A-10 Warthog

[KevinB]

I think fundamentally the question is how much COIN does one expect to do that justifies keeping a separate type that has limited utility elsewhere. The A-10s being 9.5% of the fast jet combat fleet is a substantial hindrance for the USAF. That will get cut down. If all that's planned is occasional fights in Africa, than a smaller dedicated fleet of 50-80 frames (of a COIN aircraft that is substantially less capable than the A-10) is probably what they end up with. But looking at what is happening with next gen rotorcraft, we're fast converging to a point where coax and tiltrotors have much of the same performance characteristics of an A-10. Only a matter of time to me before the Army and Marine Corps start asking why the USAF has OA1s when they can just weaponize an MV-75 and do the same job. And there's a case to be made that they can do it much better than the USAF.

Ye ole Key West Agreement rears its ugly head. I can see the USAF digging it's heels in about it isn't a rotary wing, so you can't arm it offensively ...
While that can't stop the USMC, the Army only really gets to do something with Armed Airframes if either it's hidden by USASOC or the USAF doesn't want and abdicates the role. The Army won "Chopper Wars" as the USAF didn't want it, and then USAF fought the Army adopting the Chinook and tried to bury that way back when as well. Army Aviation has ceded any gunship development to USASOC, and 160th has been rather hot/cold on the MV-75 due to it not working a lot of mission profiles.

Also the USAF doesn't own the OA1's that is SOCOM. Yes AFSOC, but funded out of SOCOM for SOCOM as the Big USAF didn't want the mission.

 

[ytz]

Yep. There's a lot of institutional politics and inside baseball on how this plays out. Mostly my point is that technology is converging to enable a rotorcraft weapons delivery platform that has the same speed, range and endurance as an A-10. As that happens, obviously current paradigms need to evolve.

 

[Kirkhill]

Yep. There's a lot of institutional politics and inside baseball on how this plays out. Mostly my point is that technology is converging to enable a rotorcraft weapons delivery platform that has the same speed, range and endurance as an A-10. As that happens, obviously current paradigms need to evolve.

On the other hand the A-10 is in the inventory right now and has trained crew to fly and support them.

I am not a fan of discarding current assets to procure future assets.

I prefer to keep one foot on the ground as I advance and start bringing in the new before disposing of the old. Even if that might cost money.

 

[KevinB]

Yep. There's a lot of institutional politics and inside baseball on how this plays out. Mostly my point is that technology is converging to enable a rotorcraft weapons delivery platform that has the same speed, range and endurance as an A-10. As that happens, obviously current paradigms need to evolve.

Agreed.

However if you need that cannon, outside something bigger than the MV-22 Osprey being fielded, you aren’t getting there from here in a non fixed wing. Now that said I think that rocket/missile loadout is preferable on the AntiTank role. The GAU-21, M61 and other lower recoil systems provide decent anti-material options outside of hard armor. Quite frankly while I think that while the A-10’s days are numbered, that @Kirkhill is right, they are still around, and many have just been recently (last 3-4 years) upgraded, so we may as well use them

I honestly don’t know what a future platform will look like, we know that with the cancellations of the attack helicopter side of Future Rotary Lift that Army Aviation doesn’t either — just that it likely won’t be a manned system.

 

[ytz]

I am not a fan of discarding current assets to procure future assets.

If you go a few pages back, I said that as long as they have life in them, it's good to use them. But they are getting old and burning through engines and airframe hours. At some point, it simply becomes massively expensive to keep sustaining what is a bespoke fleet.

I honestly don’t know what a future platform will look like, we know that with the cancellations of the attack helicopter side of Future Rotary Lift that Army Aviation doesn’t either — just that it likely won’t be a manned system.

FARA suffered from a fatal flaw. The performance specs were less than that of FLRAA. So it couldn't escort the now MV-75. In the proposals we see from the USA and USMC, they recognize this mismatch and increasingly propose simply weaponizing the MV-75.

