War Museum Bomber Command Exhibit Change

[Haletown]

or they could use other quotes from ACM Harris

"The Nazis entered this war under the rather childish delusion that they were going to bomb everyone else, and nobody was going to bomb them. At Rotterdam, London, Warsaw, and half a hundred other places, they put their rather naive theory into operation. They sowed the wind, and now they are going to reap the whirlwind."

or, one of my favorites ( substitute one Canadian Infantryman)

"I do not personally regard the whole of the remaining cities of Germany as worth the bones of one British Grenadier.

 

[Simon]

After listening to the CWM consultant on CBC this morning Im sensing a bit of a bruised ego amongst our academics, first she states that we consult groups for thier input and then decide, could this not be considered as a form of appeal. I do agree that the war museum is not necessarily a place to memorialize, however we would expect them to demonstrate a balanced approach, and dissent is a check in this balance.

I believe it partially captures the slow pendulum swinging away from the trudeauian National non identity multicultural quilt, back to a clearer form of Canadianism and a Canadian identity, as does the support the troops banners on public vehicles, and I say good show.

A natural result of this new found, or recaptured identity is a more connected approach to our CF family, and hopefully a reduction in cynicsm of its purpose.
Or did I just put on the wrong coloured glasses?

 

[Shec]

(The aim of Bomber Command) was the destruction of German cities; the killing of German workers; and the disruption of civilized life throughout Germany. It should be emphasized that the destruction of houses, public utilities, transport and lives; the creation of a refugee problem on an unprecedented scale; and the breakdown of morale both at home and at the battle fronts by fear of extended and intensified bombing, are accepted and intended aims of our bombing policy. They are not by-products of attempts to hit factories.

"The Nazis entered this war under the rather childish delusion that they were going to bomb everyone else, and nobody was going to bomb them. At Rotterdam, London, Warsaw, and half a hundred other places, they put their rather naive theory into operation. They sowed the wind, and now they are going to reap the whirlwind."

For what its worth I trust that  either of these direct quotes from 'Bomber' Harris are sufficient.  While they might indeed freeze a moment in time they answer the "why" the campaign was conducted without inviting a judgement upon whether or not it was moral.
That sort of editorializing is the prerogative of academics and clergy but not the purview of a national public institution whose role is factual and unbiased transparency so that the body politic can draw their own conclusions.

 

[rlh]

That sort of editorializing is the prerogative of academics and clergy but not the purview of a national public institution whose role is factual and unbiased transparency so that the body politic can draw their own conclusions.

That's my feeling as well, but perhaps I am an oddity of an academic to be taking the stand that musuem displays should not be used as the soap box for academic debates.  Why did the museum write the panel the way it was in the first place?  Because the people working there are academics (no criticism intended) who are doing what they are trained to do:  not just give bare facts but rather convey the complexity of history .

As I mentioned before, a public lecture series held at, and sponsored by, the musuem would be an excellent means of getting into the complexity of the story.  And there would also be the time to give all the information and context needed to understand all the different angles:  bombing theory, failed strategies, primitive technology, unexpected outcomes, view from the planes, view from headquarters, view from the civilians being bombed, differing views of historians over the years.  And then the audience would also have a chance to ask questions, challenge arguments, and take part in the debate.  All of this just cannot be covered in one display discription.

 

[Good2Golf]

....As I mentioned before, a public lecture series held at, and sponsored by, the musuem would be an excellent means of getting into the complexity of the story.  And there would also be the time to give all the information and context needed to understand all the different angles:  bombing theory, failed strategies, primitive technology, unexpected outcomes, view from the planes, view from headquarters, view from the civilians being bombed, differing views of historians over the years.  And then the audience would also have a chance to ask questions, challenge arguments, and take part in the debate.  All of this just cannot be covered in one display discription.

+1

 

[dapaterson]

What is Truth?

The "bare facts" can be arranged to suit any agenda; the plaque, as written, stimulates thought, discussion and debate (witness this thread!).  Hollow hero worship serves no purpose.

But if we want facts, let's see:

• It is estimated that between 400,000 and 600,000 German civilians died as a result of the targetting of German cities
• One of Bomber Command's stated objectives was "the disruption of civilized life throughout Germany"

Both are facts; but do not adequately portray what happened.  They lack context; oddly enough, the plaque as currently written provides context, both historical and contemporary.

The notion of "Truth" as an absolute is a fine philosophical concept; reality has pesky shades of grey that interfere with such absolutist ideas.  But if we can only ever say "Us Good.  Them Bad" we will never understand why events happened, or how to work to prevent their recurrence.  If I want to see a museum that is filled with nothing more than hollow praise of the Great Patriotic War, I'll head for Russia.

 

[Strike]

Both are facts; but do not adequately portray what happened.  They lack context; oddly enough, the plaque as currently written provides context, both historical and contemporary.

Which is the first problem...we cannot place the moral views of today onto events in the past.  Ex, we all know that the witch trial of previous centuries was wrong (not comparing the two events, just providing context here), but that's how things were at the time.

