AOR Replacement & the Joint Support Ship (Merged Threads)

[Edward Campbell]

Maybe not as easy as that.http://thechronicleherald.ca/canada/1538255-finnish-company-raises-red-flags-over-federal-negotiations-for-davie-icebreakers

As a broad, general rule in international trade law contracts for national security projects ~ which, for most countries, includes the Coast Guard fleets ~ are exempt from the normal trade rules, even, I think, from the provisions of the new CETA.

IF the government had gone to a competition, rather than sole sourcing it, then the Europeans would, I think, have been able to bid on the same basis as our 'domestic' yards ... but we didn't so they can't ~ but my very imperfect understanding of trade law is always open to correction.

 

[Underway]

Please provide a doctrinal quote, perferably Allied not Canadian, as to what you believe the real business of *a* navy is.

The reason I ask is because most blue water aspiring navies include power projection, littoral maneuver, and maritime based strike, 3 capabilities which Canada has forced the RCN to ignore.

Sure, I've cut out a lot of fluff but here's the UK's version.

UK maritime doctrine:
The 3 core British maritime roles, war-fighting, maritime security and international engagement deliver effect across the full spectrum of military tasks, at sea and from the sea.

The ability to conduct war-fighting under-writes the ability to deliver maritime security and international engagement and this role has primacy. War-fighting may be used for a variety of reasons, but the physical protection of the UK’s territorial integrity, national security in a very literal sense, is the irreducible minimum requirement. Although there has been no threat of invasion for a long time, and neither is there one on the immediate horizon, this is not the case for some of the UK’s overseas territories. Therefore, British armed forces have a non-discretionary military task to provide ‘an independent ability to defend the overseas territories’

They go on to list the primary reasons for the navy at sea is: sea control, sea denial, fleet-in-being, cover and decisive battle.  The application of force from the sea is the next chapter which include: maritime maneuver, maritime power projection (using sea control), proactive and reactive choices. 

Wikipedia:
The strategic offensive role of a navy is projection of force into areas beyond a country's shores (for example, to protect sea-lanes, ferry troops, or attack other navies, ports, or shore installations). The strategic defensive purpose of a navy is to frustrate seaborne projection-of-force by enemies.

As soon as you have a navy you have power projection, even green/brown water navies in the strategic defensive sense  (frustrate enemy actions).  All blue water navies automatically are able to project power away from their own shores and thus are more useful strategically.

That's also from wikipedia: Power projection (or force projection) is a term used in military and political science to refer to the capacity of a state "to apply all or some of its elements of national power - political, economic, informational, or military - to rapidly and effectively deploy and sustain forces in and from multiple dispersed locations to respond to crises, to contribute to deterrence, and to enhance regional stability."
- this is different than the UK definition.

Examples of power projection the RCN does are: securing sea lanes or sea control, showing the flag, compulsion/deterrence and it might be argued a limited humanitarian capacity and punitive capacity (depending on the target).  Littoral maneuver (amphibious warfare) and maritime strike (includes shore bombardment and sea based air attacks) are only two components of power projection.

Canada is quite capable of power projection and has a limited maritime based strike capability (Land attack harpoons).  The CSC (which is a first tier capability in my argument) will increase the maritime strike significantly with 127mm and the capacity to embark proper land attack missiles, and better SOF support.

The doctrine and goals are clear.  Each coast is to to be able to provide a 4 warship task group with an AOR, embarked helo's and perhaps a submarine attached.  This is the goal by 2022.

If I were to place the tiers of naval requirements the first tier would alway be to gain and maintain sea control as the primary uber alles reason for a navy.  In that primary tier I would also place the requirement for being able to sustain operations away from our shores (requiring an AOR).  This means bending all resources to ensure Canada has proper warships and can sustain them far from Canada.  It also means for defensive sea control proper submarines.  When all these capabilities are complete (which they are currently not) THEN we can look at Mistrals.

Mistral and its capabilities are second tier.  If it was first tier every navy in the world would buy them first and warships second. But they don't because they understand that littoral maneuver is secondary to sea control.

 

[Baz]

I don't think we should ever look at Mistrals; I think we missed a golden opportunity to bothmake a more meaningful NATO presence and  actually act as the Joint CF that is so vaunted but really doesn't exist.

I also don't think we will ever develop this capability as it crosses too many service stivepipes, even if we could cinvince the government it is perfect soft power.  Heck, they won't be convinced because the CF is incapable of truly delivering to them a Joint argument.

