AAD and NGS (split from JSS Amphib Capability thread)

[Cdn Blackshirt]

Nice but I would hope we would look at something more attainable. The San Antonios are nice as well but I think even they are pushing our envelope.

I need to ask a series of dumb questions which follow my sometimes questionable logic path:

Question 1)   Where do I really need an Air Defence Capability today?
Answer 1)   When I am close to shore and in range of land-based fighters/bombers.

Question 2)   What would necessitate me being this close to shore?
Answer 2)   Direct support of deployed land forces.

Key Assumptions:
1)   I would not deploy amphibious or ground forces without carrier air cover (American/British)
2)   With carriers automatically comes dedicated American/British multirole Destroyers (with TBMD I might add)

New Question:  
Would it therefore not make sense to buy (6) LPD-17's with the Ship Self Defence Suite Mk.2 (with VLS and ESSM) and eventually phase out the purpose-specific Air Defence Destroyer while transferring the already trained crews to run the Command & Control for the LPD's?  

Thanks in advance,



Matthew.    

 

[Ex-Dragoon]

So using your logic Cdn Blackshirt the only time a Cdn Rask Group would have an area air defence capability is when we took a San Antonio with us???

to me that is like saying the US should always protect Canada . :

 

[Cloud Cover]

Would it therefore not make sense to buy (6) LPD-17's with the Ship Self Defence Suite Mk.2 (with VLS and ESSM) and eventually phase out the purpose-specific Air Defence Destroyer while transferring the already trained crews to run the Command & Control for the LPD's?  

This sort of analysis at least shows an advanced level of thinking that probably wouldn't even get to the Cabinet table.

In no particular order, here are some responses to consider with 6 C&C LPD's with SSDS:

Too expensive; lack of manoeverability compared to AAD; harder on fuel [less range] than AAD; requires tanker/MPRS support: tanker/MPRS  requires ASW/AAW fighting escort to theatre; very serious EW and countermeasures concerns over using LPD for SSM launch platform; removal of scalable and proportional contribution to a coalition effort; not enough soldiers for 6 ships; not enough sailors for 6 ships; coaltion and allied escorts [readur UN "friends"]  may not be willing to take one on the chin for a Canadian LPD; a bigger less stealthy target more vulnerable to air launched stand off cruise missiles; a slower target more vulnerable to torpedo or modified torpedo; and last but not least: the bigger they are, the harder they fall!!

A ship like that cannot hide on the surface anymore. If Mr. Dithers wants an LPD capability, he is asking for real trouble without national AAD assets to go along, especially if the tanker/LPD hybrid is still being fancied.  [which is an idiotic concept expressly rejected by the officers who would have to command the things as wilfully blind folly.]

 

 

[Ex-Dragoon]

I think we are wasting our time, Whiskey, trying to convince some of these guys why we need AAD, they don't listen despite us and others going over this over and over again.

 

[Cloud Cover]

Like the man said:  "ayup".

 

[Ex-Dragoon]

I need to ask a series of dumb questions which follow my sometimes questionable logic path:

Question 1)  Where do I really need an Air Defence Capability today?
Answer 1)  When I am close to shore and in range of land-based fighters/bombers.

Question 2)  What would necessitate me being this close to shore?
Answer 2)  Direct support of deployed land forces.

Key Assumptions:
1)  I would not deploy amphibious or ground forces without carrier air cover (American/British)

What if carriers were unavailable?

2)  With carriers automatically comes dedicated American/British multirole Destroyers (with TBMD I might add)

See above...you cannot guarantee that. What if those ships were tasked elsewhere?

New Question: 
Would it therefore not make sense to buy (6) LPD-17's with the Ship Self Defence Suite Mk.2 (with VLS and ESSM) and eventually phase out the purpose-specific Air Defence Destroyer while transferring the already trained crews to run the Command & Control for the LPD's? 

So you would risk 700 plus  Marines? What about air defence when LPDs were not required? Also see whiskey's comments.

 

[Cdn Blackshirt]

Whiskey and Ex,

Thanks for taking the time to respond.   And of note Ex, it's not that I don't believe you re: AAD, it's that in order to fault-test any paradigm, I start by trying to break the one I have currently utilise with all the information I have at my disposal.