Going further, recall that FARA was only meant to replace the Kiowas. If we going down the path of discussing what can replace the A-10 and provide decent CAS in a pinch, it becomes pretty obvious that tiltrotors and coax rotorcraft are the literal 80% solution (you can see this is compare range, speed, payload) and can be organic to the Army or Marine Corps. This discussion is still maturing because the technology is new and people don't fully understand the implications yet. Just look at how shocked the Army was they saw what the MV-75 enabled for long range assault. Read this and then consider that at some point they'll need a platform that can escort that force and provide support immediately and organically:

Army Already Preparing For V-280 Valor To Dramatically Transform Air Assaults

The V-280 will "deliver one Brigade Combat Team in one period of darkness, over 500 miles, arriving behind enemy lines, and be able to conduct sustained combat operations.” The Army is busy working on its concept of Large-Scale, Long-Range Air Assault, which will be enabled by the arrival of the...

www.twz.com

 

[Kirkhill]

If you go a few pages back, I said that as long as they have life in them, it's good to use them. But they are getting old and burning through engines and airframe hours. At some point, it simply becomes massively expensive to keep sustaining what is a bespoke fleet.



FARA suffered from a fatal flaw. The performance specs were less than that of FLRAA. So it couldn't escort the now MV-75. In the proposals we see from the USA and USMC, they recognize this mismatch and increasingly propose simply weaponizing the MV-75.

Going further, recall that FARA was only meant to replace the Kiowas. If we going down the path of discussing what can replace the A-10 and provide decent CAS in a pinch, it becomes pretty obvious that tiltrotors and coax rotorcraft are the literal 80% solution (you can see this is compare range, speed, payload) and can be organic to the Army or Marine Corps. This discussion is still maturing because the technology is new and people don't fully understand the implications yet. Just look at how shocked the Army was they saw what the MV-75 enabled for long range assault. Read this and then consider that at some point they'll need a platform that can escort that force and provide support immediately and organically:

Army Already Preparing For V-280 Valor To Dramatically Transform Air Assaults

The V-280 will "deliver one Brigade Combat Team in one period of darkness, over 500 miles, arriving behind enemy lines, and be able to conduct sustained combat operations.” The Army is busy working on its concept of Large-Scale, Long-Range Air Assault, which will be enabled by the arrival of the...

www.twz.com

Seen.

But when we reduced that fleet others have been converting crop dusters to perform the same roles.

The same thing happened when proper air forces went jet powered in 1945. Twenty years later they were still looking for props to relace their Mustangs and Typhoons.

Our soldiers and police still train with shields and tactics the Romans would recognize. Some things cannot be discarded ot the enemy will exploit the opening.

 

[OldSolduer]

Seen.

But when we reduced that fleet others have been converting crop dusters to perform the same roles.

The same thing happened when proper air forces went jet powered in 1945. Twenty years later they were still looking for props to relace their Mustangs and Typhoons.

Our soldiers and police still train with shields and tactics the Romans would recognize. Some things cannot be discarded ot the enemy will exploit the opening.

Don't forget the A1 Skyraider in Vietnam IIRC

 

[YZT580]

If you go a few pages back, I said that as long as they have life in them, it's good to use them. But they are getting old and burning through engines and airframe hours. At some point, it simply becomes massively expensive to keep sustaining what is a bespoke fleet.

strictly on the side, your bespoke fleet is twice the size of our entire air force.

 

[ytz]

strictly on the side, your bespoke fleet is twice the size of our entire air force.

Sure. But contrary to popular belief, even the USAF has resource constraints. Even if those are constraints beyond our imagination. Again, the A-10 is almost 10% of the USAF's fast jet combat fleet. That is not proportional to the primary threat. Basically, they have to start planning near-peer with a 10% handicap.

 

[Kirkhill]

Sure. But contrary to popular belief, even the USAF has resource constraints. Even if those are constraints beyond our imagination. Again, the A-10 is almost 10% of the USAF's fast jet combat fleet. That is not proportional to the primary threat. Basically, they have to start planning near-peer with a 10% handicap.

And that is the role of the US Air National Guard who wants to keep flying the A-10.

A lower cost means of maintaining a "Just in Case" capability in a lower threat environment.

As the head of NORAD said, in his jurisdiction Gen 5 fighters are not critical to the threats he is facing. He is content with F16s and older F15s for most of his missions.

