Continental Defence Corvette

[Kirkhill]

DANAE project: A fleet of Armed USV for the French Navy by 2027 - Naval News

The DANAE (for Drone Autonome Naval avec de l’Armement Embarqué or Autonomous Naval Drone with Onboard Armament) project aims to rapidly equip the French Navy with armed Unmanned Surface Vessels (USV)

www.navalnews.com

French navy drone efforts.

Ukraine turned to drones because they had no ships.
The Brits are turning to drones because they don't have enough ships.
In neither case could new ships be brought on line quick enough,

Drones allowed the Ukrainians to reach out from their shores.
British drones are intended to let the available ships reach farther and cover more sea area.
They are not a replacement for ships.
They are a complement to the existing capabilities.

They can be deployed from the existing fleet. They can be controlled from the existing fleet and directly from shore or circling aircraft.

And these are a key part of the new ecosystem. They can sail for months with no attendance, transmit what they sea and hear above, on and under the water...... and critcally, they enable communications between aircraft, satellites and ships with submerged submarines and drones.

Wave Glider for Anti-Submarine Warfare | Liquid Robotics

Our Wave Glider platform has expanded detection capabilities for both littoral and deep-water environments to maximize anti-submarine warfare (ASW) budgets.

www.liquid-robotics.com

Do wave gliders allow communications between aircraft and submarines +8

Yes, Wave Gliders act as a critical,, long-endurance communication gateway between submerged submarines (or underwater drones) and aircraft, satellites, or shore stations. They function as a "bridge" over the air-water interface to overcome the limitations of acoustic (underwater) and radio (air) communication systems

Key Aspects of Wave Glider Communication:

How it Works: Wave Gliders use a two-part system—a surface float and a submerged glider connected by a tether—to maintain communication via acoustic modems with submarines, then transmit that data via radio/satellite to aircraft or command centers.

Covert Operations: They enable submarines to receive information and send data without surfacing, which reduces the risk of detection.

Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW): Wave Gliders are used to form mobile, distributed sensor networks to detect, track, and provide communication for manned and unmanned submarines.

Real-time Data Transfer: They offer a faster and cheaper method for transferring data from the seafloor or deep-sea vehicles to personnel in the air or on land.

While researchers at MIT have developed a, separate, specialized system called "translational acoustic-RF communication" (TARF) that allows aircraft to directly detect, ,underwater acoustic signals via surface ripples, the Wave Glider is the established industry-standard autonomous surface vehicle platform that actively acts as a, relay node between undersea and air assets.

 

[oldcpu]

These large long range drones are 'all the rage' in various news articles, but in truth, they are very untested.

Anyone who has been to sea knows equipment breaks down, either due to pounding/rolling of the sea, or due to the salty air, or simply due to manufacturing of some random part that was not up to spec, or due to some salt water leak impacting equipment. With warships being manned with maintainers, the equipment can be diagnosed and repaired. But for a large unmanned drone? Nope. No one onboard. The drone potentially simply drifts away potentially as a navigation hazard or until it runs aground somewhere, or until the navy is fortunately able to relocate, recover, and fix.

The jury is still out as to their effectiveness.

Do I hope these drones will work? Yes. I do.

But I am still from Missouri here on this. Again, command and control is a key weakness. If at any time they are required to up-link a signal as part of their command and control , they give away their position to an astute enemy. Further other factors can affect the command and control.

This is not as simple as these articles make it out to be.

 

[Kirkhill]

The Navy’s new 30-year shipbuilding plan outlines an effort to buy 15 battleships by 2055, and reveals details about the 80-plus robot boats it aims to add within five years.

Drone boats make debut in Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan

Service officials envision a 450-hull fleet by 2031.

www.defenseone.com

1 "Battleship" every two years
16 "Robot Boats" a year.

That is the arithmetic that is adjusting the thinking.

