Impressively thoughtful remarks, Mark C.; thanks.
This issue of a back-end solution to a front-end problem - that is, low manning leading to hyper-specialisation, plug-and-play, deterioration of unit identity & cohesion, and a stripping of the authority normally tied to the responsibility of command - is also a problem in the Militia. On the up side, hemorrhaging of the Reg F can lead to some experienced people joining the P Res. Whether they will ever become true Class A reservists is, however, another question.
That being said, the trend we are seeing is a continued split between the force generators and the force employers, and this is not good. One reason it is not good is that it is incoherent. An example is Land Force Reserve Restructure (LFRR). This project can't figure out whether it exists to remove redundancies from the Militia, increase the Militia's capabilities in the area of domestic operations, or provide capabilities to the deployable field force. This lack of coherence is evident in the fact that LFRR seeks to: (1) increase the size/manning of select infantry units (with a view to vital point security) while (2) re-roling armoured units as CBRN recce - without the equipment or mandate to conduct such operations - and (3) standing up new capabilities, specifically PsyOps, which are wholly deployable assets (we can't use PsyOps on Canadians!!). How this seems rational to anyone is a mystery to me.