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What Should the Army's Role, Capabilities & Structure Be?

  • Thread starter Thread starter Yard Ape
  • Start date Start date
We would still be better off keeping SM2s as we can use them against aircraft, crusie missiles and in extremis surface targets. SM3 and SM6 are only useful, from what have we been informed, is ballistic missiles. For AAD SM3/6 are not good choices.
 
Shifting gears a bit, here is an extract of a fascinating paper I was just sent. It is the report of a symposium held at the US Army War College, concerning the vulnerability of the US (and, by extension, Allies such as ourselves...) to asymmetric defeat. Obviously I cannot post the entire document, but you should be able to get it at the address shown. Take a look at some of  the conclusions, especially those under "Historical Perspective".

TAKEDOWN:
The Asymmetric Threat to the Nation
22 June 1998
http://www.defensedaily.com/reports/takedown.htm
by Robert David Steele of Open Source Solutions, Inc.
-- special contributor to Defense Daily Network

Can America be defeated through asymmetric means that strike at the known Achilles' heels of the military, as well as key nodes in the largely unprotected civil infrastructure? A recent Army conference provides a strong answer: YES. This leads the reviewer to propose not one, but four distinct "forces after next," each with a prominent mix of reserve and civil counterpart elements.
"Challenging the United States Symmetrically and Asymmetrically: Can America be Defeated", was the focus of the Ninth Annual Strategy Conference hosted by the U.S. Army War College this past spring, and the answer was a very clear cut "No, we cannot be defeated" by symmetric attack and "Yes, we can be defeated" by asymmetric attack. Hosted by MajGen Robert H. Scales, Jr., Commandant, and opened by LtGen Paul K. Van Riper, USMC (Ret.), the conference brought together what may be the single largest collection of iconoclasts and "out of the box" thinkers who are both available to the Department of Defense, and allowed to speak publicly on this important question.1

The Bottom Line
In the largest sense, the conference called into question every aspect of Joint Vision 2010, and clearly documented the need for abandoning the force structureâ ”but not the budgetâ ”required to fulfillâ ”simultaneouslyâ ”two Major Regional Conflicts (MRC) and a minor contingency (the "2+" approach). Although not endorsed by all present, the strategic vision offered as a substitute might be the "1 + iii" approachâ ”one MRC, one low intensity conflict or law enforcement support scenario, one major humanitarian relief operation, and one major electronic campaignâ ”either in the offense or the defenseâ ”"1 + iii", simultaneously.
The most difficult issue confronting most of the participants was not that of threat identification, nor even that of response development, but rather the more ambiguous political issue of "whose job is it?" According to many present, the U.S. military must not allow itself to be distracted from its primary responsibility to prepare for, deter, and win conventional wars. However, all present appeared to recognize that the U.S. government is not trained, equipped, and organized to deal with three of the four threat classes2, and therefore the larger challenge may be internal to the U.S. government as a wholeâ ”developing concepts, doctrine, and organizational means of working across legal, cultural, and budgetary boundaries.3

A Naval Officer Opens
LtGen Paul K. Van Riper, USMC (Ret.) set the stage for the conference with hard-hitting remarks about how the past fifty years have left us with a defense decision-making system that has forgotten how to plan, cannot adapt to change, and is incapable of stimulating a serious dialogue. From Joint Vision 2010 to "dominant battlefield awareness", we are burdened with the proverbial naked emperor.
With specific reference to information operations and asymmetric warfare, LtGen Van Riper stated in no uncertain terms that we have no one who can really define what information superiority means or how we achieve itâ ”we have substituted pablum publications for strategic thinking; and wishful thinking about how we want to wage war, in lieu of realistic planning.4
Desert Storm, seen by many to be the catalyst, the vindication, or the culminating point for the so-called Military Technical Revolution, must be considered with great caution. The enemy may have suffered a tactical defeat, but at the strategic level not only retained power, but grew in influence in both the Arab and Islamic worlds. In particular, the failed promises of aviation have not been scrutinized, and too many senior decision-makers continue to believe that strategic and tactical aviation can preclude the need for placing infantry at risk.