While 1 ship is being built and its sailors trained 32 uncrewed vessels are hitting the water. And these are in the 500 tonne class.

Not the 11m launches, Saildrones, Wave Gliders and Hernes.

...

What is driving the experiment is the same impetus that drove the rise of the corvettes and MTBs. Speed and cost and necessity.

 

[oldcpu]

This is a thread about the Canadian Continental Corvette (last I looked) and not about battleships.

Still, in response to this so-called plan, I think it important to note that the history of U.S. Navy (USN) procurement is marked by several ambitious "next-generation" programs that were curtailed due to the end of the Cold War, spiraling costs, or shifting technical requirements.

Some examples for you, of major USN ship procurement programs that were canceled or drastically reduced after only a few hulls were completed:

• Zumwalt-class Destroyer (DDG-1000). Original plan: 32 ships. Actual build: 3 ships
• Seawolf-class Submarine (SSN-21). Original plan: 29 boats. Actual build: 3 boats
• CG(X) Next-Generation Cruiser (to replace the Ticonderoga-class cruisers). Original plan: 18-19 ships. Actual build: 0. (cancelled in 2010)
• Sea Control Ship (SCS) (proposed early 1970s). Original plan: 8 ships. Actual build: 0 (cancelled 1974)
• Freedom-class Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). Original plan: 52 ships. 16 (Freedom-variant) / 19 (Independence-variant). Further, the USN is retiring them far earlier than originally planned.

A deeper pattern behind all these programs is this:

The USN repeatedly tries to make large technological leaps in a single class:

• new hull form,
• new combat system,
• new propulsion,
• new weapons,
• reduced crew,
• new doctrine,
• and often new industrial arrangements,

all at once. This has lead to problems.

Other examples:

• Virginia-class cruiser — on 4 of 11 planned actually built.
• DD-21 (Land Attack Destroyer) — predecessor that evolved into the 'failed' DD(X)/Zumwalt.
• Arsenal Ship — canceled concept

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Someone snorting good stuff for this article:

As part of that high-end mix, the Navy also wants to buy 15 new Trump-class battleships by 2055, including three in the next five years.

The report spends 876 words laying out the Navy’s rationale for the battleship, including its potential to launch nuclear weapons and to “reduce reliance on high-cost single-use munitions” through electronic warfare and high-energy lasers.

“The nuclear-powered battleship is designed to provide the fleet with a significant increase in combat power by longer endurance, higher speed, and accommodating advanced weapon systems required for modern warfare,” the report states. “Adding capability at the highest end of the high-low mix, the battleship’s primary role is to deliver high-volume, long-range offensive fires and serve as a robust, survivable forward command and control platform; it is not a destroyer replacement.”

Eric Labs, a senior naval analyst at the Congressional Budget Office, noted the shipbuilding plan eschews a next-generation destroyer, DDG(X), seemingly in favor of the battleship, and would continue building about two Arleigh Burke destroyers per year. The three Zumwalt-class destroyers are described as the “bridge between existing DDG technologies and the battleship,” the plan says.

Good luck on taking a napkin level design and turning it into a real 10,000+ DWT ship in 5 years, when they can't even build a existing frigate design in that period.

 

[Kirkhill]

This is a thread about the Canadian Continental Corvette (last I looked) and not about battleships.

Still, in response to this so-called plan, I think it important to note that the history of U.S. Navy (USN) procurement is marked by several ambitious "next-generation" programs that were curtailed due to the end of the Cold War, spiraling costs, or shifting technical requirements.

Some examples for you, of major USN ship procurement programs that were canceled or drastically reduced after only a few hulls were completed:

• Zumwalt-class Destroyer (DDG-1000). Original plan: 32 ships. Actual build: 3 ships
• Seawolf-class Submarine (SSN-21). Original plan: 29 boats. Actual build: 3 boats
• CG(X) Next-Generation Cruiser (to replace the Ticonderoga-class cruisers). Original plan: 18-19 ships. Actual build: 0. (cancelled in 2010)
• Sea Control Ship (SCS) (proposed early 1970s). Original plan: 8 ships. Actual build: 0 (cancelled 1974)
• Freedom-class Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). Original plan: 52 ships. 16 (Freedom-variant) / 19 (Independence-variant). Further, the USN is retiring them far earlier than originally planned.

