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New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy

  • Thread starter Thread starter GAP
  • Start date Start date
AOPS shouldn't be sent anywhere where it is vulnerable to the threats your describe, just like how we did not send CPF's into the Red Sea as they were not adequately able to deal with the threat environment at hand. Putting a 57mm gun aboard the ships isn't sufficient insurance to risk valuable vessels and their crews in peacetime against these threats.

Won't we have enough for them to do just doing the job they were originally intended to do? Running backwards and forwards from Esquimalt and Halifax to the ice edge, keeping 2 or three permanently on station between in the Beaufort and Baffin areas?

Angus mused about getting a big ship for the arctic. He has six ships for the arctic, and a couple of Coast Guard ones as well. Perhaps he could start integrating those lily pads with JTFN.
 
Won't we have enough for them to do just doing the job they were originally intended to do? Running backwards and forwards from Esquimalt and Halifax to the ice edge, keeping 2 or three permanently on station between in the Beaufort and Baffin areas?

Angus mused about getting a big ship for the arctic. He has six ships for the arctic, and a couple of Coast Guard ones as well. Perhaps he could start integrating those lily pads with JTFN.
Yes, AOPS has their hands full as it is between their own duties and now taking on MCDV duties. Doing CPF duties is totally untenable.
 
So when have we (since the 1980's) sent a ship that wasn't actually a warship for a combat type scenario? Gulf war was warships, some were converted with new equipment but they were still warships. MCDV's haven't done a single warship job that I can think of outside of the MCM tasks.

Honestly this "desperate" Ottawa thing doesn't really line up with the reality short of a shooting war for the navy. Army yes, it kinda does but navy not so much. If we are legitimatley desperate (like total war situation) then all the normal boundaries and guardrails are out anyways. Wooden guns on whaling ships, armed yachts and all that. Total war does that, and if that's the case the actual warships might not last that long anyways, to be replaced with whatever we have left.
 
I'll point at the "Combat Tanker" stories from the Gulf War....and yes, we have put non warships into warship roles.
 
I'll point at the "Combat Tanker" stories from the Gulf War....and yes, we have put non warships into warship roles.
The tanker is a combatant. It goes in the forward echelon with the warships. But it's not doing a warship role, its doing the tanker role with the warships. Give me one example where a non-combatant ship was used in recent history for a role a combatant was necessary. I'm happy to eat crow but I think this is a zombie lie. It may have been true but hasn't been true for a long time. There isn't an example in the last 25 years of that happening that I know of.
 
The tanker is a combatant. It goes in the forward echelon with the warships. But it's not doing a warship role, its doing the tanker role with the warships. Give me one example where a non-combatant ship was used in recent history for a role a combatant was necessary. I'm happy to eat crow but I think this is a zombie lie. It may have been true but hasn't been true for a long time. There isn't an example in the last 25 years of that happening that I know of.

During Op Apollo we (PRE) had a patrol box, and conducted patrolling and operations (Boardings) in that box.

Not sure if you would classify that as warship role.

I fully agree with your premise though.
 
The tanker is a combatant. It goes in the forward echelon with the warships. But it's not doing a warship role, its doing the tanker role with the warships. Give me one example where a non-combatant ship was used in recent history for a role a combatant was necessary. I'm happy to eat crow but I think this is a zombie lie. It may have been true but hasn't been true for a long time. There isn't an example in the last 25 years of that happening that I know of.
hasn't really been a war that needed it. 1982 and the Falklands is probably the last time
 
AOPS shouldn't be sent anywhere where it is vulnerable to the threats your describe, just like how we did not send CPF's into the Red Sea as they were not adequately able to deal with the threat environment at hand. Putting a 57mm gun aboard the ships isn't sufficient insurance to risk valuable vessels and their crews in peacetime against these threats.
There are lot of people/groups and even States that will see them as juicy targets and the proliferation of threats and the means to carry them out is going to grow and expand. Using your assessment guide, then you can rule out most of the Caribbean, Western Pacific, Med, West Coast of Africa and parts of Europe. At which point, disarm them and paint them red/white. (I did not include Eastern Africa or anywhere near the Red Sea as I don't see them going there regardless of configuration, I used historical mission sets from the MCDV)

The current belief of minimal protection just makes them more of a target, not less. The propaganda value of a hit on one is just as valuable as hit on a CFP. Particularly from non-state actors with access to aerial and surface drones.
 
The tanker is a combatant. It goes in the forward echelon with the warships. But it's not doing a warship role, its doing the tanker role with the warships. Give me one example where a non-combatant ship was used in recent history for a role a combatant was necessary. I'm happy to eat crow but I think this is a zombie lie. It may have been true but hasn't been true for a long time. There isn't an example in the last 25 years of that happening that I know of.
Russia has recently had tugs and ancient recovery ship damaged by enemy action during ops. As for fleet tankers, in a modern peer war, they are likley to be some of the first vessels sunk. When you read as just how fragile was the USN oil logistics in the WWII Pacific, had they lost even one more fleet oiler, operations would have ground to a halt for awhile. Even on the eastern seaboard, fuel oil levels became critical for awhile, thanks to Uboats sinking tankers.
 
