- Reaction score
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An excellent example of why Army.ca is so strict regarding backing up contentious assertions wtih researched facts.
Reading the following in the National Post, I had a hard time reconciling the assertion by the author of this letter that Gen Tommy Franks had "botched" both Gulf Wars, Gulf War I as Commander of VII Corps and then as Commander CENTCOM during War 2. I recalled reading a book by Gen Franks of Gulf War 1 and things just weren't adding up as I was positive I had previously checked and determined the two were different individuals. A quick Google of Gen Franks biography showed why my spidey sense was tingling, there are TWO Gen Franks; Gen Fred Franks, who commanded VII Corps in round 1 and Gen Tommy Franks who commanded CENTCOM for round 2. The author's failure to conduct the most basic of research prior to launching a scathing attack on the professional competence of two officers calls every other "fact" in the submission into question. Personally, I'd expect a much higher standard of someone who claims such august academic credentials, but that's just me...
Reproduced under the Fair Dealings...yadayada...
General botched both Gulf wars
Reading the following in the National Post, I had a hard time reconciling the assertion by the author of this letter that Gen Tommy Franks had "botched" both Gulf Wars, Gulf War I as Commander of VII Corps and then as Commander CENTCOM during War 2. I recalled reading a book by Gen Franks of Gulf War 1 and things just weren't adding up as I was positive I had previously checked and determined the two were different individuals. A quick Google of Gen Franks biography showed why my spidey sense was tingling, there are TWO Gen Franks; Gen Fred Franks, who commanded VII Corps in round 1 and Gen Tommy Franks who commanded CENTCOM for round 2. The author's failure to conduct the most basic of research prior to launching a scathing attack on the professional competence of two officers calls every other "fact" in the submission into question. Personally, I'd expect a much higher standard of someone who claims such august academic credentials, but that's just me...
Reproduced under the Fair Dealings...yadayada...
General botched both Gulf wars
General botched both Gulf wars
National Post
Wednesday, May 03, 2006
Re: Who Lost Iraq? It's Not Who You Think, David Frum, May 2.
I read with great interest David Frum's column that focuses on Michael Gordon's and Bernard Trainor's book Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq. It should come as no surprise that General Tommy Franks was at least partly responsible for the failure of the U.S. to establish stability in post-war Iraq. This is because 2003 was not the first time that General Franks botched a military operation in Iraq.
In 1991, Franks was the general officer commanding VII Corps in the First Gulf War. There he quickly proved not only to be well beyond his own competence level, but also overly cautious and lacking in initiative. With their start time for the ground war brought forward by 18 hours because of the lack of significant Iraqi resistance, Franks stopped his modern, night-vision-equipped army at nightfall, for fear of counterattack. Yet the Iraq army -- which had been bombed continuously for 30 days -- was not only immobile, but it also had no night capability. Upon learning of this ridiculous and timorous order (and so the loss of precious time), General Norman Schwarzkopf and General Colin Powell had to be persuaded not to sack Franks on the spot to replace him with a more capable officer. Franks personified the "slow, ponderous, pachyderm mentality" that Schwarzkopf had wanted to avoid: The Iraqis were fleeing Kuwait. Franks was resting.
A few days later, Franks allowed the bulk of the Iraqi Republican Guard to escape destruction because he was apparently afraid of allowing his successful lead units to pass their phase-lines (imaginary lines drawn on a map to help co-ordination). As initiative and "reinforcing success" are the sine qua non of modern manoeuvre warfare, this decision to halt General Barry McCaffrey and his 24th Infantry Division is inexplicable.
Ultimately, this failure to destroy the Republican Guard, which was the military "main effort" explicitly ordered by Schwarzkopf, resulted in Saddam Hussein's continued grip on power. The brutal destruction by the still extant Republican Guard of the Sunni and Marsh Arabs' revolt later that year is proof enough of this.
But this failure did not register. The U.S. military propaganda machine, and those of the individual armed services, geared up after 1991 to portray the war as the vindication of both the Pentagon's new AirLand Battle Doctrine and (especially) all their expensive new weaponry. In this frenzy of self-congratulation, Franks' failure could not possibly have been dealt with publicly, and instead he was put in charge of the U.S. Army's Training and Doctrine Command, presumably a chance for him to spread his skewed concepts of "modern" warfare. As we can see from this new book, the result of his future career was about as successful as his first efforts in Iraq.
Kristian C. Gustafson, senior lecturer, Department of War Studies, Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, England.


