When Liberal Generals Go To War

[tomahawk6]

This is what passes for generalship. Neither McChrystal nor Hostage have a workable strategy. The proposed policy should bring some laughter for the taliban.


http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5gYMpCvX5RBaJvz9C5ytuJLjBO1QwD9A27H581

Air Force may buzz before bombing in Afghanistan
By SUSANNE M. SCHAFER (AP) – 18 hours ago

SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, S.C. — A new military approach in Afghanistan may mean buzzing rather than bombing the enemy, according to the general taking over the air war there.

It's known as irregular warfare, designed to protect local people and then enlist their help defeating Taliban insurgents, Air Force Lt. Gen. Gilmary Hostage said Thursday.

"The first thing we do is fly over head, and the bad guys know airpower is in place and oftentimes that's enough. That ends the fight, they vamoose," said Hostage, who will direct the air battle over Iraq and Afghanistan. "The A-10 has a very distinct sound. The cannon on an A-10 is horrifically capable and our adversaries know it. When they hear the sound of an A-10, they scatter."

Hostage says the Air Force can easily drop bombs with pinpoint accuracy. But in some cases, it may be better to fly over enemy forces with noisy warplanes to get them to disperse first, then try more force if that doesn't work.

Hostage said he supports the new U.S. commander in Afghanistan, Army Gen. Stanley McChrystal, who is shifting the philosophy toward irregular warfare.

"The challenge with irregular warfare is to empower and enable the people to the point where they don't allow the adversary to hide in amongst them," Hostage said. "It really is a long-term effort."

Hostage said McChrystal has told his forces, "If you are in a situation where there's a civilian at risk, he'd rather have us back away than pressing to engage the enemy and run the risk of damaging or hurting somebody."

The general said the irregular warfare philosophy may sound strange to some, but it gives military commanders more flexibility in fighting a war.

"In a circumstance where I'm only able to blow things up, I'm pretty limited in what I can do," Hostage said. "If I use graduated measures, then there are many things I can do to affect the situation."

Hostage, 54, took the job of overseeing Air Forces for the U.S. Central Command last week. He was heading Thursday from Shaw Air Force Base in central South Carolina to his new post at al-Udeid Air Base in the Persian Gulf state of Qatar, the headquarters of all U.S. air operations in the Middle East.

He is returning to familiar territory, having served as the commander of U.S. forces stationed at Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia in 2001 and 2002. Most recently, he was the No. 2 in charge of U.S. Air Forces in the Pacific.

 

[Journeyman]

When Liberal Thinking Generals Go To War

Use of airpower as a 'show of force' is a common tactic, and well within the escalation of responses inherent in the Rules of Engagement.

During my recent tour, I had the good fortune to talk with Gen McChrystal on several occasions -- I always found him to be thoughtful and well-spoken, with no need to pose in a glow of testosterone. Maybe this doesn't play well amongst the armchair warriors within the Beltway, but for those of us with dirty boots, it's a welcome change.

Consistently leading with 500-lb bombs is what causes so many otherwise uncommitted Afghans to turn against the Americans, and by default, all coalition partners get tarred with the same brush. You can't just say "hearts & minds," then lead with your dick and tape-measure.

If we gain support of the local populace by showing restraint, then I don't give a rat's ass if the Taliban get a laugh. Far from having "no workable strategy," hearts & minds has to be embedded within operational planning; it sounds like it now may be.

 

[tomahawk6]

McChrystal gets high marks for running JSOC and operations in Iraq. While I respect your recent experience in Afghanistan and I certainly dont want to see us alienating the village elders. When a unit is under attack they dont want the first pass by CAS to be a fly by at 10,000 ft.

 

[pbi]

My impression over the last couple of years, through professional reading of Army and USMC reportage, as well as contacts with US forces both during deployment and as part of my current duties, is that the US has learned a huge amount from its experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. Foremost among these is a realization that in a COIN op brute military force, applied indiscriminately, will either achieve nothing significant or will make the situation worse.  "Kill 'em all and let God sort 'em out" is probably heard around the bar in US Legion or VFW branches a lot more than it would be in any US HQ. Second is the realization that  the US can really learn something from its allies, even if they are not nuclear superpowers. This observation is based on direct personal experience: I have found our reception with US forces to be (happily...) utterly different from how it has historically been during my career. No more patronizing or vaguely disinterested attitudes, no more eyes glazing over after a few perfunctory questions. Tomahawk may disagree with me but in my view this represents a major and vitally important cultural shift , one that makes the US military different from  the mainstream US society that in my experience generally doesn't care much about what any of those stupid foreign wimps have to say, and certainly would never admit that a foreigner might have a better idea.  But then maybe, just like in Canada, the professional US military is culturally quite different than the society it serves.

