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Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ship AOPS

One reason I like the 57mm for the AOP's is it out reaches by a fair margin most of the things the non-State actors will point at it. It brings a good AD system using the programmable fuze feature against drones, loitering munitions and older Anti-ship missiles. It's also in our system and would allow crew to carry over their training from AOP-Halifaxes. It has minimal deck penetration as well. It would likely mean a major rejig of the magazine and Combat systems and some weight distribution.
 
One reason I like the 57mm for the AOP's is it out reaches by a fair margin most of the things the non-State actors will point at it. It brings a good AD system using the programmable fuze feature against drones, loitering munitions and older Anti-ship missiles. It's also in our system and would allow crew to carry over their training from AOP-Halifaxes. It has minimal deck penetration as well. It would likely mean a major rejig of the magazine and Combat systems and some weight distribution.
The 57mm's are likely to go where the 76mm went from the 280's and that's back to the factory for credit. We'll just have to face all the swarms of drones from those pesky non state actors.
 
Stoker, laugh all you want, till it happens...

Meanwhile Congrats to the RCN and the crew of HDW for a awesome and safe trip, welcome home!!!

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As before if we had to worry about all manner of threats out there real or imagined we wouldn't leave the Bedford Basin let alone go to the Arctic, Caribbean, Baltic, Africa.....
 
Actually, you've made my point. This weapon is more suitable on and APC/LAV/etc not a warship. It can't be used for missile defense, nor would it provide any form of intimidation for another ship.

I'm not a naval tactician but I was an armorer. Therefore I look at weapons systems pragmatically. This system has zero compatibility to the design concept of this ship. We'd be better off just removing it.

Comparatively, should they have removed the C6 from the Bison in Afghanistan? It won’t take out a MBT or anything so…why bother?

I’m an operator. I look at a weapons system from a “tactical employment” perspective. I’d take the 25 over “nothing”.
 
As before if we had to worry about all manner of threats out there real or imagined we wouldn't leave the Bedford Basin let alone go to the Arctic, Caribbean, Baltic, Africa.....

If you don’t mind me saying, that isn’t much of an argument. Threats exist; they must be assessed, risk calculated and a commander assume that risk. The “meh” argument doesn’t convey that message ….
 
If you don’t mind me saying, that isn’t much of an argument. Threats exist; they must be assessed, risk calculated and a commander assume that risk. The “meh” argument doesn’t convey that message ….
I previously stated that before any unit is sent anywhere a comprehensive risk assessment and risk mitigation is done, all I got back from some here was the RCN was inept and would somehow send us into harms way. All I'm saying is that we are in the risk business, its managed and we go. I believe for what we do, we are appropriately equipped and prepared. There are all kinds of things that could happen by chance, no unit can be prepared 100% but if we had to worry about everything we wouldn't go anywhere. Like any CAF deployment its always inherently risky.
 
I previously stated that before any unit is sent anywhere a comprehensive risk assessment and risk mitigation is done, all I got back from some here was the RCN was inept and would somehow send us into harms way.
I don't disagree with you there, but also the CAF has a history of making risk analysis and then sending anyway...
I don't consider the RCN to be alone there. CA and RCAF assets have been sent a lot of places without what many would consider appropriate enablers to conduct the mission.
All I'm saying is that we are in the risk business, its managed and we go. I believe for what we do, we are appropriately equipped and prepared. There are all kinds of things that could happen by chance, no unit can be prepared 100% but if we had to worry about everything we wouldn't go anywhere. Like any CAF deployment its always inherently risky.
Your original posts IMHO where fairly dismissive of the threats out in the world to Canadian flagged vessels. I think your last post is a much better summation.
 
I don't disagree with you there, but also the CAF has a history of making risk analysis and then sending anyway...
I don't consider the RCN to be alone there. CA and RCAF assets have been sent a lot of places without what many would consider appropriate enablers to conduct the mission.
Your original posts IMHO where fairly dismissive of the threats out in the world to Canadian flagged vessels. I think your last post is a much better summation.

This; exactly this.
 
I don't disagree with you there, but also the CAF has a history of making risk analysis and then sending anyway...
I don't consider the RCN to be alone there. CA and RCAF assets have been sent a lot of places without what many would consider appropriate enablers to conduct the mission.

