Afghanistan: Why we should be there (or not), how to conduct the mission (or not) & when to leave

[mainerjohnthomas]

Does anyone else but me find it strange that everyone in the west is pointing to our troops and calling us invaders, but no one is pointing at the Pakistanis and Uzbek's, the Arabs and Chechen's, and the dimwits from our own shores who have signed up to carry the spear against us in Afghanistan?  Has it occurred to no one, save the aid workers and soldiers on the ground in happy Afghanistan that it is two sets of foreigners battling to determine the future of the Afghans?  Both sides can claim to have native Afghans fighting along side them.  Only our side is determined to leave the Afghans in charge when we leave; the Taliban was the poisoned offshoot of Pakistani fundamentalism, and ruled Afghanistan as a base for its continued efforts to destabilize those richer, stronger nations they viewed as the real prizes.

 

[GAP]

I add this to this thread on the debate, simply because if even 1/2 of this is occurring, it's gotta make the outcome tremendously difficult. Some of this stuff will really hurt the relations with the people in rural (and urban) areas.

If we do not have a handle on what these contractors are doing and control over the quality of work, with basic building standards that will give some longevity to the projects, there is no long term. If someone built a community (and a lot of us have seen some pretty shoddy work, and that's WITH regulations) and the problems listed here arose...would we not complain?

It's a long read, somewhat biased, but look at the commentary of what the contractors are giving them. Maybe there should be a second look as to who is providing the services.



How the West short-changed Afghanistan
The Sunday Times October 29, 2006
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2099-2422241,00.html

We went to war to restore democracy and prosperity to Afghanistan, and spent billions on building new homes, hospitals and highways. But five years and thousands of lost lives later, everything is crumbling and the ferocious Taliban are back. Where did it all go wrong? Fariba Nawa reports on the troubles of her homeland
 
The supposedly "posh" apartment where I am writing this is in one of dozens of buildings constructed in 2004 near downtown Kabul. It is part of the extensive reconstruction process taking place in Afghanistan in the midst of war. The landlord is a businessman who built the shiny five-storey apartment block with tinted windows as an investment in what then seemed an equally shiny new economy. Across the way are a mosque and a wedding hall, and the call to prayer competes with Afghan pop music. Lately, the roar of fighter jets has added another level to the noise, as security in Kabul declines to its worst state in five years. During the morning rush hour earlier this month, the windows shook from an explosion that injured more than a dozen police several blocks away.

There are three of us in the flat, including my fiancé and an American friend, and we pay £165 a month in rent, the going price in the city. But few locals could afford such luxury: a civil servant’s salary is £27 a month. And this is no Trump Tower. We’re not sure if our building is earthquake-safe, since no seismic standards are enforced in this construction boom. Afghanistan is to earthquakes as Florida is to hurricanes – we know that when the ground shakes, the walls crack and the doorframes shift.

Our bathroom drains emit the stench of sewage; the pipes inside the walls leak, and the water seeps into the plaster. The lightest touch sends disintegrated wallboard cascading to the floor. There’s no insulation in the walls, and the gaps in our misshapen door and window frames allow icy winds to blow in. The building’s exterior was never finished with a primer or sealant, so when it rains, the moisture soaks through and beads on the interior walls. Metal beams supporting the ceiling of our living room are rusting, the rust is bleeding through the paint, and the paint is cracking. The list goes on.

I consider myself lucky. These flawed buildings and services are an inconvenience, but I could leave. Yet the shoddy reconstruction effort in Afghanistan since the Taliban were theoretically ousted has had far greater consequences for Afghans, and now, it seems, for westerners, who have footed the bill for these botched efforts. Amid the detritus of rubble and lost opportunities, the Taliban have returned.
More on link

 

[McG]

Fraser hands reins to Dutch after Afghan mission
Updated Sun. Oct. 29 2006 1:23 PM ET

Canadian Press

After more than eight months in the kind of high-stress zone that tries tough souls, Canadian Brig.-Gen. David Fraser is about to hand over command in southern Afghanistan.

...


"This environment is more dangerous than I've ever seen anywhere else in the world," he said in a parting interview with The Canadian Press.

"Over here, everybody is a target. The Taliban respects nobody. A reporter, the International Committee of the Red Cross, UN, military, Afghan. Everybody is an equal target of opportunity for them."

From Cyprus to the height of Bosnia's ugly civil war, Fraser has seen nothing in 26 years and seven missions that equals southern Afghanistan.

Still, he thinks the situation in Kandahar is misconstrued.

"Security is probably the most over-used, ill-defined word in the lexicon in this country.

"There's tens and hundreds of thousands of people going about living their lives downtown. And that place is just bustling," he said of the ramshackle sprawl of vegetable vendors and low-rise buildings near the main military base at Kandahar Airfield.

"Suicide attacks are a concern," he says. "The Taliban have gone and demonstrated complete disregard for attacking the people. Because what they're attacking is success."

Few women are seen on Kandahar streets even in full veils, and local Afghans who welcome foreigners describe growing intimidation and fear.

