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US Navy to be big budget winner as PRC the main enemy, er adversary?
Mark
Ottawa
Mark
Ottawa
US Navy Woes
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FJAG
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It will be interesting to see if the Army will rely on the depth it has in it's National Guard and Reserve formations and cut back some of it's Active Army strength or whether the ARNG and Reserve side will bear the brunt.
With some 472,000 Active Army and 250,000 full time civilians, there's a lot of $s tied up in full time paycheques. There's some very critical new equipment in the pipeline (but also some expensive stuff that feels more discretionary - I'm talking about you Next Gen Combat vehicle and Future Vertical Lift)
:cheers:
With some 472,000 Active Army and 250,000 full time civilians, there's a lot of $s tied up in full time paycheques. There's some very critical new equipment in the pipeline (but also some expensive stuff that feels more discretionary - I'm talking about you Next Gen Combat vehicle and Future Vertical Lift)
:cheers:
The USAF is experiencing all-time high retention right now, and is considering shuffling some of the troops to the NG and reserve units. While Covid is no doubt playing a factor, maybe we should take a look to see if there is anything we can learn from them.
**Sorry to hijack the thread - this issue had come up in a different article related to the same topic here**
Very expensive programs that seem to be discretionary, yes. But that being said, how much of a game changer would a Raider be compared to an Apache? Worth the financial investment right now?
Or would that money be better put towards a 3rd shipyard producing subs, perhaps a modified version of the Virginia class as their new SSBN instead of a whole new design, amongst other 'Navy' things?
**Sorry to hijack the thread - this issue had come up in a different article related to the same topic here**
Very expensive programs that seem to be discretionary, yes. But that being said, how much of a game changer would a Raider be compared to an Apache? Worth the financial investment right now?
Or would that money be better put towards a 3rd shipyard producing subs, perhaps a modified version of the Virginia class as their new SSBN instead of a whole new design, amongst other 'Navy' things?
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MarkOttawa said:
US Navy, Marines, Coast Guard and whole lot of complicated planning to take on PRC/PLA Navy:
1) New U.S. Maritime Strategy Sets Sights on China
https://news.usni.org/2020/12/17/new-u-s-maritime-strategy-sets-sights-on-china
2) What’s the role of Marine infantry in the new strategy to fight China? The Corps is still trying to figure it out
https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-marine-corps/2020/12/17/whats-the-role-of-marine-infantry-in-the-new-strategy-to-fight-china-the-corps-is-still-trying-to-figure-it-out/
3) Japan's Potential Contributions in an East China Sea Contingency
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA314-1.html
Mark
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Start and conclusion of worried article at War on the Rocks:
Mark
Ottawa
Gradually and Then Suddenly: Explaining the Navy’s Strategic Bankruptcy
Christopher Dougherty
How did you go bankrupt?” Bill asked. “Two ways,” Mike said. “Gradually and then suddenly.”
– Ernest Hemingway, The Sun Also Rises
The U.S. Navy is on the verge of strategic bankruptcy. Its fleet isn’t large enough to meet global day-to-day demands for naval forces. Due to repeated deployments and maintenance backlogs, the fleet also isn’t ready enough to meet these demands safely, nor can it quickly surge in an emergency. Finally, the fleet isn’t capable enough to meet the challenges posed by China’s increasingly modern and aggressive People’s Liberation Army Navy. How did this happen to a force that, as recently as two decades ago, dominated the world’s oceans to a degree perhaps unequalled in human history? The answer is gradually and then suddenly...
The Heart of the Matter
A series of decisions (and indecisions) decades in the making have backed the Navy into a budget and force-planning corner. Even if the Navy were to receive a larger share of the defense budget — which Herzinger and others suggest — there simply is no way to build a bigger fleet quickly, and any attempt to do so might burden the Navy with ships of limited utility in the long-term strategic competition with China. While perhaps unsatisfying, the Navy’s 2022 budget request is a product of these constraints. It prioritizes the ballistic missile submarines, munitions, auxiliary ships, and mature combatant designs, and divests older or less-capable ships. At the same time, the budget attempts to rebuild readiness (again) and invest in research and development to accelerate next-generation capabilities like unmanned surface and undersea vessels. It doesn’t rapidly grow the fleet for the same reasons that no budget request has rapidly grown the fleet in decades: There is no widespread agreement on why the fleet should grow; or how it should grow; and the underlying ideas, designs, and infrastructure needed for rapid growth have all withered.
