What comes first Equipment or Doctrine? (from: I see a Role for MGS)

[TangoTwoBravo]

I was reading through John Ellis' The Social History of the Machine Gun and came across an interesting persepective on the relationship between equipment and doctrine.  J.F.C. Fuller wrote a staff paper in 1914 (before the war) which proposed that "tactics are based on weapon-power and not on the experience of military history, and that since in 1914 the quick-firing field gun and the machine gun were the two most recent weapons, our tactics should be based on them."  Apparently Fuller was criticized for taking this position at the staff college. 

We can get into a chicken and egg routine with what comes first, but I would offer that equipment should have the right of way over doctrine.  This may be backwards, but I think that doctrine and tactics should adapt to new technology and not the other way around. 

p.s. Editted to remove one obvious grammar error.  Others may remain...

 

[Colin Parkinson]

The Marines have the luxury of occupying a Niche in the US force structure, admittedly it is evolving. However Canada's Military has two distinct roles that contradict each other in the terms of equipment and roles. The first is the need for domestic defence for an area way out of proportion to the size of military available. The 2nd is the need for an expeditionary force that may fight/peacekeep anywhere in the world. I can't imagine a bigger headache for any military planner, trying to balance domestic, peacekeeping, war fighting both in the present sense and being able to respond to a threat such as a massive conventional war with N. Korea.

 

[Infanteer]

We can get into a chicken and egg routine with what comes first, but I would offer that equipment should have the right of way over doctrine.  This may be backwards, but I think that doctrine and tactics should adapt to new technology and not the other way around. 

I agree.  Technology is the "external" force in this one; we (as in a military force) have no control over how it is "evolved" into the battlefield - it is our professional duty to observe this evolution and to mold doctrine so that our force best puts the technology to use.

Another interesting point.  Technological and doctrinal evolutions are completely dependent on the context.  I was reading a comparison of the evolution of German and British defensive doctrine in WWI.  The German system evolved over two years, going through many iterations before becoming the "elastic defence" we now read about.  When the Brits realized their offensive capability was spent in 1917, they tried to bring their defensive doctrine up to speed.  Their solution was to copy, almost verbatim, German manuals they had captured.  However, when doing so, they failed to consider that German defensive doctrine was designed to counter Allied offensive tactics, and that it may have been wholly unsuited to counter German offensive tactics.

Point is, there is no "good way" and "bad way" in absolute terms - the interaction between doctrine and technology is entirely dependent on time and space (who you're fighting and the circumstances of the fight).  In essence, the "evolution" or "revolution" (however one sees it) isn't really a forward moving process, but rather one of constant loops.  I'm sure now that Counterinsurgency is en vogue, you could find lots of examples of this. 

Does any of this make sense.  I'm just procrastinating from reviewing PDRs.... 

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Their solution was to copy, almost verbatim, German manuals they had captured. 

I think I saw the same sort of thing going on here in the late 90s with our own doctine...

In all seriousness, doctrine, tactics and related equipment do have cultural and societal aspects and your point on context is very well taken.  What works very well for one army in one time and place may very well not work for another army in another time and place.  Other nations could not just pick up the devastating English longbow.  The English longbowmen of Crecy and Agincourt were the product of a society over time, not an instant technological weapons advancement.  I might be reading into the politics of the day too much, but I don't know if the French knights would have supported having their own 'commoners' possessing such weapons, assuming that they could have developed the strength and trainig to do so.  The Samurai had brakes on military development in Japan for hundreds of years to preserve their own place.

Going further back, the Persians had learned over time that 'Greek' hoplite infantry were pretty tough to beat (maybe they had watched 300).  They began to hire Greek mercenaries to provide infantry formations, and the long Pelopenisian War provided a ready supply of hoplites available for hire.  When Darius III lost his Greek mercenaries at the Grancius (the first big battle of Alexander's war against Darius) he tried to form his own Persian 'heavy infantry' to counter the Macedonian phalangists (pike-armed infantry who fought in close, deep formation).  The Persian Kardaces, however, were apparently not up to the task and were crushed at Issus.  There was more to being in a Macedonian phalanx that having a pike.  What works for one culture may not work for another.  Alexander himself hired allied contingents to provide other types of troops that his own Macedonians had trouble fielding, with the outstanding Agrianian skirmishers being perhaps the most prominent.