"I don't agree with that assessment," Fraser says. "A lot of those people don't get out of their houses. What they have is a perception. Eight months ago, Kandahar city wasn't as busy as it is now.

"You've got to put it into context."

Forty-two Canadian soldiers and one diplomat have died in Afghanistan since 2002. Since March, Fraser has watched 34 times as members of his military family were honoured and sent home in caskets.

There's no shortage of debate -- some of it stingingly critical -- about mounting troop and civilian death tolls, the slow pace of reconstruction and the prospects of success against those who would revert Afghanistan to a repressive terrorist incubator.

Fraser's optimism is steadfast.

Afghan police and security forces are being built from nothing, he says.

Several provincial governors have restored enough law and order to move on to budgets, education "and other issues that any governor or provincial premier would have to deal with."

North Atlantic Treaty Organization troops are advancing into parts of the country that were virtual no-go zones even a year ago, he says. The list includes Spin Boldak, a notoriously cut-throat border conduit for smugglers, mercenaries and suicide bombers who move from Pakistan into Afghanistan all but unimpeded.

"We are making progress," Fraser says. "That's a good news story. That's an expansion of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan's footprint."

Holding that ground ultimately depends on whether military leaders can help deliver enough locally driven development. How better to convince Afghans to shun a growing anti-government insurgency than to offer new health clinics, schools and credit for new businesses?

Too many Afghans, though, are still waiting five years after a resurgent Taliban was defeated. It doesn't help that many people have lost faith in a widely corrupt Afghan government that doubles as a bastion for former warlords accused of vicious abuses.

Further complicating Canada's aid efforts is the refusal of several international agencies to work in the South. CARE and World Vision are among those who say the military's foray into road building, well digging and school projects has blurred the line between unarmed aid workers and combat troops.

They want soldiers to stick with security.

Fraser calls that "Old Think."

"The new reality is we're all working complementary to each other in an environment that is dangerous.

"These people deserve nothing less than our international community's 100-per-cent commitment to provide them hope and opportunity in a safe environment.

"It's worth it," he says. "And this is do-able. But it comes at a cost."

http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20061029/afghanistan_fraser_061029/20061029?hub=Canada

 

[McG]

No surprise here:

Cdns. ill-informed about Afghan mission: Fraser
Updated Tue. Dec. 5 2006 6:02 PM ET
Canadian Press

OTTAWA -- The debate over Canada's role in Afghanistan has been ill-informed and bereft of facts, says the former commander of Canadian troops there.

Brig.-Gen. David Fraser, who returned from the war-torn country last month, says he's having a hard time getting used to the chill in the air - both in terms of the weather and the public discourse involving the mission.

"It would be nice to have a debate with all of the facts on the table," Fraser said Tuesday in a speech to the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies.

"I'll tell you right now, the story Canadians are receiving is like an iceberg. They're only seeing one-third of it."

In part, the soft-spoken general blamed the media for focusing on the casualty count, rather than the more nuanced narratives of nation-building.

"What was reported this past summer was my operations in Sangin and Helmand; what I did to fight the Taliban," he said.

"No one reported the fact that I spent $20 million building roads, schools, wells and training and mentoring an Afghan corp commander."

In fact, there has been media coverage of reconstruction efforts, but access and information is often difficult to get.

Fraser's criticism follows similar comments by Prime Minister Stephen Harper who has said several times that the good work Canadians soldiers are doing often goes unreported.

What the Conservative government does not say is that civilian members of government agencies, such as the Canadian International Development Agency and the Foreign Affairs Department, are routinely barred from speaking with journalists on the ground about redevelopment projects.

Last spring, Fraser's own principal political advisor at Kandahar Airfield - a Foreign Affairs staffer - was not allowed to be quoted on the record by the embedded media.

Liberal defence critic Ujjal Dosanjh blamed the information vacuum on the Conservatives and their policy of muzzling ministers and officials.

"I have the utmost respect for Gen. Fraser, the work he's done, and I understand his frustration," said Dosanjh. "But it's really up to the government to provide information. And they have not been providing that information."

Opposition MPs and senators - especially parliamentary defence committees - have "fought tooth and nail" to be briefed on the latest goings on in Afghanistan, he said.

Speaking to NATO parliamentarians last month about anemic support for the mission, Defence Minister Gordon O'Connor conceded the government hadn't gone a good job engaging the public on the question of why the country was in Afghanistan.

Fraser, who was in charge of all coalition and NATO forces in southern Afghanistan, ended his overseas tour Nov. 1 and turned over responsibility to a Dutch general.

During his time on the ground, Canadians were involved in the heaviest fighting they've seen since the Korean War. A series of conventional and guerrilla-type battles as well as accidents claimed the lives of 36 soldiers and wounded over 200 others.

Public opinion polls reflected a deep skepticism for the mission when troops were first deployed to the unstable southern region last winter. The results in subsequent surveys have ebbed and flowed, depending upon the state of fighting and the number of casualties.

