Author Topic: Chariots on Fire by Maj Cole Petersen  (Read 20651 times)

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Offline Haligonian

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Re: Chariots on Fire by Maj Cole Petersen
« Reply #50 on: August 03, 2018, 14:34:28 »
Namer is one of the finest systems going.  I actually wrote a paper for my masters on the requirement for a HAPC over the continued use of IFVs. 

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Re: Chariots on Fire by Maj Cole Petersen
« Reply #51 on: August 03, 2018, 20:31:16 »
While the Namer is nice, I would suggest that when you are coming to the dismount point you need some bone crushing firepower to suppress the enemy and assist the dismounts.

That being the case, the Merkava 1 is actually much better. It has room for a dismount section in the back, carries a 105mm to deal with bunkers, hard points and AFV's which might have been missed (a 105mm at point blank range will ruin anyone's day). It also has a 60mm breech loading mortar, two or 3x7.62mm GPMG's and often a .50 HMG mounted over the barrel of the main gun. The ability to provide massive fire support to the dismounting infantry also provides more freedom for the commander to deploy tanks, artillery and ATGM's outside of the direct assault. While no solution is 100%, a heavily armoured battle taxi like the Namer or Achzarit gets you there, but provides limited help at the actual dismount or assault.
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Re: Chariots on Fire by Maj Cole Petersen
« Reply #52 on: August 04, 2018, 08:00:52 »
Quote from: Haligonian
.  I actually wrote a paper for my masters on the requirement for a HAPC over the continued use of IFVs.

Crap deleted a post instead of editing.

Basically asked how come?
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Offline GR66

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Re: Chariots on Fire by Maj Cole Petersen
« Reply #53 on: August 04, 2018, 08:19:58 »
No arguments on the tactical benefits of the Namer or Merkava I on the battlefield (although my understanding of the Merkava's troop carrying capability is that it's designed/meant for taking troops on board for short tactical advances rather than acting as a true APC), but are they practical for an expeditionary army like Canada's?

At 60+ tons we can only deliver one at a time on a C-17, so realistically we're looking at deployment by ship in order to deliver any meaningful sized force.  Then being a heavy tracked vehicle we'd need tank transporters/trains to move them from the (possibly distant) safe port to the front.

I'm personally of the firm belief that the military threats from Russia/China are not invasion of Western Europe or our major Asian allies, but rather quick campaigns where they can muster localized superiority of forces in order to seize limited objectives before NATO/Western forces can respond.  Is a slow to deploy heavy Canadian mechanized force able to respond in time to such a situation?

I'm not suggesting that there are no situations where Canada wouldn't have time to deploy a heavy force (planned interventions like Iraq or Afghanistan, Peace Keeping missions, or deterrent deployments like Latvia come to mind), but is that what our military should be fundamentally designed for?  In most of those situations Canadian involvement is as much a political requirement as a military requirement and that need could possibly be filled by other types of forces that may be more effective in a true major power military crisis.

Like so many discussions on this Forum, I guess it again comes down to the fundamental question of what is the real purpose of the Canadian military, and how should it be organized and equipped to fulfill that purpose.

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Re: Chariots on Fire by Maj Cole Petersen
« Reply #54 on: August 04, 2018, 21:44:20 »
. . .
I'm personally of the firm belief that the military threats from Russia/China are not invasion of Western Europe or our major Asian allies, but rather quick campaigns where they can muster localized superiority of forces in order to seize limited objectives before NATO/Western forces can respond.  Is a slow to deploy heavy Canadian mechanized force able to respond in time to such a situation?

I'm not suggesting that there are no situations where Canada wouldn't have time to deploy a heavy force (planned interventions like Iraq or Afghanistan, Peace Keeping missions, or deterrent deployments like Latvia come to mind), but is that what our military should be fundamentally designed for?  In most of those situations Canadian involvement is as much a political requirement as a military requirement and that need could possibly be filled by other types of forces that may be more effective in a true major power military crisis.

Like so many discussions on this Forum, I guess it again comes down to the fundamental question of what is the real purpose of the Canadian military, and how should it be organized and equipped to fulfill that purpose.

That truly is the question.

At the moment we are involved in a trip wire tasking to deter Russian aggression in the Baltics. The Russians have heavy mech forces capabilities and therefore our force there should be capable of defending against any Russian activities up to and including heavy mech forces. Under the old rule of "you don't bring a knife to a gun fight" anything less would not be a credible deterrent.

