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Canada moves to 2% GDP end of FY25/26 - PMMC
- Thread starter Maxman1
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Now that is a myth.
1 Cdn Div mobilized in Sep 1939. It sailed to England that December. In 1940 it was receiving new equipment to replace the stuff they were mobilized with and in the spring of 1940 deployed to France with the British expeditionary forces. In June 1943 it was back in combat in Sicily.
2 Cdn Div also mobilized in Sep 1939. It sailed to England in August 1940. In Aug 1942 it was in combat at Dieppe.
We're basically talking one to three years here in which two divisions went from mobilizing and deploying to being on combat operations with over 15,000 men the vast majority of rose, primarily through the Nonpermanent Active Militia system to being RSMs and commanders of battalions and brigades. By 44 Canada had a two corps army in the field.
That's significantly shorter than the 15 years that were posited to take to create a junior major.
True enough. It's not a big math problem to figure out that you can do more training on full-time service than part-time. But full-time service costs about 6 to 10 times what part-time costs on an annual basis for pay alone, not counting the costs of exercises.
The point is finding that balance of having just enough full-timers to do the day-to-day essential things from administration to deployment of Roto 0s and a large stock of part-time things that can be mobilized to be reasonably effective on additional full-time mobilization training so that by Roto 1 you have five to ten times the force available.
The point in this debate is that you can do a lot of the fundamental training for medium level leadership well in advance on a part time basis and then when a major crisis occurs you can mobilize that and even civilians on much less time than the fifteen years spoken of to train junior PO1s and LCdr.
Canada's poor mobilization planning extends to the fact that we have neither the planned facilities for expanding the force (either equipment or personnel or facilities) nor do we have wartime accelerated individual training plans to put into use when that event occurs. We'll ad hoc that if and when the time comes. In short, we need to know and plan for how to turn that regular force or reserve force MCpl and Lt into an effective WO and Maj within a year. We're already pretty good at turning mediocre LCols into MGens.
I agree with 95% of what you say. Everything except for that "This fixation on WWII has to stop" thing. It's not a fixation at all. What it is is reminder that the CAF has lost its way in preparing for major wars and that some of the lessons of WW2 need to be remembered and put into effect. That needs to be imposed along side with the understanding of modern warfare. Just a quick question. Who would have thought that modern war would revert to WW1 attrition trench warfare where thousands of lives are lost daily?
The CAF lives almost entirely for "what can you do for me today" without much thought for the needs of tomorrow's major crisis.
My mantra has always been that during peacetime the regular force should consist of those people who are needed day to day to ensure the functioning of the system as a whole and those people whose skill sets are so complex that they need to honed and practiced ever day. That includes all the skill sets you mention plus a few more and just enough generalist such as soldiers, and sailors who are needed to provide a sufficient framework to train and form the higher NCM and offr ranks and doctrine for the future. Everyone else who is not needed day to day or whose skills can be acquired and maintained to an acceptable level on a part-time basis serves solely as a part-time reservist until needed. That requires a good understanding of force structure, the needs of modern warfare, a formula for funding the total force and the ability to mobilize the force when a nation-threatening crisis occurs.
DND and the CAF have far too many full-time people doing work best described as a that of a "self licking ice cream cone" and not enough preparing for the war that is already ongoing.
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Wait…are you trying to say that an indepth knowledge of the profession of arms is more important than an MBA and being bilingual?
An Interesting perspective…
Early days. The vast majority of the people have little to no experience with space. That's how startups work. We're now in the process of standing up a new trade and formalizing all kinds of training.
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I would also suggest that perhaps senior IM IT GOFOs might be drawn from CELE and AIGs, not Armor and Log.
But that's heresy, I know.
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He had no intellectual curiousity? He had no prior exposure to space?
GOFOs should not stumble into a job without background knowledge or experience. Selection should not be filtered at the rank my major by discrimination against non "operational" occupations.
CAF leadership permitted the erosion of the CAF to the point where there are systemic lacks of personnel, equipment and materiel. That's strongly suggestive of failed leadership selection models.
I specifically said there are some lessons to be learned. Especially on mobilization.
