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2025 Wildfire Season

Algonquin Provincial Park is 770,000 ha
The largest single tenure I can find in Ontario is the Abitibi Forest near Cochrane at 3,285,435 ha in size.

Assuming harvesting cuts around 0.5% per year of each land base that works out to 15% of the area cleaned up via logging/reforestation each 30 years (a generational intervention as the Scandinavians call it). So

Assuming I put an experiences saw man into the forest and he cuts/cleans up 1 ha per day...
and works 275 days a year...

Area x 85% / 275 work days /3 generational interventions =

I need to find roughly 730 folks willing to work just to deal with Algonquin Provincial Park working full time...
Or ~3,350 people to deal with the Abitibi Forest. But there's only 5,400 people there according to Wikipedia.

Now assuming they're working for $50k/year (just making my math simple) and taxes/EI/WCB/etc. add another 50% in costs to the employer...
That's close to $50,000,000 just for Algonquin Park

And google tells me the entire Ontario Wildfire Budget is only $130,000,000. But there's also some emergency funding to account for fire costs so it's actually more like $330,000,000 total funds available. Doesn't really matter...fact is taxpayers can't afford the costs it would take to deal with the Crown Lands.

And even if you do the work there will still be fires so it's not as simple as cleaning up the forest.

That being said what I could see working much more effectively is a much stricter and visible approach to zoning with both carrots and sticks involved.
1) you want the rustic camp/cottage in the trees and have dead forest all over your lands? Your property will be formally inspected and declared a low priority assets to try to protect (this is already happening within some municipal areas in Canada where they are tagging properties in advance of disasters especially in slow/off season conditions). Sucks but we need to quit wasting dollars and sucking up resources trying to protect buildings that are cheaper to rebuild that spend suppression costs on. Especially when they might not be insured in the first place.
2) get serious about building codes for homes/building in the wildland urban interface. Cedar shingles look nice...but burn better. Follow more the Australian changes where renovations/new builds require updated standards and insurance breaks are provided for those properties.
3) Look at small co-gen power generation. The amount of building construction waste from the City of Toronto alone should allow for enough fuel to feed at least a small facility. Chipped material is more efficient than lumber scraps/tree trunks but a single chipper can deal with a lot of material. Make this free to drop off if it's clean (i.e. scrap lumber is okay...drywall still attached is not).
4) Get serious about doing burning in lower hazard conditions. This will require more crews/resources in the shoulder seasons but there also needs to be more work done to build up cooperative burn groups with First Nations, loggers, parks, and communities. This is a really tough one to do but will require re-examining who can start fires, when, and how...and what liabilities are assigned to each burn. Can think of several First Nations I work with who could burn safely on their reserve or nearby...but need us there for liability in case something goes wrong.
5) encourage more managed forest on private lands....what is the minimum size to be considered managed? Is the number different in the north vs south? Could it be as simple as windbreaks cumulatively adding up to be a couple of acres...and then changing the taxes from residential lands to agricultural if kept clean? Big tax implications but also possible reduced costs for suppression.
6) We need to do a much better job at explaining nature and history. The Abititi Forest cited above and the town of Cochrane have a long history of fire. Heck Wikipedia tells me the town was burnt in 1910, 1911, and 1916. Cochrane, Ontario - Wikipedia. So it's been a hundred years and the forest is not the same as that of my father's or grandfathers youth. Some of these big fires are not just climate change but also 100 years of wildfire suppression, mature forest starting to fall apart with 100 years of fuel load in there, and a history of having large fires in the area. So start teaching what should be more "normal" and less of the dramatization of "massive fires everywhere".
 
Algonquin Provincial Park is 770,000 ha
The largest single tenure I can find in Ontario is the Abitibi Forest near Cochrane at 3,285,435 ha in size.

Assuming harvesting cuts around 0.5% per year of each land base that works out to 15% of the area cleaned up via logging/reforestation each 30 years (a generational intervention as the Scandinavians call it). So

Assuming I put an experiences saw man into the forest and he cuts/cleans up 1 ha per day...
and works 275 days a year...

