The Army Reserve needs to lose a lot of its history and embrace the future instead.
No it doesn't. The history doesn't impede anything if you have a proper future to work towards. The reason people look backwards is because they have nothing to look forward to. If I was a reservist these days and told that my future would be homeland defence and "no, we don't know what that means but we want you to do it as cheaply as possible," then I'd be handing in my walking papers.
Tell me, in good conscience - what is this future that they are supposed to be embracing?
Units need to have training areas within reasonable proximity.
Easy to say when you live a couple of hours from Petawawa. The mass of your reservists live in areas where the training areas are tiny and close to non-existent - Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver - Canada's three largest cities with a third of the country's population have miniscule training areas.
There needs to be a force structure designed for outputs, not perpétuation of fictional tales of heroism from the world wars.
There needs to be a force structure designed for outputs. Period. The tales of heroism aren't fictional; they're very real. But they are not the impediment to creating force structures designed for outputs. The impediments reside in Ottawa.
There needs to be institutional commitment to members, and member commitment to the institution.
That we agree on.
Somehow CSS and engineer units can be amalgamated and renamed and they continue on just fine; why are the infantry, artillery and armoured such snowflakes?
The Suttie commission amalgamated combat arms units in the 1960s and closed a hundred or so armouries. It solved nothing because it was followed by an immediate drop in funding and mission/role confusion and reservists left in leaps and bounds.
Forget the history crap - its a red herring. Set proper roles that people want to join for; buy the equipment; hire the maintainers; and spend money on realistic training. That's what will create valuable outputs. But that won't happen because it costs money and needs regular force personnel to be involved in leadership, administration and maintenance (as we both say to everyone - continuing, full-time = regular force) But the RegF won't play that game. They'd rather wink, wink, nudge, nudge, use Class Bs that are barely more qualified then the folks they are supporting.
I had a chat with someone recently on the IFM project and asked "what about the reserves?" The answer was "Up to now we've had to put all of our energy into the RegF - we'll be able to turn our attention to the reserves now."
That's exactly where the system comes crashing down. When force structures are discussed, reservists are an afterthought rather than part of the initial force structure discussion - its the perpetualization of reservists as augmentees rather than an element in the expanded force structure.
