Airfield defence role for PRes? (From: "Re-Royalization")

[MilEME09]

You could sneak in a Glider assault battalion by incorporating the Air Cadet glider program  [

Does that mean we will be using tetrarch's again? >

 

[Colin Parkinson]

The Weisel, which is the modern Tetrarch or universal carrier. Of course the large assault gliders program would over budget and being held up because it unfairly discriminates against engine manufacturers     

 

[Halifax Tar]

The Weisel, which is the modern Tetrarch or universal carrier. Of course the large assault gliders program would over budget and being held up because it unfairly discriminates against engine manufacturers   

Unless there is a glider company in Quebec that needs work in return for votes!

 

[Colin Parkinson]

Well they did use furniture factories to build them before and it was ok for most of the time, except in one rather fatal PR event when the wings fell off.

 

[daftandbarmy]

In WW2 the Germans stood up their Airborne Forces under command of the Luftwaffe, initiated by Herman Goering of course:

During World War II, the German Air Force (Luftwaffe) raised a variety of airborne light infantry (Fallschirmjäger) units. The Luftwaffe built up a division-sized unit of three Fallschirmjäger regiments plus supporting arms and air assets, known as the 7th Flieger Division. Throughout World War II, the Fallschirmjäger overall commander was Kurt Student.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fallschirmj%C3%A4ger

 

[Kirkhill]

dapaterson, there you go again, injecting some reality in the Army/Infantry Branch's "pick-and-choose" way of doing things.  For all those who say that VP protection is uniquely (or nearly) an INF thing, ask yourself what the likelihood of getting those dedicated (especially RegF) infantry types committed to doing the D&S task? Ah yes, look at all the infantry dedicated to defending/guarding critical facilities.  Certainly didn't go to other groups...oh wait.

The Army has enough issues having nine RegF Inf BNs to cover off assigned Pri 1 taskings - arguing a Divisional IRU could be chopped responsively enough to deploy to guard an "hours NTM" deployed C-17 or Herc or Aurora or...does anyone think that would happen?  The Army had a hard enough time task tailoring a small responsive capability even when Govt is pressing it hard...we see Govt pick CANSOF not just once, but twice to send a small package abroad, then triple its size while the Army writ large was still trying to be responsive.

Having worked closely to support the Army for more than a quarter century, I don't have any reason to believe that the Army would institutionally desire to even consider dedicating INF, let alone actually executing such a mission, to provide air task force (and smaller) force protection, all the grandstanding argumentation earlier in this thread notwithstanding.

New MOSID for the RCAF? Why not, if the Comd RCAF makes a cogent argument to the Department and either the internal offsets are provided, or an appropriately developed request goes into the MYEP.  Independent of employment specifics, that's exactly what Comd CANSOF of the day did for Spec Op MOSID, made the case and execute the Departmentally-approved plan.

The Army needs to spend more time on its own issues, including making sure it is adequately supported logistically before it starts arguing that it should be doing yet another task that would add to its already overburdened Infamtry Corps.

:2c:

G2G

http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2012/dn-nd/D2-73-1987-eng.pdf

Further to the track record of the Army/Infantry with respect to novel approaches:

1987 and Vital Point forces, 10/90, 30/70 and 90/10 battalions, Bv206s and Bisons

Although it was Government Policy there was pitifully little evidence of anybody trying to make the policy work - because the real war was in Germany and needed Leos and Marders.

And the same thinking sank the CAST Brigade - nobody wanted it to work.

 

[Old Sweat]

http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2012/dn-nd/D2-73-1987-eng.pdf

Further to the track record of the Army/Infantry with respect to novel approaches:

1987 and Vital Point forces, 10/90, 30/70 and 90/10 battalions, Bv206s and Bisons

Although it was Government Policy there was pitifully little evidence of anybody trying to make the policy work - because the real war was in Germany and needed Leos and Marders.

And the same thinking sank the CAST Brigade - nobody wanted it to work.

As I recall, at the time there was all sorts of planning going on for VP protection. The whole thing, virtually the whole army, cam unstuck in the 1989 budget that slashed all sorts of things in the DND budget and the withdrawal from Europe a few years later finished the process. The Balkans commitment a few years later was the only thing that saved the army from a six battalion (plus three 10/90 ones) structure.

As for CAST, I went up for a social visit to Petawawa circa 1971 from CFHQ where I was the Sec to DG Plans. When I came back, the boss asked me what the troops thought of CAST. I thought he was going to cry when I told him they referred to it as Hong Kong Mk II. With his submergence in the Ottawa world, he could not understand why they did not accept it as government policy and get on with it.

 

[Kirkhill]

No disrepect to your observations Old Sweat, or the tearful chap in Ottawa, but it was Government Policy.

Now the troops weren't wrong, in my opinion, to equate CAST with Hong Kong in the sense that both commitments were more about show than anything else.

That doesn't mean that CAST could have been a lot more than a Hong Kong showboat.  If the effort had been put behind CAST, rather than into airfields in Germany, then Canada would have had, again in my opinion, a force more compatible with Canada's domestic needs and also more useful in the current political environment.  The CAST force would have been no more "sacrificial" than was 3 RM Cdo with the Dutch, the USMC, the Norwegians and the Danes themselves.  But success would have meant diverting dollars and people from Leos and Marders (we wanted them but never got them) into ships and helicopters.