This reminds me of a rather interesting seminar I attended in Germany shortly after the Baltic states became Partners for Peace but before full NATO membership. One of our guest speakers was a young Russian diplomat who had been thrown in as a substitute for the Russian ambassador at the last minute. During question period he was asked as to what Russia's response would be to the Baltics being given full NATO membership. His terse response was "The tanks will role."  :threat: To say the least, we were somewhat taken aback by this blatant statement.

Somehow our deployment in the Baltics right now makes me think of "C" Force and how effective it was in deterring the Japanese attack on Hong Kong in 1941.

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Offline dapaterson

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Re: Chariots on Fire by Maj Cole Petersen
« Reply #55 on: August 04, 2018, 21:47:06 »
Totally different situation.  C Force never had GBA+ training.
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Re: Chariots on Fire by Maj Cole Petersen
« Reply #56 on: August 04, 2018, 22:04:04 »
Totally different situation.  C Force never had GBA+ training.

Neither have the Russians. ;D

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Re: Chariots on Fire by Maj Cole Petersen
« Reply #57 on: August 04, 2018, 22:12:10 »
While the Namer is nice, I would suggest that when you are coming to the dismount point you need some bone crushing firepower to suppress the enemy and assist the dismounts.

That being the case, the Merkava 1 is actually much better. It has room for a dismount section in the back, carries a 105mm to deal with bunkers, hard points and AFV's which might have been missed (a 105mm at point blank range will ruin anyone's day). It also has a 60mm breech loading mortar, two or 3x7.62mm GPMG's and often a .50 HMG mounted over the barrel of the main gun. The ability to provide massive fire support to the dismounting infantry also provides more freedom for the commander to deploy tanks, artillery and ATGM's outside of the direct assault. While no solution is 100%, a heavily armoured battle taxi like the Namer or Achzarit gets you there, but provides limited help at the actual dismount or assault.

I talked to an Israeli Officer once upon a time who mentioned that the space in the back of the Merkava is actually for ammo. The Golan Heights defensive battle during the '73 war convinced them they needed more on board storage for bullets.

The other key determining factor for Israeli armour is survivability of the crew, within the context of a defensive battle for national survival, hence the reason the Namur is so huge and the Merkava has the engine in the front etc.

I think this topic has been done to death in other sections of this forum but, as seen on comments on another page, if we have 'wheels' bogging down in Gagetown while 'tracks' float forward, I think we have a systemic issue.
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Offline dapaterson

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Re: Chariots on Fire by Maj Cole Petersen
« Reply #58 on: August 04, 2018, 22:19:47 »
... if we have 'wheels' bogging down in Gagetown while 'tracks' float forward, I think we have a systemic issue.

Exactly.  Never fight a war in Gagetown.  Clearly, we should just use New Brunswick as a buffer to absorb the enemy before they reach Quebec.
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Offline Haligonian

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Re: Chariots on Fire by Maj Cole Petersen
« Reply #59 on: August 04, 2018, 23:02:33 »
Like so many discussions on this Forum, I guess it again comes down to the fundamental question of what is the real purpose of the Canadian military, and how should it be organized and equipped to fulfill that purpose.

This is it.

I honestly argued the paper from the reverse perspective though by starting at the tactical level and assuming we wanted the ability to operate in conventional mechanized operations as part of the main force.  The argument sounds something like this (without reviewing the paper):  LAV is too light and is likely to result in massive casualties as sections are destroyed while mounted so we need something with tank like protection to accompany tanks.  It should also have tank like mobility.  The IFV as a concept puts an infantry carrier in the wrong place on the battlefield by virtue of its armament.  People are going to fight the vehicles and they will be subsequently destroyed as any light vehicle involved in the direct fire fight will be.  Even if the section is mounted at the time the section is likely to become irrelevant as they will have lost their tpt to keep up with the mobile fight.  We do combined arms, so, we should let tanks worry about the mounted combat and allow infantry to focus on the dismounted.  As part of this the trg requirements to keep mechanized infantry competent in crew skills while also maintaining dismounted skill sets (and now, potentially, a full suite of cbt sp skills as well) is too large and results in us being not sufficiently good at either.  I also traced the IFV development lineage to show that it is a concept uniquely suited to the Cold War defence of western Europe scenario where an opportunity to put additional kinetic energy penetrators and ATGMs on the battlefield to deal with the mass of the Warsaw Pact was a decisive factor over any specific operational requirement of the infantry.