We can, however, go too far down the road of national tendencies.  In my recent readings on European armies on the eve of the First World War I have often come across contemporary writers discuss the differences between Germans and Frenchmen and making assumptions about either regardind suitable tactics.  The French doctrine writers of 1904 trumpeted the 'souplesse" or flexibility of Frenchmen as compared to the more rigid Germans.  They thought that the more individually-minded French soldiers would find a way forward on their own to deliver attacks.  This sounds fine in theory, but the practice ten years later showed that initiative will only get you so far. 

We can also get a little arrogant or stereotypical regarding other nations, and pride comes before the fall. 

 

[Mikeg81]

But arn't you always fighting the last war, when you are trying to make doctrine?
Sure, during the '20's and '30's, development of equipment happened, but it was applied re: experience gained previously(ie: Tanks taking over from horses).

Whereas during a war, like right now, if you've haven't fought one like it before, you end up learning on the fly, adapting exisitng equipment and getting new stuff?

Do you think we'd have bought RG31's of the 'Gan didn't happen?

(What came first, chicken or the egg?)

 

[Colin Parkinson]

So you are saying we should hire a battalion of Gurkha's? For that light infantry sensitive touchy feely stuff?

It certainly would solve our manpower problems. Mind you I doubt they would enjoy being stationed in Shilo.

 

[Mikeg81]

So you are saying we should hire a battalion of Gurkha's? For that light infantry sensitive touchy feely stuff?

It certainly would solve our manpower problems. Mind you I doubt they would enjoy being stationed in Shilo.

Not a bad idea...but the cold might get to them...

Naw, I'm just trying to answer the question posed in the thread title.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

It may come to the point one day where a rich western country may have to contract out to a poorer country for troops to meet their obligations. I could see where such an arrangement would benefit both sides. We would sign an agreement with a particular country to hire X number of troops who would train to a certain agreed standard and practise with our forces regularly, they would agree to deploy under set conditions. What we would be doing is formalizing a scenario that already takes place in UN missions, but this would be an improvement on that existing arrangement. The benefits they would receive is better training, money to support the hiring housing of troops, an agreement to pay a portion of pensions and disability claims, access to modern equipment, good officer training. We would get the ability to deploy and sustain a much larger ground force than we can currently do.

This doesn't mean that Canadian infantry would be replaced, i suspect the higher trained, better equipped Canadians would be the hammer and the foreign troops would be the anvil. I would foresee the country of choice would be smallish, with a fairly large population and limited economic status. The country could also benefit from other econmic ties as well.

 

[a_majoor]

I think that technology isn't really the driving force behind doctrine, but more indefinable factors such as culture. There are many historical examples where opposing sides had very similar equipment, yet one side had a huge advantage based on their ability to deploy, support and employ their men and equipment. This is explored in greater detail in VDH's book "Carnage and Culture", with pretty concrete examples such as the opposing galley fleets at the Battle of Lepanto which were functionally identical (many of the Ottoman galleys were copies of Venetian galleys, for example).

This is one of the reasons I will stand by the introduction of the staff system and communications technology as the real revolutionary changes that drove changes in doctrine. The way work is handled, decisions are made and information transmitted depends a lot on cultural factors, and cultures which are open and flexible are much more likely to make the best use of their men and equipment, and establish structures and doctrines that work to do so.

 

[dapaterson]

It may come to the point one day where a rich western country may have to contract out to a poorer country for troops to meet their obligations.

Already doing it.  CANCAP and other contractor augmentation programs provide us with poor nation personnel to support our troops.  We lose the flexibility that military personnel filling those roles would give us, but get to claim with a semi-straight face that we have fewer troops deployed.

Of course, if you contract out much of your CSS and then discover that you won't be operating out of one static base the lack of military assets can cause some heartache...

 

[Infanteer]

Do you think we'd have bought RG31's of the 'Gan didn't happen?

Yes, because we did - we owned and operated them before we ever deployed to Afghanistan....

 

[Mikeg81]

When was that?

 

[Infanteer]

I think that technology isn't really the driving force behind doctrine, but more indefinable factors such as culture. There are many historical examples where opposing sides had very similar equipment, yet one side had a huge advantage based on their ability to deploy, support and employ their men and equipment. This is explored in greater detail in VDH's book "Carnage and Culture", with pretty concrete examples such as the opposing galley fleets at the Battle of Lepanto which were functionally identical (many of the Ottoman galleys were copies of Venetian galleys, for example).