It's interesting you use the UK doctrine because their force model is based on three pieces: carrier and TLAM strike, amphibious, and strategic deterence (much like the USN) .  The have shown they are perfectly willing to forgo the platforms you consider first tier in order to protect those three... to the point noone is even sure if they have enough escorts for those carriers.  Interestingly now they are stretched so thin that the carriers and amphibs seem to be in competition.

I was a targeting officer at SHAPE; I can assure you when a joint commander is asking for strike no-one asks where is the nearest Harpoon / Slammer platform.  They do ask where are the carriers or TLAMs...

The point is there is only one first tier Navy.  All of the second tier navies have robust power projection and/or littoral maeuver capibilities.  The RCN would like to be in that group but fate has determined that they unfortunately will probably be left just outside... most definitely the best of the rest but not premier league.


Excuse if this is riddled with typos as I'm on my phone.

 

[Baz]

PS i think it's important to understand wht it keeps coming up...

It's really unfortunate... Canada is a G7 country with a robust economy and GDP, large enough population, sufficient maritime interests, and strategic distance to be able to do more. Nothng extravagant, but nore than just scraping together the minomum.

That we choose not to is ot only too bad but is also noticed by others...

 

[Good2Golf]

PS i think it's important to understand wht it keeps coming up...

It's really unfortunate... Canada is a G7 country with a robust economy and GDP, large enough population, sufficient maritime interests, and strategic distance to be able to do more. Nothng extravagant, but nore than just scraping together the minomum.

That we choose not to is ot only too bad but is also noticed by others...

...and then many (most?) Canadians become indignant when the issue of our dependance on other serious defence/defense players (....cough...USA...cough...) is raised.  #CanucksLoveHavingItBothWays

Regards
G2G

 

[Underway]

I was a targeting officer at SHAPE; I can assure you when a joint commander is asking for strike no-one asks where is the nearest Harpoon / Slammer platform.  They do ask where are the carriers or TLAMs...

Of course they do,  ;D.  Proven platforms with a greater ability to land more HE on target.  I expect experience and knowledge on what a Slammer could do was (and still is) pretty thin on the ground.  However I suspect that the Slammer is much less capable overall then the TLAM being their design is specific for ASuW not land attack.  The CSC should be able to adjust for this in the future assuming strike length VLS.

The point is there is only one first tier Navy.  All of the second tier navies have robust power projection and/or littoral maeuver capibilities.  The RCN would like to be in that group but fate has determined that they unfortunately will probably be left just outside... most definitely the best of the rest but not premier league.

Canada defines navies in ranks which I listed below for those who are following the discussion and don't have access to the doctrine.  So using that info I completely agree, though right now I suspect we are not at the top of rank 3.  Further down the list right now behind Australia and Spain.

Rank 1: Major Global Force Projection Navy (Complete) — This is a navy capable of carrying out all the military roles of naval forces on a global scale. It possesses the full range of carrier and amphibious capabilities, sea control forces, and nuclear attack and ballistic missile submarines, and all in sufficient numbers to undertake major operations independently. E.g., United States.

Rank 2: Major Global Force Projection Navy (Partial) — These are navies that possess most if not all of the force projection capabilities of a “complete” global navy, but only in sufficient numbers to undertake one major “out of area” operation. E.g., Britain, France.

Rank 3: Medium Global Force Projection Navy — These are navies that may not possess the full range of capabilities, but have a credible capacity in certain of them and consistently demonstrate a determination to exercise them at some distance from home waters, in cooperation with other Force Projection Navies. E.g., Canada, Netherlands, Australia.

Rank 4: Medium Regional Force Projection Navy — These are navies possessing the ability to project force into the adjoining ocean basin. While they may
have the capacity to exercise these further afield, for whatever reason, they do not do so on a regular basis.

Rank 5: Adjacent Force Projection Navies — These are navies that have some ability to project force well offshore, but are not capable of carrying out high level naval operations over oceanic distances.

Rank 6: Offshore Territorial Defence Navies — These are navies that have relatively high levels of capability in defensive (and constabulary) operations up to about 200 miles from their shores, having the sustainability offered by frigate or large corvette vessels and (or) a capable submarine force.

Rank 7: Inshore Territorial Defence Navies — These are navies that have primarily inshore territorial defence capabilities, making them capable of coastal
combat rather than constabulary duties alone. This implies a force comprising missile-armed fast-attack craft, short-range aviation and a limited submarine
force.

