Informing the Army’s Future Structure

[IKnowNothing]

What was the plan for the CCV had the project gone forward? Concentrated in one Bde? One Btn per CMBG? One Coy per LAV Btn?

 

[dapaterson]

From memory:

Original plan was all in 1 CMBG (none at the infantry school).

Amended plan once the regimental mafias weighed in was dispersed between Gagetown, Valcartier and Edmonton.

 

[Kirkhill]

My take-away from 184 pages of discussion on this topic is that there are simply too many issues with the current Canadian Army for Force 2025 (or whatever is replacing it) to be any sort of truly transformative restructuring of the Army.

We have an Armoured Corps with a worn out fleet of tanks that is too small to support and sustain a true Heavy Brigade and a primary Recce vehicle that current operations in Ukraine are showing may be totally unsuitable for a peer conflict.

Our Infantry Corps is undermanned to fill the 9 x Battalions we have and both the Mechanized and Light Battalions are missing the key enablers which would allow them to survive in a peer conflict (ATGMs, integral DFS, sufficient integral IDF, a SHORAD capability, etc.).

The Artillery Regiments are woefully lacking in the number of guns they have in addition to not having a self-propelled platform to at least give them a greater chance of survival in a peer conflict. We have no IDF support beyond the direct support Regiments for the Battalions, no rocket artillery, no loitering munitions, no SHORAD batteries, and no MRAD batteries or C-RAM capabilities to protect our forces or our logistics infrastructure.

Logistics support appears to be ad hoc for overseas deployments with the line between expeditionary support capabilities and garrison support capabilities in the Service Battalions being blurred. Overall our logistics support infrastructure may turn out to be very vulnerable in a large scale peer/near-peer conflict. It sound like even peacetime maintenance capabilities are stretched to almost the breaking point.

Given all of the above I'm beginning to think that rather than Force 2025/202? being a transformation plan it should rather be a consolidation plan.

The global security situation has changed significantly since Force 2025 was first initiated and there are a lot of lessons to be learned from what is happening in Ukraine. These changes will mean that the Canadian Army has to really take a serious look at what a modern battlefield will really look like from a Canadian perspective and look at what capabilities are missing and if our Doctrine may have to be reviewed/revised in order to be successful and relevant.

Perhaps a first step should be to eliminate the 3rd (Light) Battalions from the Infantry Regiments and feed those PYs back into the schools and the Mechanized Battalions. Then a focus can be put on re-establishing those support capabilities that we already know are missing in order to make the infantry survivable in a peer conflict (including integral AT, AA and IDF capabilities). At the same time the Armoured Corps can focus on reviewing our Recce doctrine and determining what the Brigade Recce Squadron needs to look like and at the same time concentrating our tanks in a single Regiment. The Artillery can focus on bringing in a self-propelled gun system to replace the M777. The Combat Engineer Regiments and Service Battalions can take the time to review their own units and ensure that they have the equipment and capabilities required to support a deployed Canadian Brigade Group.

While this consolidation and re-building effort is taking place within the Army the CAF leadership should engage with the Government of Canada to push for a new Defence White Paper to clearly define what kind of forces the Government expects to be able to deploy in this new security environment. This will then allow the Army to look at the larger questions of how many and what type of Brigades are required for the Reg Force and what expectations there are for the contributions will be required from the Reserves to meet our military commitments. This would define our broader organizational and equipment/training/support requirements.

Not nearly as sexy as the other proposals, but I'm guessing that it would provide a much more solid base to build on going forward.

I am firmly opposed to eliminating the light battalions. I agree entirely with working with what is available rather than what is on the wish list.

That starts with the PYs. And in that regard I would be inclined to keep the 3 Battalions as organizing principles around which additional Light Companies would be created from the Reserves. And we should be creating lots of those Light Companies so that they supply a pool of Fire Teams from which the Regs can find 5-10% willing volunteers for international augmentation or 30-70% for domestic crises.

The Light Companies could also be raised by the Cavalry, Gunners and Engineers for domestic duties with dedicated troops forming the specialized Troops of their trades.

The LAV battalions - I would retain their vehicle establishments and fully man the crews (3 people) but reduce the number of Regs in the Rear, perhaps reducing the total per vehicle from 10 (Crew and Pax) to six or seven with a standing augmentation element of 3 or 4.

As to enablers, if you can carry it through a door you can get it inside a LAV, especially if you have fewer pax. So you have room for 81mm mortars and a mortar team or a DMR/MG team.