A deeper pattern behind all these programs is this:

The USN repeatedly tries to make large technological leaps in a single class:

• new hull form,
• new combat system,
• new propulsion,
• new weapons,
• reduced crew,
• new doctrine,
• and often new industrial arrangements,

all at once. This has lead to problems.

Other examples:

• Virginia-class cruiser — on 4 of 11 planned actually built.
• DD-21 (Land Attack Destroyer) — predecessor that evolved into the 'failed' DD(X)/Zumwalt.
• Arsenal Ship — canceled concept

This is a thread about a corvette for Canada. Something that is still in the definition stage with an indeterminate time line.

 

[Kirkhill]

Someone snorting good stuff for this article:

As part of that high-end mix, the Navy also wants to buy 15 new Trump-class battleships by 2055, including three in the next five years.

The report spends 876 words laying out the Navy’s rationale for the battleship, including its potential to launch nuclear weapons and to “reduce reliance on high-cost single-use munitions” through electronic warfare and high-energy lasers.

“The nuclear-powered battleship is designed to provide the fleet with a significant increase in combat power by longer endurance, higher speed, and accommodating advanced weapon systems required for modern warfare,” the report states. “Adding capability at the highest end of the high-low mix, the battleship’s primary role is to deliver high-volume, long-range offensive fires and serve as a robust, survivable forward command and control platform; it is not a destroyer replacement.”

Eric Labs, a senior naval analyst at the Congressional Budget Office, noted the shipbuilding plan eschews a next-generation destroyer, DDG(X), seemingly in favor of the battleship, and would continue building about two Arleigh Burke destroyers per year. The three Zumwalt-class destroyers are described as the “bridge between existing DDG technologies and the battleship,” the plan says.

Good luck on taking a napkin level design and turning it into a real 10,000+ DWT ship in 5 years, when they can't even build a existing frigate design in that period.

All of which, in my view, drives development away from future complexity towards near term simplicity, What can be done today with the tools at hand versus what might be done tomorrow with tools that have to be developed.

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

Not to mention the fact that, the US is basically going back to the nuclear propelled aircraft carriers dilemma: Any "Trump" class battleship will need to be escorted - by regular, non-nuclear, escort vessels that require fuel and can't get to those high speeds, not even in short bursts, let alone in sustained ways, without running out of gas. US nuclear carriers can get to speeds in excess of 35 Kts, but none of the escorts can follow, so they never use that speed. The "Trump" class would do exactly the same, thus negating the advantage of sustained high speed they allegedly possess.

 

[FSTO]

Every day, George Orwell is proven more and more a visionary:

In George Orwell's 1984, a "floating fortress" is a massive, nearly unsinkable, and heavily armed military sea base used by the superstates (Oceania, Eurasia, or Eastasia) to protect strategic sea lanes. They represent the wasteful, perpetual war economy, consuming immense labor and resources to prevent improvement in the general standard of living. [1, 2, 3, 4]
Key Aspects of the Floating Fortress:

• Function: These vessels dominate the world's oceans, guarding vital maritime routes and acting as mobile bases for military power.
• Symbol of Waste: According to The Theory and Practice of Oligarchical Collectivism in the novel, these fortresses are designed to lock up industrial labor and resources. They function to destroy surplus goods without creating consumer wealth, thus maintaining the impoverished state of the populace.
• Design: They are described as "skeleton ships" or massive, interconnected structures that have replaced the fragile, conventional battleships of earlier eras.
• Strategic Stagnation: While they make the superstates appear powerful, none of the nations ever gain a decisive advantage, as the war is designed to be permanent rather than won.
• Real-World Context: While not directly created, some commentators link them to the concept of massive artificial islands or aircraft carriers. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]

 

[oldcpu]

This is a thread about a corvette for Canada. Something that is still in the definition stage with an indeterminate time line.