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Re: Chariots on Fire by Maj Cole Petersen
« Reply #60 on: August 04, 2018, 23:07:51 »
No arguments on the tactical benefits of the Namer or Merkava I on the battlefield (although my understanding of the Merkava's troop carrying capability is that it's designed/meant for taking troops on board for short tactical advances rather than acting as a true APC), but are they practical for an expeditionary army like Canada's?

At 60+ tons we can only deliver one at a time on a C-17, so realistically we're looking at deployment by ship in order to deliver any meaningful sized force.  Then being a heavy tracked vehicle we'd need tank transporters/trains to move them from the (possibly distant) safe port to the front.

I'm personally of the firm belief that the military threats from Russia/China are not invasion of Western Europe or our major Asian allies, but rather quick campaigns where they can muster localized superiority of forces in order to seize limited objectives before NATO/Western forces can respond.  Is a slow to deploy heavy Canadian mechanized force able to respond in time to such a situation?

I'm not suggesting that there are no situations where Canada wouldn't have time to deploy a heavy force (planned interventions like Iraq or Afghanistan, Peace Keeping missions, or deterrent deployments like Latvia come to mind), but is that what our military should be fundamentally designed for?  In most of those situations Canadian involvement is as much a political requirement as a military requirement and that need could possibly be filled by other types of forces that may be more effective in a true major power military crisis.

Like so many discussions on this Forum, I guess it again comes down to the fundamental question of what is the real purpose of the Canadian military, and how should it be organized and equipped to fulfill that purpose.

I thought about the sustainment and deployability issues but when it came down to it, rightly or wrongly, Canada likes to go to mature theaters where it can take its time getting in there or forward deploy.  How many times have we deployed armoured vehicles by air?  How many times have we done it at short notice?  Were not going to be running anything like US Army SBCT's that are supposed to be able to deploy by C130 anytime soon.  LAV 6 is too heavy now anyway!

Latvia would be a perfect on going current mission where a platform like Namer could be employed if we were willing to pay the sustainment costs with HETs being a major one.

Offline daftandbarmy

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Re: Chariots on Fire by Maj Cole Petersen
« Reply #61 on: August 04, 2018, 23:10:38 »
This is it.

I honestly argued the paper from the reverse perspective though by starting at the tactical level and assuming we wanted the ability to operate in conventional mechanized operations as part of the main force.  The argument sounds something like this (without reviewing the paper):  LAV is too light and is likely to result in massive casualties as sections are destroyed while mounted so we need something with tank like protection to accompany tanks.  It should also have tank like mobility.  The IFV as a concept puts an infantry carrier in the wrong place on the battlefield by virtue of its armament.  People are going to fight the vehicles and they will be subsequently destroyed as any light vehicle involved in the direct fire fight will be.  Even if the section is mounted at the time the section is likely to become irrelevant as they will have lost their tpt to keep up with the mobile fight.  We do combined arms, so, we should let tanks worry about the mounted combat and allow infantry to focus on the dismounted.  As part of this the trg requirements to keep mechanized infantry competent in crew skills while also maintaining dismounted skill sets (and now, potentially, a full suite of cbt sp skills as well) is too large and results in us being not sufficiently good at either.  I also traced the IFV development lineage to show that it is a concept uniquely suited to the Cold War defence of western Europe scenario where an opportunity to put additional kinetic energy penetrators and ATGMs on the battlefield to deal with the mass of the Warsaw Pact was a decisive factor over any specific operational requirement of the infantry.

The IFV concept, developed by those pesky Russians (and copied by the Germans with the Marder), reflects an atavistic 'fight to the death' philosophy - connected to national survival - that we in the Western World just don't get.

Regardless, if the Infantry can't keep up with the tanks, you're doing the enemy's job for them and we won't have any tanks left. Or much Infantry either.
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Re: Chariots on Fire by Maj Cole Petersen
« Reply #62 on: August 04, 2018, 23:30:10 »
Were not going to be running anything like US Army SBCT's that are supposed to be able to deploy by C130 anytime soon.  LAV 6 is too heavy now anyway!

The idea of Stryker C-130 deployability, which drove the whole "medium weight fad" of the early 00's, was proven wrong by RAND's study which found the vehicle was simply too heavy and the logistics tail too big to rapidly deploy, even using C-17s.  I've seen a layout for a contingency deployment of a Stryker Company - it takes something like a dozen C-17s to get the company deployed.