And on the wish list of things that will fit inside and are man-portable are AD and AT systems.

I think a FORCE 2025 Renovation along those lines are entirely doable, including buying additional M777s.

FORCE 2030 can address the Big Ticket items and take advantage of both Lessons Learned from Ukraine and the stabilizing of what is likely to be a significantly revised geopolitical and strategic situation.

 

[GR66]

I am firmly opposed to eliminating the light battalions. I agree entirely with working with what is available rather than what is on the wish list.

That starts with the PYs. And in that regard I would be inclined to keep the 3 Battalions as organizing principles around which additional Light Companies would be created from the Reserves. And we should be creating lots of those Light Companies so that they supply a pool of Fire Teams from which the Regs can find 5-10% willing volunteers for international augmentation or 30-70% for domestic crises.

The Light Companies could also be raised by the Cavalry, Gunners and Engineers for domestic duties with dedicated troops forming the specialized Troops of their trades.

The LAV battalions I would retain there vehicle establishments and fully man the crews (3 people) but reduce the number of Regs in the Rear, perhaps reducing the total per vehicle from 10 (Crew and Pax) to six or seven with a standing augmentation element of 3 or 4.

As to enablers, if you can carry it through a door you can get it inside a LAV, especially if you have fewer pax. So you have room for 81mm mortars and a mortar team or a DMR/MG team.

And on the wish list of things that will fit inside and are man-portable as AD and AT systems.

I think a FORCE 2025 Renovation along those lines are entirely doable, including buying additional M777s.

FORCE 2030 can address the Big Ticket items and take advantage of both Lessons Learned from Ukraine and the stabilizing of what is likely to be a significantly revised geopolitical and strategic situation.

I'm going to disagree with you on the Light Battalions.

The role of true Light Infantry and Mechanized Infantry are quite different. I'd argue that right now we don't actually have "Light Infantry"...we have Infantry Battalions that don't have armoured vehicles. Personally I think it's likely beyond the bandwidth of the CAF to simultaneously review and develop doctrine for both Mechanized and Light Infantry at the same time while also working on integrating (re-integrating) key enablers that are required to make each type of infantry survivable on the battlefield. Maintaining the two types of Infantry Battalions also forces the Army to have two separate CSS structures to support their different needs, while focusing for now on Mechanized infantry only allows for a concentration of effort.

LAVs make up the bulk of our vehicle fleet and they aren't going to go away even if we eventually do purchase a tracked IFV, a HAPC or develop Light Infantry Brigades. The LAVs aren't going anywhere so whether they remain the main/only Infantry carrier, are concentrated in "Medium" Stryker-like Brigades or are relegated to the Reserves we will need our LAV Battalions to have all the required enablers and a clear doctrine on how to employ them.

In terms of Light Infantry in general, I don't discount their utility and think it is something worthwhile exploring for the CAF. However, I think there are a couple of factors to keep in mind before we go for some major expansion of our Light forces. Firstly (and very importantly) is the high level of risk aversion in the Canadian Government. I am highly doubtful that except in the most desperate of situations that any Canadian Government will be terribly willing to deploy our infantry in anything other then well protected armoured vehicles. Despite what's going on in Ukraine, the most likely deployments for the Canadian Army in Cold War 2.0 will be into periphery state conflict zones to provide deterrence, monitor conflicts or to engage in counter-insurgency, etc. Highly unlikely that the Canadian Government would deploy Light forces (outside of CSOR) to these kind of engagements. Even in a less likely near peer/peer conflict I would imagine a reluctance to deploy light troops (as opposed to mechanized troops operating dismounted).

Then there is the question of how do we best utilize the Reserves. Again here I think you're putting the cart before the horse. Based on the changing global security environment I think it is absolutely vital for the Canadian Government to review our Defence policy and define exactly what expectations we have for the Army going forward. As much as a reorganization of the Reserves is long overdue, I think it would be unwise to make significant role/equipment decisions until the broader policy is defined and the role that the Reserves would be expected to play in fulfilling that policy determined.

In the meantime I think that a general consolidation of the Reserves along with a review of Reserve Employment policy could be undertaken while that happens. Required Legislative changes as well as "right sizing" of Reserve Regiments into Companies and possibly consolidation of units as required could be done while the high level policy decisions are made.

 

[Infanteer]

Given all of the above I'm beginning to think that rather than Force 2025/202? being a transformation plan it should rather be a consolidation plan.

Ding-ding-ding - we have a winner.

You've now arrived where the initiative has been at for the last 5 month.