And now for a tangential rant..... I have to ask something: Why are we using terms like "Liberal General"? (And, yes, I know it's the "small "l" not the big "L") I can't imagine that in the rest of the English speaking world we would actually care about (or even know about...) a General Officer's political affiliation as long as he was still serving. Who cares what his private political or social views are long as he is a good, loyal and capable leader? In my view the worst thing a General (or any professional soldier) can do is publicly align himself with any political or religious faction, beyond his sworn duty to the Govt in power (as an agent of the People he serves). For example, I find the excessive presence of overt religious fundamentalism amongst senior officers a bit frightening, no matter whose military it occurs in. I'd be interested to hear what folks think about this.

Cheers

 

[Journeyman]

Agreed T6. I am absolutely a fan of CAS when and where it's required!

Hostage says the Air Force can easily drop bombs with pinpoint accuracy. But in some cases, it may be better to fly over enemy forces with noisy warplanes to get them to disperse first, then try more force if that doesn't work.

Quite often, however, airstrikes have been the first option. In one particular instance, British SOF backed off from a target because they assessed that the potential collateral damage was too high. The US rep then took that target information and the whole compound, and several nearby buildings, were destroyed by F15Es that night.

In addition to creating more enemy's from amongst the village's survivors, the USAF just couldn't understand why several members of the CJSOTF team were...miffed.

Airpower definitely has a role (although somewhat dated, I'd recommend Jim Corum's Airpower in Small Wars), and I believe it's a positive sign that the senior commanders increasingly embrace options to complement the kinetic.

Edit: typo

 

[tomahawk6]

US ROE's have been changed to minimize civilian casualties. A good example of which is the Apache engagement video I recently posted. I agree we need to try to minimize civilian casualties.

 

[Loachman]

US ROE's have been changed to minimize civilian casualties. A good example of which is the Apache engagement video I recently posted. I agree we need to try to minimize civilian casualties.

I do not think that that Apache engagement represents a change of ROE, and certainly not a recent one. We took at least as long during my tour, regardless of who was actually engaging a target, under the same sort of circumstances (no real urgency).

And it paid off, too. I watched a couple of potential targets for at least an hour before everybody agreed that they were not enemy.

Unlike that particular video, it is not always easy to determine what people are really doing, especially those from a different culture. I, for one, have no desire to make a mistake, especially an avoidable one.

 

[observor 69]

The career of a "Liberal" general:    ;D

Early career
McChrystal graduated from the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York, in 1976 and was commissioned a second lieutenant in the United States Army. His initial assignment was to C Company, 1st Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82d Airborne Division, serving as weapons platoon leader from November 1976 to February 1978, as rifle platoon leader from February 1978 to July 1978, and as executive officer from July 1978 to November 1978.[3][4]

In November 1978, McChrystal enrolled as a student in the Special Forces Officer Course at the Special Forces School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Upon completing the course in April 1979, he remained at Fort Bragg as commander of Detachment A, A Company, 1st Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) until June 1980, when he attended the Infantry Officer Advanced Course at the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia, until February 1981.[3][4]

In February 1981, McChrystal moved to South Korea as intelligence and operations officer (S-2/S-3) for the United Nations Command Support Group—Joint Security Area. He reported to Fort Stewart, Georgia, in March 1982 to serve as training officer in the Directorate of Plans and Training, A Company, Headquarters Command. He moved to 3rd Battalion, 19th Infantry, 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), in November 1982, where he commanded A Company before becoming battalion operations officer (S-3) in September 1984.[3][4]

McChrystal moved to 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, as battalion liaison officer in September 1985, became commander of A Company in January 1986, served again as battalion liaison officer in May 1987, and finally became battalion operations officer (S-3) in April 1988, before reporting to the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, as a student in the Command and Staff Course in June 1989. After completing the course in June 1990, he was assigned as Army Special Operations action officer, J-3, Joint Special Operations Command until April 1993, in which capacity he deployed to Saudi Arabia for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.[3][4]

From April 1993 to November 1994, McChrystal commanded the 2nd Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82d Airborne Division; then commanded the 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, from November 1994 to June 1996. After a year as a senior service college fellow at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, he moved up to command the entire 75th Ranger Regiment from June 1997 to August 1999, then spent another year as a military fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stanley_A._McChrystal