Without naming NDP Leader Jack Layton, who's called for Canadian troops to be brought home, Fraser took aim at critics and said it is important the Conservative government stay the course.

"Those people over there in Afghanistan asked for us to be there. They want us to be there. They continue to want to be there."

However, Dosanjh said it's not the job of the military to promote the mission - that's up to the government.

Fraser, who is on a speaking tour, said Canada's history of diversity and racial tolerance means it has a lot offer the fractious tribal country.

"When I met the governor, Assadullah Khalid, in Kandahar he led with a pistol eight months ago," he said.

"Today he picked the phone and picks up a pen. He leads by example. Ladies and gentlemen, that is huge progress."

http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20061205/cda_afghan_061205/20061205?hub=Canada

 

[MG34]

These attacks are common place and it is probably having a desensitizing effect on the media and that may be a good thing. 

I hate to sound callous but I would rather have the media focus on other aspects of the mission than the constant IED attacks, such as the reconstruction efforts.  That doesn't mean I don't think deaths should be reported, but if there are no injuries or the injuries are minor I don't see the need for making a big deal out of it.

  Reconstruction has not really began on other than on a very limited scale,the security conditions have not yet been set to allow any projects of real value to start. The PRT has done some great work,but until the ACM forces have been pushed back and/or defeated there is little sense glorifying small scale projects that have limited effects on small areas close to Kandahar City. The PRT is over here are facilitating projects under CIDA and other organizations such as USAID,by providing contracts,chanelling of funds and what not ,while the Battlegroup sets security conditions (driving out or killing ACM forces). Neither actually conducts the reconstruction projects, (other than in a managing/overseeing position in the case of the PRT),that is not our mandate. We are here to support the legimate government of Afghanistan currently the ACM is the biggest threat to a free and democratic Afghanistan ,we are here to destroy them,not to build schools or dig wells,that is the realm of the NGOs.
  Reconstruction sounds good on the news and gives Joe Sixpack a warm and fuzzy feeling about having troops over here but there can be no real reconstruction unitl the ACM has been defeated, unfortunately that will mean the possibility of further Canadian and ISAF casulties wether they be "news worthy" or not. It is far too soon to shift the focus from kinetic operations to reconstruction.
Just my 2 cents sitting here on a mountain top.

 

[KevinB]

I'll offfer a somewhat contradictory opinion -- in that some reconstruction -- especially political/democratic information operations can be sucessfully as some (and not all) of the enemy can be swayed by finding out they can gain power via non violent measures as well.
  I agree that the enemy much be found fixed and destroyed -- but at the same time an effort must be made to minimize/neutralize the enemy via other means too.

 

[MG34]

True,unfortunately the info/ops campaigns here have been ineffective or even more sadly absent.

 

[KevinB]

I know some people DFAIT/Cf should hire -- and a PSD team for them too  ;D

I agree wholesale on your point about major recontstruction.  It really needs to be understood that these missions are long term.  We (as Canadians) need to have the intestinal fortitude to see them thru and help bring Afghanistan into an area of peace and stability.  Failure to do that will result in a far greater number of Canadian (and other westerners) deaths -- in addition to being the morally correct action.

 

[Mithras]

  Reconstruction has not really began on other than on a very limited scale,the security conditions have not yet been set to allow any projects of real value to start. The PRT has done some great work,but until the ACM forces have been pushed back and/or defeated there is little sense glorifying small scale projects that have limited effects on small areas close to Kandahar City. The PRT is over here are facilitating projects under CIDA and other organizations such as USAID,by providing contracts,chanelling of funds and what not ,while the Battlegroup sets security conditions (driving out or killing ACM forces). Neither actually conducts the reconstruction projects, (other than in a managing/overseeing position in the case of the PRT),that is not our mandate. We are here to support the legimate government of Afghanistan currently the ACM is the biggest threat to a free and democratic Afghanistan ,we are here to destroy them,not to build schools or dig wells,that is the realm of the NGOs.
  Reconstruction sounds good on the news and gives Joe Sixpack a warm and fuzzy feeling about having troops over here but there can be no real reconstruction unitl the ACM has been defeated, unfortunately that will mean the possibility of further Canadian and ISAF casulties wether they be "news worthy" or not. It is far too soon to shift the focus from kinetic operations to reconstruction.
Just my 2 cents sitting here on a mountain top.

If I came across as ignorant that wasn't my intention.  "But" the Canadian government is going to need to find good news stories for our media in Afghanistan to keep Joe Sixpack all warm and fuzzy about this mission.  At the moment it seems most of the more vocal Canadian citizens do not have the intestinal fortitude to see a complex, dirty mission through to the end so you are going to have to find something positive to show them, even if it is just a new well.

Stay safe.

 

[The Bread Guy]

Shared in accordance with the "fair dealing" provisions, Section 29, of the Copyright Act.

Canadian government analysis suggests rebuilding Afghanistan a tough slog
Jeff Esau, Canadian Press, 16 Dec 06
Article Link

OTTAWA (CP) - Afghanistan's financial infrastructure is "primitive" and its recent economic growth "will be difficult to sustain," says a blunt assessment of the country's future by senior Canadian government officials.