The problems facing the Navy weren’t created in a single budget, and they won’t be fixed in a single budget. To get the Navy out of its force-planning doldrums, the next National Defense Strategy should clarify its assessment of the China challenge and serve as a forcing function to create a shared vision of the future Navy. The 2018 defense strategy tried to prioritize modernizing the Navy to deter future war with China over building near-term fleet capacity to supply ships to service geographic combatant command requests for forward forces. This prioritization got lost in implementation, as “Dynamic Force Employment” became shorthand for running the Navy ragged with repeated deployments, often to tertiary theaters like U.S. Central Command.
A clear assessment of the China challenge and a shared vision for the future fleet would help improve the gap between strategy and implementation that plagued the 2018 strategy. Perhaps more importantly, it would enable Navy and department leadership to work with, rather than against, Congress to undertake a long-term program to rebuild the Navy and reinvigorate the maritime industrial base on which the Navy and the nation depend.
Achieving consensus on this won’t be easy, as there are good reasons why China observers vary in their assessments of the risk of conflict and why U.S. naval and defense strategists differ on their visions of the future fleet. However, without this consensus and a concerted effort to reverse decades of drift, the Navy will continue its gradual slide toward strategic bankruptcy, and the risk of its debts coming due suddenly (and perhaps violently) will increase.
Chris Dougherty is a senior fellow in the Defense Program and co-lead of the Gaming Lab at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). Prior to joining CNAS, Mr. Dougherty served as senior adviser to the deputy assistant secretary of defense for strategy and force development at the Department of Defense.
Gradually and Then Suddenly: Explaining the Navy’s Strategic Bankruptcy - War on the Rocks
“How did you go bankrupt?” Bill asked. “Two ways,” Mike said. “Gradually and then suddenly.” - Ernest Hemingway, The Sun Also Rises The U.S. Navywarontherocks.com
Mark
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OceanBonfire
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The US Navy wants to retire $600M+ ships that are only 4 years old (LCS):
www.thedrive.com
www.navytimes.com
This Is The Navy's Timeline For Ridding Itself Of Four More Littoral Combat Ships
The Navy wants to decommission another four LCS warships, the youngest of which has served for less than four years.
www.thedrive.com
Here are the ships the Navy wants to inactivate in fiscal 2022
The final list will be dictated by the defense bill lawmakers pass in the coming months.
www.navytimes.com
FJAG
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The Congressional Report on the US Navy is out:
See full report here:
Small comment: Change "US Navy" to "Canadian Armed Forces" and ...
Navy 'is in disarray and focusing more on diversity than warfighting'
The report prepared by Marine Lt. Gen. Robert Schmidle and Rear Adm. Mark Montgomery, both retired, came in response to recent Naval disasters, including a fire on the USS Bonhomme Richard.www.dailymail.co.uk
See full report here:
Small comment: Change "US Navy" to "Canadian Armed Forces" and ...
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daftandbarmy
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They didn't read this article then, I guess:
Leaders must stay attuned to the cost of failure but more so to the larger cost of failure avoidance. In any zero defect, risk-averse culture there is a compelling incentive to succeed but a stronger incentive to not fail. This is natural when working in areas where decisions can have life or death consequences—navigating crowded waters, rigging a submarine for dive, calibrating aircraft instrumentation, and maintaining nuclear reactors requires high levels of risk aversion. There is no room for mistakes.
This worldview is operationalized through the process of Operational Risk Management (ORM), which implements risk avoidance and mitigation strategies in daily evolutions. The Navy has transferred the culture of risk management to all aspects of Sailors’ lives. Millions of dollars of manhours are spent each year training Sailors how to avoid risk in their jobs, while online, in foreign countries, in recreational sports, and even while cooking a Thanksgiving turkey. In our aversion to negative consequences we have neglected to instill risk-seeking skills required for Sailors to innovate and develop themselves professionally.