This is one of the reasons I will stand by the introduction of the staff system and communications technology as the real revolutionary changes that drove changes in doctrine. The way work is handled, decisions are made and information transmitted depends a lot on cultural factors, and cultures which are open and flexible are much more likely to make the best use of their men and equipment, and establish structures and doctrines that work to do so.

Culture is, I believe, part of the "context" portion of the equation that I mentioned.  But as previously stated we can only push the cultural explanation so far.  Victor Davis Hanson goes, in my opinion, too far - his theory was rightly ripped apart by John Lynn in "Battle".

 

[Infanteer]

When was that?

I can't tell you when we first purchased them, but I have a picture of myself sitting on one in Bosnia - we're using an Engineer route proving vehicle as an armoured patrol vehicle.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

No argument from me about the effect of culture on doctrine.  I still think that it can be dangerous, however, to start ascribing values and stereotypes to cultures and armies.  Cultural determinism might make smug people feel more smug about their own culture, but the bones of many a smug army can be found.  I won't argue about the need to be flexible and adaptable, but part of that flexibility might include looking beyond one's own culture.

The Byzantines appear to have had a well-organized army with many components to include infantry and cavalry and can be seen as a blend of Roman and Greek practices (albeit with centuries of evolution).  Nevertheless, they were crushed by the Seljuks at Manzikert in 1071.  The Romans suffered any number of disasters, not to mention one against the Parthians at Carrhae in 53 BC.  My point about Manzikert and Carrhae is that we in the West tend to look down upon Eastern rivals and that we should be careful using culture.  Cultures and societies may wax and wane indepenent of any inherent cultural tendency.

When comparing two armies we can look to many factors.  Numbers, quality of troops, quality of leadership, morale, tactical methods, equipment, logisitics are all ways to assess relative strengths.  Many of these are subjective, however, and we can sometimes shoe-horn our assessment when reverse engineering.  Knowing the outcome, we can set up the assessment to support that known outcome.  While minor differences in equipment may not matter compared to large differences in numbers, leadership or tactical methods, I do not think that we can write-off weaponry.  

I enjoy reading about the English longbowmen, perhaps due to cultural bias and the need to bask in the warm glow of victories.  I suppose I should ignore the defeat at Patay to maintain that warm glow.  The English longbowmen were able to accomplish at Crecy and Agincourt what many other foot bowmen had been unable to do.  Previous missile troops on foot were unable to achieve great effects against armoured targets before getting swept away (either by a phalanx or a heavy cavalry charge).  The longbow, however, presented at technological advance over other missile systems in terms of range, hitting power and rate of fire.  The French knights at Agincourt made things easier for their enemies by attacking over a muddy field on a narrow front, but nevertheless we see one system defeating another system.  The English system included considerable training requirements and required a doctrine for its employment, but I think that we can look to the longbow as an example of a weapon system giving a decided advantage to one side.  Going back to Patay (some fifteen years after Agincourt), however, we have an example of a French frontal charge sweeping away the English longbowmen before they were completely ready.  Thus, I concede that weaponry alone is not the only determinent.  Factors such as tactical setting and timing can make a huge difference as well.

I must concede, at this point, some ground to your argument about adaptive cultures.  The post-1066 English were, in effect, Normans.  Those Normans, themselves transplanted Danish Vikings hired to protect the Franks against maruading Vikings, were an adaptable lot who included various aspects of other cultures that they encountered.  They adopted the mounted heavy cavalry of their Frankish hosts and then added Bretonian light cavalry.  The post-conquest English Normans incorporated Welsh longbows and got away, somewhat, from the reliance on the mounted knight that seemed to grip France.  Adaptability is very important, but that can be a bit of a truism. In any case, we are speaking here in this thread about adaptation and namely should doctrine adapt to equipment or the other way around (which somehow started with the MGS).

The staff system and communications (do you include rail as communications?) were certainly important additions to warfare, but I still look to some rather mundance tactical aspects such as the machine gun and quick firing artillery as having driven the change in how war is fought today from how it was fought up until the turn of the last century.

Where I have been going here, however, is not to determine a way to tell which of two armies is better, but rather should equipment be purchased to fit doctrine or rather should doctrine be adapted to equipment.  

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

So you are saying we should hire a battalion of Gurkha's? For that light infantry sensitive touchy feely stuff?

It certainly would solve our manpower problems. Mind you I doubt they would enjoy being stationed in Shilo.