Area x 85% / 275 work days /3 generational interventions =

I need to find roughly 730 folks willing to work just to deal with Algonquin Provincial Park working full time...
Or ~3,350 people to deal with the Abitibi Forest. But there's only 5,400 people there according to Wikipedia.

Now assuming they're working for $50k/year (just making my math simple) and taxes/EI/WCB/etc. add another 50% in costs to the employer...
That's close to $50,000,000 just for Algonquin Park

And google tells me the entire Ontario Wildfire Budget is only $130,000,000. But there's also some emergency funding to account for fire costs so it's actually more like $330,000,000 total funds available. Doesn't really matter...fact is taxpayers can't afford the costs it would take to deal with the Crown Lands.

And even if you do the work there will still be fires so it's not as simple as cleaning up the forest.

That being said what I could see working much more effectively is a much stricter and visible approach to zoning with both carrots and sticks involved.
1) you want the rustic camp/cottage in the trees and have dead forest all over your lands? Your property will be formally inspected and declared a low priority assets to try to protect (this is already happening within some municipal areas in Canada where they are tagging properties in advance of disasters especially in slow/off season conditions). Sucks but we need to quit wasting dollars and sucking up resources trying to protect buildings that are cheaper to rebuild that spend suppression costs on. Especially when they might not be insured in the first place.
2) get serious about building codes for homes/building in the wildland urban interface. Cedar shingles look nice...but burn better. Follow more the Australian changes where renovations/new builds require updated standards and insurance breaks are provided for those properties.
3) Look at small co-gen power generation. The amount of building construction waste from the City of Toronto alone should allow for enough fuel to feed at least a small facility. Chipped material is more efficient than lumber scraps/tree trunks but a single chipper can deal with a lot of material. Make this free to drop off if it's clean (i.e. scrap lumber is okay...drywall still attached is not).
4) Get serious about doing burning in lower hazard conditions. This will require more crews/resources in the shoulder seasons but there also needs to be more work done to build up cooperative burn groups with First Nations, loggers, parks, and communities. This is a really tough one to do but will require re-examining who can start fires, when, and how...and what liabilities are assigned to each burn. Can think of several First Nations I work with who could burn safely on their reserve or nearby...but need us there for liability in case something goes wrong.
5) encourage more managed forest on private lands....what is the minimum size to be considered managed? Is the number different in the north vs south? Could it be as simple as windbreaks cumulatively adding up to be a couple of acres...and then changing the taxes from residential lands to agricultural if kept clean? Big tax implications but also possible reduced costs for suppression.
6) We need to do a much better job at explaining nature and history. The Abititi Forest cited above and the town of Cochrane have a long history of fire. Heck Wikipedia tells me the town was burnt in 1910, 1911, and 1916. Cochrane, Ontario - Wikipedia. So it's been a hundred years and the forest is not the same as that of my father's or grandfathers youth. Some of these big fires are not just climate change but also 100 years of wildfire suppression, mature forest starting to fall apart with 100 years of fuel load in there, and a history of having large fires in the area. So start teaching what should be more "normal" and less of the dramatization of "massive fires everywhere".

And then there's the road building that would be required, both mainlines and on block roads ;)
 
I have touched on this before and it is timely to mention it again.

This disturbing trend of seeking to nationalize disaster responses has been occurring in Canada for over thirty years. The current legislative framework (Emergency Management Act, Statutes of Canada) actively constrains the federal government from intervening in disasters, such as this summer's wildfires, unless invited in by provinces. There are exceptions to this limitation. When the legislation was correctly applied for the pending solar eclipse along Niagara Falls, there was objections and ridicule to the necessity for a state of emergency being declared (CBC, 2024).

