Training for a war vs training for this war (Split from: Airborne Infantry vs Armoured Recce)

[Infanteer]

We train for 'a' war. Not for 'the' war.

I love this one.

What's the difference?

 

[McG]

I love this one.

What's the difference?

It is a fairly common expression though it might be more appropriate/accutate to state "we train for wars, not just this war."
If we limit ourselves to only training (& developing our forces) for "this war" we might fool ourselves into believing that Anti-Armour Platoons and Air Defence are unessential; we might divest ourselves of capabilities that are essential, or forget skills which are difficult to re-learn.  It is the sort of thing that leads to troops entering a new theatre and complaining that too many mind-sets & equipment is based on the last theatre (like the designed for Bosnia TacVest in Afghanistan).

 

[Kiwi99]

Lets also remember that the last theater may have been the training area in wainwright, or the Infantry school in Gagetown. 

 

[McG]

I believe in the train for wars, not just this war philosophy (except on the road to high readiness).  The above post raises a good point though -> I don't know that we are really that good at putting the philosophy into practice.

Quite often the "core" or "base-line" training looks like NATO vs Warsaw, or Bosnia.  Every battalion, regiment, school & training centre seems to have a generic senario that it feels comfortable with employes across most/all training.  Rarely (if ever) do we introduce a new threat model for every exercise and force our leaders to start from doctrind & first principles to select right tactics & procedures for the fight.

Do we effectively train this anywhere?  Teaching leaders at all levels to understand why doctrine/TTPs call on us to do things one way vs another?  Teaching leaders at all levels how to pre-emplively modify doctrine/TTPs to the theatre, threat & missions?

If the enemy force in Wainwright is always the same, then we really are not training to fight any war - we are training to fight the Wainwright war.

 

[Fishbone Jones]

It is a fairly common expression though it might be more appropriate/accutate to state "we train for wars, not just this war."
If we limit ourselves to only training (& developing our forces) for "this war" we might fool ourselves into believing that Anti-Armour Platoons and Air Defence are unessential; we might divest ourselves of capabilities that are essential, or forget skills which are difficult to re-learn.  It is the sort of thing that leads to troops entering a new theatre and complaining that too many mind-sets & equipment is based on the last theatre (like the designed for Bosnia TacVest in Afghanistan).

Thank you MCG. In a nutshell.

 

[SeanNewman]

MCG I think you're bang on with your separating of this war vs the war.

Not just the enablers you mentioned but flat out warfare in general.  Things like living out of your ruck for weeks on end or tanks using the ground properly because if they don't they'll get destroyed are only from my knowledge getting practiced on the earlier courses now.

The OpFor we've been using for the last little while isn't too bad because it has conventional warfare elements like the 1 PGD but also terrorist/insurgent groups like the VFFA so scenarios can be molded accordingly when required.

What I think we need is a universal training method that trains the three block warrior concept because that way we can be flexible.  One thing I don't like to see is the mindset of "We train for 100% all out combat because you can always scale back and you're ready for anything", because that makes for disaster in COIN, even though an aggressive posture may help in peacekeeping in terms of separating other factions.

In your opinion, where else would one deliver this training?  You have your schools teaching early on, and then you have Wainwright teaching units going out the door the most up-to-date relevant skills they'll need for the "now" theatre, but where else?

 

[s23256]

Agree with MCG

From my experience it's the lack of focus on basic soldier skills in the preliminary/continuation stages of trainging in order to focus on current operations.  e.g. cutting out conventional fighting patrols to spend time on COIN/PSO tasks

Obviously there needs to be a balance struck, spending all of your training time on practicing the assault of an eastern bloc trench system is clearly inefficicent.

My personal opinion, focus general trg on basic soldier skills with a bit of lean forward towards the COE but keep it general until the next tour is confirmed.

 

[SeanNewman]

FWIW, the new DP3A will see a return to basic small party leadership instead of a small arms course.

You'll now have Sgts getting promoted who have been assessed as leaders in "the war" like scenarios much more recently than PLQ Mod 6.

