast fleet fulfill it. Also,  every time we slip the lines, we fall under a complex structure of NATO, SEATO oceanic areas of responsibilities and automatically integrate into the current joint CANUS structure for maritime defence of North America, which predates NORAD, by the way.

As a result, most of what the Navy does is neither area-centric nor joint. What you propose would either not work for these naval tasks or impose on admirals duties with regards to the army and air forces that they have little training or knowledge to carry out. Learning the naval trade is more than sufficiently demanding to preclude the simultaneous learning of land and air operations.

I think we can have regional commands in Canada that generate forces for operations and conduct domestic operations within their regions. Now as to who conducts the overseas or combined (multinational) operations: maybe NDHQ/Joint Staff, maybe designated commanders, maybe even regional commanders, themselves, sometimes. Other nations do it; are they that managerially superior to us? Most of the US ships in any CANUS operation 'belong' to a US unified command: CINCLANT, CINCPAC, etc.

With regard to you other point re: ranks. I wholeheartedly agree.

 

[Journeyman]

... a complex structure of NATO, SEATO oceanic areas of responsibilities...

Well, only because today seems to be nitpicking day.....SEATO hasn't existed since 1977.

Other than that, I've got nothing. 

 

[TimBit]

Interesting idea here on lowering ranks of positions here at NDHQ. While it certainly could and perhaps should be done, I see two interesting bumps along that road:
1. Pay rates were locked in comparison with civilian's pay based on equivalent tasks. Therefore it was assessed, at the time, that a say a Colonel was doing the equivalent job to an EX1 and therefore the salary is the same plus 8% military factor. Now in jobs that are alternately occupied by civvies and military persons (there are some), that means that if the job can be occupied by an EX1 therefore it should be occupied by someone with an equivalent wage. If we lower the posn to LCol, then one of two things happen: we bump up the whole pay structure to equate with PS ranks, or we lower the civvy classification of the job. I don't think that last one would fly.
2. The whole career structure of officers would have to be reviewed. Are you ready, as a LCol, possibly pre-command, to become a director at NDHQ? I don't think so. Many Captains are not even posted to NDHQ but rather go to regional HQ's or sometimesbrigade level duties for staff jobs. Then Majors might get a junior job here in policy or something along those lines. That means very few officers are actually ready to lead a mixed civvy-military directorate in policy, force development, programs, and so on. Lowering jobs by one rank would probably entail more staff exposure before DP4.

Any thoughts?

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

Oh! Timbit, don't get me started.

Your post emphasizes all that is WRONG with the current system. Where to start?

Posts "alternatively occupied by civvies and military": Why do they exist? Either a post exist to fulfil a military purpose, in which case it is to be manned by a uniformed member, or it fulfils a civilian oversight of the military purpose, in which case it ought to be manned by a civil servant at all time. In the first instance, the soldier reports to the CDS, not a civilian, in the later case, the civil servant reports to the Deputy-Minister.

"Pay rates were locked in comparison with civilian's pay": Read my original post: That is exactly the "de-locking" I talk about: It serves no specific military purpose. Have a military pay scale that has nothing to do with the civilian one (I am not aware of other nations where they lock one to the other, but I may  be wrong here), then let uniformed personnel fulfill their task at whatever rank they happen to have  as long as they are capable of the job. I, for one, could not care less about my rank when carrying my job as a ship driver: Be it Lt, Lcdr or Cdr, I would do the job and be happy to do it.

"The whole career structure of officers ...": YES! The purpose of a military is to FIGHT, not to provide career progression. If a  lieutenant is doing a good job but does not possess the qualities required for promotion to next rank: let him be. Find a way to use his good skills as a LT.

"Are you ready, as a LCol, ... , to become a director": Yes. Why not? Even as a Major or, dare I say it a Captain. It is not the rank that makes the director, its the intellectual capacity as a staff officer and the amount of higher level of strategy and military management (in the noble sense of the term) knowledge. Some general officers do not possess it while some lowly ranked officers do. There is a way to develop it and identify it quickly: A continental european style General Staff: identify early on the officers with the intellectual abilities for HQ staff work and advance them quickly through junior command tours and advanced schooling in military affairs (grand strategy, plans, intelligence, etc.) so they may fill these HQ "elated" positions as staff  and senior staff and become the collective repository of military professional knowledge and national  defence plans.

I will confess here that I am a follower of Major John Hasek.