My ramblings about Alexander's foreign troops were not to suggest that we should hire foreingers to do the dirty work.  Rather, I was providing examples from the past of a given doctrine or fighting style being suited to a given culture or nationality.  Alexander merely took advantage of that.  His Agrianians and Thessalians should not , however, be seen as mercenaries if we are looking for modern parallels.  They were, perhaps, more like coalition allies who provided specialists. 

 

[a_majoor]

Where I have been going here, however, is not to determine a way to tell which of two armies is better, but rather should equipment be purchased to fit doctrine or rather should doctrine be adapted to equipment. 

In the broadest sense, Doctrine is independent of equipment, ideally it is something like a philosophy which allows you to use your resources to the greatest effect. Doctrine also incorporates cultural assumptions, sometimes with unexpected results. Europeans were caught up with the idea of morale and marital spirit as the prime determinate factor of military success in the second half of the 19th century, which led to the cult of cold steel and the almost unshakable belief that soldiers trained and imbued with the right spirit could prevail by taking the offense. We might think of French soldiers mown down by machine gun fire in WWI as the end result of such thinking, but examinations of battles between European armies (or the Japanese, who were heavily influenced by European ideas) in the period between @ 1870 and 1915 has lots of examples. The worst thing was this actually worked for most of the period in question, hence Captains and Majors who led charges to victory in the closing years of the 19th century were now Colonels and Generals in 1914 who knew that this would work......

I think we all have a tendency to think more of TTPs which are dependent on equipment and resources, rather than the deeper assumptions which underly them. Although VDH's thesis about the cultural assumptions that underly our western brand of warfare is contentious, it seems pretty self evident that Western forces seek to settle the issue through shock encounters with formed bodies of the enemy, and this seems true when examining Alexander's march through Afghanistan or TFA Roto 4's actions today. Even the current buzz phrase "Kinetic effects" sums up the idea nicely.

Given that sort of assumption underlying the entire enterprise, fearsome shock weapons like tanks and PGMs become the preferred means of dealing with the enemy. Programs like MGS or FCS are harshly criticized because they are NOT shock weapons, and even their proponents in western armies have a difficult time rationalizing the utility or use of these weapons. (Manoeuvre Warfare buzzwords like "shaping the battlefield by fire" and "substituting speed for mass"  are about shock action after all).

Staff, telegraph communications and railroad logistics marked a huge change in the way things were done, time, space and distance were always factors in the past, but once these innovations were brought into play, the scale and scope of the battlefield and how wars were fought increased far beyond anything that the ancient Generals could have imagined or dealt with; the example of Alexander not recognizing Ypres is the logical outcome of these developments.

So in the end, it doesn't matter (much) if you are going into battle in columns of route or delivered by a flying carpet, the issues there are resolved by TTPs appropriate to the means at hand and the skilled men to implement them. Getting these means and skilled men is the result of doctrine.

 

[McG]

So, the Nyala is not an Engineer route proving vehicle, it is an armoured patrol vehicle.

Especially since, doctrinally, such a process does not exist.  It was a recce vehicle in the engineers & it was frequently used to recce routes with high explosive threats.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

In the broadest sense, Doctrine is independent of equipment, ideally it is something like a philosophy which allows you to use your resources to the greatest effect. Doctrine also incorporates cultural assumptions, sometimes with unexpected results.

I think we all have a tendency to think more of TTPs which are dependent on equipment and resources, rather than the deeper assumptions which underly them. Although VDH's thesis about the cultural assumptions that underly our western brand of warfare is contentious, it seems pretty self evident that Western forces seek to settle the issue through shock encounters with formed bodies of the enemy, and this seems true when examining Alexander's march through Afghanistan or TFA Roto 4's actions today. Even the current buzz phrase "Kinetic effects" sums up the idea nicely.

So in the end, it doesn't matter (much) if you are going into battle in columns of route or delivered by a flying carpet, the issues there are resolved by TTPs appropriate to the means at hand and the skilled men to implement them. Getting these means and skilled men is the result of doctrine.

I think that your definition of doctrine might be a little more broad than mine, and in looking at underlying cultural organization I see some more of that cultural determinism that I am uncomfortable with.  Doctrine should deal with fundamentals, but I think that it does delve into the "how" of combat to some degree.  I would include field regulations under doctrine, and in past there may not have been a big difference between doctrine and TTPs.  I would include how troops are organized (groupings) in combat as part of doctrine.  Thus, by 1942 the Germans had evovled some pretty effective combined arms doctrine that incorporated the new equipment of the day.  The British did not develop that doctrine for a little while longer and suffered for it.

