From the article:
"The teaching model is still based on the assumption that when we go to war, that war will be conventional, as in the
Godless Russian hordes lined up in tanks coming at us from one direction," a veteran non-commissioned officer at
Kandahar Airfield told the Toronto Star.
"It is not the fault of the instructors. That was the environment they came up in. But at the same time, that's not what
war is anymore. The reality today is counter-insurgency. The top Canadian brass realize this and so do the front-of-line
soldiers. But in between, there is a layer of the army locked in hidebound thinking, basically resistant to change.
"So a lot of us deployed in Afghanistan today have basically had to throw out the book and educate ourselves. It's
really not that difficult, because so many armies around the world have been training in counter-insurgency techniques
for so long now that there is a substantial library of knowledge available. And we're studying it on our own."
This is understandable, and from a training system point of view, it isn't entirely accurate. In terms of leadership training, the type of conflict is the tool by which candidates are assessed. His quote of "that's not what war is anymore" is not entirely accurate either: perhaps it should have been "that's not what THIS war is".
In all seriousness, think about the 1980's in training when we all did platoon level fighting patrols and the like. When the heck would we EVER do them? NEVER was the thought. What with the "Godless Russian hordes" bearing down on us in our reverse slope positions, when could we even contemplate doing a fighting patrol? Well, guess what: that's exactly what we are doing now. "Two up, one back" made sense for the Central Front, but doesn't make sense at all for Khandahar. Does this mean we don't teach it? Certainly not. As I said, it is (a) a training tool to assess (at least for leadership) and (b) some wars may still be fought that way. Heck, that's what the Iraqi army faced in 2003: "Godless" hordes rolling down on them from every direction. We may be on one side or another, but the full can of beans does include the "conventional" model of warfare. I can't forsee anything like that in the future, but who forsaw us in Afghanistan of all places back in the summer of 2001?
As for counter-insurgency and all that, I think we are on the right track with modernisation of training (at all levels) and it's good to see the units on the ground studying it on their own, but that's exactly what we are doing back here as well.
Now, we were in a Counter Insurgency op (of sorts) in South Africa in 1900 or so. I wonder if any of those lessons apply to today?
Just food for thought
Garvin out.
(edited because that blue was so, well, "Godless")