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I never wanted to find out that I was stuped this way :crybaby: :kidding:Hauptmann Scharlachrot said:People are stupid. Treat them as though they are stupid and you can get your message across.
I never wanted to find out that I was stuped this way :crybaby: :kidding:Hauptmann Scharlachrot said:People are stupid. Treat them as though they are stupid and you can get your message across.
http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20070107/afghan_insurgency_070107/20070107?hub=Canada'Awful, evil mix' behind Afghan insurgency funding
Updated Sun. Jan. 7 2007 6:19 PM ET
Canadian Press
KANDAHAR, Afghanistan -- An "awful, evil mix'' of Taliban hardliners, drug lords, black marketers and corrupt officials are funding the insurgency that Canadian troops are battling in the Panjwaii and Zhari districts of southern Afghanistan, a senior Canadian officer said Sunday.
"I call them the predators,'' Col. Fred Lewis, deputy commander of the task force in southern Afghanistan, told The Canadian Press in an interview in which he discussed efforts to uproot the insurgency in the Arghandab River Valley area.
Despite years of drought, the region remains one of the country's bread baskets, with plentiful grape orchards -- along with huge marijuana and poppy fields that have developed into a major cash crop for farmers.
As Canadian troops continue to push ahead with Operation Baaz Tsuka in this former Taliban heartland, there seems to be a never ending supply of money to fund the hiring of more rebel fighters or for training suicide bombers brought in from Pakistan.
"I think more people are more and more convinced there's a pretty close connection (between the Taliban and the drug lords), which is pretty ironic because in 1996 when the Taliban took over the country one of their platforms was `we're not doing drugs anymore,''' Lewis said.
"Why would the Taliban fight so hard for this Arghandab Valley triangle area that we're all so familiar with now? The fact is that valley has water and it's green,'' he said.
Lewis said probably a third of the marijuana and opium crops under cultivation in the Arghandab Valley are drug-related.
"So why do you fight for that? Lewis said. "Well if you're a drug lord who is making millions and millions and millions of dollars, is it worth paying guys $200 to fight so that the coalition doesn't come into your valley?''
The Taliban pay their fighters about US$200 a month.
"Yeah, I think there's a pretty close connection between the Taliban and drug lords. Is it about financing? Maybe. It's just putting two and two together and it's not based on any secret intelligence reports or anything,'' he added.
Lewis said using the term Taliban to describe all the forces fighting Canadian troops is probably inaccurate. A number of groups: religious, political and criminal have a stake in the ongoing instability.
For the drug lords, it comes down to making sure farmers in the area plant marijuana or opium poppies, Lewis said, claiming that ordinary farmers were being coerced into the drug trade.
"An Afghan farmer gets $200 a month for farming opium but my understanding is when he farms grapes he gets $500 a month. The ones making all the money are the drug lords,'' he said.
"When you're making in the millions, are you willing to have a gang along who shows up at two in the morning who says to Farmer Smith: `You're growing opium next year, right?'''
Operation Baaz Tsuka, with the goal of helping Afghans defend themselves, is the only one that will eventually allow Afghanistan to emerge from the quagmire, said Lewis, who conceded that the Taliban are not going to go away.
There are probably about 500 Taliban hardliners in the province right now and likely still will be 10 years from now, he said.
"They may continue to exist for decades, but they (the Afghan people) can get to the level where they can deal with the situation,'' he said, noting that the overall population of the province is about two million.
Lewis said Canadians need to know that the war against the Taliban and their associates is winnable and a "noble cause'' and it would be wrong to leave the Afghan people at their mercy.
"They are the drug lords, they are the black marketeers, they are probably certain corrupt leaders. You add that to the Taliban leadership and it is just an awful, evil mix,'' Lewis said.
A bad end looms over Canada's Afghan mission
JEFFREY SIMPSON
From Saturday's Globe and Mail
Now that we've seen the last of the Christmas feel-good stories about Canada's troops in Afghanistan, serious analysis can focus on the tasks ahead for those troops — tasks made more difficult by the lack of progress in 2006.
That lack of progress was not the troops' fault. Instead, it reflected wider, ominous developments over which the Canadians have little, if any, control. These developments include the growing Taliban presence in Pakistan, the refusal of other NATO countries to assume new responsibilities, the Americans' Iraq distraction, the ongoing failure of NATO's poppy eradication policy, and the inability to make a dent against endemic poverty and corruption.
Canada has about 2,500 personnel in the province of Kandahar. Of these, perhaps 800 to 1,000 actually go on patrol. Their job remains to bring peace and stability (with such Afghan soldiers as can be found) to territory roughly the size of Nova Scotia.