The Historical Perspective

Several distinguished historians5 examined lessons from the past, but were perhaps most helpful in provoking thoughts for the future:
· Mobility is more important than mass.
· Technology is worth little in the absence of timely and insightful intelligence, and geospatial data at a useful level of resolution.
· Tools must fit the targetâ ”we cannot afford to take out hundreds of small targets with extremely expensive high precision munitions.6
· Time and space are much more available to our enemies than to ourselvesâ ”and can be traded for bodies and bullets.
· The enemy's objective is to get us to spread ourselves too thinâ ”yet we persist in starting every confrontation that way: spread too thin.

The Threat Todayâ ”Non-State and State

Seven speakers provided a comprehensive review of the non-state threat today. Their most telling observations are summarized below

· We are our own worst enemyâ ”continuing to procure computers which are wide open to errors & omissions, inadvertent destruction of data, insider abuse, and outside attack (the least of our problems).7
· U.S. vulnerabilities to asymmetric attack are largely in the civil sector, and include bridges, levees, dams; power and telephone switches; and downlinks for the U.S. Intelligence Community and operational commands. Most vulnerable of all are the data managed by banks and major logistics elements including fuel suppliers.8
· Our enemies will succeed by waging war between the seams in our legal system, not our operational capabilities.9
· Time favors the enemy using any kind of information virus.10
· Our future enemies will not be stupidâ ”they will choose carefully between stand-off, indirect (anonymous) and hands-on attacks.11
· The political, economic, and technological climate favors an increase in terrorism and asymmetric attack. This will lead to the privatization of security, the militarization of the police, and the gendarmnification of the military.12
· Our existing criteria for victory are impossible to achieve (decisive victory, limited casualties).13
· Our existing force structure is vulnerable to superior asymmetric maneuvering in time, space, and materials (e.g. infrasonic waves easily penetrating armor to harm personnel).14
· We continue to be vulnerable to well-informed campaigns to manipulate the international media and our home public's perceptions, especially with regard to atrocities and casualties.15
· Our Achilles heel in future overseas deployments will be our dependence on volunteer civilian contractors essential to the maintenance of complex technologies beyond the abilities of our uniformed personnelâ ”as soon as they are terrorized, we lose our cohesion.16
· When all is said and done, most men, and especially men from non-Western cultures and less-developed areas, are capable of taking great pleasure in great evilâ ”the human factor cannot be ignored and cannot be underestimated as a cause and a sustaining element in conflict.17

Interesting, eh? Cheers.
 
I couldn't resist adding this further extract:

MajGen Timothy Kinnan, Commandant, Air War College, was trenchant and to the point:

We cannot afford the existing force structure, but the services are like rats in a box, eating each other over the allocation process. We need to move away from 2+.
Technology will not replace boots on the ground...its greatest contribution may be to let us all work together in real time and finally begin the process of integrating all of our components in a sensible fashion.

Cheers.
 
When all is said and done, most men, and especially men from non-Western cultures and less-developed areas, are capable of taking great pleasure in great evilâ ”the human factor cannot be ignored and cannot be underestimated as a cause and a sustaining element in conflict.17

And here was me looking forward to a good night's sleep secure in the knowledge of the basic goodness of man and his inevitable progress towards Utopia here on Earth.

Thanks for the cheery article pbi.