Rank 8: Constabulary Navies — These are significant fleets that are not intended to fight, but to act purely in a constabulary role.

Rank 9: Token Navies — These are navies that have some minimal capability, but this often consists of little more than a formal organisational structure and a few coastal craft. These states, the world’s smallest and weakest, cannot aspire to anything but the most limited constabulary functions.

 

[Baz]

Of course they do,  ;D.  Proven platforms with a greater ability to land more HE on target.  I expect experience and knowledge on what a Slammer could do was (and still is) pretty thin on the ground.  However I suspect that the Slammer is much less capable overall then the TLAM being their design is specific for ASuW not land attack.

We knew what a Slammer could do, it just wasn't a real player.  I was also targetting lessons learned JointEx 13 in Wainwright and the RCN's understanding of the Joint targetting process was pretty thin... hopefully it has gotten much better.

To illustrate the point, TLAM's are pretty much always held at the operational level, Slammers not so much so.

 

[Cloud Cover]

Not that Maclean is an authoritative or even reliable source, but some of the persons interviewed have at least fairly good grasp on the matter of the state of the RCN 2 years ago: https://www.google.ca/amp/www.macleans.ca/news/canada/the-sinking-of-the-
"In the long term, this can-do attitude and unwillingness to speak painful truth to power only made it easier for the political class to squeeze out more and more cuts."

It would appear there is consensus Canada had sunk its Navy to a tier 5 on the Todd scale.
With Asterix I wonder if there is some upward (slight) with that.
The addition of the AOPS would seem to reinforce a Tier 5 rating, the capabilities are pretty solid within that space.

 

[jollyjacktar]

I would agree that until we have legs on both coasts, we're no longer tier 3 level.

 

[Czech_pivo]

https://www.therecord.com/opinion-story/8086568-shipbuilding-strategy-hobbling-our-fleets/

 

[CBH99]

Whoa whoa whoa.... just hold your horses there, Mr. Senator.

Who do you think you are?  Coming in here with your good ideas, efficient way of thinking, respectful analysis of taxpayer dollars being spent, and a real concern that we could get far more bang for our buck if our time & money was used efficiently. 

This isn't the way we do things here...sheesh, get with the program  :facepalm:

 

[Czech_pivo]

This is the line that I find troubling - "The government has opted to lease the ship for five years at a cost of $650 million, including operating costs, rather than purchase it outright for $659 million."

 

[Uzlu]

This is the line that I find troubling - "The government has opted to lease the ship for five years at a cost of $650 million, including operating costs, rather than purchase it outright for $659 million."

Perhaps the Royal Canadian Navy believes that it does not have enough sailors for three replenishment ships?  If this is the case, the navy should recommend that the coast guard takes the Harry DeWolfs and, please, for the love of god, let us have four replenishment ships.  I hear that the coast guard can really use some new icebreakers.  Yes, I know they are only Polar Class PC 5.  But beggars can’t be choosers.

 

[Czech_pivo]

Perhaps the Royal Canadian Navy believes that it does not have enough sailors for three replenishment ships?  If this is the case, the navy should recommend that the coast guard takes the Harry DeWolfs and, please, for the love of god, let us have four replenishment ships.  I hear that the coast guard can really use some new icebreakers.  Yes, I know they are only Polar Class PC 5.  But beggars can’t be choosers.

The timeline to have these 4 ships online is 4-5yrs out.  I would think that the RCN has the ability to address any potential human resource shortfalls within a 5yr timeframe.
To go the route that you suggest would mean the 'arming' of the CDN Coast Guard, something that I have no issues with, but I'm sure that I'd be in the minority on this.  Though we finally have armed the CDN Border Agents so precedent has been set. I mean even the Royal Newfoundland Constabulary is now armed.... ;D

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

If the Honourable Senators' figures are correct ($650M for five years or $659M to buy outright), my back-of-the-envelope calculations I made a few days ago would now mean a residual purchase value after five years of about $75M, and after ten years, well, it's the old $1 purchase.

But Asterix is also a new experiment, basically imposed on the Navy by the Conservatives when they agreed to Davie's plan: Operation of the ship by merchant seaman.

