Informing the Army’s Future Structure - CAMO Discussion

[Brad Sallows]

"tactical actions against enemy forces, typically out of direct contact with friendly forces, intended to shape future close operations and protect rear operations. At the operational level, deep operations isolate current battles and influence the timing, location, and enemy forces involved in future battles. At the tactical level, deep operations set favorable conditions for close combat and subsequent engagements."

simplified, sounds like a substantial part is: "My deep ops are those which prevent/shape enemy forces not already/imminently engaged by my subordinates from interfering with their active/imminent fights."

Theoretically any echelon could have some kind of "deep fight", and each echelon obviously must have a different deep fight, reaching further out in time and space and breadth of types of enemy systems engaged, some becoming less important and others more so. A divisional deep fight in this framing is in large part whatever is undertaken prevent enemy beyond the brigade fights from interfering with the brigade fights or with - as stated explicitly - division rear.

I lack imagination to come up with even a handful of general ways to do this past whatever might be thought of as a brigade "deep fight": very long range fires and air; EW; and for ground forces, whatever approximates cavalry raids.

"As an assaulting force leader, I want someone to suppress/divert the enemy flanking and depth elements capable of supporting the enemy on my objective, so that I am not stretched absurdly beyond my capabilities and shot to pieces."

 

[PrairieFella]

The Deep and Close areas are not some informal concept to think about. It's doctrine.

Someone please explain to me how a "Medium Cavalry" organization fights and sustains itself on 50 ton armoured vehicles in the Division's deep area, which is conceivably 30-50 km forward of the FEBA?

The Sqn A1 and A2 echs are robust - but man is it a lot to manage for the 2IC, SSM and Adm Sgt. Drones make it so much worse.

 

[KevinB]

Honestly I like the Battle Group context we deployed with the Bosnia. Each 12-1500 group in theory had their own tanks, artillery Heli support, engineers, infantry, medical support comms, transport CSS etc.

Have three to four battle groups per Brigade. Each one being self sufficient in the Combined arms battle. Able to be combined together or operate separately.

I wanted to jump back to this for a second.
It worked great for FYR, and for Afghanistan and Iraq.

However as @Infanteer and others have mentioned it doesn’t work for a LSCO.

I used to be really enamored with the CMBG “Mini-Division” setup, but while it was good for somethings it falls down heavily in any sort of maneuver requirement as it is too large and ungainly. Keep in mind the Division is a Maneuver Element...

 

[McG]

I used to be really enamored with the CMBG “Mini-Division” setup, but while it was good for somethings it falls down heavily in any sort of maneuver requirement as it is too large and ungainly.

Keep in mind, our modern understanding of a CMBG contains a lot of post Cold War fat that exists to support FGing BGs and our geographical dispersion. 4 CMBG had CFE for support functions that today we would want the Bde Comd to own.

 

[dapaterson]

Keep in mind, our modern understanding of a CMBG contains a lot of post Cold War fat that exists to support FGing BGs and our geographical dispersion. 4 CMBG had CFE for support functions that today we would want the Bde Comd to own.

The fundamental failing of the CMBG construct is that it trains Canadian staff to misunderstand both the Bde and Div at the same time.

 

[FJAG]

Keep in mind, our modern understanding of a CMBG contains a lot of post Cold War fat that exists to support FGing BGs and our geographical dispersion. 4 CMBG had CFE for support functions that today we would want the Bde Comd to own.

I hope to hell that we don't want the bde comd to own any of that.

We need to think div, and/or being part and parcel to a div, which div is itself supported by either a corps or theatre support structure.

Divs need to remain small and manoeuvrable and bdes even smaller and leaner. If more mass is needed then add divisions and don't make the division - and especially not the bde - fat and sluggish.

 

[FJAG]

News release from 6 CCSB

Today, we are honoured to mark the appointment of the 8th Air Defence Regiment Command Team: Commanding Officer Lieutenant-Colonel Lisa Nodwell and Regimental Sergeant-Major Chief Warrant Officer David Blais. This appointment represents another important step forward in the modernization of the Canadian Army.
6th Canadian Combat Support Brigade is proud to welcome this new unit under its command. While we formally appoint the command team today, the regiment will be officially stood up this fall at Canadian Forces Base Gagetown.

Meanwhile in Shilo at 1 RCHA

On 26 May 2026, in recognition of Artillery Day, 1st Regiment, Royal Canadian Horse Artillery (1 RCHA) conducted a reorganization parade.
The parade formally recognized recent organizational changes within 1 RCHA, including the reduction of Z Battery to nil strength and the re-designation of C Battery as a Long-Range Precision Strike (LRPS) Battery. These structural adjustments were made in alignment with Canadian Army modernization initiatives to ensure 1 RCHA remains well-positioned to integrate the LRPS capability as part of 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group (1 CMBG).

Ubique

 

[Ostrozac]

Divs need to remain small and manoeuvrable and bdes even smaller and leaner. If more mass is needed then add divisions and don't make the division - and especially not the bde - fat and sluggish.

One capability that goes against small and manoeuvrable divisions is aviation. A US Cold War division had something like 70 helicopters. Nowadays a US division operates over a 100 helicopters, plus 12 or so MQ-1 Grey Eagles that need to operate from a runway. Does the Division need that many, can the Division sustain that many, and are Corps-level aviation brigades the answer?

 

[KevinB]

One capability that goes against small and manoeuvrable divisions is aviation. A US Cold War division had something like 70 helicopters. Nowadays a US division operates over a 100 helicopters, plus 12 or so MQ-1 Grey Eagles that need to operate from a runway. Does the Division need that many, can the Division sustain that many, and are Corps-level aviation brigades the answer?

The Grey Eagles can operate off any flat stretch of roadway. Take Off roll of ~800m, and like the RQ-7 Shadow (at all Bde’s not just Aviation) they can land on shorter distances by using recovery nets (similar to the fouling net on a CVN).

The Aviation Brigades are actually fairly nimble.

The larger question is if the Combat Aviation Brigades will be able to function in a Near Peer LSCO or if they will be relegated to rear area operations due to UAS and AD threat.