The pacing threat he is facing at home is the low and slow UAS threat and in that threat environment the A-10 still has a place.

The A-10 Warthog Can Now Destroy Drones

The A-10 Warthog has a "surprising new role" as a drone hunter. Recent photos show 2 Shahed kill marks, likely from cheap APKWS rockets. (149 characters)

nationalsecurityjournal.org

A-10 Warthog Appears To Have Become A Drone Killer

The laser-guided APKWS II rocket is an established surface-attack weapon for the A-10, which is now likely using a version of it for drone hunting. The laser-guided APKWS II rocket is an established surface-attack weapon for the A-10, which now appears to be using it for drone hunting.

www.twz.com

 

[GR66]

FARA suffered from a fatal flaw. The performance specs were less than that of FLRAA. So it couldn't escort the now MV-75. In the proposals we see from the USA and USMC, they recognize this mismatch and increasingly propose simply weaponizing the MV-75.

Is the MV-75 a good configuration for the CAS role? The rotors are huge vulnerable targets for ground fire and when in the forward flight position would seriously constrain the firing arcs of any weapons mounted. Even missiles mounted on the stub wings would be firing pretty darned close to the blade tips and cabin-mounted weapons would have their forward firing arcs blocked. Maybe a chin-mounted cannon like the Apache?

 

[Kirkhill]

In defence of @YZT 's position that the future is catching up to the A-10

France tests MQ-9 Reaper for drone intercept role

France’s Air and Space Force has successfully carried out its first anti-drone missile test from an MQ-9 Reaper, using a Hellfire missile to engage an aerial drone target. The test took place on April 2 at the military range on

defence-blog.com

Hellfires from Reapers.

Given that the APKWS II was developed as the low cost alternative to the Hellfire for the AH-64, and uses the same guidance system, I think it is safe to assume that the Hellfires on the Reaper could be swapped out for 4 or 7 packs of the APKWS II.

 

[KevinB]

Is the MV-75 a good configuration for the CAS role? The rotors are huge vulnerable targets for ground fire and when in the forward flight position would seriously constrain the firing arcs of any weapons mounted. Even missiles mounted on the stub wings would be firing pretty darned close to the blade tips and cabin-mounted weapons would have their forward firing arcs blocked. Maybe a chin-mounted cannon like the Apache?

No, it really is not -- the same way the MV-22 Osprey is very limited in offensive weapons.
Also Bell had to go back and rework the V-280 Valor's (MV-75) internal cabin layout after award due to realizing (read being told) the need for crew chief weapon stations. It is very problematic as while in rotary flight the cabin area is clear - and the arcs are solid for ground support - but when the shift to forward propellor "winged" flight the arc are extremely limited from both a wing pylon type or from crew chief minigun stations.

Quite honestly the Chinook replacement segment of FVL is still in draft - give the size/weight capacity of that program - you may end up with a much more fit for purpose Ground Support / Ground Attack platform in that. If it becomes anything at all, as there is a still a lot of angst in the Army Aviation community about the MV-75, and if the gains in speed and range where worth the other capability losses.

I am not holding my breath, as MV-75 is still in it's infancy, and there will be a lot of lessons to be learned from it as it starts to mature.

 

[ytz]

And that is the role of the US Air National Guard who wants to keep flying the A-10.

A lower cost means of maintaining a "Just in Case" capability in a lower threat environment.

Again. Doesn't solve the problem I said. 10% of the USAF fast jet force is an aircraft that has no role in the pacing scenario.

As the head of NORAD said, in his jurisdiction Gen 5 fighters are not critical to the threats he is facing. He is content with F16s and older F15s for most of his missions.

The pacing threat he is facing at home is the low and slow UAS threat and in that threat environment the A-10 still has a place.

I missed the part where he said he needs A-10s to combat UAS. Could you please provide the appropriate timestamp?

 

[Kirkhill]

Again. Doesn't solve the problem I said. 10% of the USAF fast jet force is an aircraft that has no role in the pacing scenario

I missed the part where he said he needs A-10s to combat UAS. Could you please provide the appropriate timestamp?