In any case, a couple of quick responses:
1)   Whiskey - I think we can eliminate "proportional contribution" as an item as we could allocate CPF's if a single vessel is what is required.
2)   Whiskey - Too expensive in comparison to what?   Are AAW's and the LPD-17 not nearly equivalent in procurement cost?
3)   Whiskey - Support - see below....
4)   Whiskey - Not enough soldiers/sailors - downsize NDHQ, and reallocate salaries.    ;D
5)   Ex-Dragoon - If there are no escorting carriers and a land-based fighter/bomber/cruise missile threat exists, I don't enter the theatre.   I would want complete air dominance before ever putting a vessel with 700 "marines" in harm's way.

That being said, let's say that your operational model of an AAD being absolutely necessary to defend an LPD fleet is undeniable, is there a possibility of changing our current structure as generalists with every piece of kit we have, and instead specialize certain kit in certain roles?   Specifically, can we break our naval assets (to start with) into two specific groupings high risk littoral vessels (requiring an AAW capability) and lower risk coastal patrol vessels (perhaps not requiring an AAW capability)?

If we did that, could we then get away with procuring only (2) AAD's as flagships for said Littoral Battle Groups?

Littoral Battle Group Composition (one unit per coast)
(1) Aegis Destroyer (off-the-shelf, don't dick with it, keep Tomahawk capability)
(2) CPF - eventual upgrade but pass on the hull extension and focus on ASW and self-defence
(3) LPD-17 - carrying a maximum of 2100 troops with gear.   (I say we find a way to get the soldiers and sailors rather than dismiss this sized battlegroup)

Littoral Battle Group Supply Structure (one unit per coast)
(1) Patino-equivalent AOR/MPRS (or alterntaive type)
(2) CPF - same as above

Add-On Units (one unit per coast)
(2) Additional CPF's for ASW and additional self-protection
(3) Dedicated non-steel Minesweepers
(2) Victoria-class Submarines

Remaining CPF's along with Kingston-class become primarily Coastal Defence Units although all CPF's would receive same set of upgrades.  

Bottom Line:   It would change our role from a long-duration single/double ship allocations to more than one multinatinal projects that last years (constant rotation), to a shorter duration ground forces deployment and support role for shorter time frames at which point everyone comes home, and the second string from other nations step in.

Thank you again for your thoughts....

Cheers,



Matthew.    

 

[DJL]

If we did that, could we then get away with procuring only (2) AAD's as flagships for said Littoral Battle Groups?

Playing with fire with going that low.........What would you do if one of your DDGs is in a major refit and the sole deployable one gets into an accident or suffers a mechanical fault (or sunk)? Scrub the deployment, go ahead without the AAD?

Littoral Battle Group Composition (one unit per coast)
(1) Aegis Destroyer (off-the-shelf, don't dick with it, keep Tomahawk capability)
(2) CPF - eventual upgrade but pass on the hull extension and focus on ASW and self-defence
(3) LPD-17 - carrying a maximum of 2100 troops with gear.  (I say we find a way to get the soldiers and sailors rather than dismiss this sized battlegroup)

So you are proposing about six LPD (at about a billion a pop) to move an army battlegroup? How about instead, 3-4 RO/ROs to move (the equipment) of an entire brigade for about a billion (possably under if used) all told?

Littoral Battle Group Supply Structure (one unit per coast)
(1) Patino-equivalent AOR/MPRS (or alterntaive type)
(2) CPF - same as above

A single (Patino sized) AOR would be grossly inadequate to support your taskgroup of 6-9 ships and well over 4k personal, then to say nothing about supporting the pongos when they get ashore. You would need a supply train roughly the same size as an American ATF........say about 1-2, large AORs, then a couple of oilers and dry goods/ammunition ships, then throw in some additional freighters and tankers to support your embarked force once they land and the fighting starts............Biggggg Money......After the Americans, the only other nation that I think could pull this off would be the Brits......

 

[Ex-Dragoon]

5)  Ex-Dragoon - If there are no escorting carriers and a land-based fighter/bomber/cruise missile threat exists, I don't enter the theatre.  I would want complete air dominance before ever putting a vessel with 700 "marines" in harm's way

Sorry we don't have that luxury.