Likewise, wrt the militia/infantry reorganization - I don't believe any one in uniform wanted to make that work, with or without the budget.  It was as well that Yugoslavia came along after the wall came down because it permitted the relocation of the Canadian field force from Germany.

There is not a lot of flexibility in evidence in the Canadian Forces.  Just take a look at the summary of available forces in "Challenge and Commitment" and ask yourself how many new capabilities are in place now compared to those in evidence when Perrin Beatty took over.  I suggest that the structure then and now is identical with the sole differences being that there is a lot less of everything and the kit is a lot older.

 

[daftandbarmy]

there is a lot less of everything and the kit is a lot older.

Hey man, I'm in the room

 

[Kirkhill]

Hey man, I'm in the room

Ooops sorry.  I will stipulate that there is more of you now than there was in 1987.  >

 

[MilEME09]

The difference I see here, like CAST, is that it's not that people didn't want it to work. It's that no one did anything to make it work, the government at the time seemed to use it as a token gesture to NATO. Any initiative will fail if no one helps to make it work.

 

[FJAG]

The difference I see here, like CAST, is that it's not that people didn't want it to work. It's that no one did anything to make it work, the government at the time seemed to use it as a token gesture to NATO. Any initiative will fail if no one helps to make it work.

I guess it all depends on what level of participant one talks about.

In the early 1970's I was at Petawawa where our unit was a part of the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (Land) (AMF(L)) which, like CAST, was targeted at Norway. Being a battle group sized organization we were an even smaller speed bump than CAST however during those days (i.e. the dark days of Trudeau I) we relished having an operational role to fill and much of our training was directed towards ops in Northern Norway (I still recall fondly being on an exercise with the Italian mountain artillery in the alps.)

:cheers:

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

Ah si!

"We mussta taka tha two hours a break to have da six course meal, and digest the whole thing with a the gooda vino!"

[

 

[FJAG]

Ah si!

"We mussta taka tha two hours a break to have da six course meal, and digest the whole thing with a the gooda vino!"

[

Pasta and wine both came up the mountains in jerry cans on mule back. Still tasted good though.  ;D

:cheers:

 

[Old Sweat]

Pasta and wine both came up the mountains in jerry cans on mule back. Still tasted good though.  ;D

:cheers:

I was on the same exercise with FJAG. This was 1973 and some Italian officers told us they had just adopted the same ration scale for the officers and the non-commissioned members. Welcome to the 20th century! Agree that the wine was pretty good, even if of the chateau screwcap variety.

 

[daftandbarmy]

I was on the same exercise with FJAG. This was 1973 and some Italian officers told us they had just adopted the same ration scale for the officers and the non-commissioned members. Welcome to the 20th century! Agree that the wine was pretty good, even if of the chateau screwcap variety.

1 PARA were brigaded with the Canadians and the Alpini. Guess who always got stuck on the Bridge Demolition Guard?

OTOH, it was fun swapping real (dehydrated) food for grappa and vino with the Alpini, who were always starving on their meagre conscript rations.

The Canadians? I seem to recall seeing the RCR emerge from their giant tents from time to time, usually with a steak sandwich in one hand and a bottle of coke in the other

 

[Old Sweat]

1 PARA were brigaded with the Canadians and the Alpini. Guess who always got stuck on the Bridge Demolition Guard?

In 4 CIBG in the mid-sixties the service support units often were tasked for those sort of things for a variety of reasons. No duff, it was in the real plan as well.

 

[daftandbarmy]

In 4 CIBG in the mid-sixties the service support units often were tasked for those sort of things for a variety of reasons. No duff, it was in the real plan as well.

Holy cr#p. More reasons to count our blessings that the Cold War stayed cold...

Infantry? We're relatively expendable. Echelon wallahs? They go, we all go....

 

[Old Sweat]

Holy cr#p. More reasons to count our blessings that the Cold War stayed cold...

Infantry? We're relatively expendable. Echelon wallahs? They go, we all go....

These guards were often tasked for anti-Pegasus Bridge type envelopments on bridges not earmarked for demolition, and required for our own movement. Infantry did guard the more critical demolitions. It was fifty years ago this fall, so my recollections are a tad fuzzy. I do recall as a brigade LO being stationed on the key bridge over the Weser to pass word to brigade when the 1 PPCLI covering force withdrew, which I did. On order I then passed the applicable code words to a Danish battalion commander, who was the commander of the demolition guard, and hence to the commander of the firing party. That was the start of a very long night, and I won't bore you with the details.

 

[daftandbarmy]

These guards were often tasked for anti-Pegasus Bridge type envelopments on bridges not earmarked for demolition, and required for our own movement. Infantry did guard the more critical demolitions. It was fifty years ago this fall, so my recollections are a tad fuzzy. I do recall as a brigade LO being stationed on the key bridge over the Weser to pass word to brigade when the 1 PPCLI covering force withdrew, which I did. On order I then passed the applicable code words to a Danish battalion commander, who was the commander of the demolition guard, and hence to the commander of the firing party. That was the start of a very long night, and I won't bore you with the details.

That's OK, I can watch the film on YouTube

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kspwZdqqCjg