Sweet dreams. ;) :salute:
 
A bit of "cutting and pasting" from existing regiments and battalions, allied with a modest increase in funding and manpower (yes, those 5000 troops we are promised) can give us the following:

The three LIB parachute companies combined with the resources currently at the Canadian Parachute Centre to create the "Canadian Parachute Battalion" (we will avoid the name Airborne Regiment for now to divert negative energy, and because it really will only be a battalion)

3 x LIBs (augmented with new companies to replace the parachute companies) combined with three squadrons worth of tactical helicopters and some innovative use of UAV's to create an airmobile capability (restyle the units as battalions of the Canadian Mounted Rifles). Those of you who know who I am will have have read this in the ADTB (The Return of the Canadian Mounted Rifles, ADTB Vol 5 No 4).

This provides some light/medium capabilities to react quickly to a crisis situation, "kick in the door" for the arrival of the Joint Expeditionary Force, or carry our manoeuvre warfare at the operational and tactical levels.
 
pbi,
from your article posted would you agree with the defiencies stated from Lt. Gen. Van Riper, are aligned with instruction at the USMC Command and Staff College?
 
2FtOnion said:
pbi,
from your article posted would you agree with the defiencies stated from Lt. Gen. Van Riper, are aligned with instruction at the USMC Command and Staff College?

I'm not sure I fully understand your question. Are you asking: "Does the USMC C&SC teach the wrong thing"?, or are you asking "Does the USMC C&SC identify these weaknesses in its curriculum?"

If you can clarify for me, I'll try to answer. Bear in mind I was a student there in 97/98: six years ago. Cheers.
 
Does the Staff College address these weaknessed?  Also how does the Canadian Staff Colleges address these weaknesses?
 
2FtOnion said:
Does the Staff College address these weaknessed? Also how does the Canadian Staff Colleges address these weaknesses?

Not specifically at the time I attended, but we were encouraged to discuss and critiqe existing and emerging doctrine, such as the USMC/USN "Manouevre from the Sea". The course was very much like a university, with emphasis on understanding and reasoning rather than the rote learning that IMHO marred Cdn Land Force Command and Staff College when I went through in 1990.

I have not attended Canadian Forces Staff College (Toronto): I went to Quantico instead. I do not know much about the curriculum at CFC, although I have heard that it is not very "warry". I stand to be corrected by any alumni of CFC. Cheers.
 
pbi, is there a web site or anything that talks more in detail about the army transformation?
 
ArmyRick said:
pbi, is there a web site or anything that talks more in detail about the army transformation?

Try these threads:

SORD 05/06: http://army.ca/forums/threads/17412.0.html

and for Engr Transformation:  http://army.ca/forums/threads/2139.30.html
 
Whatever our structure will be, there are a few principles it must support: speed and audacity. This will allow even our currently shrunken forces to achieve a disproportionate result on the battlefield or on PSO's

http://victorhanson.com/articles/hanson060204.html

June 2, 2004
Kill the Insurgents - Stop Talking
by Victor Davis Hanson
The New Republic

Most of the time in war, diplomatic machinations don't create enduring realities--events on the battlefield do. After World War I, the defeated, but not humiliated, German army that surrendered in France and Belgium provided the origins for the "stab in the back" mythology that fueled Hitler's rise to power. After World War II, by contrast, the shattered and shamed Wehrmacht in Berlin was unable to energize a Fourth Reich. George S. Patton, snarling to head for Berlin and beyond in 1945, grasped the importance of "the unforgiving minute," when military audacity can establish a fait accompli on the ground that diplomats quibble over for decades. His unfulfilled wish to take Prague meant a blank check for a late-arriving Red Army that would help ensure a half-century of totalitarianism in Eastern Europe.

The labyrinth of failed plans and bad-faith deals in the Balkans led nowhere until the U.S. Air Force secured in 79 days in 1999 the capitulation of Slobodan Milosevic--the chief foreign policy achievement of the Clinton administration. Suicide bombing failed to bring Yasir Arafat what he could not obtain at Camp David only because of the skill and ingenuity of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), which--through a multifaceted strategy of border fortification, proactive attacks, targeted air assassinations, and increased intelligence and vigilance--drastically curtailed the efficacy of the tactic. Arafat today is a marginalized figure not because of a belated European perception that he is corrupt and murderous, but because he was first reduced to a humiliated lord of a rubble pile--thanks to the IDF.