 

[IKnowNothing]

And given the number of tanks we have on hand - we could generate 5 MEU(SOC)-Cda Battle Groups, each with a platoon of 4x Leo2A4M(Can) and still leave a Type 57 regiment of Leo2A4s and Leo2A6M(Can), complete with an Armoured Engr Sqn around which to create another Battle Gp or Bde Gp.

Or 6 with a spare plus an ABCT/SBCT Hybrid Cavalry Squadron/Btn (with a spare) and still leave 20 tanks for training overall fleet spares.

 

[Infanteer]

What was the plan for the CCV had the project gone forward? Concentrated in one Bde? One Btn per CMBG? One Coy per LAV Btn?

Original plan to buy enough platforms to equip a battalion. Two companies were going to go to Edmonton, and one to Shilo. This was changed mid-stride when silly games started getting played to two companies in Edmonton and one in Gagetown.

The whole plan was a pipedream that would have burdened the CA with a boutique fleet. We were spared when it was dispatched....

 

[Kirkhill]

I'm going to disagree with you on the Light Battalions.

The role of true Light Infantry and Mechanized Infantry are quite different. I'd argue that right now we don't actually have "Light Infantry"...we have Infantry Battalions that don't have armoured vehicles. Personally I think it's likely beyond the bandwidth of the CAF to simultaneously review and develop doctrine for both Mechanized and Light Infantry at the same time while also working on integrating (re-integrating) key enablers that are required to make each type of infantry survivable on the battlefield. Maintaining the two types of Infantry Battalions also forces the Army to have two separate CSS structures to support their different needs, while focusing for now on Mechanized infantry only allows for a concentration of effort.

LAVs make up the bulk of our vehicle fleet and they aren't going to go away even if we eventually do purchase a tracked IFV, a HAPC or develop Light Infantry Brigades. The LAVs aren't going anywhere so whether they remain the main/only Infantry carrier, are concentrated in "Medium" Stryker-like Brigades or are relegated to the Reserves we will need our LAV Battalions to have all the required enablers and a clear doctrine on how to employ them.

In terms of Light Infantry in general, I don't discount their utility and think it is something worthwhile exploring for the CAF. However, I think there are a couple of factors to keep in mind before we go for some major expansion of our Light forces. Firstly (and very importantly) is the high level of risk aversion in the Canadian Government. I am highly doubtful that except in the most desperate of situations that any Canadian Government will be terribly willing to deploy our infantry in anything other then well protected armoured vehicles. Despite what's going on in Ukraine, the most likely deployments for the Canadian Army in Cold War 2.0 will be into periphery state conflict zones to provide deterrence, monitor conflicts or to engage in counter-insurgency, etc. Highly unlikely that the Canadian Government would deploy Light forces (outside of CSOR) to these kind of engagements. Even in a less likely near peer/peer conflict I would imagine a reluctance to deploy light troops (as opposed to mechanized troops operating dismounted).

Then there is the question of how do we best utilize the Reserves. Again here I think you're putting the cart before the horse. Based on the changing global security environment I think it is absolutely vital for the Canadian Government to review our Defence policy and define exactly what expectations we have for the Army going forward. As much as a reorganization of the Reserves is long overdue, I think it would be unwise to make significant role/equipment decisions until the broader policy is defined and the role that the Reserves would be expected to play in fulfilling that policy determined.

In the meantime I think that a general consolidation of the Reserves along with a review of Reserve Employment policy could be undertaken while that happens. Required Legislative changes as well as "right sizing" of Reserve Regiments into Companies and possibly consolidation of units as required could be done while the high level policy decisions are made.

I see the Light Infantry as a stepping stone to everything else in the army. Even a new entry in their first week of training can stand sentry and firewatch (14 year old Sea Cadets did it at Cornwallis).

That is why I emphasize the Light Infantry - not entirely as a tactical capability, although it has its merits there, but for its organizing, training and general utility value. A useful capability to unload tasks from the Regs, launch military careers in the Reserves and supply a formed body for the Goverhment. And provide, from the keeners, trainable augmentees for all Corps of the army.

 

[Infanteer]

I'm going to disagree with you on the Light Battalions.

The role of true Light Infantry and Mechanized Infantry are quite different.

Not the case. The role of an infantry battalion, regardless of its transportation, is the same. An infantry battalion's role is to close with and destroy the enemy, repel the enemy’s assault by fire, and to seize and retain ground. It conducts close engagement tasks in stability operations.