Of course, if it isn't rapidly deployable, then it begs the question of what purpose a wheeled IFV fleet actually serves....
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Re: Chariots on Fire by Maj Cole Petersen
« Reply #63 on: August 05, 2018, 00:08:48 »
The idea of Stryker C-130 deployability, which drove the whole "medium weight fad" of the early 00's, was proven wrong by RAND's study which found the vehicle was simply too heavy and the logistics tail too big to rapidly deploy, even using C-17s.  I've seen a layout for a contingency deployment of a Stryker Company - it takes something like a dozen C-17s to get the company deployed.

Of course, if it isn't rapidly deployable, then it begs the question of what purpose a wheeled IFV fleet actually serves....

Gets me back to my days as the Unit Emplaning Officer for 2 RCHA as part of the ACE Mobile Force (L) and working around the edges of the ill fated CAST Brigade Group. We couldn't do it then with much lighter forces.

Makes one wonder why the Navy isn't investing in RORO LMSRs. Now that would be a Navy Reserve function well worth having.

http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=4600&tid=500&ct=4

Note the ships ability to support humanitarian missions. Should make it desirable for even a Liberal government. ;D

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Offline GR66

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Re: Chariots on Fire by Maj Cole Petersen
« Reply #64 on: August 05, 2018, 09:32:32 »
I thought about the sustainment and deployability issues but when it came down to it, rightly or wrongly, Canada likes to go to mature theaters where it can take its time getting in there or forward deploy.  How many times have we deployed armoured vehicles by air?  How many times have we done it at short notice?  Were not going to be running anything like US Army SBCT's that are supposed to be able to deploy by C130 anytime soon.  LAV 6 is too heavy now anyway!

Latvia would be a perfect on going current mission where a platform like Namer could be employed if we were willing to pay the sustainment costs with HETs being a major one.

This is the point I take issue with.  What military sense does it make to design your force structure to suit the kind of deployments you'd LIKE to make?  I guess it's OK when Canada's involvement in an operation has as much to do with showing political support for a particular operation rather than contribution our being a truly essential part of the military force.  What happens though when an enemy inevitably does something which requires a response which doesn't allow for a leisurely deployment to a safe disembarkation point in a mature theater? 

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Re: Chariots on Fire by Maj Cole Petersen
« Reply #65 on: August 05, 2018, 09:51:04 »
Of course, if it isn't rapidly deployable, then it begs the question of what purpose a wheeled IFV fleet actually serves....

This  :nod:
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Re: Chariots on Fire by Maj Cole Petersen
« Reply #66 on: August 05, 2018, 10:21:51 »
The idea of Stryker C-130 deployability, which drove the whole "medium weight fad" of the early 00's, was proven wrong by RAND's study which found the vehicle was simply too heavy and the logistics tail too big to rapidly deploy, even using C-17s.  I've seen a layout for a contingency deployment of a Stryker Company - it takes something like a dozen C-17s to get the company deployed.

Of course, if it isn't rapidly deployable, then it begs the question of what purpose a wheeled IFV fleet actually serves....

Because, in Canada, we don't actually have a Defence Policy, so much as we have a Defence Theatre Policy.

It is all, literally, for show....

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Re: Chariots on Fire by Maj Cole Petersen
« Reply #67 on: August 05, 2018, 12:11:36 »
The LAV 3 is likely the heaviest vehicle to succeed in places like Mali and generally well suited for that style of warfare, the French who been in Africa for centuries, have a whole series of light wheeled armour for those conflicts. They also have heavy armour and IFV's for fighting more traditional warfare. I have always been an advocate for Canada to have a light and heavy brigade and the proper equipment for both. We have zero idea where we will be fighting next and have always been since 1870 a expeditionary force, with a semi-permanent overseas deployment in the Cold war.   

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Re: Chariots on Fire by Maj Cole Petersen
« Reply #68 on: August 05, 2018, 14:43:30 »
I talked to an Israeli Officer once upon a time who mentioned that the space in the back of the Merkava is actually for ammo. The Golan Heights defensive battle during the '73 war convinced them they needed more on board storage for bullets.

The other key determining factor for Israeli armour is survivability of the crew, within the context of a defensive battle for national survival, hence the reason the Namur is so huge and the Merkava has the engine in the front etc.