In our current postmodern world, we tend to deprecate the efficacy of arms, trusting instead that wise and reasonable people can adjudicate the situation on the ground according to Enlightenment principles of diplomacy and reason. But thugs like Moqtada Al Sadr's Mahdi Army and Saddam Hussein's remnant killers beg to differ. They may eventually submit to a fair and honest brokered peace--but only when the alternative is an Abrams tank or Cobra gunship, rather than a stern rebuke from L. Paul Bremer. More important, neutrals and well-meaning moderates in Iraq often put their ideological preferences on hold as they wait to see who will, in fact, win. The promise of consensual government, gender equality, and the rule of law may indeed save the Iraqi people and improve our own security--but only when those who wish none of it learn that trying to stop it will get them killed.

A year ago, we waged a brilliant three-week campaign, then mysteriously forgot the source of our success. Military audacity, lethality, unpredictability, imperviousness to cheap criticism, and iron resolve, coupled with the message of freedom, convinced neutrals to join us and enemies not yet conquered to remain in the shadows. But our failure to shoot looters, to arrest early insurrectionists like Sadr, and to subdue cities like Tikrit or Falluja only earned us contempt--and not just from those who would kill us, but from others who would have joined us as well.

The misplaced restraint of the past year is not true morality, but a sort of weird immorality that seeks to avoid ethical censure in the short term--the ever-present, 24-hour pulpit of global television that inflates a half-dozen inadvertent civilian casualties into Dresden and Hiroshima. But, in the long term, such complacency has left more moderate Iraqis to be targeted by ever more emboldened murderers. For their part, American troops have discovered that they are safer on the assault when they can fire first and kill killers, rather than simply patrol and react, hoping their newly armored Humvees and fortified flak vests will deflect projectiles.

This is the context for the current insistence on more troops. America's failure to promptly retake Falluja or rid Najaf of militiamen demands more soldiers to garrison the ever more Fallujas and Najafs that will now surely arise. In contrast, audacity is a force multiplier. A Sadr in chains or in paradise is worth more, in terms of deterrence, than an entire infantry division.

There are other advantages to a force of some 138,000 rapidly responding soldiers, rather than 200,000 or so garrison troops. The more American troops, the less likely it is Iraqis will feel any obligation to step up to the responsibilities of their own defense. The more troops, the more psychological reliance on numbers than on performance of individual units. And, the more troops, the higher the profile of culturally bothersome Americans who disturb by their mere omnipresence, rather than win respect for their proven skill in arms.


On Monday evening, the president outlined a sober, workable, step-by-step transition plan from the appointment of constitutional framers to representative delegates and on to direct democracy, which, like it or not, will at long last put a much-needed Iraqi face on both political and military operations. The long-term trends offer hope--whether we look at heightened petroleum revenue from increased pumping and prices to the influx of U.S. aid and the resurrection of the Iraqi infrastructure. But these trends won't endure unless our youth bring to bear the full force of U.S. military might that credits the Iraqis for their success in putting down the opponents of their own newly created society.

This formula does not require more American soldiers. It requires the increasing use of admittedly unreliable Iraqi troops made more reliable by the massive use of U.S. tanks, airpower, and artillery. The former will grow in confidence, as did the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, when they grasp that real force is on their side and that their enemies have no commensurate recourse to air strikes, armor, and heavy artillery--much less billions of dollars in aid. In other words, we can accomplish two seemingly mutually exclusive goals--more security and less of an American profile--but only by using the force we have to punish the enemy on every single occasion it attacks, starting immediately.