I'd argue that right now we don't actually have "Light Infantry"...we have Infantry Battalions that don't have armoured vehicles. Personally I think it's likely beyond the bandwidth of the CAF to simultaneously review and develop doctrine for both Mechanized and Light Infantry at the same time while also working on integrating (re-integrating) key enablers that are required to make each type of infantry survivable on the battlefield. Maintaining the two types of Infantry Battalions also forces the Army to have two separate CSS structures to support their different needs, while focusing for now on Mechanized infantry only allows for a concentration of effort.

What is "true light infantry?"

 

[CBH99]

Agreed for the Reg Force.

The only way I see it working in Canada is for Regular Force Bases to have a Pool of extra vehicles to do reserve training on so one can use reserve augmentees as something more than a GIB, or radio watch guy.

And only truly practical if there is a will and desire for the CA to become a Total Force Army and acquire more vehicles so Reserve units can become mobile as well.

Wasn’t that the idea behind the MSVS truck fleet?

I thought it was supposed to be used primarily by reserve units and some Reg force units, while another model of medium logistics trucks was also purchased.


(Did the 2nd fleet ever get purchased? Am I totally out to lunch on this whole thing?)

 

[dapaterson]

Yes, the MSVS project delivered the MSVS MilCOTS fleet, intended primarily for the Res F, and more recently the MSVS SMP fleet.

 

[CBH99]

Did those vehicles end up getting scooped up by the regular force, leaving the reserve force still lacking that type of vehicle?

 

[daftandbarmy]

Did those vehicles end up getting scooped up by the regular force, leaving the reserve force still lacking that type of vehicle?

Not that I know of. The MSVS fleet seems to be intact at our local armoury.

 

[Infanteer]

Did those vehicles end up getting scooped up by the regular force, leaving the reserve force still lacking that type of vehicle?

Some Divisions transferred some MSVS MilCot from Res units to Regular units due to the collapse of the LS/ML/HL fleet.

 

[markppcli]

The LAV battalions - I would retain their vehicle establishments and fully man the crews (3 people) but reduce the number of Regs in the Rear, perhaps reducing the total per vehicle from 10 (Crew and Pax) to six or seven with a standing augmentation element of 3 or 4.

So force 2013 (or was it 2016?). We’re already no authorized our full strength.

 

[Kirkhill]

---

So force 2013 (or was it 2016?). We’re already no authorized our full strength.

It's bad but it is what you've got.

 

[Infanteer]

That is indeed Force 2013, and part of the reason we're in the situation we are in today. Go with that COA, and you'll have nobody dismounting out the back, so you may as well pack it in.

 

[markppcli]

Exactly, have been bith reservist and regular I’m very confident that you will not get those augmentees for anything that isn’t “sexy,” no one wants to leave their lives for routine training or deployments to Latvia. It’s a total nonstarter to expect their to fill out positions.

 

[FJAG]

From memory:

Original plan was all in 1 CMBG (none at the infantry school).

Amended plan once the regimental mafias weighed in was dispersed between Gagetown, Valcartier and Edmonton.

Original plan to buy enough platforms to equip a battalion. Two companies were going to go to Edmonton, and one to Shilo. This was changed mid-stride when silly games started getting played to two companies in Edmonton and one in Gagetown.

The whole plan was a pipedream that would have burdened the CA with a boutique fleet. We were spared when it was dispatched....

I had the chance to ask exactly that question of Leslie when I interviewed him.

He confirmed that there were clear and opposing viewpoints but at the end he was persuaded to the distribute them to each brigade for the reason that it was to be a more heavily protected vehicle for deployments (remember this whole thing got its genesis with the Op MEDUSA situation and the LAV3's low protection factor) and if they were to be operationally deployed then every brigade would need some to train on under the Managed Readiness System.

The regimental mafia and equality amongst brothers is a very heavy influencer but the MRS system really is the trump card when it comes to three symmetrical brigades. One first needs to break out of the MRS, as fashioned, if one wants to make any viable arguments for going asymmetrical.

 

[Kirkhill]

Exactly, have been bith reservist and regular I’m very confident that you will not get those augmentees for anything that isn’t “sexy,” no one wants to leave their lives for routine training or deployments to Latvia. It’s a total nonstarter to expect their to fill out positions.

Latvia is now what I would define as a "standing commitment" in the same sense as Stanavforlant". So it seems reasonable to me that it should be met by standing forces. Ie Regs.

Are we so reduced and straitened that the Regular Force can't even sustain two companies on their own from three brigades with nominal strengths of something like 4000 each?

Indeed we might as well just pack it in.