Your original posts IMHO where fairly dismissive of the threats out in the world to Canadian flagged vessels. I think your last post is a much better summation.
Sorry I just don't see that in regards to where we send RCN assets. If your suggesting we are intentionally sending our ships into harms way regardless of the risk which they can't handle I don't agree. Just tired of seeing posts about why the ships are armed the way they are over and over again.
 
There was an interesting comment made on one of RUSI's Western Way of War podcasts (Episode 71: Alessio Patalano: The Evolution of Warfare at Sea) which basically noted that the roles and requirements of a peacetime navy are quite different than the roles and requirements of a wartime navy and that all navies struggle to find that balance.

I think that perfectly describes the discussions we're seeing on this thread. AOPS and the MCDVs are quite suitably armed for their roles in a peacetime Navy. The roles they fulfill as non-combatant Navy vessels are very important to the political goals of Canada at peace and quite possibly some of those roles may not be politically suitable for a heavily armed warship. Most of those roles would also be significantly more expensive to be performed by combatant vessels as well (with many possible knock-on effects from that as well).

What we're seeing now is a period of heightened tensions globally where our thoughts are shifting further away from the requirements of our peacetime Navy and more to our potential need for a wartime Navy. That naturally means that we're questioning the mix we have of combatant vs non-combatant vessels in our fleet as well as the suitability of some of our vessels for a conflict. The balance becomes more difficult to find when you're dealing with a Navy as small as ours.

My personal opinion is that:
  1. Our Navy is too small in the first place (for either peacetime or wartime) for the size of our maritime domain and the role we profess to play in the world.
  2. With the potential for armed conflict seemingly increasing we need to (rapidly) begin shifting more toward a wartime (combatant heavy) Navy than the mix we currently have.
  3. We should be more thoughtful in our planning in the future by taking advantage of modularity, etc. in order to be able to up-arm (and down-arm) our ships in order to more quickly shift the peacetime-wartime balance of our fleet. Building completely new ships to face a changing environment simply takes too long (and is too expensive) and likely won't be quick enough to meet a suddenly changing need.
 
There was an interesting comment made on one of RUSI's Western Way of War podcasts (Episode 71: Alessio Patalano: The Evolution of Warfare at Sea) which basically noted that the roles and requirements of a peacetime navy are quite different than the roles and requirements of a wartime navy and that all navies struggle to find that balance.

I think that perfectly describes the discussions we're seeing on this thread. AOPS and the MCDVs are quite suitably armed for their roles in a peacetime Navy. The roles they fulfill as non-combatant Navy vessels are very important to the political goals of Canada at peace and quite possibly some of those roles may not be politically suitable for a heavily armed warship. Most of those roles would also be significantly more expensive to be performed by combatant vessels as well (with many possible knock-on effects from that as well).

What we're seeing now is a period of heightened tensions globally where our thoughts are shifting further away from the requirements of our peacetime Navy and more to our potential need for a wartime Navy. That naturally means that we're questioning the mix we have of combatant vs non-combatant vessels in our fleet as well as the suitability of some of our vessels for a conflict. The balance becomes more difficult to find when you're dealing with a Navy as small as ours.

My personal opinion is that:
  1. Our Navy is too small in the first place (for either peacetime or wartime) for the size of our maritime domain and the role we profess to play in the world.
  2. With the potential for armed conflict seemingly increasing we need to (rapidly) begin shifting more toward a wartime (combatant heavy) Navy than the mix we currently have.
  3. We should be more thoughtful in our planning in the future by taking advantage of modularity, etc. in order to be able to up-arm (and down-arm) our ships in order to more quickly shift the peacetime-wartime balance of our fleet. Building completely new ships to face a changing environment simply takes too long (and is too expensive) and likely won't be quick enough to meet a suddenly changing need.
I agree. If we somehow become involved with a conflict then there are plenty of tasks the AOPS and MCDV can do in safer areas and close to home and the reason why we have risk assessments based on the current threat. I can't see us ever having excess in ships that we currently have or are planned. Perhaps the smarter thing for us to have done is in addition to the 15 CSC was to have a smaller GP combatant with some with an ice class, a MCM version and offshore patrol with modular payloads.
 
Sorry I just don't see that in regards to where we send RCN assets. If your suggesting we are intentionally sending our ships into harms way regardless of the risk which they can't handle I don't agree. Just tired of seeing posts about why the ships are armed the way they are over and over again.
Many us here are also critical of the army for failing to maintain a viable AD arm, ATGM, mortar, artillery and vehicle fleet. Neither does the RCAF get off from criticisms. Personally I am a big fan of the AOP's in every area except this issue, same with the MCDV.
 