 

[Cdn Blackshirt]

Don't mind me, but based on what I'm learning, I'm continueing to try to improve the model....

What if we modify the Battle Group Structure:

Canadian Expeditionary Group (now only one)
(3)   AAD's
(3)   CPF's
(3)   LPD's

*3 interchangeable ground units of 2,000 men capable of fighting from this structure in order to guarantee healthy rotations.
[of note, I don't see how we can have a force structure of over 60,000 men and not be capable of sustaining 2,000]

Canadian Support Group (please ignore stupid name)
(3) CPF's
(3) AOR/MPRS
(3) Ro-Ro (usually allocated to Canadian Auxilliary Reserve in model identical to British Structure)


And assume add-on unit remain unchanged....


Better?   Worse?   Recommendations for further modification.




M.    

 

[DJL]

What if we modify the Battle Group Structure:

Canadian Expeditionary Group (now only one)
(3)  AAD's
(3)  CPF's
(3)  LPD's

*3 interchangeable ground units of 2,000 men capable of fighting from this structure in order to guarantee healthy rotations.
[of note, I don't see how we can have a force structure of over 60,000 men and not be capable of sustaining 2,000]

Why does the army require "3 interchangeable ground units" (to "guarantee healthy rotations") and the Navy is only afforded one "Expeditionary Group"? IOW, what is the point of having three army formations for rotation when the navy can only deploy one third of the time? Do you plan to increase the Navy's workload by three times?

 

[FSTO]

Don't mind me, but based on what I'm learning, I'm continuing to try to improve the model....

What if we modify the Battle Group Structure:

Canadian Expeditionary Group (now only one)
(3)   AAD's
(3)   CPF's
(3)   LPD's

*3 interchangeable ground units of 2,000 men capable of fighting from this structure in order to guarantee healthy rotations.
[of note, I don't see how we can have a force structure of over 60,000 men and not be capable of sustaining 2,000]

Canadian Support Group (please ignore stupid name)
(3) CPF's
(3) AOR/MPRS
(3) Ro-Ro (usually allocated to Canadian AuxAuxiliaryserve in model identical to British Structure)


And assume add-on unit remain unchanged....


Better?   Worse?   Recommendations for further modification.




M.    

Okay, staying with the concept of the Canadian Task Group;

2(at the very best 3) LHD/LPD/LHA whatever is decided. One on each coast with the 3rd being used for surge capability/refit replacement/etc.

4 AORs (one on each coast) we could even build updated Protecteur class. (diesel electric propulsion, flight deck on same deck as stores elevators, modern bridge, modern MCR, compartment monitoring by tv; all these improvements will drop the number of pers required substantially)
4 AAW destroyers (there are lots out there that we can buy off the shelf)
12 FFH (this is where we could go with the new common hull, the CPFs are in worse shape than anyone would believe. They will not last the 30+ yrs that the old steamers did)
4 to 6 subs
Then the rest of Patrol ships. If you need something like force protection in the area you are operating, you can send the smaller ships on a heavy lift ship (similar to the one that brought the USS COLE back from Yemen) and then operate them out of there.

In my strongest opinion the CF should stay away from a hybred hybridD there is a reason why nobody has done it. It will not satisfy anyone.

 

[Ex-Dragoon]

I pretty much have the same view as FSTO with minor differences. What I would also add to his post is MCM units. Not the Kingston class but something designed from the keel up to be a mine hunter. Suggestions being the German built Hameln class, the Belgium Tripartite class, and the UK Sandown & Hunt classes come to mind as being good platforms.

 

[Infanteer]

In all my writings and ramblings on "Joint Force Transformation" that I've put up here and am working on at home, I've found it useful to stick to what is "doable".  I've solicited the advice of both Ex-Dragoon and FSTO and they've both given me very similar and very workable layouts for increasing our Naval Power while at the same time enhancing our Joint Capabilities.  Lets just say that, when your trying to work out a plan, you should really stick to the advice of those "in the know".

As "sexy" as LPD's, 2000 man battlegroups, and multi-role ships sounds, it wouldn't survive the light of day if it was put on PM PM's desk.  Heed the proposals that these Sailors have put up here - they are solid and workable.