But the fixation I'm referring to is the neverending focus (often over here) on the capabilities that existed in WWII. There's often complete ignorance on all the arms of modern warfare. A modern staff doesn't just have air, land sea. Synchronization needs to happen across all domains. And actions often need to be cross-domain to succeed. An army that ignores the EM and Cyber fight is highly likely to fail. Just a reminder. This is war in 2025:
NTK/RTK. Nobody is getting a full LVL III brief on things outside their dayjob normally. Obviously the brief you as Comd of 3 CSD is going to be different from what you get as DCOMD 1 CAD.
And I will say to their credit, both the Wing and Div Cdrs don't actually think their personal situations are ideal. Your first space posting shouldn't normally be as the JFSCC/Div Comd. To that end, both of them have pushed hard for professionalization of CAF Space and succession plans so that nobody like them fills those jobs in the future. That's as good as one can ask for with a commander.
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Now that is a myth.
1 Cdn Div mobilized in Sep 1939. It sailed to England that December. In 1940 it was receiving new equipment to replace the stuff they were mobilized with and in the spring of 1940 deployed to France with the British expeditionary forces. In June 1943 it was back in combat in Sicily.
2 Cdn Div also mobilized in Sep 1939. It sailed to England in August 1940. In Aug 1942 it was in combat at Dieppe.
We're basically talking one to three years here in which two divisions went from mobilizing and deploying to being on combat operations with over 15,000 men the vast majority of rose, primarily through the Nonpermanent Active Militia system to being RSMs and commanders of battalions and brigades. By 44 Canada had a two corps army in the field.
That's significantly shorter than the 15 years that were posited to take to create a junior major.
True enough. It's not a big math problem to figure out that you can do more training on full-time service than part-time. But full-time service costs about 6 to 10 times what part-time costs on an annual basis for pay alone, not counting the costs of exercises.
The point is finding that balance of having just enough full-timers to do the day-to-day essential things from administration to deployment of Roto 0s and a large stock of part-time things that can be mobilized to be reasonably effective on additional full-time mobilization training so that by Roto 1 you have five to ten times the force available.
The point in this debate is that you can do a lot of the fundamental training for medium level leadership well in advance on a part time basis and then when a major crisis occurs you can mobilize that and even civilians on much less time than the fifteen years spoken of to train junior PO1s and LCdr.
Canada's poor mobilization planning extends to the fact that we have neither the planned facilities for expanding the force (either equipment or personnel or facilities) nor do we have wartime accelerated individual training plans to put into use when that event occurs. We'll ad hoc that if and when the time comes. In short, we need to know and plan for how to turn that regular force or reserve force MCpl and Lt into an effective WO and Maj within a year. We're already pretty good at turning mediocre LCols into MGens.
I agree with 95% of what you say. Everything except for that "This fixation on WWII has to stop" thing. It's not a fixation at all. What it is is reminder that the CAF has lost its way in preparing for major wars and that some of the lessons of WW2 need to be remembered and put into effect. That needs to be imposed along side with the understanding of modern warfare. Just a quick question. Who would have thought that modern war would revert to WW1 attrition trench warfare where thousands of lives are lost daily?
The CAF lives almost entirely for "what can you do for me today" without much thought for the needs of tomorrow's major crisis.
My mantra has always been that during peacetime the regular force should consist of those people who are needed day to day to ensure the functioning of the system as a whole and those people whose skill sets are so complex that they need to honed and practiced ever day. That includes all the skill sets you mention plus a few more and just enough generalist such as soldiers, and sailors who are needed to provide a sufficient framework to train and form the higher NCM and offr ranks and doctrine for the future. Everyone else who is not needed day to day or whose skills can be acquired and maintained to an acceptable level on a part-time basis serves solely as a part-time reservist until needed. That requires a good understanding of force structure, the needs of modern warfare, a formula for funding the total force and the ability to mobilize the force when a nation-threatening crisis occurs.
DND and the CAF have far too many full-time people doing work best described as a that of a "self licking ice cream cone" and not enough preparing for the war that is already ongoing.
I keep hearing about how "easy" it is to train a soldier but how hard it is to train a platoon, a battalion or a division.