 

[Fishbone Jones]

FWIW, the new DP3A will see a return to basic small party leadership instead of a small arms course.

You'll now have Sgts getting promoted who have been assessed as leaders in "the war" like scenarios much more recently than PLQ Mod 6.

Yet they don't know how to light a Coleman stove or lantern : Or what a hexamine stove and tablets are.

 

[the 48th regulator]

We train for 'a' war. Not for 'the' war.

I love this one.

What's the difference?

Finally a statement that makes sense.  Just like all wars that Canadians have battled, we must remind our selves that we had a military before 2001...


Kudos Recceguy.

dileas

tess

 

[Infanteer]

So, the difference between "a" war and "the" war is whether or not TOW missiles get employed?

Battle group validation was, IIRC, done with armoured assaults covered by artillery and aviation.  How much closer to "a" war can one get.  Or does one need an armoured counter-attack to shake out the Afghan cobwebs?

 

[REDinstaller]

Yet they don't know how to light a Coleman stove or lantern : Or what a hexamine stove and tablets are.

And this is the reason my Regiment is starting to run IBTS training again. Podium proved that the basic skills of many soldiers is not upto what it should be.

 

[Michael OLeary]

So, the difference between "a" war and "the" war is whether or not TOW missiles get employed?

Battle group validation was, IIRC, done with armoured assaults covered by artillery and aviation.  How much closer to "a" war can one get.  Or does one need an armoured counter-attack to shake out the Afghan cobwebs?

Actually, we probably want to be very careful not to simply try and replace current operational training with a return to some form of old-school two-up-bags-of-smoke assaults. As much as we needed to (and did) break the "this is how it was done in Germany" mindset, we now have to work at making sure it is not replaced by a dominant "this is how we did it in Afghanistan" mindset. The key is making sure that soldiers, whose entire career has been Afghanistan focused, are ready to put their many skills and talents to any potential future theatre or operation, which may bear little resemblance to the terrain and actions of their personal experiences (or of those who prepared to dig in at the Fulda Gap).

 

[McG]

So, the difference between "a" war and "the" war is whether or not TOW missiles get employed?

No.  It is about all the skills and capabilities not relevant (or maybe just less relevant) to this war but that we know are relevant to war.  This includes the ability to fight an enemy with mechanized capabilities, CBRN weapons, offensive air assets, SOF, some combination of this, and maybe all of this.  "A war" includes fighting in places that may require assault bridging or major crossing operations.  "A war" might be a counter insurgency against a threat closer to what the Russians fought in Chechnya or what the British have been guarding against in North Ireland.

In the past, we have become focused on "the war" or "the mission."  We did things like abolish mortar, pioneer and anti-armour platoons because we were not using them so clearly they were surplus capabilities.  Our training showed us that tanks, armoured engineer vehicles, and self-propelled artillery were not necessary.  The Army let its EOD capacity atrophy to near nonexistent, and it took one hell of an effort to grow that back when we found ourselves in a war that needed the capability.  Now, our current mission and training for "the war" are teaching us that AVLB are unnecessary - That decision is made and we are stuck with it for whatever comes next. 

The much maligned TacVest was designed for "the mission" and it seemed to work in training that also focused on "the mission."

What are we allowing to atrophy now that might be needed for the next war?  Air Defence?  Combat Diving?  Parachuting?  Bridging?  Arctic Field Craft?  Joint Ops with the Navy? 

What about operating in a theatre with an air threat?  There are plenty of little bits in the way we should do business for all-arms air defence, for concealment from air, for deception, etc.  None of that is or need be trained for "this war" but how much skill loss is occurring?  Would we be ready to fight insurgents with a moderate UAV airforce or a conventional military able to establish periods of its own air superiority?  Will we get the drills & practices right before being punished with a lot of casualties?

What equipment might we be procuring that won't be suited to another theatre than Afghanistan?  How will we recognize the deficiencies of this kit if our training blinders have caused us to forget all those other requirements.