Indeed. and you believe a 'battleship' design named after Trump is relevant enough to the Canadian design, that it must be covered in this thread on the Canadian Continental Defense Corvette?

Well - I guess if that your view, given your post, that we will have to agree to disagree. Frankly, IMHO, its not relevant the Canadian Continental Defense Corvette.

 

[Kirkhill]

Indeed. and you believe a 'battleship' design named after Trump is relevant enough to the Canadian design, that it must be covered in this thread on the Canadian Continental Defense Corvette?

Well - I guess if that your view, given your post, that we will have to agree to disagree. Frankly, IMHO, its not relevant the Canadian Continental Defense Corvette.

I agree with you on the battleship.

 

[Kirkhill]

No disrespect to any here however I feel that we have been here before.

For exactly the same reasons.


Were there voices in the royal navy and the royal canadian navy opposed to spending money and sailors on Corvettes and Motor Boats +11

Yes, there were notable voices and, in some cases, significant internal skepticism within both the Royal Navy (RN) and the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) regarding the reliance on corvettes and motor boats (such as motor torpedo boats and Motor Launches) during the early years of World War II.
While these small ships ultimately became the backbone of the Allied convoy escort, they faced opposition due to concerns over their capabilities, seaworthiness, and impact on resources.

Opposition in the Royal Navy (RN)

Initial Skepticism on Effectiveness: The Flower-class corvette was developed as a compromise—a cheap, quickly produced ship based on a whaler design for coastal, rather than deep-sea, patrol. Many in the RN preferred larger, faster vessels.

Operational Shortcomings: The early Flowers were notoriously difficult to live in, with severe wetness, lack of insulation, and terrible stability, earning them the reputation of being "nasty" ships. This led to criticism about using them for Atlantic convoy work, where they were eventually superseded by larger and more reliable frigates.

Open Bridge Debates: There was debate over the open bridge design of the early corvettes, which left officers and crew exposed to extreme weather conditions, although this was partly for visibility reasons in action.

Opposition in the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN)

Focus on Larger Ships: Early in the war, some in the RCN hoped to build a "modern" navy consisting of destroyers, rather than being relegated to operating large numbers of small anti-submarine vessels.

The Motor Boat/MTB Dilemma: The RCN initially faced challenges in defining the role of Motor Torpedo Boats (MTBs) and small patrol craft, with some leaders initially questioning their long-range capabilities and suitability for the North Atlantic, viewing them as better suited for coastal defence.

Political Misgivings (Pre-War): During the interwar period, RCN leaders struggled to get funding, with some Canadian politicians, including Prime Minister Mackenzie King, viewing spending on the navy as "waste on these military and naval fads".

Context of the OppositionDespite these initial reservations, the rapid escalation of the U-boat threat necessitated the adoption of these ships.

The Corvette's Success: Despite the hardships, the corvettes proved exceptionally seaworthy and effective, forcing U-boats to dive. Their ability to maneuver quickly and their abundance made them invaluable, and they eventually saw significant success under leaders who embraced their capabilities, like Captain James D. "Chummy" Prentice.

The "Hell Boats" Question: It took roughly four years of war for the Royal Navy to fully integrate fast patrol boats (MTBs) into a proper operational role, highlighting that the skepticism was not just about the cost, but also about the technical utility of these vessels in the early, learning phase of the war.

 

[Underway]

No disrespect to any here however I feel that we have been here before.

You would be closer to looking at the mid cold war fleet instead of the WW2 lessons for the CDC. The number we need is 32-36 ships that can do the patrol and combat jobs.