The A-10 is not a 5th Generation fighter. 5th Generation fighters are not needed per the GOC. The A-10 has a recent track record of knocking down the threats that concern the GOC in his jurisdiction.

Ipso facto QED.

 

[ytz]

The A-10 is not a 5th Generation fighter. 5th Generation fighters are not needed per the GOC. The A-10 has a recent track record of knocking down the threats that concern the GOC in his jurisdiction.

Ipso facto QED.

What the Commander said was that he doesn't need 5th Gen fighters to defeat the primary threat today. He didn't say the primary threat was UAS at home. Nor did he say he needed A-10s. Nor did he speak about substantially longer horizons. He answered a specific question pertaining to buying more F-15E for continental defence.

The NORAD/Northcom Commander may not be concerned with a fifth Gen threat or even higher air threats. But that's one cocom among several that the USAF as a whole has to service. Or are you going to say that what the INDOPACOM, CENTCOM and EUCOM Commanders need are irrelevant?

If you're going to twist his logic and explanation, you're no better than the Gripen fans using his words to advocate for dumping the F-35 order. After all, fifth gen isn't needed right?

 

[Kirkhill]

What the Commander said was that he doesn't need 5th Gen fighters to defeat the primary threat today. He didn't say the primary threat was UAS at home. Nor did he say he needed A-10s. Nor did he speak about substantially longer horizons. He answered a specific question pertaining to buying more F-15E for continental defence.

The NORAD/Northcom Commander may not be concerned with a fifth Gen threat or even higher air threats. But that's one cocom among several that the USAF as a whole has to service. Or are you going to say that what the INDOPACOM, CENTCOM and EUCOM Commanders need are irrelevant?

If you're going to twist his logic and explanation, you're no better than the Gripen fans using his words to advocate for dumping the F-35 order. After all, fifth gen isn't needed right?

Your "twisted logic" is my "debating tactic". I learned that in High School.

In debate you get to line up your datum points (intentionally singular) to create the narrative you wish to support your argument.

I am no better than those Gripen fans, or those that are convinced of the appropriateness of the F35 solution or the value of resurrected big gun battleships.

A debate gets to examine both the data and the narrative. And sometimes you are seeking to convince the person opposite you and sometimes you seek to convince the audience. And sometimes you fail to convince either.

It has been very hard for me to find right answers. Sometimes I have followed the right answer to the wrong solution.

...

I say nothing about the needs of the other CoComs. I would point out that if fifth gen solutions are in short supply, and if one CoCom says he can adequately manage his tasks without fifth gen solutions then that leaves more fifth gen solutions in the hands of his peers.

As to the rising threat -

NORAD and USNORTHCOM Commander General Gregory Guillot has expressed significant concern regarding the rapid rise in drone threats (small unmanned aerial systems - sUAS) over North American military installations, highlighting a dramatic increase in incursions.
U.S. Department of War (.gov) +1
Core Concerns and Recent Data:

• Rapid Rise in Incidents: Guillot revealed that there were over 350 UAS detections at approximately 100 U.S. military installations last year.
• Border Threats: He has reported that drone incursions along the U.S.-Mexico border likely exceed 1,000 per month, noting their use by criminal gangs.
• Surveillance Risks: The primary concern is the use of drones for surveillance of sensitive military capabilities, including nuclear-capable bomber bases and submarine silos.
• Threat Expansion: Beyond the border, there is increasing fear that drones could be used in coordinated "swarms" to surveil or attack domestic military bases and critical infrastructure.
  U.S. Department of War (.gov) +6

Action Taken and Future Needs:

• Request for Expanded Authority: Gen. Guillot is pushing for broader legal authority to destroy drones that are surveilling military bases, particularly at a greater range from the installations.
• Increased Defeat Capability: In early 2026, he noted that while a year prior almost no detected drones were defeated, recent improvements have allowed for the neutralization of roughly one-quarter of detected drones.
• Rapid Deployment of Counter-Drone Kits: Northcom has deployed "Fly-Away Kits" (FAKs) to participate in counter-drone activities, validating the ability to quickly deploy tools to detect and disable enemy drones, such as at Minot Air Force Base in Oct 2025.
  DefenseScoop +4

The commander emphasized that while DOD has taken steps, "work remains to be done to ensure that there are resources there quickly".
AZPM News

.....