The notion of "Truth" as an absolute is a fine philosophical concept; reality has pesky shades of grey that interfere with such absolutist ideas.  But if we can only ever say "Us Good.  Them Bad" we will never understand why events happened, or how to work to prevent their recurrence.  If I want to see a museum that is filled with nothing more than hollow praise of the Great Patriotic War, I'll head for Russia.

Then perhaps the new panel should include the stats of the German bombing campaign.  Again, let people make up their own minds.

 

[Old Sweat]

The start point should be the theories of air power by Douhet et al that influenced all the major powers in the structure of their air forces in the period between the war. It was considered acceptable to bomb the enemy's cities as a tactic, just as it was an accepted tactic to target factories, railways and power plants.

The challenge for the British especially is that they had made a real mess of structuring their bomber force. The bombs were weak and prone to not detonating; the aircraft lacked payload, range and defensive armament; when forced into night bombing, it was found that the aircrew could not navigate to reach the target; in all for much of the war Bomber Command was ineffective. We make much of the failure of the British army to develop a proper tank and the tactics to fight a mechanized war; surely the RAF is equally culpable in its failure to develop its component of what was the major Western Allied offensive for the first four years of the war. That these aircrew continued to operate at all says much about the motivation and courage of these youngsters, many of whom were still in their teens.

This must have been understood. One could ask why wasn't it fixed? A major effort was made to adapt the force, and it was largely successful, but Bomber Command was an imprecise and imperfect instrument. So were all the services on both sides, but that is the nature of war.

In my opinion, it was the result of looking for a panacea for the bloodbath of the Great War. It was earnestly hoped, and probably believed that air power could substitute for ground combat power. The senior air officers were true believers and were concerned that the other services were looking for an excuse to take them over. They wanted to win the war with air power to prove the others wrong and to cement their position. The politicians wanted to minimize the loss of life on their side while winning the war. It would have been inconceivable for both groups to try to change course midways during the war; thus the errors made in the pre-war period largely dictated the shape of the aerial campaigns.

 

[rlh]

The start point should be the theories of air power by Douhet et al that influenced all the major powers in the structure of their air forces in the period between the war. It was considered acceptable to bomb the enemy's cities as a tactic, just as it was an accepted tactic to target factories, railways and power plants.

Precision bombing is what the allies wanted to do and started to do.  Because the desired precision was not being attained with the current technology, tactics were changed from precision to carpet bombing and night bombing for better protection.

If you are going to talk about failed accomplishments, you have to talk about original expectations and modified tactics.  I don't think the musuem plaque captures this element of the story.

 

[Old Sweat]

rlh

Agreed re the failure of precision bombing. Even carpet bombing was and is not that effective. A couple of examples if I may. In Normandy when the heavy bombers were used in support of the ground forces, many of the missions were less than effective despite air superiority, daylight conditions and clear weather. It was the nature of the weapon systems, both day and night. At the time the Allied Air Forces commanders were emphatic that carpet bombing was not possible.

During the first Gulf War I was part of an ad hoc group created to follow and analyse the results both during the air preparation and the ground campaign. Early on a senior official in DND raised the possibility of the USAF being able to destroy the Iraqi forces deployed in Kuwait and Southern Iraq by carpet bombing. It was possible to demonstrate to him that the Americans did not have enough resources to achieve this aim. Remember the question specifically had to do with destruction (which we took to be rendering the enemy militarily ineffective) by carpet bombing.

 

[Shec]

What is Truth?

The "bare facts" can be arranged to suit any agenda...


...The notion of "Truth" as an absolute is a fine philosophical concept; reality has pesky shades of grey that interfere with such absolutist ideas...

Ah, but is not the quest for truth based upon bare facts?  Seems to me that the evidence-based approach is the fundamental precept of our legal system.  And is not the responsibility of each individual  to determine their own truth on the basis of those facts?  As far context goes, if memory serves me correct the entire section of the CWM that is devoted to WW2 provides that, the section on the bomber campaign is hardly an isolated display.   Therefore, unless those who presented the interpretation are jurists their "truth" borders on propaganda and perhaps they should the ones to go to Russia, but not on our tax dollars.

 

[rlh]

Even carpet bombing was and is not that effective.

I totally agree!  I didn't mean to imply that carpet bombing was any more successful that precision bombing in carrying out the intended consequences.  What was going through my mind was that theorists and policy makers were thinking precision targeting first, and when that didn't work, they moved on to what they could do -- drop bombs everywhere.  It was this change of tactics that lead to actually executing full-fledged attacks on civilian morale.

The success or failure or extent of success of this new tactic is what this entire debate is about.

 

[Old Sweat]

The success or failure or extent of success of this new tactic is what this entire debate is about.

And ultimately that becomes subjective and emotional. I have not reached a conclusion one way or the other about the effectiveness of the bombing campaign; there are just too many subjective variables and I have other things to occupy my attention.