If we train for "the war" we might get the "80% solution" for 80% of the force.  However, we are getting the "95% solution" across the force when we keep our core & baseline training broader focused on "a war."  "The war" is certainly a war that may be included in the spectrum of wars we train for in "a war," and "the war" must be the sole focus of road to high readiness.

Michael O'Leary has it exactly right.

 

[SeanNewman]

Yet they don't know how to light a Coleman stove or lantern : Or what a hexamine stove and tablets are.

You're talking about MCpls and Sgts, you know (?)

DP3 = MCpl to Sgt course.  Are you seeing "3" and thinking the old QL3 level?

 

[Infanteer]

No.  It is about all the skills and capabilities not relevant (or maybe just less relevant) to this war but that we know are relevant to war.  This includes the ability to fight an enemy with mechanized capabilities, CBRN weapons, offensive air assets, SOF, some combination of this, and maybe all of this.  "A war" includes fighting in places that may require assault bridging or major crossing operations.  "A war" might be a counter insurgency against a threat closer to what the Russians fought in Chechnya or what the British have been guarding against in North Ireland.

In the past, we have become focused on "the war" or "the mission."  We did things like abolish mortar, pioneer and anti-armour platoons because we were not using them so clearly they were surplus capabilities.  Our training showed us that tanks, armoured engineer vehicles, and self-propelled artillery were not necessary.  The Army let its EOD capacity atrophy to near nonexistent, and it took one hell of an effort to grow that back when we found ourselves in a war that needed the capability.  Now, our current mission and training for "the war" are teaching us that AVLB are unnecessary - That decision is made and we are stuck with it for whatever comes next.

Infantry Combat Support Platoons were done away with (or planned to be) well before Bosnia ended.  I'm willing to bet dollars to donuts that it was a decision based upon fiscal/manpower considerations as opposed to conceptions of what future conflict would look like.  The plan to axe the Third Battalions falls into the same folder.  Denuding the Army of heavy armour and having the artillery on life support is buying into bad theory and believing crystal balls exist - I'm still impressed with how General Hillier got away with that 180 degree turn.

As for all the assets you mentioned (CBRN/Air/Avn/Armoured/SOF) they are assets that, largely, all conventional military forces possess.  So fighting them would be just plain old "war".  As well, these are (nuclear holocaust aside) niche roles of a conventional army and to operate without them still covers a large percentage of relevant military "stuff".  So even if you cut them out to focus your efforts on a dispersed, light infantry force, you'd still be covering most of the aspects of "war".  Remember, for a troop in the back of a vehicle, even a Division Offensive is still just a section attack.  When we get to bigger picture stuff, sure - a difference exists (its nice for plans guys when they can throw the enemy aviation element out and whoever heard of a counter-moves force?).  However, if we are confusing what are essentially police actions over the last 10 years as "war" then perhaps we are simply reading a little too heavily into DLR's latest comic book.  You're either practicing for wars or small wars (police actions/counter-insurgency/pacification/peace-making/whateveryouwanttocallit) or, smartly, both.  Even with the rapid turnaround of pers and units in today's managed readiness, there is enough time and resources to rehearse the concepts and even fight some battles against an opposing military force (as opposed to a band of guerrillas).  Failing to do so to dedicate focus on Three-Block-War nause (a rehash of basic soldiering skills followed by some civic action) is, in my opinion, simply a lack of originality in training.

So, in essence I don't buy the "a" war/"the" war dichotomy as a useful though model for training/resource planning.  It's war and all the other stuff.  If you don't plan for both - like failing to teach soldiers about hextabs and Coleman stoves - then you ain't doing yourself any favours.

 

[McG]

Infantry Combat Support Platoons were done away with (or planned to be) well before Bosnia ended.  I'm willing to bet dollars to donuts that it was a decision based upon fiscal/manpower considerations as opposed to conceptions of what future conflict would look like.