Afghanistan is "seriously hampered" by security problems, endemic corruption, skilled labour shortages, limited access to finances, land tenure problems, the strain of returning refugees and "the generally weak rule of law," says the Sept. 5 analysis prepared by the Privy Council Office.

The office, the co-ordinating body for cabinet and the prime minister's office, released the seven-page document after a request under the Access to Information Act.

Its bleak forecast, delivered almost two weeks before a visit to Canada by Afghan President Hamid Karzai, appears at odds with recent claims by other Canadian officials that progress has been significant and steady.

The heavily censored report, The Future of Afghanistan: The Next Five Years, was written by PCO's intelligence assessment co-ordinating committee and widely distributed within government.

Based on "diplomatic and intelligence sources from Canada and allied countries," the report says some progress has been achieved since the U.S.-led victory over the Taliban in November 2001, particularly in children's schooling and improved access to basic health care.

But the vast majority of the population still struggles for the "bare essentials of survival," just as they did in the days of the Taliban.

The economy has benefited from the influx of foreign aid, which is driving a reconstruction boom, but is far from being self-sustaining.

Substantial budget subsidies and continued foreign financing will be required for many more years to help with trade and current account deficits, says the report.

The country's economy is heavily dependent on the drug trade, and although most poppy production is located in the southern provinces, revenue from drug production and shipment is important outside these Taliban-controlled areas.

The authors praise Afghanistan's new constitution and the direct election of the president, and say the elected legislature "has been surprisingly active and effective" since it was formed a year ago.

But the committee's stark economic assessment will likely stir debate, as the Liberals and the Bloc Quebecois question whether the Canadian mission is properly focussed and how much progress has really been made since Canadian troops were deployed to Afghanistan in 2002, and to the volatile Kandahar region last year.

Bob Bergen, of the University of Calgary's Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, says the committee's report is a "very good assessment because it lays out in very stark terms the challenges that NATO faces" in both military and economic spheres.

The Afghan economy is "a step back to the seventeenth century."

The Privy Council assessment is more in line with the "very realistic" briefings of joint parliamentary committees than with some of the government's public statements, Bergen said in an interview.

"The threat posed by the narco-economy to the efforts to rebuild is so overwhelming that without doing something about that economy first, the Afghani government could be completely and utterly overrun by the Taliban."

The key to preventing that, he says, is NATO adopting a military approach "even more robust" than it has to date.

Bergen said UN statistics he has analyzed indicate the drug trade represents 52 per cent of the country's $5.2-billion economy, while the Afghan government's revenue is only 5.2 per cent.

The Privy Council committee produced at least one earlier report on Afghanistan last December, The Afghan Economy: Is there one?

That study slammed non-governmental agencies for their "squandering of aid money" and said "the rehabilitation efforts of disparate aid groups, agencies and nations often overlap, conflict, or are at worst, fratricidal."

Bergen said the aid money the Canadian government has earmarked for Afghanistan "is probably not getting through in a way the military commanders on the ground would like to see it."

Aid money should be channeled through coalition military forces, he said.

 

[zipperhead_cop]

Aid money should be channeled through coalition military forces, he said.

I could see much stink and hollering at that comment, despite it making sense. 

 

[mainerjohnthomas]

In the rebuilding operations in Afghanistan we are in the "building the tools to make the tools stage".  We cannot simply hand over control to the civilian infrastructure, and plug in our add on contributions, as there really isn't an infrastructure there, and hasn't been in living memory.  We must supply the security, and leadership in the rebuilding efforts, so that the Afghans will have time to build something that will supply commerce, government, and security for the Afghan people.  It has to come from the military because no one else can provide it in defiance of the Taliban, no one else can make promises that can not be swayed by Taliban threats.  The civilian aid agencies have a lot that they can do, but they are constrained to work within the existing structures, and that leaves the aid given subject to local limitations, corruption and outright theft unless a credible and incorruptible outside force (like the CF) is present to make sure that what is given gets used by the intended recipient, for the intended purpose.
    We are not stabilizing an essentially functional nation that just needs a little help, we are dealing with a nation that has been smashed back to the stone age and totally coopted by criminals and fanatics for so long they have forgotten any other way.  Rebuilding from the ground up will take time, and progress will be slow.  We cannot fix it and be home by Christmas, the boys and girls will be there for a few more tours, but if they don't b#tch about it, then the politicians can sit on their padded little benches and suck it up for a change.

 

[Jammer]

If I might throw my bit in here.
Having been at the PRToff and on for the last four months (I'm home on HLTA). I beleive I can offer some statments of fact and dispense with conjecture.

First, DFAIT, USAID, ICRC and any other NGO organizations CANNOT and WILL NOT travel out side of the confines of thier compounds or the environs of Kandahar city without ANY sort of protection. Some NGOs have taken the steps to hire private guards just to get them back and forth to the various places they have to go to just get basic supplies, let alone do any "reconstruction" work.