I think this topic has been done to death in other sections of this forum but, as seen on comments on another page, if we have 'wheels' bogging down in Gagetown while 'tracks' float forward, I think we have a systemic issue.

Fully agree. The Merkava 1 can carry up to 80 rounds of 105mm ammunition if the rear is used as the ammo stowage area, but it can also be cleared of the ammo racks for an 8 man section or several litter born casualties. The Merkava is actually a very extreme example, but a similar philosophy can be found in a CV9040 (shooting in the attack with a 40mm canon overcomes everything below a MBT), or the German PUMA with the "C" up armour package (roughly equal to a Leopard 1) or the new German Lynx, which improves on the PUMA concept.

But as noted, the true answer lies in discovering "what is the purpose of the Canadian Forces", which will involve a full court press on all the DIME (Diplomatic, Intelligence, Military and Economic) fronts. Direct assault on a heavily defended position is a possibility, and HAPC's are the tool to use in that situation, but is assaulting dug in need peer enemies likely? Do we have the manpower and resources to support such actions? If I was looking into a crystal ball, I'd actually say we should be looking very seriously at naval warfare, with secondary considerations for amphibious operations, cyber and space in support of the Navy. Troops splashing ashore will need very different tools than 60 ton HAPC's, and deployments to failed states and countering insurgent movements also need different tools.

Should we really be looking at the USMC's new Amphibious Combat Vehicle?
Dagny, this is not a battle over material goods. It's a moral crisis, the greatest the world has ever faced and the last. Our age is the climax of centuries of evil. We must put an end to it, once and for all, or perish - we, the men of the mind. It was our own guilt. We produced the wealth of the world - but we let our enemies write its moral code.

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Re: Chariots on Fire by Maj Cole Petersen
« Reply #69 on: August 05, 2018, 19:18:52 »
Perhaps a specialist squadron within the Tank units for HPC's and Assault vehicles. After all with the size of our Combat troops, we will not need many. Perhaps a Namer type vehicle based on the Leopard II chassis, I suspect it would sell well and limit the logistical chain.

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Re: Chariots on Fire by Maj Cole Petersen
« Reply #70 on: August 06, 2018, 13:47:35 »
The big problem with "specialist" groupings is our entire force is essentially the size of most "specialized" forces in other militaries. We are already at the point that  we consume a large percentage of our resources maintaining "boutique" capabilities. A fairly easy to understand example is replacing over 1400+ M-113's with a hodge podge of incomparable LAV variants (Bison, Coyote, LAVIII and now LAV 6) and making up the deficit with T-LAV's, G-wagons and now TAPV's. While initially more expensive, the unit costs and O&M savings of buying 1400 LAV 3 chassis to do all of those things would have saved tons of money, training and other resources over the years....

The big problem with the LAV as we have it now is it is not very flexible, and as noted in the article which kicked off the thread, not being used in ways which are conducive to success. Even the evolution to bigger and heavier LAV 6.0 simply restricts mobility and reduces the ability of the commander to use speed  or manoeuvre to displace the enemy as an alternative to direct assault. Certainly we can all go to "Janes" and catalogue shop for what we think are the best vehicles to do the job, but the reality is we are stuck with what we have, barring some huge catastrophic event or change which forces a complete rebuilding.

I certainly don't know what the answer could be with the tools we have now, though.

Dagny, this is not a battle over material goods. It's a moral crisis, the greatest the world has ever faced and the last. Our age is the climax of centuries of evil. We must put an end to it, once and for all, or perish - we, the men of the mind. It was our own guilt. We produced the wealth of the world - but we let our enemies write its moral code.

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Re: Chariots on Fire by Maj Cole Petersen
« Reply #71 on: August 06, 2018, 14:23:54 »
. . . Certainly we can all go to "Janes" and catalogue shop for what we think are the best vehicles to do the job, but the reality is we are stuck with what we have, barring some huge catastrophic event or change which forces a complete rebuilding.

I certainly don't know what the answer could be with the tools we have now, though.

None of us do although that doesn't stop us from developing our own favourite tables of organization and equipment at the drop of the hat.

I agree that "barring some huge catastrophic event or change which forces a complete rebuilding", we won't change in any meaningful way. Afghanistan was a huge event for us and, while not catastrophic and while it brought about some significant changes, it failed entirely in bringing about the complete rebuilding that we so desperately need.