The enemies of peace and stability — the Taliban, al-Qaeda, jihadists — are in the province, and over the border in Pakistan. Throughout this winter, these groups have rested, reorganized and trained for the next onslaught.
Borders must be sealed to improve any counterinsurgency's chance of success. The Pakistani-Afghan border, by contrast, is wide open. One slice of territory inside Pakistan adjacent to the border — the so-called federally administered tribal areas — has become what diplomats and intelligence officials quoted in The New York Times call a “Taliban mini-state.”
Last month, the Times chronicled how foreign fighters have implanted themselves in the area, supplanting tribal leaders, sometimes by violence. The foreign fighters have imported from Iraq the use of suicide bombings, car bombs and roadside explosive devices. These tactics will be increasingly used in Afghanistan.
The enemies of stability are also recruiting in Pakistan's madrassas (religious schools). The Times quoted unnamed officials saying the list of youths lining up for suicide attacks is lengthening in the tribal areas and Quetta, the headquarters of al-Qaeda.
Pakistan signed an agreement with the area's tribal leaders that made everything easier for the Taliban and al-Qaeda — and, therefore, more ominous for the Canadians and other NATO forces. The agreement stipulated that Pakistan would withdraw forces from the area in exchange for a pledge by tribal leaders to prevent people from crossing into Afghanistan.
Pakistan's central government essentially gave up trying to control the tribal areas. The result has been a political vacuum into which the Taliban and other militants have moved. It's widely believed that some elements of Pakistan's security forces support the Taliban, either because they sympathize with the Taliban's ideology or prefer a weak Afghanistan.
The Americans went easy on Pakistan's safe haven for the Taliban in exchange for (fitful) co-operation in pursuing al-Qaeda, the use of some military bases, and the shutting down of A. Q. Khan's nuclear proliferation network. The U.S. and NATO retain much leverage over Pakistan.
While the situation in Pakistan deteriorated, so did NATO's overall commitment to the success of the Afghan mission. With security threats rising, NATO countries failed to correspondingly increase the number of forces and reconstruction funds committed to Afghanistan.
When the countries doing the fighting in the troubled south — Canada, Britain and the Netherlands — asked for help, they got next to nothing from the other allies (Poland excepted). These countries, therefore, will spend 2007 facing a redoubtable, better-equipped foe with essentially the same forces as in 2006.
The United States is completely overwhelmed by the catastrophe it created in Iraq. President George W. Bush will make one last desperate attempt to stabilize at least the Baghdad area by sending thousands of additional U.S. soldiers. That deployment means no more troops for Afghanistan.
Police training in Afghanistan, supposedly the responsibility of Germany, is going badly. Poppy eradication, supposedly the responsibility of Britain, is going backward, with the United Nations reporting a record crop in 2006. The profits from the poppy trade help fuel the insurgency and augment corruption. Judicial training, supposedly the responsibility of Italy, is a joke.
Barnett Rubin, the foremost U.S. academic expert on Afghanistan, visited the country four times last year. His eminence gave him access to leaders everywhere. His article in Foreign Affairs chronicles the problems and failures, although he rightly credits Canadians and others (without mentioning them) for preventing the Taliban from winning a fight for territory west of Kandahar.
Failure to provide enough aid, he writes, is leading to rising crime, lack of electricity, deepening poverty, police corruption, and a booming drug economy. Failure to persuade Pakistan to be helpful means a more difficult military challenge. Failure of NATO countries to step up their military contributions (and to redeploy to the dangerous south and east) and to increase reconstruction aid has placed the long-term success of the entire Afghan mission in doubt.
These are factors over which Canada has minimal control. But they are the ones, ultimately, that will determine the fate of the mission in Kandahar.
[email protected]
MarkOttawa said:Another take on Rubin's Afghanistan piece in Foreign Affairs--headline Jan. 6 in the Ottawa Citizen:
Afghan mission 'doomed to fail'
http://www.canada.com/ottawacitizen/news/story.html?id=87414256-04d1-442f-a43b-03855cfc8da2&k=75000
The phrase in quotes appears nowhere, as the quotes suggest, in the Foreign Affairs article and are the words of the reporter himself. I thought it was standard journalistic practice to use quotes in a headline only when referring to words other than those of the reporter.
Indeed, a headline writer with a different agenda could have written this using a phrase that actually is in the article:
"Battle for Afghanistan 'is still ours to lose'"
But that would not suit the agenda of many of our journalists, who seem to be lusting for defeat.
The Citizen may print a letter of mine on this Jan. 9.
Mark
Ottawa
rmacqueen said:The news report CBC radio this morning stated the report was marked SECRET. If this is true there is a big problem at NDHQ