Second, Countries that have pleged millions of dollars to "rebuild Afghanistan" are now attaching caveats to their donations even though they were made in the days following Sept 11th (our staunch European Allies no less...)

Third, The "Taliban" or whoever you want to call them (we call them ACM- anti coalition militia), will continue to do thier best to disrupt by any means they have what ever work has or is being done by the Canadian PRT, who I might say are the only ones in ALL of Kandahar province going out on a regular basis doing lots with nothing.

Should we be there? Good question

Are we there? Yes!

What are we doing there? Come over and see!

 

[Pikepusher]

Jammer,

thanks for a touch of realism in a whole bunch of idle speculation.

I would like to follow up your three Q&As with a fourth question: What can we over here do to help you over there? 

 

[fixerdave]

I would like to add two separate points in favour of the current Canadian Afghan mission:

1) We are currently rebuilding the Canadian military.  Imagine the disaster if we were trying to do this during peacetime.  Politicians would be haggling forever over their piece of the billions that are being spent.  Pork-belly procurement would rule and most of the money would be wasted, at least from a military perspective.  When soldiers lives are on the line, most politicians will avoid the more blatant "my riding first" shenanigans that go on during peacetime military spending.  Combat not only makes better soldiers, it makes better politicians, mostly.  I know, it's a little cynical to list "an improved military procurement system" as a reason for going to war, but it's true.

2) The next time people say Canada should be concentrating on reconstruction instead of combat, offer to raise money for them to go to Kandahar and do some reconstruction themselves.  If they promise to go over - right now, promise them you will bust your a** canvasing to raise all the money they need for whatever reconstruction project they think is valid.  $10,000, $100,000, whatever it takes.  Of course, you might want to give them an option: they could raise their own money while waiting for NATO soldiers to secure the province.  You know, so they could do the reconstruction without getting their heads chopped off.

Jammer,

I would like to follow up your three Q&As with a fourth question: What can we over here do to help you over there?

I've wondered that myself.  I like the idea of the Tim Hortons gift certificates but I can't see that doing much for the moral of someone freezing/frying in some FOB.  Anywhere outside of the Kandahar base, staring at a Timmy's gift certificate has gotta hurt.  Given the shipping difficulties, any other suggestions?

David...

 

[midget-boyd91]

I would like to add two separate points in favour of the current Canadian Afghan mission:

1) We are currently rebuilding the Canadian military.  Imagine the disaster if we were trying to do this during peacetime. 

I seem to recall replacing some pieces of equipment like the twin huey... that was in peacetime. and now the griffons we have that replaceed the
T-hueys with arent suitable for deployments in Afghanistan. Now dont worry, yes I know it isn't hot and dry and high suitable. But I am talking about the armour situation.. or lack thereof.

 

[a_majoor]

WRT how we should conduct the mission, here is a breakdown of the numbers which suggests that the current strategy is the correct one and that pulling back to do more "reconstruction" is not only a dangerous fantasy, it is actually more dangerous for the troops on the ground as well:

http://cjunk.blogspot.com/2006/12/construction-more-deadly-than-combat.html

Construction more Deadly than Combat

It sometimes takes time to expose falacious arguements. In the combat versus reconstruction (construction) debate, it has taken a bit of time to expose the truth, but we finally have some very compelling evidence that the Jack Layton/progressive mantra of "construct don't destruct" has a sinister side.

In a John Turley-ewart op-ed for the National Post, it becomes clear that "construction" is more deadly than combat. I've argued long and hard that the touchie-feely approach puts our troops at greatest risk because they are forced into a passive possition ... sitting ducks as it were. Turley-ewart has put statistics to my premise:

Of our 44 fallen soldiers, five died in friendly fire incidents, five in accidents, 12 in combat and, 22 were felled by terrorists when on patrols providing security in support of reconstruction efforts. Put another way, only 27% of Canadian fatalities in Afghanistan are the result of combat with enemy insurgents.

For those who are unschooled in things military, let me expand a bit. Traditionally, soldiers on the attack (offense) suffer the greatest casualties unless they can bring massive superiority to the battle. Soldiers on the defensive, hold the advantage and relatively few can hold off much larger forces. It is an endorsement of NATO superiority and tactics to realize that offensive operations in Afghanistan have cost so few soldiers.

On the other hand, patrolling activities leave soldiers dangerously exposed to ambush and mechanical attack (booby traps, mines, IEDs, etc.) Once a force limits itself to guarding civilian infrastructure in a passive way, that force leaves itself open to classic guerrilla tactics. These tactics are most effective when safe havens exist for the guerrilla force, and where the guerrilla force enjoys indigenous support.

Perhaps the single greatest mitigating factor is the landscape/rural geographic environment. Considering this, Canadian soldiers operate in a region that is very well suited to guerrilla tactics and leaves small force patrols dangerously exposed. In other words, construction projects are exceedingly dangerous for Canadian troops.