I don't blame politicians for this. They're not experts in the military nor even in external affairs. I blame the military leadership which so far has failed entirely in coming forward with any viable alternatives to put before the politicians to restructure and equip the Forces for future roles (whether within existing budgets or expanded ones) What should be clearly obvious is that we have no continental enemies (We haven't fought with the US since 1814 [or that squabble in the 1860s]) so we should be configured for expeditionary expeditions on other continents with our most likely enemies and in cooperation with our most likely allies. We aren't and haven't been for many decades notwithstanding that we have operated in an allied environment.

I've said it before and will say it again: The CF needs to be rebuilt from the ground up (and not just fine tuned) before the next catastrophic event.

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Re: Chariots on Fire by Maj Cole Petersen
« Reply #72 on: August 06, 2018, 15:22:34 »
The chances of the military being fundamentally changed for the better without a major conflict driving that change is almost zero. A change for the worst is quite possible. Going back to the LAV, my armchairing tells me that the LAV 3 is really the biggest and heaviest a wheeled AFV can practical be. Anything heavier needs to be tracked. The IFV idea has hit a wall, to make them tough enough to survive and take on all but MBT's, you must sacrifice troop carrying ability. One option is to go with a common chassis with a mix of HPC and IFV's (and SPG) working together to support the tanks. Each group of HPC's gets an IFV to support them, the HPC focuses on minimal firepower, but good carrying capacity for troops and stores. Literally you could build the HPC,IFV,SPG all on the Leo II chassis, this gives you lots of room, power to work with, plus logistics is eased.

The light Brigade is all based around the LAV 3, sacrificing some protection for speed, range and mobility. SPG's would be automatic 120mm mortars, IFV version would be what we have now and a Styker type LAV for troops and kit. alos perhaps some armed with the 90mm Cockerill gun to provide a means to give DF support verses hardpoints. Perhaps fit out IFV versions with ATGM's as well. 

Both brigades have different tasks and training focuses. A prolonged deployment may for a temporary change in training for one group to support the other.   

Offline Thucydides

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Re: Chariots on Fire by Maj Cole Petersen
« Reply #73 on: August 06, 2018, 17:11:04 »
Quote
Each group of HPC's gets an IFV to support them, the HPC focuses on minimal firepower, but good carrying capacity for troops and stores.

I'm a bit unclear, here. Are you talking about having something like "escort" IFV's to help shepherd and shoot in the HAPC's? While in technical terms this isn't very difficult (A platoon of LAV 6.0 in a company sized unit of Stryker's or turret less LAV hulls) there may be a few organizational and operational issues.

I'm starting to think IFV's of the LAV variety should not be in Combat Teams at all, but be the main mounts of "Cavalry" or "Mounted Rifles" type units. They would have the speed and mobility to turn flanks, set up blocks or do a multitude of other tasks while the "heavy" unit rumbles forward with tanks and HAPC's. The "Cavalry" would need a portion of the force armed with ATGM's and mortars, but going back to the 1980's era Mechanized Infantry Battalion, we could arrange for a mounted Mortar Troop and a Mounted ATGM Troop in the "Support Squadron". The on board firepower of IFV's should suffice for flanking, screening and similar roles. and the addition of organic mortars and ATGM's in direct support (not to mention the flexibility offered by modern weapons with their much greater range, precision and ability to accept off board sensor information) should allow the commander to shape his battle or break contact if he is engaged on unfavourable terms. Obviously, different models could be used as well, but this would provide for a real role taking advantage of the LAV's performance and firepower attributes, as opposed to hugely expensive and vulnerable not quite battle taxies.
Dagny, this is not a battle over material goods. It's a moral crisis, the greatest the world has ever faced and the last. Our age is the climax of centuries of evil. We must put an end to it, once and for all, or perish - we, the men of the mind. It was our own guilt. We produced the wealth of the world - but we let our enemies write its moral code.

Offline Colin P

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Re: Chariots on Fire by Maj Cole Petersen
« Reply #74 on: August 06, 2018, 20:32:30 »
Yes "escort" or in the support squadron/platoon. what I am seeing is that the size of the vehicle grows in order to support a full section and a useful turret, add in the weight and mobility penalty that comes with it, having some dedicated IFV's with minimal troop room makes for a smaller, lighter vehicle, meaning less internal volume to protect. The HPC sacrifice firepower for internal volume while maintaining protection and mobility and keeping size manageable. the IFV's means the tanks don't have to necessarily dedicate themselves to HPC protection.