Other countries already encourage a variety of voluntary national service models, including New Zealand (Grant & Langer, 2021), Australia (McLennan et al., 2021), Germany (Fathi et al., 2020; Kehl et al.., 2017), and Japan (Atsumi & Goltz, 2014). A reoccurring theme among these successful volunteer examples is the cultural aspect involved. Both Japan and Germany actively enable citizens to be able to participate and volunteer. The desire to volunteer is engrained at the individual level.

For five years (2021-2026), the Canadian federal government has experimented with establishing a national voluntary humanitarian workforce, through the use of the major NGOs. Research on the results from these efforts indicate continued gaps and areas for improvement (Beveridge, 2025; Public Safety Canada, 2025). Without stable funding due to this program's funding expires March 2026 and the government's budgetary cutbacks, it is unlikely this program will survive.

The biggest challenge has been the NGOs inability to attract volunteers. This is not a new phenomenon, as we have been witnessing the decline in volunteerism across the board, including important public services, such as volunteer fire departments. Over the past five decades, the Canadian public increases their demands for more government / public services. This reliance on government services has seen a drop in the public's engagement with volunteering, which greatly reduces local community resiliency. As one academic points out, Canadians as a whole need to reverse decades of government reliance and return to a state of self-reliance (Jeff Donaldson, 2024).

The current situation begs the question, where do we turn to when new disaster(s) overwhelm existing emergency services?
 
...
Other countries already encourage a variety of voluntary national service models, including New Zealand (Grant & Langer, 2021), Australia (McLennan et al., 2021), Germany (Fathi et al., 2020; Kehl et al.., 2017), and Japan (Atsumi & Goltz, 2014). A reoccurring theme among these successful volunteer examples is the cultural aspect involved. Both Japan and Germany actively enable citizens to be able to participate and volunteer. The desire to volunteer is engrained at the individual level.

...

The biggest challenge has been the NGOs inability to attract volunteers. This is not a new phenomenon, as we have been witnessing the decline in volunteerism across the board, including important public services, such as volunteer fire departments. Over the past five decades, the Canadian public increases their demands for more government / public services. This reliance on government services has seen a drop in the public's engagement with volunteering, which greatly reduces local community resiliency. As one academic points out, Canadians as a whole need to reverse decades of government reliance and return to a state of self-reliance (Jeff Donaldson, 2024).

The current situation begs the question, where do we turn to when new disaster(s) overwhelm existing emergency services?
So one big part...also common with the CAF reserves...is the job protection aspects at least in Australia. A person who deploys to a bushfire in Australia still must have employer consent to leave...but the employer is also compensated for the absence of the employee which allows them to cover OT/replacement staff during their deployment. This makes it much easier to allow employers to allow their employees to depart and the second part is many of their deployments are short stints...days...not weeks. So much higher turnover on incident manpower and stress for logistics but also higher deployment rates due to variable terms allowed.

That being said Australia is also struggling with attracting newer folks to the rural fire brigades/volunteer forces. Most of the folks I've worked with have been 40 plus in age...very few young folks coming over. Partially that is due to the roles (experienced higher end positions needed) but also trying to send frankly over qualified folks over so they have enough experience to adjust the unknowns vs. raw recruits. And there is also a prestige aspect of sending long term folks over in recognition of work done at home vs the young bloods. But all the brigades are talking about similar stories about how it's tough to recruit new young volunteers especially if they don't already have family ties to the brigade.

I did find it interesting looking at the Team Rubicon recruitment ads on the weekend (Team Rubicon is currently deployed to Manitoba) where they were highlighting no experience necessary and one week deployment norms from anywhere in Canada.

Is part of the solution changing the thinking from long term easy buttons (call in the CAF for 3 months of OP LENTUS or 18 day deployments under CIFFC) and instead think of what is the minimum time to be effective? Would hate to be the Plans Chief responsible for tracking manpower on 5 day deployments...but I'd rather 5 days of motivated work than 18 days of tired, worn out folks.