The skinny on this one is that blow hard “progressives” who open their pie-holes merely for domestic political advantage should be taken for what they are: ignorant and disingenuous charlatans who speak from a point of supreme ignorance and complete lack of genuine care for the soldiers serving in Afghanistan. They form policy based on ideological arguments that are not grounded in reality but rather intended to sway a public that is misinformed or just plain ill-informed. The proof is in the numbers ... and numbers say that the Jack Layton plan is the most dangerous plan.

 

[observor 69]

CANADA, AFGHANISTAN
AND THE BLAME GAME
Sean M. Maloney

While Canadian troops are deployed in Afghanistan’s dangerous province of Kandahar,
the re-defined nature of the mission — from patrolling the capital to taking it to the
Taliban in the wild south — has left Canadians deeply dvided about the mission. Royal
Military College historian Sean Maloney, who has been on the ground four times in
Afghanistan since 2003, points out that Canada is engaged in war, not peacekeeping,
against an unrelenting foe and rigid ideology — radical Islamism. “The al-Qaeda
movement’s belief system, its ideology,” he writes, “is in no way compatible with ours.
We cannot negotiate with it. We have to keep it as far away as possible and
aggressively challenge it. That is what we are doing in Afghanistan.”

http://www.irpp.org/po/archive/dec06/maloney.pdf

 

[The Bread Guy]

Let's see if THIS gets the message out there.....

Canadian Forces Operations in Afghanistan - Why Are we There?
Backgrounder
Canadian Forces Operations in Afghanistan
Gov't of Canada Backgrounder BG–07.009, 5 Jan 07
Backgrounder

Why are we there?

Canada is in Afghanistan at the request of the democratically elected government, along with 36 other nations, and as part of a UN-sanctioned mission to help build a stable, democratic, and self-sufficient society.

About 2500 members of the Canadian Forces (CF) are currently serving as part of Joint Task Force Afghanistan (JTF AFG). They play a key role in the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission whose goal is to improve the security situation in Afghanistan and assist in rebuilding the country.

Canada’s continued engagement in Afghanistan helps create the conditions for longer-term reconstruction. All CF operations in Afghanistan are conducted with the consent and at the request of the Afghan government to:

    * Provide the people of Afghanistan with the hope for a brighter future by establishing the security necessary to promote development and an environment that is conducive to the improvement of Afghan life;
    * Conduct operations in support of Afghan National Security Forces;
    * Help strengthen and enhance Afghan Governance capacity;
    * Help extend the authority of the Government of Afghanistan in the South;
    * Facilitate the delivery of programs and projects that support the economic recovery and rehabilitation of Afghanistan; and
    * Assist in addressing humanitarian needs of Afghans by supporting Canadian governmental organizations and NGOs whose efforts meet Canada’s objectives.

The Afghan people are relying on the international community to help them rebuild their lives and their country after having suffered through decades of instability, oppression and insurgency.

By supporting the rebuilding of institutions such as independent courts, police and an army, Canada is on the ground laying the foundation for Afghans to govern themselves and secure a better future.

Canada has shown leadership by committing troops, resources, development and political effort to help the Afghan government secure a better future for its people. We have made a commitment to the Afghan people and we will stand by that commitment.

Helping Afghanistan continues the noble Canadian tradition of taking an active role to bring stability and lasting peace in a part of the world that has seen turmoil and upheaval.

Canada’s efforts in Afghanistan are guided by the Afghanistan Compact, which provides a five-year framework for coordinating the work of the Afghan government and its international partners by outlining specific outcomes, as well as the benchmarks and timelines for their delivery in the three areas of security, governance, and development.

Rebuilding a shattered Afghanistan is a slow and complex process in a country that is emerging from more than two decades of human rights abuses, terror, conflict, drought and poverty.

We are making progress – unthinkable only a few years ago – which is a testament to the will and fortitude of the Afghan people, as well as the commitment and engagement of the international community.

For example, a new Afghan constitution has restored the rule of law and respect for the human rights of every Afghan citizen, including those of women and children. Because of our efforts, the Afghan people now vote, women and girls have rights and children are going to school.

However, Canada is in perhaps the most troubled region of the country, where the challenges of establishing security and stability are more pointed than in other parts of Afghanistan. We are there because the job has to be done, if reconstruction and a better life for the people in the southern region are to be a reality.

The biggest threat to rebuilding is continued violence and threats from the Taliban and al-Qaeda whose principle mission is to disrupt and prohibit Afghan men, women and children from going about their daily lives.

Terrorism remains a threat to global peace and security. Afghanistan has been used as a base for terrorists in the past. In the interests of our collective security, Canada and its international partners share a responsibility to help ensure that terrorism cannot again take root in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan is not, nor has it ever been a traditional peacekeeping mission. There are no ceasefire arrangements to enforce and no negotiated peace settlement to respect. Negotiation is not an option with groups such as the Taliban nor al-Qaeda who are not interested in the kind of peace that the Afghan people seek. Their tactics are terrorism not talks aimed at establishing a truce.