As to the utility of the A-10 in the role

The A-10 Thunderbolt II ("Warthog") is actively evolving into a Counter-Uncrewed Aircraft System (CUAS) platform, with recent deployments confirming its capability to engage small, slow-moving drones, signaling a new, specialized role within the U.S. Air Force.

• Drone Kill Markings (2025): The Idaho Air National Guard's A-10s returned from a CENTCOM deployment featuring kill markings for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAS), confirming successful engagements.
• Ideal Capabilities: The A-10's ability to loiter for extended periods at low speeds and low altitudes makes it a cost-effective choice for combating slow-moving threats, such as Shahed-type drones, compared to high-cost fighters like the F-15 or F-35.
• Weaponization for C-UAS: A-10s have been cleared for using the AGR-20F Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System II (APKWS II) to shoot down drones, allowing for high-precision, low-cost interceptions.
• Limitations: Despite its success, the A-10 lacks organic radar for long-range detection of drones, making it reliant on external targeting pods or ground control interception (GCI) to vector it to targets.
  The War Zone +4

While primarily tested and employed in the CENTCOM theater, this adaptation of the A-10 represents a major shift in how the USAF plans to use the platform, potentially extending its life beyond 2030 by offering a dedicated drone-hunting role.

...
As to the willingness of the Air National Guard to continue flying the A-10

Despite the U.S. Air Force’s plan to retire all A-10 Thunderbolt II "Warthogs" by the end of fiscal year 2026, the Air National Guard (ANG) and Congress have sought to keep them flying due to their unparalleled Close Air Support (CAS) capabilities. While some units like the 175th Wing are transitioning, the aircraft remains in demand, with structural upgrades extending its life and new deployments proving combat readiness in 2026.
National Guard.mil +4

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mqCkUi9qUjQ&t=651
Key Points on A-10 National Guard Status:

• Retirement Deadline: The Air Force is executing a phased retirement of the entire A-10 fleet by 2026, aiming to focus on higher-end modernization.
• Congressional Intervention: Congress has previously blocked complete retirement, with the 2025 National Defense Appropriations Act ordering the Pentagon to maintain at least 103 Warthogs, pushing final phase-out toward 2029.
• Unit Transitions: The 175th Wing of the Maryland ANG, a long-time operator, retired its last A-10s in early 2025. Meanwhile, the 127th Wing in Michigan continues to operate them.
• Capabilities & Upgrades: The A-10 remains highly valued for its combat effectiveness, with newly installed reinforced wings extending the airframe's life until 2040.
• Replacing the Mission: The Air Force intends to replace A-10 units with more advanced fighters, including the F-35 and F-15EX.
  Air & Space Forces Magazine +7
  
  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ve5-vrNaZZk&t=59
  ....

The Air National Guard wants to continue flying them.
They are effective against a developing threat in addition to demonstrated effects againt their design targets and in the CoIn role.
They are available.
They are cheaper to fly.

The A-10 Thunderbolt II is significantly cheaper to operate per flying hour than the F-22 and F-35, and it generally remains less expensive to fly than most F-15 and F-16 variants. While newer 5th-generation jets offer advanced stealth and sensor capabilities, the A-10's lower maintenance demands—largely due to its simpler technology and lack of advanced stealth coatings—make it a highly cost-effective platform for close air support.
WION +3

Operating Cost Per Hour Comparison (Approx. 2024-2026 Data)
Operating costs (Cost Per Flying Hour - CPFH) vary depending on whether they include only direct costs (fuel, parts) or full sustainment (maintenance, personnel, overhead).
Simple Flying +2

• A-10 Thunderbolt II: ~$20,000 - $22,000 per hour
• F-16 Fighting Falcon: ~$22,000 - $27,000 per hour
• F-15EX/E Eagle: ~$29,000 - $34,000 per hour
• F-35A Lightning II: ~$33,000 - $42,000 per hour
• F-22 Raptor: ~$60,000 - $85,000 per hour
  Simple Flying +5