Practically, a new aggressiveness means greater use of Special Forces, Rangers, elite airborne units, and Marines to spearhead retaliatory raids in conjunction with Iraqi forces. Conventional and purely American units should form strategic reserves out of sight that can arrive in overwhelming force to surround recalcitrant cities should our Iraqi-American forces face problems--and they will, at first. Clear success in Falluja--defined not just by apparent tranquility, but the absence of arms caches, nocturnal assassins, and organized gangs of Baathists using homes and businesses to foment insurrection--will undermine Sadr's militias, embolden democracy-minded moderates, and frighten Iran and Syria into curbing their mischief. Iran will talk to us soon enough about behavior that promotes stability rather than terrorism--but only when they have real reason to fear U.S. success in Iraq. A consensual Iraq, then, even in the broadest sense, is a de facto revolutionary force in the region, whose daily televised parliamentary proceedings, free and open presses, economic transparency, and vibrant popular culture offer an alternative paradigm to the same old tired Middle East dichotomy between the Islamic fundamentalism of the masses and the fascist autocracy of the elite.

By contrast, hesitation and uncertainty would propel the sequence of events into reverse. If the humiliating withdrawal from Vietnam in 1975 helped create the landscape for the boat-people, reeducation camps, the Cambodian holocaust, the takeover of the Tehran Embassy, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Russian-sponsored insurrection in Central America, and a decade-long demoralization at home, so, in the same way, our momentum thus far has curtailed the Libyan weapons program, brought revelations of nuclear mischief from Dr. A.Q. Khan, and put Iran and Syria under scrutiny--a volcanic, not a static, situation that can as easily deteriorate as improve. The hard truth is that grand diplomacy and geopolitical calculus depend on the lethality of a few thousand American fighters in the streets of Karbala, Kufa, and Najaf. The more lethal they are today, the safer Iraqis and Americans will be in the years to come.

Victor Davis Hanson is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution.

© 2004 Victor Davis Hanson
 
Right-o recon-man, definately less top heavy IMO.
We could easily lay off most of the civilian sector in NDHQ and force all remaining excess to serve in operational units..
We should in theory already have the command staff in place to tackle a fourth brigade with minimal impact on budget (just do sh*t wack more recruiting)..
Cheers to all who have at least dug a trench and froze their bag off in the field..
 
IF we do adopt LAVIII and its derivatives as our primary AFV (don't entirley agree) then we need NEW doctrine..
Personally I would go with 3 x Medium Brigades in the CF (Valcartier, Gagetown and Shilo), 1 x Light/airmobile brigade (Petawawa) and 1 x Heavy brigade (Wainwright) buts thats me and I won't be PM for awhile...
 
Armyrick,

Lets take your 5 brigade structure as good, I like it, how would it work if the three light battalions were grouped together in a new light brigade for rapid intervention, the three existing brigades were reduced to two battlegroups based on the LAV mounted infantry battalions and geared towards Area Denial operations while the Blackhats were all grouped together in an armoured (Lt/Med/Hvy/what-have-you) brigade geared towards higher intensity conflicts?  Individual cross posting and unit/sub-unit cross attachments would still occur as would inter-unit training.
 
Given the very "asymmetrical" natures of the present day conflicts, I do agree a new doctrine is in order. I would go for a five brigade structure, but parcel out the light/airmobile capabilities to the various brigades, and have "5 Bde" as a Special Forces Brigade, housing the unusual and difficult to categorize elements of the CF. This would be a strategic element, capable of intervening at any level of conflict in the "firefighting" role (i.e. squelch small problems before they become big), or to prepare the ground for the Joint Expeditionary package if things are already too far gone.