Or have we become so risk adverse we only accept top end folks? Can on the job training be done for smaller sub-set of recruits tacked onto an establish structure. If I have 15 fully trained firefighters in May on a crew could I tack on 5? more fit high school students in July with minimal training to bulk up numbers? Pay, training and retention issues abound but just thinking what could be done...especially if pay was significantly better than current state?

Just a thought as I ponder where to find hundreds more people to go...
 
I have touched on this before and it is timely to mention it again.

This disturbing trend of seeking to nationalize disaster responses has been occurring in Canada for over thirty years. The current legislative framework (Emergency Management Act, Statutes of Canada) actively constrains the federal government from intervening in disasters, such as this summer's wildfires, unless invited in by provinces. There are exceptions to this limitation. When the legislation was correctly applied for the pending solar eclipse along Niagara Falls, there was objections and ridicule to the necessity for a state of emergency being declared (CBC, 2024).

Other countries already encourage a variety of voluntary national service models, including New Zealand (Grant & Langer, 2021), Australia (McLennan et al., 2021), Germany (Fathi et al., 2020; Kehl et al.., 2017), and Japan (Atsumi & Goltz, 2014). A reoccurring theme among these successful volunteer examples is the cultural aspect involved. Both Japan and Germany actively enable citizens to be able to participate and volunteer. The desire to volunteer is engrained at the individual level.

For five years (2021-2026), the Canadian federal government has experimented with establishing a national voluntary humanitarian workforce, through the use of the major NGOs. Research on the results from these efforts indicate continued gaps and areas for improvement (Beveridge, 2025; Public Safety Canada, 2025). Without stable funding due to this program's funding expires March 2026 and the government's budgetary cutbacks, it is unlikely this program will survive.

The biggest challenge has been the NGOs inability to attract volunteers. This is not a new phenomenon, as we have been witnessing the decline in volunteerism across the board, including important public services, such as volunteer fire departments. Over the past five decades, the Canadian public increases their demands for more government / public services. This reliance on government services has seen a drop in the public's engagement with volunteering, which greatly reduces local community resiliency. As one academic points out, Canadians as a whole need to reverse decades of government reliance and return to a state of self-reliance (Jeff Donaldson, 2024).

The current situation begs the question, where do we turn to when new disaster(s) overwhelm existing emergency services?

The forests in Japan and Germany are more aptly described as 'fibre plantations'. Everyone laughed when Trump mentioned 'raking the forest', but that's what they do in European plantations, most of which look like rows of giant asparagus and are only a few minutes drive from urban centers with alot of people.

North American boreal forests are mountainous, remote, harsh and extremely dangerous. Injecting partially trained volunteers into those environments can be fatal. That's why they ended the old time practice in North America of 'conscripting' local labour in the event of wildfires - avoiding casualties that cause insurance claims against the Crown.

As a result of the gigantic fires in recent history, and bowing to pressure from local communities, BC has implemented a new policy to work with organized groups of Rural and Remote firefighters in extreme conditions. However their roles are very restricted, they are under command of wildfire management officials, and the job seems not much different from CAF members deployed on OP LENTUS....

How we work with rural and remote firefighters: Cooperative Community Wildfire Response Groups​

Responsibilities​

Rural and remote firefighters must carry out all activities under the supervision and guidance of BCWS. BCWS does not authorize rural and remote firefighter groups to voluntarily respond to a wildfire.

The BCWS designate will assign roles based on the group's experience and training. Groups may be asked to support activities such as:
  • Expediting resources, like personnel, equipment and supplies
  • Mopping-up. For example, cooling ash pits
  • Patrolling areas to prevent potential flare-ups
Without explicit direction from BCWS, rural and remote firefighters are not permitted to:
  • Suppress wildfire
  • Conduct initial attack
  • Enter or remain in an area that's under an evacuation order
  • Move or re-deploy BCWS resources
  • Be paid to conduct FireSmart activities
Note: Structural Protection and Defense is not included in the rural and remote firefighter model. Individuals or groups interested in participating in structural firefighting and protection within buildings and other structures should consider joining a local volunteer fire department.

 
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