Many us here are also critical of the army for failing to maintain a viable AD arm, ATGM, mortar, artillery and vehicle fleet. Neither does the RCAF get off from criticisms. Personally I am a big fan of the AOP's in every area except this issue, same with the MCDV.
There's nothing wrong with being critical when it warrants it. The problem that I have is when its not. That's only my opinion.
 
There was an interesting comment made on one of RUSI's Western Way of War podcasts (Episode 71: Alessio Patalano: The Evolution of Warfare at Sea) which basically noted that the roles and requirements of a peacetime navy are quite different than the roles and requirements of a wartime navy and that all navies struggle to find that balance.

I think that perfectly describes the discussions we're seeing on this thread. AOPS and the MCDVs are quite suitably armed for their roles in a peacetime Navy. The roles they fulfill as non-combatant Navy vessels are very important to the political goals of Canada at peace and quite possibly some of those roles may not be politically suitable for a heavily armed warship. Most of those roles would also be significantly more expensive to be performed by combatant vessels as well (with many possible knock-on effects from that as well).

What we're seeing now is a period of heightened tensions globally where our thoughts are shifting further away from the requirements of our peacetime Navy and more to our potential need for a wartime Navy. That naturally means that we're questioning the mix we have of combatant vs non-combatant vessels in our fleet as well as the suitability of some of our vessels for a conflict. The balance becomes more difficult to find when you're dealing with a Navy as small as ours.

My personal opinion is that:
  1. Our Navy is too small in the first place (for either peacetime or wartime) for the size of our maritime domain and the role we profess to play in the world.
  2. With the potential for armed conflict seemingly increasing we need to (rapidly) begin shifting more toward a wartime (combatant heavy) Navy than the mix we currently have.
  3. We should be more thoughtful in our planning in the future by taking advantage of modularity, etc. in order to be able to up-arm (and down-arm) our ships in order to more quickly shift the peacetime-wartime balance of our fleet. Building completely new ships to face a changing environment simply takes too long (and is too expensive) and likely won't be quick enough to meet a suddenly changing need.

I would add that even in peace time, in a low threat environment, there needs to be a plan B. Plan B doesn't need to be on board. It can be a supporting asset available as a Quick Reaction Force - either an offensively armed frigate or air cover from national or allied aircraft.
 
To reply to early posts.....and stir the pot! :)

This would take out the AOPS!


Crew of Russian Navy and Spetnaz (they serve dinner!)

Rumored to have more than just LRAD and a missile detection system. May have an active system too like missiles. Plus enough small arms to invade a small island. :)
 
I agree. If we somehow become involved with a conflict then there are plenty of tasks the AOPS and MCDV can do in safer areas and close to home and the reason why we have risk assessments based on the current threat. I can't see us ever having excess in ships that we currently have or are planned. Perhaps the smarter thing for us to have done is in addition to the 15 CSC was to have a smaller GP combatant with some with an ice class, a MCM version and offshore patrol with modular payloads.
My concern is the CAF never buys enough capital items to do not dual role tasking. Thus and as @Kirkhill can't attest I am very critical on any platform that isn't up for a wartime role - or a peacetime role in a contested area.
- the LAV 6.0 and the CH-146 Griffon get a lot of my axe grinding here - the RCN gets off pretty lightly.
 
To reply to early posts.....and stir the pot! :)

This would take out the AOPS!


Crew of Russian Navy and Spetnaz (they serve dinner!)

Rumored to have more than just LRAD and a missile detection system. May have an active system too like missiles. Plus enough small arms to invade a small island. :)
I've seen that ship - and the one the owner had before.
It has both a missile and gun anti-missile systems - and I suspect some more offensive tools as well.
Crew is former Russian Mil - not currently serving (or so claimed ;) )
 
What everyone is missing is that the RCN isn't a wartime asset. It's an "all the time" asset. The army is a "break in case of war" asset. The airforce is divided neatly into assets for war and assets for everything else and specialized platforms are the way things have always been done for the airforce.

The RCN has and will continually operate in what is essentially a civilian environment with civilian threats almost exclusively within certain areas. The AOPS is one of the specialized vessels that deal with civilian-type problems.

AOPS isn't the SWAT team, it's the bobby with a nightstick. Therefore we shouldn't waste money, time, effort in making it something that it's not. Its a specialized vehicle for a specialized role.

Why am I still arguing this? Must be a masochist....
 
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