 

[I_am_John_Galt]

During the first Gulf War I was part of an ad hoc group created to follow and analyse the results both during the air preparation and the ground campaign. Early on a senior official in DND raised the possibility of the USAF being able to destroy the Iraqi forces deployed in Kuwait and Southern Iraq by carpet bombing. It was possible to demonstrate to him that the Americans did not have enough resources to achieve this aim. Remember the question specifically had to do with destruction (which we took to be rendering the enemy militarily ineffective) by carpet bombing.

Interesting ... I just finished a book about Gen Horner (Every Man a Tiger) in which he recalled that the aim of the air campaign was to render the enemy militarily ineffective (i.e., <50% strength) through bombing ... seems like he achieved that objective ... not challenging you here, but I am curious to hear your thoughts (did precision bombing achieve in this case what carpet bombing could not, though one could argue the opposite in Vietnam) ...

 

[Old Sweat]

Interesting ... I just finished a book about Gen Horner (Every Man a Tiger) in which he recalled that the aim of the air campaign was to render the enemy militarily ineffective (i.e., <50% strength) through bombing ... seems like he achieved that objective ... not challenging you here, but I am curious to hear your thoughts (did precision bombing achieve in this case what carpet bombing could not, though one could argue the opposite in Vietnam) ...
It's hard to say. The BDA's (Battle Damage Assessments) were all over the map. As I recall, and it was nearly two decades ago and we were looking at a lot of stuff, we doubted the official figures. Having said that, the air campaign did a lot of good stuff; would it have been as successful against a better enemy? We saw a lot of videos of guided bombs hitting buildings. The question is, was that the best use of air power?

Sorry if I am weasel-wording, but I still don't know.

 

[a_majoor]

From what I saw at the museum prior to the change, the exhibit was not about the argument between what was desired and what was achieved during WW II (which would be the proper role of a museum supposedly devoted to military history and scholarship), but rather implying that the campaign was immoral based on the PC values of Canadian academics working in Ottawa in the 1990's.

Some of the posts in this thread are well thought out, well researched and succinct enough to have been plaques at the exhibit, answering questions in ways that the non specialist could understand (Why was airpower so emphasised in the pre war period? Why was precision bombing abandoned? Was carpet bombing effective? What metrics were being used to determine the effect of the bombing? etc.). The fact that a bunch of posters on the internet can put together a better virtual exhibition in their spare time than "professionals" using unlimited tax dollars probably says far more about the museums than anything else. Perhaps someone can be so kind as to forward this thread to the CWM and suggest their exhibit is waiting for them right here.......

 

[rlh]

The fact that a bunch of posters on the internet can put together a better virtual exhibition in their spare time than "professionals" using unlimited tax dollars probably says far more about the museums than anything else.

Ouch!

But I can't argument with the observation, though.

 

[klambie]

Ouch!

But I can't argument with the observation, though.

Rubbish.  Most of the posters here seem unaware that this is a single panel in a larger Bomber Command display that attempts to address many of the arguments raised here.  Read the minutes of the Senate hearings (and the final report that I have not yet read) if you are interested in both sides of this tiff.

Final report
http://tinyurl.com/35ufn2
http://tinyurl.com/2vq7ft

Senate hearings
April 18
http://tinyurl.com/2oyu9c
May 2
http://tinyurl.com/2mrqan
May 9
http://tinyurl.com/33je34
May 16
http://tinyurl.com/2n3f5u

 

[time expired]

And what, I would like to ask these Revisionist intellectuals was the alternative
to the allied bombing campaign?.Stalemate or possible defeat, surely from even
their point of view, morally unacceptable.However as usual they have no viable
alternatives to present.The bombing campaign,flawed as it was,due mainly to
the technology or lack of same of those times, was the only weapon available
to the Allies to strike back at Nazi Germany.As a child I can remember well
standing in the street with my mother cheering as the RAF bombers flew at
low level over my hometown (Coventry)to assemble for the first 1000 bomber
raid on Köln.As targets of the Luftwaffe for 2 years, the feeling was of pure joy
that we were at last striking back,the morality of it was something that is the
luxury of the non involved.
Another point that I feel is overlooked is the question ,who were these innocent
civilians?,were they the millions that voted for the NSDAP?,the rapturous crowds
that greeted every victory won by Hitler in every town or city that he visited?,or
were they the people that screwed together the planes,tanks or guns that Hitler
won these victories with?.Was not the locomotive engineer who drove the train
to Auschwitz in some way responsible for what happened there?.Or are civilians
completely devoid of responsibilities, is it only those who wear uniforms that
bear responsibility.That would seem to be the view of these left wing so called
intellectuals and that makes sense given their distaste for all things military.
                            Rant over.
                                  Regards
                                     
   

 

[Strike]

TE

+1 on the first part of your post.

-1 on the second.  We have to remember that had any of these "innocent" civilians rebelled against the German war machine they would have most certainly lost their lives, along with their family.  It's all fine and dandy to say that I would fight back had I been living in that time and place, but if the safety of my family, let alone my own, was at stake, I'm not so sure.