From a motley crew of militia men, WW1 retreads and civilians of the street, with a variety of new weapons in the offing (Bren Carriers, tanks, radios, Self-propelled guns, radar....)
Canada managed to put 1,000,000 people in uniform with 730,000 in the Army.
That was split into two Commands and an Army (Pacific, Atlantic and 1st Canadian)
There were 2 active Corps (1 in Italy and NW Europe, 2 in NW Europe)
There were 8 Divisions (1 and 5 in Italy - 2,3 and 4 in NW Europe - 6 and 8 on the Pacific Coast and 7 on the Atlantic Coast)
There were 21 Infantry Brigades and 5 Armoured Brigades.
Along with all their relevant attachments of Gunners, Sappers, Signallers, Ack Ack Gunners... and various Special Service types.
None of those formations existed in 1939. Most of the weapons didn't exist. And certainly most of the soldiers didn't exist.
There was an awful lot of learning to do in the next 6 years. Learning that didn't stop when battle commenced. That only sped up the process until May 8,1945 - or Aug 15 if you prefer.
There were professionals that carried the army through the war.
There were armed civilians that also carried the army.
Much of a sameness with WW1 and much of a sameness with modern Ukraine.
I could say the same with the RCN and the RCNVR.
September 1939 - 1674 ratings and 145 officers in the RCN with another 1700 or so in the RCNR and the RCNVR.
August 1945 - about 110,000 with some 80% of those being RCNVR in 123 corvettes, 70 frigates and 84 motor launches and torpedo boats. Many with crews that had never seen the ocean let alone sailed.
You can credit the Canadian professionals and their training skills, or their Brit counterparts, or both, or the innate capabilities of Saskatchewan farmhands. But people with no prior knowledge ended up learning how to operate any and every gun available from Boer War relics to the latest kit with prox fuses, torpedoes and depth charges, HFDF, sonar and radar - by 1943, 4 years later. And along they way they picked up Morse, Semaphore, the Aldis lamp and the Flag Locker. And they learned how to operate in Hunter-Killer groups between 1942 and 1943.
By 1945 all were experienced professionals.
....
The real question is, in my opinion, how quickly can we learn to adapt.
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I don't disagree. But they might have the same problem we have in space where nobody above LCOL has operational experience in the domain (cyber) for them.
Will agree that it's malpractice that a lot of the CAF don't understand that these are distinct domains and simply treat it as a supporting activity. Reflected in some of the discussion here.
daftandbarmy
Army.ca Fossil
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daftandbarmy
Army.ca Fossil
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It takes about 6 months to train a good soldier. Maybe a little longer for a Junior Officer - say 8 months or so.
With well selected, trained, and hardened Officers and troops you can train up sections, platoons, companies and battalions in about the next 6 months.
If you have poorly trained basic material, you'll usually fail in any attempt to build an effective larger sized force.
MilEME09
Army.ca Fixture
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How dare you question the sacred practice of promote and post for our worst people. There's no way that we could of foreseen that biting us in the butt! None i say!!
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A lot of things go out the window in wartime. Second language training. "How to" manage projects and function in various roles other than one to which one is appointed. (If you're not posted to DND for the duration, there's a lot about DND you don't need to know.)
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The most important lesson of mobilizing for WW II was "how to mobilize". And it's worth studying the different implementations. Examples: the US did the best job of advance planning; the Soviets did the best job of mobilizing under extreme pressure; the British did the best job of squeezing the highest fraction of GDP.
If we’re going to have somewhere between 1/3 and 1/5 of the fighting army deployed to Latvia for the long haul, then we’ve got to make troops want multiple tours, the way they craved time in Lahr and Baden. There has to be some way to make tax free service in Eastern Europe, with no one shooting at you, atttractive. Hell, myself and my peers lined up around the block for trips to the Balkans, and back then we had to pay income tax.
Some kind of reverse Pony Express, where we swap out the riders (the senior officers that want to ‘make their mark’) and keep the same horses (the troops that remain in the line units for the bulk of their career) is just a recipe to burn out the army quickly.
Some kind of reverse Pony Express, where we swap out the riders (the senior officers that want to ‘make their mark’) and keep the same horses (the troops that remain in the line units for the bulk of their career) is just a recipe to burn out the army quickly.