While the JTF-2 is an obvious element, I would also add CF-DART; a cyberwar unit and a reborn Canadian Parachute Battalion. A very strong internal Int and CIMIC type element is also a must have in the Special Forces Bde. The Government can dispatch elements of "5 Bde" for humanitarian missions (laying the ground for favorable reception of later Canadian missions if required, JTF-2 for strategic recce, deploy the cyberwar unit to shield our IT resources, track and identify enemy IT systems and resources and take action against them and so on.
 
pbi said:
If the argument is that we need Artillery officers in order to plot and control WWII-legacy "Div Shoots"   I suggest that idea   is also OBE. I doubt we will engage in such activities again, and if we ever do, I suspect it will be by the digital coordination of fires observed by UAVs, striking with more precision from fewer systems, rather than flattening a grid square with hot steel. Nothing that cannot be taught to any officer who has mastered a Mortar Platoon CP operation, with modern   fire control equipment. Further, I think that to separate fire effects from manouevre, at the level we are likely to function at, is a mistake. The two are intimately connected and in fact "fires" should really be extended to "effects" to take in the full range of lethal, non-lethal and electronic systems we may employ on different types of ops.

Apart from the "specialist" skills of the C2 element of the Artillery branch(mainly officers but with a few NCOs), the jobs performed by the great majority of the soldiers are IMHO of a limited mechanical nature that could easily be taught to infantrymen (or to anybody else, for that matter).

Back from leave....

Re the above, in fact, to take it to its next logical step, systematics could, and probably will be developed to the extent that any target that a "sensor" (regardless of who or what that may be) can acquire, a "shooter" (which may be direct, indirect, air-delivered, or even non-lethal or something working in the EM spectrum) can engage.  The decision at that point really revolves around the desired effect on that target, and what shooter assets are available to engage it.  This COULD imply the sensor having some sort of target "designator" that sends information on target back to a central clearing-house, where the decision (human or automated) is made re how to effect it.  But it doesn't necessarily have to be a case of "Cpl Bloggins pushes the button on this discriminator and waits to see what happens to the target--a surprise with every engagement!"  It could be something decidedly lower-tech.  The point is there are potentially many sensors on the battlefield, not all of whom will be "close combat" pers (so I actually see even more melding of battle functions across the force).  The targeting inputs will have to be assessed from all of them, and effects matched to those targets.  This "blurring" of the boundaries between the various forces on the battlefield is probably both inevitable and desirable (as long, as pbi points out, it's done rationally and with adequate forethought).

I would also add that "effects" also need to include information operations effects, including things like psyops, CIMIC, etc.  While we might not view these as traditional close combat effects, we need to be able to employ them in advance of, conjunction with, support of and after the application of close combat effects.  The US is facing this right now in Fallujah (and, in a broader sense, in Iraq generally).  When the shooting stops, the battle is half-over.  I think, therefore, that we also need to consider how to integrate these sorts of activities into the overall effects spectrum that modern war demands.
 
Mountie said:
... I think all like-tasked systems should be grouped together. The infantry battalions will basically be combat manoeuvre battalions with all the infantry and direct fire support assets. The armoured regiments will become armoured reconnaissance units with two squadrons of Coyotes. The close reconnaissance (dismounted) assets would be in the infantry battalion recce platoons. I would equip these recce platoons with eight of the new British Panther Command & Liaision Vehicle which is basically and armoured car (similar to the MOWAG/GM Eagle IV) and equipped with a PWS. (I would call it a Light Armoured Support Vehicle). Then all indirect fire support assets should be grouped in the artillery regiment. I propose three mortar batteries of 6-8 LAV-III 120mm Armoured Mortar Systems, one artillery battery of 6 LAV-III 105mm Denel SPHs and an air defence battery of 24 Light MMEV (the new version of the Starstreak air defence missile which is dual purpose like the ADATS mounted in a 6 round pedestal mount on the back of a modified Panther LASV). All the mobility support and counter-mobility assets within a large combat engineer squadron with all the heavy engineer support assets held in the Role 3 Area Support Group, which I would rename a General Support Group.
Once again, I'll point out that your engineer squadron would have to consist of at least 7 troops (Fd & Sp) plus Admin pers and would be as large as the regiments we already have.  You will not reduce manpower, but you will destroy the ability of the engineers to support three of the four manoeuvre units in the brigade.
 
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