It was a fiscal/manpower decision which was drenched in "this war"-itis.  I listened to the CLS of the time give a speech in London ON.  He stated that there were nine AAP in the Land Force but only one section deploying on every FRY tour - therefore, it was evident that the Army would only ever need three AAP.  You are absolutely right that the decision was not based on a concept of future conflict -> the decision did not look any farther than the current mission ("this war").

As for all the assets you mentioned (CBRN/Air/Avn/Armoured/SOF) they are assets that, largely, all conventional military forces possess.  So fighting them would be just plain old "war".

Those are all legitimate threats that we may find ourselves fighting as early as in the next five years.  Modern wars typically do not come with significant advance notice.  At the same time, nothing prevents the possibility of these same threats facing us in an insurgency.  Chechens had limited mechanized capabilities.  Hezbollah has fought with a small UAV airforce.  We cannot brush these threats away as "old war" because these threats are still there.

Remember, for a troop in the back of a vehicle, even a Division Offensive is still just a section attack. 

So, maybe it is all the same for the infantryman in the back of a section carrier.  For the vast majority of the enablers from combat team beyond battle group, there can be significant differences in approach as the threat and environment change.  Even for the OC & CSM - there is change as the threat and environment change.  In Afghanistan & training for Afghanistan, every hide, harbour and league can completely ignore procedures and layouts intended to protect against air threats.  However, every now and again, our training (when not on the road to high readiness) needs to include that air threat if only so the next generation of leaders sees & learns what to do when we next face that threat.

You're either practicing for wars or small wars (police actions/counterinsurgency/pacification/peace-making/whateveryouwanttocallit) or, smartly, both.  Even with the rapid turnaround of pers and units in today's managed readiness, there is enough time and resources to rehearse the concepts and even fight some battles against an opposing military force (as opposed to a band of guerrillas).  Failing to do so to dedicate focus on Three-Block-War nause (a rehash of basic soldiering skills followed by some civic action) is, in my opinion, simply a lack of originality in training.

So, in essence I don't buy the "a" war/"the" war dichotomy as a useful though model for training/resource planning.  It's war and all the other stuff.  If you don't plan for both - like failing to teach soldiers about hextabs and Coleman stoves - then you ain't doing yourself any favours.

Here I wonder if we are not arguing the same thing from opposite directions.  We must train for war.  We cannot be overly focused on this war, that war or the next.  We also cannot exclude any of the aforementioned.

Perhaps, if you don't like "a war" and "this war" dichotomy, you would be happier with the concept of broad baseline training and focused mission specific training.

 

[Infanteer]

Bosnia wasn't a war for us, so whomever was making estimates of a war based off of SFOR was stupid.  I wouldn't call that "this war-itis", I'd call it stupidity (or a lame excuse for cuts that had to be made).

We cannot brush these threats away as "old war" because these threats are still there.

I said plain old "war", not plain "old war" - the distinction is important.

Here I wonder if we are not arguing the same thing from opposite directions.  We must train for war.  We cannot be overly focused on this war, that war or the next.  We also cannot exclude any of the aforementioned.

Perhaps, if you don't like "a war" and "this war" dichotomy, you would be happier with the concept of broad baseline training and focused mission specific training.

I think you're right on this one.  To me there is good training and time wasted.  Some things may be left out based upon a commander's risk analysis, but they should never be discounted from general training (which should take place before TMST).

 

[pbi]

  Some things may be left out based upon a commander's risk analysis, but they should never be discounted from general training (which should take place before TMST).

Or, as I believe the UK refers to it as "adaptive foundation training". (I think we used to use the term MLOC "Minimum Level of Capability" ) For a small army with a limited budget but a potentially huge list of possible engagements across the spectrum of conflict, we haven't got much choice but to build a good basic core skill toolbox, keep the non-core skills alive and on the radar screen somehow (if only in a reduced state), and use TMST to focus, sharpen or add whatever the theatre demands.

Soldiers, units and formations equipped with a good "toolbox" can (IMHO) adapt to almost anything, given some time and good leadership. (Our own experience should tell us that much). I fear that "niche-ism" or overspecialization, or irresponsible shearing away of core skillsets, woulld cripple this ability.

Cheers