6 AOPS
15 RCD
12-20 CDC

Which gives us 33-41 ships. Ideally the 20 CDC means we have 35 combatants, with 6 patrol ships. Pretty big lift for the RCN as it currently stands.

 

[Kirkhill]

You would be closer to looking at the mid cold war fleet instead of the WW2 lessons for the CDC. The number we need is 32-36 ships that can do the patrol and combat jobs.

6 AOPS
15 RCD
12-20 CDC

Which gives us 33-41 ships. Ideally the 20 CDC means we have 35 combatants, with 6 patrol ships. Pretty big lift for the RCN as it currently stands.

I agree. A very big lift.

How long is it going to take Canada to build 15 RCDs and 20 Halifax IIs?

In point of fact I think this bit of news is much more important than any discussion of battleships or corvettes.

10,000 Low-Cost Cruise Missiles In Three Years Procurement Plan Laid Out By Pentagon (Updated)

The U.S. military now also plans on buying 12,000 'cheap' hypersonic missiles as part of a larger push to bolster munitions inventories.

www.twz.com

Missiles by the thousands fired from containers on shore or on deck.

 

[Czech_pivo]

You would be closer to looking at the mid cold war fleet instead of the WW2 lessons for the CDC. The number we need is 32-36 ships that can do the patrol and combat jobs.

6 AOPS
15 RCD
12-20 CDC

Which gives us 33-41 ships. Ideally the 20 CDC means we have 35 combatants, with 6 patrol ships. Pretty big lift for the RCN as it currently stands.

Throw in a dozen subs and 3-4 JSS and that's a respectable navy, no?

 

[Czech_pivo]

I agree. A very big lift.

How long is it going to take Canada to build 15 RCDs and 20 Halifax IIs?

In point of fact I think this bit of news is much more important than any discussion of battleships or corvettes.

10,000 Low-Cost Cruise Missiles In Three Years Procurement Plan Laid Out By Pentagon (Updated)

The U.S. military now also plans on buying 12,000 'cheap' hypersonic missiles as part of a larger push to bolster munitions inventories.

www.twz.com

Missiles by the thousands fired from containers on shore or on deck.

We've circled around and around on this question.

It won't happen unless a viable, scalable, net new shipyard enters the chat.

 

[Kirkhill]

Good idea fairy of the day

I understand that one of the enclosed orange lifeboats on an AOPS have sufficient space to support 50 to 70 people.

I like the uncrewed 60m OSVs but I don't like the idea of leaving containers of missiles unattended on the high seas.

How about?

Convert a lifeboat for 60 into a living space for 6 from which the 60 m uncrewed vessel could be commanded. Park it where the bridge used to be and equip it with an "ejection" system so that it can rapidly separate from the main craft.

The main vessel, like the UH60 commanded by the USNG Staff Sergeant from a tablet, could be fully autonomous in its operations but still under supervision and control.

Faster builds, cheaper builds, smaller crews, less training, more hulls.

And you can load them up with containers of missiles.

 

[Underway]

I agree. A very big lift.

How long is it going to take Canada to build 15 RCDs and 20 Halifax IIs?

In point of fact I think this bit of news is much more important than any discussion of battleships or corvettes.

10,000 Low-Cost Cruise Missiles In Three Years Procurement Plan Laid Out By Pentagon (Updated)

The U.S. military now also plans on buying 12,000 'cheap' hypersonic missiles as part of a larger push to bolster munitions inventories.

www.twz.com

Missiles by the thousands fired from containers on shore or on deck.

I think the Light Frigates could be build rather quickly, particularly if you share the work between shipyards that build blocks. Blocks would then be transported to a single location for final assembly. So if you have three yards building blocks then ideally the ship is built 3x faster.

Design time is a challenge.

 

[Kirkhill]

Throw in a dozen subs and 3-4 JSS and that's a respectable navy, no?

Can we bulid them faster than a determined enemy can sink them?