One of the most damaging results of this culture is manifest in how we approach professional qualifications. Sailors across the rank structure avoid professional opportunities due to a reluctance to fail. If Sailors’ qualifications are not strong enough to guarantee success, they do not engage. In many cases, less than perfect candidates are selected due to a weak candidate pool. Good enough and available always trumps nearly perfect but not in the running.
blog.usni.org
Celebrate Failures to Spur Risk-Taking and Innovation in Sailors
Leaders must stay attuned to the cost of failure but more so to the larger cost of failure avoidance. In any zero defect, risk-averse culture there is a compelling incentive to succeed but a stronger incentive to not fail. This is natural when working in areas where decisions can have life or death consequences—navigating crowded waters, rigging a submarine for dive, calibrating aircraft instrumentation, and maintaining nuclear reactors requires high levels of risk aversion. There is no room for mistakes.
This worldview is operationalized through the process of Operational Risk Management (ORM), which implements risk avoidance and mitigation strategies in daily evolutions. The Navy has transferred the culture of risk management to all aspects of Sailors’ lives. Millions of dollars of manhours are spent each year training Sailors how to avoid risk in their jobs, while online, in foreign countries, in recreational sports, and even while cooking a Thanksgiving turkey. In our aversion to negative consequences we have neglected to instill risk-seeking skills required for Sailors to innovate and develop themselves professionally.
One of the most damaging results of this culture is manifest in how we approach professional qualifications. Sailors across the rank structure avoid professional opportunities due to a reluctance to fail. If Sailors’ qualifications are not strong enough to guarantee success, they do not engage. In many cases, less than perfect candidates are selected due to a weak candidate pool. Good enough and available always trumps nearly perfect but not in the running.
Celebrate Failures to Spur Risk-Taking and Innovation in Sailors
Leaders must stay attuned to the cost of failure but more so to the larger cost of failure avoidance. In any zero defect, risk-averse culture there is a compelling incentive to succeed but a stronger incentive to not fail. This is natural when working in areas where decisions can have life or...
blog.usni.org
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Are you suggesting the folks in the Daily Mail would be less than fair and balanced in their reporting and editing?
I do believe that for all the ‘stir’ it is causing in modern times (and I’m in no way defending or justifying the dumb nonsense from the woke crowd) — in terms of the CAF, the initial changes made were done with good intentions and with tangible results for some members.The Congressional Report on the US Navy is out:
See full report here:
Small comment: Change "US Navy" to "Canadian Armed Forces" and ...
The reasonable changes that were made to accommodate members in changing times were welcome, and ultimately made the CAF a better place to work.
Hindsight is always 20/20. And I think we can all agree that somewhere along the line, we may have gone too far in some ways. We were so worried about representing ourselves as old fashioned & toxic, that we became woke & toxic instead.
The problem is - in my opinion - that we (and many other governments and militaries around the world) are still going down that path. We can see the problems that are cropping up by having gone tok far, and yet we continue to go further anyway. Constantly making changes to accommodate the one member who insists a binary unicorn with unique “everything.” Which is all fine and dandy, but our focus still needs to be on warfighting.
Because like the lieutenant said quite rightly - everybody bleeds the same colour when your ship gets blown up by a missile. And the Chinese don’t give a crouching tiger, flying f**k about what gender pronoun you prefer.
We are an organization who is trained and equipped to protect Canadians and engage in armed conflict on their behalf. That has to be the number one focus.
