- Reaction score
- 6,221
- Points
- 1,260
pbi said:Details of hulls and cruising speeds aside, its good to see that there's some unity of thought on the idea that we can't just configure the Army in a vacuum-we need to think about a joint force "package" that can project/protect/employ/sustain/recover itself in a expeditionary way. We cannot afford to have Army, Navy, Air Force (nor supporting organizations such as Comms, MP, Med) focused on their own little rice bowls and losing sight of the big picture. I hope that some of the thinking we see in these posts will be reflected in the results of the Def/ForPol review and the resulting force structure. Cheers.
Agreed.
I think we need to recognize some strategic imperatives:
First: we must have sufficient internal security and home defence forces. These will likely be 'reserve' forces - not in the sense of a regular/permanent force vs. reserve/militia force but rather in the sense of expeditionary (ready) vs. reserve (resting/rebuilding) components;
Second: there is no 'conventional' direct threat to Canada but we must maintain the surveillance, detection/identification and interception capabilities, including quick reaction, light (almost certainly air mobile if not airborne) land forces. Forces which have intercepted an intruder must be powerful enough to see the intruder off - a couple of Mounties ferried about in a Griffon is not the right answer;
Third: the threats to our peace and prosperity are best countered by taking preventive military actions - e.g. to rescue failing states. We need sufficient expeditionary forces to -
"¢ Conduct, unilaterally, large unit/small formation low intensity operations anywhere in the world and on fairly short notice,
"¢ Participate, as members of a coalition of the willing, in mid-to-high intensity operations anywhere in the world after a brief period of preparation/mobilization;
"¢ Participate, as members of an alliance, in all levels of operations - including general war, far from home, after a period of mobilization.
We probably need some light (amphibious and air mobile/airborne) army forces - maybe several battle groups' worth, organized into joint task forces at the heart of our permanent expeditionary force. These forces will be best able to handle low intensity, unilateral operations and to 'lead' the way into mid-intensity operations. We should, also, have a 'medium' (motorized/mechanized) formation (brigade+/-) within another joint task force which can participate, fully, in mid-intensity operations and 'lead' the way into higher intensity missions. These must be backed up by adequate reserves (who are available for internal security in their copious free time between deployments).
Consider, just for the sake of argument:
"¢ 10 to 15 battalions of infantry - four light units (two amphibious and two airborne) at high states of readiness and three more in a mechanized/motorized formation - in an up to strength albeit not too 'ready' state;
"¢ A half dozen 'cavalry' units - some with Strykers or even light tanks, some with recce/surveillance/target acquisition systems and some with attack helicopters. Some units will be full regiments, others independent squadrons or composite units;
"¢ An artillery brigade;
"¢ Combat support and combat service support units - including army aviation and electronic (information) warfare units;
"¢ A few VSTOL fighter/bomber squadrons;
"¢ An air transport wing (maybe four heavy lift strategic transports - like the C-17s, possibly leased, 30+ modern medium tactical transports plus some heavy lift helicopters - not unlike the ones we sold to the Dutch several years back); and
"¢ A couple of Navy task groups built around a 30,000+/- ton strategic transport/landing platform.
That would require a massive increase in the defence spending - maybe (remember, please, I've been retired for a long, long time) a 100% increase (to 2% of GDP) over a fairly short period - say five years, and then sustainment for protracted periods.