Personally, I say we should not buy it outright. We should operate it as planned by Federal Fleet for a few years. In the discussion that broke out recently on the Mistrals in another thread, someone reminded us that the Navy is awfully short of personnel, particularly in the engineering trades. If the model of having merchant seaman run your supply ships can be shown to work, this would perhaps be the turning point where Canada goes the full route of auxiliaries run by a merchant service (We already have it - the CFAV - and would just need to expand it) and the Navy brass realize that it is to its advantage to do so. The biggest one being of course having four AOR's without any new pressures on the engineering trades.

Then buy it outright, keep merchant seaman operation and "get the next three" proposed by Senator Colin.

BTW, it may have escaped notice here, but: For Davie to make the modification it did to Asterix, it had to either acquire outright or measure by itself and develop a full set of plans for the Asterix, including the built hull and Engine layout. This means that, for the next ones, they wouldn't even have to acquire a next hull, they could just build it from scratch. It may even be faster, as they would be able to do module building and assembly, which they could not do on Asterix. Moreover, building it new would, for that portion (hull and main engine), not be much more expansive than purchasing a five year old full ship, stripping it bare and completely refurbishing the main engine as new.

 

[Czech_pivo]

"This means that, for the next ones, they wouldn't even have to acquire a next hull, they could just build it from scratch. It may even be faster, as they would be able to do module building and assembly, which they could not do on Asterix."

Who do I call to make this happen? 

 

[Navy_Pete]

[quote author=Oldgateboatdriver
BTW, it may have escaped notice here, but: For Davie to make the modification it did to Asterix, it had to either acquire outright or measure by itself and develop a full set of plans for the Asterix, including the built hull and Engine layout. This means that, for the next ones, they wouldn't even have to acquire a next hull, they could just build it from scratch. It may even be faster, as they would be able to do module building and assembly, which they could not do on Asterix. Moreover, building it new would, for that portion (hull and main engine), not be much more expansive than purchasing a five year old full ship, stripping it bare and completely refurbishing the main engine as new.
[/quote]

It depends on the agreements of how they got the design; they may have only limited uses for it.  Also, they would need to take the design and do the production engineering. THey would need to modify that so it would work with how they build ships in modules, so it would most likely be easier to start from scratch, so that the connection points are in the right place and the modules are the right size for their line.

They might be able to buy an up to date basic design for a bulk fuel carrier and modify that to take a couple of posts, but aside from all that they would need to improve their facilities to be able to build them from scratch at a competitive rate.

It's all doable, but it's not really that simple, and ship conversion is still a far cry from being a proven builder.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

If the Honourable Senators' figures are correct ($650M for five years or $659M to buy outright), my back-of-the-envelope calculations I made a few days ago would now mean a residual purchase value after five years of about $75M, and after ten years, well, it's the old $1 purchase.

But Asterix is also a new experiment, basically imposed on the Navy by the Conservatives when they agreed to Davie's plan: Operation of the ship by merchant seaman.

Personally, I say we should not buy it outright. We should operate it as planned by Federal Fleet for a few years. In the discussion that broke out recently on the Mistrals in another thread, someone reminded us that the Navy is awfully short of personnel, particularly in the engineering trades. If the model of having merchant seaman run your supply ships can be shown to work, this would perhaps be the turning point where Canada goes the full route of auxiliaries run by a merchant service (We already have it - the CFAV - and would just need to expand it) and the Navy brass realize that it is to its advantage to do so. The biggest one being of course having four AOR's without any new pressures on the engineering trades.

Then buy it outright, keep merchant seaman operation and "get the next three" proposed by Senator Colin.

BTW, it may have escaped notice here, but: For Davie to make the modification it did to Asterix, it had to either acquire outright or measure by itself and develop a full set of plans for the Asterix, including the built hull and Engine layout. This means that, for the next ones, they wouldn't even have to acquire a next hull, they could just build it from scratch. It may even be faster, as they would be able to do module building and assembly, which they could not do on Asterix. Moreover, building it new would, for that portion (hull and main engine), not be much more expansive than purchasing a five year old full ship, stripping it bare and completely refurbishing the main engine as new.

Or have a yard build a new hull to the point where Davie took Asterix down to and then have it brought over for completion. I should add that even if we have a shortage of personal, there is nothing wrong with doing a hot layup of one of the AOR's or an extended refit.

 

[Cloud Cover]

I can't find a reference, but I thought Davie had stated that the commercialized sistership of the MV Asterix was available for purchase?

 

[jollyjacktar]

It is, the Obelix.