I've been researching for a paper on the Russo-Japanese War.  The Japanese Army went in with essentially Prussian doctrine.  As Japan underwent the Meirji Restoration that threw off the restraining hand of the samurai they actively sought out "best practices" from the world.  They figured that the British had the best navy and the Germans the best army (certainly looked that way after 1870) and they adopted those doctrines accordingly.  They certainly tried to make the extant German doctrine work, and their horrific casualty lists bear testament to that.  Shock combat is not a European monopoly.

The doctrine of the day, however, had come hard up against new technology and associated methods.  Eventually the Japanese adapted their doctrine to allow for skirmishing, fire preparation and infiltration, not to mention drab uniforms.  The British observers were able to smugly report that the Japanese had adapted their methods that they had learned in South Africa, although they were disappointed that cavalry did not play a big part.  The French drew that their 1904 infantry regulations were fine, since the ascendancy of the offensive over the defensive had been demonstrated by the outcome of the war (Russian defeat, and they were on the defensive) and that their "supple" infantry would figure things out on the ground when the time came.

Nobody got it right completely, but the French looking at a high theoretical level may have led them to have ignored the realities at the tactical level.  Those realities made their overarching strategy irrelevant.  People don't always 'figure it out' in time.  That casual laissez-faire attitude cost the French army dearly.

Going back to how you defined doctrine, I also don't know if I would include how we get the "means and skilled men" for war as part of doctrine in this discussion.  Force generation has, I suppose, its own 'doctrine' and that can certainly have an impact on failure or success.  Regardless, doctrine that exists independent of means (to include equipment and technology) may find itself rather irrelevant.

 

[Kirkhill]

I see that PPCLI Guy is on a one man crusade to bring Rugby to the CF.  Is that a doctrinal shift?

In Gulf War 1 Rupert Smith was the Divisional Commander of 1 UK Division attached to US General Franks' Corps in US General Norman Schwarzkopf's Army.  This put a Rugby player in the middle of a Football playing chain of command.  When Scwarzkopf set up his "Hail Mary" play he and his staff created a planning document that put the Encyclopaedia Britannica to shame.  The demanded and expected the same from their subordinate commanders. From the Americans they got them.  From the Rugby player they got a 4-page document and the information that he would rely on his subordinates and their training come the day.

Football is a game of chess played violently.  The decisions are made off the board by one man.  Troops with specialist skills are shuttled in to fill specific tasks and withdrawn once their task is complete.

Rugby is organized mayhem. The decisions are made by 15 individuals on the field at the time.  They are reliant on their training and the knowledge they have acquired of each other to be able predict each others actions and best utilize each others skills.  Decisions are made locally and rapidly, dependent on the enemy and the situation.

Or is doctrine about how you conduct appreciations and planning?  Because if it is staff work then Sun Tzu defined a method of performing appreciations (Way, Weather, Terrain, Leadership, Discipline) 2200 years ago. 

Or is doctrine about having canned METT-T appreciations in a playbook to meet every eventuality?

Both METT-T and Sun Tzu appreciations consider technology as a planning factor but only indirectly. For Sun Tzu it appears under the head of Discipline: how troops are organized, their chain of command and the logistics necessary.  Under METT-T (Mission, Enemy, Terrain (Environment), Troops (and equipment) and Time.

I guess I am confused as to exactly what "doctrine" is.


Merriam Webster defines doctrine this way:

doctrine
Main Entry: doc·trine 
Pronunciation: \ˈdäk-trən\
Function: noun
Etymology: Middle English, from Anglo-French & Latin; Anglo-French, from Latin doctrina, from doctor
Date: 14th century
1archaic : teaching, instruction
2 a: something that is taught b: a principle or position or the body of principles in a branch of knowledge or system of belief : dogma c: a principle of law established through past decisions d: a statement of fundamental government policy especially in international relations e: a military principle or set of strategies

From that I take it that doctrine may be construed as a teaching tool that eventually becomes dogma. And in my view dogma, and dogmatic response is the antithesis of flexibility and flexible response.

With Million Man conscript armies men were trained in a short period of time to perform a limited task and then were applied to the "board" as the Chain of Command saw fit.   Is that still an appropriate model for professional, volunteer soldiers who give their lives over to the study of arms and are likely to experience a number of "wars" in their career? 

Can you gain by delegating Responsibility-Authority-Budget to the players on the field? 

Would that be a doctrinal shift?