Infanteer, the Joint Force Cheerleader

 

[Cloud Cover]

Whiskey and Ex,

Thanks for taking the time to respond.  And of note Ex, it's not that I don't believe you re: AAD, it's that in order to fault-test any paradigm, I start by trying to break the one I have currently utilise with all the information I have at my disposal.

In any case, a couple of quick responses:
1)  Whiskey - I think we can eliminate "proportional contribution" as an item as we could allocate CPF's if a single vessel is what is required.
2)  Whiskey - Too expensive in comparison to what?  Are AAW's and the LPD-17 not nearly equivalent in procurement cost?
3)  Whiskey - Support - see below....
4)  Whiskey - Not enough soldiers/sailors - downsize NDHQ, and reallocate salaries.  ;D
5)  Ex-Dragoon - If there are no escorting carriers and a land-based fighter/bomber/cruise missile threat exists, I don't enter the theatre.  I would want complete air dominance before ever putting a vessel with 700 "marines" in harm's way.

Cheers,
Matthew. 

Matthew:

WRT:
1) If you read Leadmark, the navy has quite correctly pointed out that it's simply no response at all to show up with allies with ability to defend only oneself. Thus, a ship with capabilities beyond that of the CPF is an asset that we can force an enemy to say "Ok ... HMCS XXYY has arrived with TF... we must now alter our plans to deal with the arrival of HMCS XXYY, because she can really hurt us if we're not careful."  It seems to me that is the sort of message to project that we, as NATO, G-8 and otherwise supposedly superior nation, should try to attain. This should not be construed as some sort of a write off of the work done on ops by the CPF's- but the fact is that in the finest tradition and probably the most enduring tradition of the Navy, the missions assigned were completed by the crews in spite of the limitations of the equipment they have to work with.

2) This ties directly into 1 above ... I think we can do this cheaper and without going AEGIS ... an enemy will have already factored AEGIS into their own plans.. why accommodate them?

3) As part of a coalition, of course a single surface warship could fuel and hopefully resupply off a coalition or contracted AOR. Unlike Ex-D and FSTO, I do however see a role for a twin set of small AOR's in addition to a quad set of improved Protecteur Class. I would also modify FSTO's plan by adding the large AOR's to an fleet auxillary. [i've been a proponent of that for a while- btw FSTO,  am i missing something: how does 4 AOR's equal one on each coast?]

4) WRT numbers of pers: the Navy is really caught here with a quality of life issue. The most practical solution I can think of is to automate as many functions as possible. The problem with that is the retention of skilled trades, which can only be solved by vastly improving quality of life and pay which, IMHO, might be improved to the point where it outpaces civilian competition. Very big $$ no matter which way you slice it. Can's speak to the green guys, they'll weigh in soon enough. I do think that the army will not be very happy if they are crammed like sardines into an LPD or JSS- they have quality of life issues as well, and few [if any] of them signed up or were meant to be stuffed into a floating target.

Cheers.
 

 

[FSTO]

W-601 - Typo on my part regarding AORs. For sure 2 on each coast.

As for this entire thread, there seems to be very interesting glacial movements coming from NDHQ. Nothing concrete yet, but my contacts say that there will be some surprised faces come this summer.

 

[Cdn Blackshirt]

Matthew:

WRT:
1) If you read Leadmark, the navy has quite correctly pointed out that it's simply no response at all to show up with allies with ability to defend only oneself. Thus, a ship with capabilities beyond that of the CPF is an asset that we can force an enemy to say "Ok ... HMCS XXYY has arrived with TF... we must now alter our plans to deal with the arrival of HMCS XXYY, because she can really hurt us if we're not careful."   It seems to me that is the sort of message to project that we, as NATO, G-8 and otherwise supposedly superior nation, should try to attain. This should not be construed as some sort of a write off of the work done on ops by the CPF's- but the fact is that in the finest tradition and probably the most enduring tradition of the Navy, the missions assigned were completed by the crews in spite of the limitations of the equipment they have to work with.

2) This ties directly into 1 above ... I think we can do this cheaper and without going AEGIS ... an enemy will have already factored AEGIS into their own plans.. why accommodate them?