FSTO
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I was talking with a comrade of mine yesterday about this article. Honestly you could replace USN with RCN and minus the deaths in the two collisions the two navies issues are eerily similar. Right now our leadership in Ottawa is consumed by the Sexual Misconduct (SM) controversy. On the coasts the RCN is gamely doing the business but the sailors and officers are being worked like rented mules and are reaching the breaking point. Our ships are being bandaged to keep them going. Our IA should be to tie up 2 ships in Halifax and 1 in Esquimalt and disperse the crews to other ships to get some depth in our positions and then put the 3 ships into a deep PM to fix everything. Wash and repeat until the Common Surface Combatants (Type 26) start arriving. Then get recruiting and training flows fixed, this year the Navy recruited 12% of its requirement. This cannot continue!!!!The Congressional Report on the US Navy is out:
See full report here:
Small comment: Change "US Navy" to "Canadian Armed Forces" and ...
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wow.
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As long as they don't put them on Kijiji saying 'used.' Otherwise, the PM will order the BoC to print the money so he can buy them at the garage sale.The US Navy wants to retire $600M+ ships that are only 4 years old (LCS):
This Is The Navy's Timeline For Ridding Itself Of Four More Littoral Combat Ships
The Navy wants to decommission another four LCS warships, the youngest of which has served for less than four years.
Here are the ships the Navy wants to inactivate in fiscal 2022
The final list will be dictated by the defense bill lawmakers pass in the coming months.
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This.
All of this.
The boots on the deckplates are, from everything I've heard, being worn past the sole and into the sock. The deck plates are cracking, and the millions worth of plate steel that ISI gave back to the RCN following the MLR that they didn't have time/money to install is now coming home to roost. Ships that were surveyed on entry to the HCM project have still not had that metal work done in many areas. That's....concerning....
As for recruiting, the failure to leverage the downturn in jobs in the civilian economy and turn the military into a 'preferred choice' employer is a clear failure of the recruiting system. Yes, COVID slowed stuff down a lot, but now that things are returning to 'normal' there needs to be a concerted push to get folks in the door and into uniforms. 12% of recruiting goals is not just terrible, it's practically a death knell.
NS
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Yep. I wonder what the recruiting stats were like across the board - are all trades that bad for recruiting, or just RCN ones?
Mods: Feel free to split since we're not really talking USN anymore.
Halifax Tar
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For 20/21 and now into 21/22, the issue has been BMQ/BMOQ capacity more than recruiting capacity - maintaining spacing reduces throughput (as did shutdowns for a non-zero amount of time).
However, the RCN's inability to attract entrants has been an issue for a considerable length of time. That ~25% of Canadians identify as French first language, but hard sea trades are only ~12% Francophone is a fundamental underlying issue that the RCN refuses to confront. As long as the RCN wants to be more British than the RN, that problem will continue. (Question: why has there never been a Francophone in command of the RCN?)
However, the RCN's inability to attract entrants has been an issue for a considerable length of time. That ~25% of Canadians identify as French first language, but hard sea trades are only ~12% Francophone is a fundamental underlying issue that the RCN refuses to confront. As long as the RCN wants to be more British than the RN, that problem will continue. (Question: why has there never been a Francophone in command of the RCN?)
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Is there some way that senior leadership is unaware of the situation?
What could be the reasoning behind not taking one ship out of service on each coast to do the required service? Especially if it helps to relieve manning issues.
Recruitment is obviously a problem and unacceptable but this is not a new issue. There are tons of people available for work in this country but the disconnect between employer and employee is growing larger. How to bridge the gap?
If we can't maintain or man 12 Halifax, 12 Kingston, and 4 Victoria how are we to handle 15 CSC, 2 Protecteur, 12 Kingston, 4 Victoria and 6 AOPS?
What could be the reasoning behind not taking one ship out of service on each coast to do the required service? Especially if it helps to relieve manning issues.
Recruitment is obviously a problem and unacceptable but this is not a new issue. There are tons of people available for work in this country but the disconnect between employer and employee is growing larger. How to bridge the gap?
If we can't maintain or man 12 Halifax, 12 Kingston, and 4 Victoria how are we to handle 15 CSC, 2 Protecteur, 12 Kingston, 4 Victoria and 6 AOPS?
Halifax Tar
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I've read you post this stuff before. You've brought a problem... What's your solution ?
Why do you think there has never been a Francophone CRCN ?