Russia has recently had tugs and ancient recovery ship damaged by enemy action during ops. As for fleet tankers, in a modern peer war, they are likley to be some of the first vessels sunk. When you read as just how fragile was the USN oil logistics in the WWII Pacific, had they lost even one more fleet oiler, operations would have ground to a halt for awhile. Even on the eastern seaboard, fuel oil levels became critical for awhile, thanks to Uboats sinking tankers.

Anything can be a noncombatant until the enemy decides its combatant.

That said we should be employing our equipment as designed.
 
There are lot of people/groups and even States that will see them as juicy targets and the proliferation of threats and the means to carry them out is going to grow and expand. Using your assessment guide, then you can rule out most of the Caribbean, Western Pacific, Med, West Coast of Africa and parts of Europe. At which point, disarm them and paint them red/white. (I did not include Eastern Africa or anywhere near the Red Sea as I don't see them going there regardless of configuration, I used historical mission sets from the MCDV)

The current belief of minimal protection just makes them more of a target, not less. The propaganda value of a hit on one is just as valuable as hit on a CFP. Particularly from non-state actors with access to aerial and surface drones.
It's not just potential, it's probability.

The probability of an attack is low, so AOPVs can go to those places. Even a combatant ship can be taken out by an attack out of nowhere, because you don't sail closed-up at action stations at all times.
 
Russia has recently had tugs and ancient recovery ship damaged by enemy action during ops. As for fleet tankers, in a modern peer war, they are likley to be some of the first vessels sunk. When you read as just how fragile was the USN oil logistics in the WWII Pacific, had they lost even one more fleet oiler, operations would have ground to a halt for awhile. Even on the eastern seaboard, fuel oil levels became critical for awhile, thanks to Uboats sinking tankers.
There is a certain point where you just take the hit and build a new ship for some of these specialist craft. AOPS is a specialist craft. You're not building a tug boat to do the job of a battleship. AOPS is a patrol vessel, not a warfighter. If the shooting starts they are going to be in a different role or different place.

And as far as someone taking a shot at them, that's what intelligence is for. Even a full blown warship can be surprised in the wrong situation if intelligence is off.
 
Problem with intelligence, is you need to be right almost every time and then very lucky if you are not right. There is a lot that I like about the AOP's, but the self-defence armament is not one of them and the RCN as an organization has not covered itself in glory via it's decision making processes, either in equipment or personal management. I will continue to argue they cheaped out on the armament/sensor side of the equation, and I fear it will come back to haunt us one day.
 
Problem with intelligence, is you need to be right almost every time and then very lucky if you are not right.
That goes back the core problem with police and the military. The potential for an unpredicted attack is omni-present.

Police don't patrol in APCs, despite attacks on police happening far more frequently than random attacks on warships/naval vessels.

There was/is little reason to put expensive self-defense kit on an AOPV for the very unlikely event that an attack would happen when the kit was fired-up and staffed, with the RoE to use the kit within an effective timeframe.

If we need to add capability, bolt-on or portable options will make sense, but until then, it would be wasted money that could be used to address more pressing issues.
 
That goes back the core problem with police and the military. The potential for an unpredicted attack is omni-present.

Police don't patrol in APCs, despite attacks on police happening far more frequently than random attacks on warships/naval vessels.

There was/is little reason to put expensive self-defense kit on an AOPV for the very unlikely event that an attack would happen when the kit was fired-up and staffed, with the RoE to use the kit within an effective timeframe.

If we need to add capability, bolt-on or portable options will make sense, but until then, it would be wasted money that could be used to address more pressing issues.
Wouldn't it be wise to identify and procure those bolt on options whilst they are available to be purchased? It is better to have them sitting in a warehouse in Victoria than backordered because our allies are in the same boat. "Should a" is not a valid explanation and "just in time stocking" might work for Ford but it is a bad way to run a military supply depot.
 
Wouldn't it be wise to identify and procure those bolt on options whilst they are available to be purchased? It is better to have them sitting in a warehouse in Victoria than backordered because our allies are in the same boat. "Should a" is not a valid explanation and "just in time stocking" might work for Ford but it is a bad way to run a military supply depot.
Again, there are other priorities for the money.

The CA completely lacks GBAD, how likely do you think it is that the RCN will get GBAD/CUAS systems for warehouses before the CA gets those systems for the troops in Latvia?

Once the CA has systems and figures out what works, it makes sense for them RCN to evaluate those systems against the RCN's requirements.

There may be a lot more money, but it isn't infinite, and the people required to run the projects aren't falling from the skies in abundance.
 
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