3) As part of a coalition, of course a single surface warship could fuel and hopefully resupply off a coalition or contracted AOR. Unlike Ex-D and FSTO, I do however see a role for a twin set of small AOR's in addition to a quad set of improved Protecteur Class. I would also modify FSTO's plan by adding the large AOR's to an fleet auxillary. [i've been a proponent of that for a while- btw FSTO,   am i missing something: how does 4 AOR's equal one on each coast?]

4) WRT numbers of pers: the Navy is really caught here with a quality of life issue. The most practical solution I can think of is to automate as many functions as possible. The problem with that is the retention of skilled trades, which can only be solved by vastly improving quality of life and pay which, IMHO, might be improved to the point where it outpaces civilian competition. Very big $$ no matter which way you slice it. Can's speak to the green guys, they'll weigh in soon enough. I do think that the army will not be very happy if they are crammed like sardines into an LPD or JSS- they have quality of life issues as well, and few [if any] of them signed up or were meant to be stuffed into a floating target.

Cheers.
 

Thanks again guys....

First I did read Leadmark 2020 a couple of years ago but I don't recall them describing a new vessel (or vessels) that would create an "oh-oh" factor on the part of a potential enemy.

That being said, I agree with that sentiment 100%.

Putting on the shoes of that potential enemy, my "oh-oh" list would rank as follows:
1)  Conventional Aircraft Carrier - Aircraft to provide constant air superiority and CAS as required
2)  Amphibious Carrier - Conventional Aircraft provide air cover, LCAC provide marines to shore, and helicopters provide mobility
3)  Multirole Destroyer/Cruiser (like Arleigh Burke) - Cruise Missiles pose a constant threat of hitting inland while Aegis poses high risk for any opposition aircraft
4)  Long range attack submarine - Opposition Naval Assets as well as Land Structures (cruise missiles) are constantly under threat from stealthy adversary

After that, no single vessel really scares me....(I await correction for an omission  ;D)

What would scare me is a mix of vessels that accomplish some of the same things.  

Here's the question though:  "Are we procuring to be a completely independent battle group or are we procuring to work as part of a coalition of the willing?"

If we are procuring to be a completely independent battle group, everything mentioned above is true and we need our own AAD (although I would argue that a land attack capacity should be built into those vessels).  

However, if we are going to deploy as a coalition of the willing (which makes sense since even in the best case a unilaterally deployed balanced task group won't really carry much of an "oh-oh" factor), I would contend that our traditional allies will be able to bring significant numbers of AAD to any such battle group but will lack the an effective amphibious assault structures (and by that I mean an ability to deploy ground forces from ships and then support them, as opposed to storming the beach).  

In essence, if we recognize that based on our allocated resources that unilaterally we won't scare anyone, does it not make sense to build our structures to focus on improving the overall "oh-oh" factor of coalition task group?  (of note, my answer is yes....)

Thanks again gentlemen.



Matthew.  

 

[Infanteer]

After that, no single vessel really scares me....(I await correction for an omission  ;D)

SSBN with a handful of SLBM's?

 

[Cdn Blackshirt]

SSBN with a handful of SLBM's?

See I knew it was coming....



M.  ;D

 

[Ex-Dragoon]

First I did read Leadmark 2020 a couple of years ago but I don't recall them describing a new vessel (or vessels) that would create an "oh-oh" factor on the part of a potential enemy.

Its there...when they refer to the single hull program to replace both CPF and 280s.

If we are procuring to be a completely independent battle group, everything mentioned above is true and we need our own AAD (although I would argue that a land attack capacity should be built into those vessels). 

I think the ground pounder if given a choice would prefer to get to the target safely vice having a diminished air defence suite and a land attack suite.

However, if we are going to deploy as a coalition of the willing (which makes sense since even in the best case a unilaterally deployed balanced task group won't really carry much of an "oh-oh" factor), I would contend that our traditional allies will be able to bring significant numbers of AAD to any such battle group but will lack the an effective amphibious assault structures (and by that I mean an ability to deploy ground forces from ships and then support them, as opposed to storming the beach).

From my experience our allies prefer we have more assets in place to be able to defend our HVUs and their HVUs. If we can't cover our own warships and auxiliaries not to mention their warships and auxiliaries they have to take up the slack that we cause.

As for your "oh oh" list not even going to touch it.

Infanteer the SSBN with SLBMs scares me too. Kind of reinforces the need for our own sub capability IMO.