Our mission is one of nation building. Our forces are doing exactly the type of work that needs to be done in Afghanistan. Our soldiers are the best in the world for this kind of mission. They are well trained, well led and have the best equipment on the ground.

We know the success of our mission cannot be assured by military means alone. No fewer than 19 UN agencies are in Afghanistan working tirelessly to help the Afghan people and their national government build a democratic and secure society.

Canada has also deployed diplomats, development workers, civilian police, as well as experts in human rights, good governance, the rule of law and democracy building — all of whom come together in common endeavour in Afghanistan.

The CF commitment is an important aspect of the Government of Canada’s whole of Government approach to assisting Afghanistan. For more information on Canada’s commitment to Afghanistan visit the Canada-Afghanistan website.
The situation today

The CF contribution to Afghanistan consists of approximately 2,500 personnel from units across Canada and is referred to as Joint Task Force Afghanistan (JTF AFG). The CF efforts in Afghanistan are subdivided into three distinct missions that work in concert with each other and have the same overarching goal of improving the security situation in Afghanistan, and assisting in rebuilding the country. The three missions currently underway are:

    * Op ATHENA - The Canadian contribution to the UN-sanctioned and NATO led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) currently has 2,500 CF personnel committed to Op ATHENA.
    * Op ARCHER – Consists of embedded CF staff officers at the Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A) in Kabul and a few liaison officers at Bagram Airfield supporting Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) as well as a small cadre of CF instructors involved in the training of the Afghan National Army (ANA) at the Canadian Afghan National Training Centre Detachment (CANTC Det) in Kabul. The current Canadian contribution to Op ARCHER consists of about 30 CF personnel.
    * Op ARGUS - The Strategic Advisory Team to the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan currently has 15 Canadians working in Kabul in support of Op ARGUS.

Operation ATHENA: The Canadian Forces contribution to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF): approximately 2,500 CF personnel

On July 31, 2006, CF personnel serving in Afghanistan were once again assigned to the UN-authorized, NATO led ISAF mission in Afghanistan when ISAF assumed command of the southern region of Afghanistan from the US-led Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF). This transition occurred as a result of the planned expansion of ISAF’s mission in Afghanistan.

From February to July 31, 2006, CF personnel had been operating in Afghanistan under OEF leadership following the consolidation of the majority of CF assets from Kabul, to Kandahar Airfield. CF personnel had previously served as part of ISAF from August 2003 to November 2005 in the Kabul area (Operation ATHENA 2003-2005).
Background

ISAF was originally authorized by the UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1386 on December 20, 2001, with a mandate to assist the Afghan Transitional Authority. UN support for ISAF has since been reaffirmed in subsequent Security Council Resolutions, most recently in UNSCR 1707 on September 12, 2006. Since its original mission of providing security in the Kabul area, ISAF has gradually expanded throughout the whole of Afghanistan.

ISAF’s responsibility is exerted via five Regional Commands (RCs):

    * Capital located in Kabul;
    * Northern located in Mazar-e Sharif;
    * Western in Herat;
    * Southern in Kandahar; and
    * Eastern in Bagram.

These in turn have Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) underneath them, five in the North, four in the West, four in the South and 12 in the East. There are no PRTs in RC Capital. Their role is to assist the local authorities in the reconstruction and maintenance of security in the area. More information on ISAF can be found on the ISAF website.

Overall, 2,500 CF personnel support the ISAF mission. CF personnel deployed as part of OP ATHENA comprise the following units (all figures approximate):

    * A Battle Group in Kandahar, primarily from 1st Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment (1RCR), which includes:

          o Soldiers from 1 RCR and 2nd Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry based out of CFB Petawawa and CFB Shilo, in Manitoba, respectively;
          o An engineer squadron from 2 Combat Engineer Regiment (2CER) in Petawawa;
          o An artillery battery from 2 Royal Canadian Horse Artillery (2RCHA) in Petawawa;
          o An armoured reconnaissance troop, from The Royal Canadian Dragoons (RCD) in Petawawa;
          o A Leopard tank squadron from the Lord Strathcona's Horse (Royal Canadians) in Edmonton, Alberta;
          o A Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Unit comprised primarily of personnel from 408 Tactical Helicopter Squadron based in Edmonton, AB, and 5e Régiment d'artillerie légère du Canada based in Valcartier, PQ.;
          o Operational Mentor Liaison Teams (OMLTs) from Land Forces Quebec Area (LFQA), partnering with Afghan National Army (ANA) Infantry Kandak Battalion and ANA Corps HQ;

    * 70 Health Service Support (HSS) personnel at the Multinational Medical Unit (MMU) at Kandahar Airfield comprised of personnel from 2 Field Ambulance and 1 Canadian Field Hospital in Petawawa, Ontario, and other Health Services units from across Canada;
    * About 30 CF members with the Multi-National Brigade (MNB) Headquarters assisting Dutch Major-General Ton van Loon in accomplishing his mission and exercising command and control over the MNB Region Command (South) in Afghanistan;
    * 300 CF members with the National Command Element (NCE) at Kandahar Airfield. Primarily composed of elements of 2 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group based in Petawawa, Ontario. The NCE also contains members from various units within the Land Force Central Area, as well as health services personnel from across Canada;
    * 300 CF members with the National Support Element (NSE) in Kandahar, primarily from 2 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group and 2 Service Battalion, also from Petawawa;
    * In Kabul, about 50 CF personnel at ISAF Headquarters, 15 personnel with a smaller NSE Detachment and 11 at the Canadian Embassy;
    * 250 CF members with the Theatre Support Element (TSE) in Southwest Asia.

The Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT)

Since August 2005, a Canadian PRT has operated in Kandahar City, where it will remain until February 2009. The PRT brings together elements from the Canadian Forces (CF), Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), and civilian police led by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) in an integrated Canadian effort known as the “All of Government” approach. Approximately 350 personnel are based at the PRT site at Camp Nathan Smith in Kandahar City.
The PRT helps reinforce the authority of the Afghan government in Kandahar Province, assisting in the stabilization and development of the region. It monitors security, promotes Afghan government policies and priorities with local authorities, and facilitates security sector reforms.
The PRT military component comprises personnel, drawn largely from Land Forces Central Area (LFCA) and 2 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group (2 CMBG) based in Petawawa, Ont as well as from Land Forces Quebec Area (LFQA). The PRT includes:

    * The PRT Commander’s Tactical Headquarters Group, which provides protection and mobility to the PRT Commander and his staff;
    * An Infantry company from 1st Battalion, Royal 22e Régiment protecting and escorting the PRT, providing a quick reaction force for Kandahar City, and performing defence and security tasks;
    * Military project managers (military engineers) enhancing the PRT’s capability to manage quick impact reconstruction and development projects;
    * A Civil-Military Cooperation Platoon from Land Force Central Area;
    * A Military Police Platoon from 2 CMBG in Petawawa;
    * Health and medical support from 1 Field Ambulance (1 Fd Amb);
    * Service and support elements drawn from across Canada; and
    * Other specialized elements from various CF units across Canada.

Operation ARCHER (Approximately 30 Personnel)

The Canadian contribution to the U.S. led Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan is known as Operation ARCHER.

Since the fall of the Taliban in December 2001, the International Community has been rebuilding Afghanistan’s infrastructure, institutions, government, and army. This effort involves more than just supplying weapons and equipment; Canada has contributed to the U.S. led effort to build a security infrastructure that includes operational forces, sustaining institutions, and the general staff and ministries to direct these organizations. The Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A) (formerly the Office of Security Cooperation - Afghanistan) is currently re-forming and building both the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP). The Canadian Forces currently has Brigadier General Greg Young and 12 other Canadian officers with CSTC-A in Kabul.

The CF also contributes 15 personnel to act as instructors involved in the training of the Afghan National Army at the Canadian Afghan National Training Centre Detachment (C ANTC Det) in Kabul.
Operation ARGUS (15 Personnel)
Strategic Advisory Team – Afghanistan (SAT – A)

Since September 2005 the Canadian Forces has, on a bi-lateral basis, provided a team of strategic military planners to support the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in developing key national strategies and mechanisms for the effective implementation of those strategies. The team is called the Strategic Advisory Team - Afghanistan, or SAT-A.

The Strategic Advisory Team consists of 15 Canadian Forces members and civilian employees, augmented by a CIDA officer to advise on development issues. The team includes a small command and support element, two teams of strategic planners, a defence analyst and a strategic communications advisor. The composition, size and capabilities of the team are adjusted as necessary.

The Strategic Advisory Team, in consultation with the Canadian Ambassador, the Head of Aid and with a senior representative of the Afghan government, provides direct planning support to government ministries and working groups in the development and governance realms. To date, the team has worked extensively with the Afghanistan's National Development Strategy Working Group, Public Administration Reform, Civil Service Gender Equity Policy, and with the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development.

The teams are embedded in their partner Afghan Government ministries and agencies and work under Afghan leadership. The basic method of operation is that the team assists working level officials integrate the substantive ideas of the Afghan leadership and international experts into cohesive strategic frameworks. Working closely with the Ambassador, CIDA and the Afghan Government, SAT-A is an example of the "whole of government" concept at work so that Canada can maximize the value of its contribution. The planning team members bring a very wide range of training, education, experience, and military strategic planning skills to bear on the resolution of complex civil problems.

- 30 -

 

[vonGarvin]

Too many words.  Not enough sound bytes.  Unfortunately, "No Blood for Oil" is a much more compelling argument than fact after fact laid out: we live in an ADD society and we have to cater to that.

Maybe "Nie Wieder Faschismus" (Fascism never again) is a better slogan as to why we are there.  That or a pic of OBL superimposed on a pic of a plane slamming into the World Trade Center.  Or a pic of that woman shot in the head by the Taliban for whatever crime she was alleged to have committed....


People are stupid.  Treat them as though they are stupid and you can get your message across.