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Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ship AOPS

Be careful what you wish for.

Australia did that twice. The Hobarts were a friggin mess when the showed up and one of the reasons for the massive cost increases and project delays was the Ozzies fixing all the crap that Spain screwed up in the hull.

Same thing for their resupply vessel which almost sunk within sight of Sydney on its trip over to Australia. Then a year later it had an internal fuel FLOOD on RIMPAC.

NATO standard ship build isn't a thing BTW, and has nothing to do with where the ship is built. Germany, UK, France, US, Canada, Spain, Italy, Poland, Romania and Turkey all build their own ships in their own shipyards. The Dutch, Norway and a few other have the hulls built elsewhere and then final refit is in their own yards.

Having a shipbuilding industry that can do the start to finish build is a strategic industrial capability.

I think that its cheap ass, small country thinking, to not want our own shipbuilding.

Just a couple points I suspect that if we experienced what the Aussies did the same pro Irving folks would simply call it growing pains and normal for a first of class.

Moving on, a shipbuilding industry is great and I think everyone here would love us to have one. But at what cost does it become unreasonable ? What quality should be expecting and not accept anything less ? Sure a shipbuilding industry would be fantastic, but make it about building the right ships to a good mix a quality VS cost and on time.

Altruistic I know, but I want our defence production about defence production and not politics, jobs and local economic spin offs.
 
I think the problem with our "shipbuilding industry" is that it is built around the only customer that it currently has...the Canadian Government. As a result, it's not an industry that's capable of building ships for anyone else. What company would be willing to pay the porkbarrel overhead that the GOC does for a product?

We are building a strategic national capability, which is important.

We are not building a productive industrial part of the national economy. It will always be a money sink.
 
My thought was if they could ship a US Navy DDG on a heavy lift ship they could do the same for any ship. Our ships are much smaller etc
You can do it, it just turns a build project into essentially a refit type job, and you lose all the benefits of efficient work of doing it during build, for no real benefit.

If we're going to do it overseas, just do it overseas, but just doing a hull and then filling it afterwards is a massive waste of money, and the whole point of the NSS is to build capable shipbuilders, which includes the hull.

We accepted upfront there would be a learning curve (ie initial inefficiencies for learning how to build ships again), so the build pace is withing real expectations; the problem is the PR was based on unacheivable BS and not reality for the schedule. That's the downside of having 15 layers between the people that know what they are talking about and who is briefing the BGHs, and then gets further dumbed down for the PR releases.
 
Just a couple points I suspect that if we experienced what the Aussies did the same pro Irving folks would simply call it growing pains and normal for a first of class.

Moving on, a shipbuilding industry is great and I think everyone here would love us to have one. But at what cost does it become unreasonable ? What quality should be expecting and not accept anything less ? Sure a shipbuilding industry would be fantastic, but make it about building the right ships to a good mix a quality VS cost and on time.

Altruistic I know, but I want our defence production about defence production and not politics, jobs and local economic spin offs.

Part of the sales pitch for NSS was to 'leverage' class societies for the design review, which allowed much smaller PMOs. Which is great in theory, because we've lost the expertise for the project offices, and the SMEs doing the LCMM work are shorthanded already, but assumes;
  • requirements are clear and acheivable, and the standard is up to what the RCN wants
  • class society does proper due diligence
  • RCN adapts SOPs/crewing to suit new design
Requirements are pretty complex and can be competing, so that will always be difficult, but for AOPs anyway when there are capability gaps due to unclear requirements, we haven't had luck getting the PMO to fix it in the build side, so lots of engineering changes for brand new ships (including on the 6th AOPs which hasn't even started yet, so they'll be building things we'll change later).

Some things can't get a clear answer out of class society how the base design met safety codes, and seems to have been pressure placed on head office to overrule local surveyors assessments.

But the commercial standards are also built around commercial SOPs and crew qualifications, which we don't follow, so our old way of doing things also doesn't work. You really need to start with what the goal was for the old SOP, see how the different design changes the context, and start fresh.

Definitely some things that could be better on the shipyard side of things, but we suck as well. We pay for a lot of overhead for the extra bureaucracy and government interfaces, as there are whole cells whose job is basically just to feed the needy customer demands for a lot of extras that aren't part of normal business. Reporting on all the economic spin offs, requiring additional part selection rules, and all kinds of other things adds in a huge amount of extra work that adds in delays and costs money. That's all on the GoC requirements, so really unfair to pretend it's a standard commercial contract when we've added on a lot of direct/indirect bloat to meet the demands of TBS, finance, PBO etc etc.
 
Part of the sales pitch for NSS was to 'leverage' class societies for the design review, which allowed much smaller PMOs. Which is great in theory, because we've lost the expertise for the project offices, and the SMEs doing the LCMM work are shorthanded already, but assumes;
  • requirements are clear and acheivable, and the standard is up to what the RCN wants
  • class society does proper due diligence
  • RCN adapts SOPs/crewing to suit new design
Requirements are pretty complex and can be competing, so that will always be difficult, but for AOPs anyway when there are capability gaps due to unclear requirements, we haven't had luck getting the PMO to fix it in the build side, so lots of engineering changes for brand new ships (including on the 6th AOPs which hasn't even started yet, so they'll be building things we'll change later).

Some things can't get a clear answer out of class society how the base design met safety codes, and seems to have been pressure placed on head office to overrule local surveyors assessments.

But the commercial standards are also built around commercial SOPs and crew qualifications, which we don't follow, so our old way of doing things also doesn't work. You really need to start with what the goal was for the old SOP, see how the different design changes the context, and start fresh.

Definitely some things that could be better on the shipyard side of things, but we suck as well. We pay for a lot of overhead for the extra bureaucracy and government interfaces, as there are whole cells whose job is basically just to feed the needy customer demands for a lot of extras that aren't part of normal business. Reporting on all the economic spin offs, requiring additional part selection rules, and all kinds of other things adds in a huge amount of extra work that adds in delays and costs money. That's all on the GoC requirements, so really unfair to pretend it's a standard commercial contract when we've added on a lot of direct/indirect bloat to meet the demands of TBS, finance, PBO etc etc.

I get it. Our major asset procurement contracts are always going to be complicated.

I just want the best product, on time and on budget.

To me, if that means we build off shore, or tack on our order to allied order then we should do it. And if Irving can build the best bang for our buck and on time then they should get the contract.
 
I think the problem with our "shipbuilding industry" is that it is built around the only customer that it currently has...the Canadian Government. As a result, it's not an industry that's capable of building ships for anyone else. What company would be willing to pay the porkbarrel overhead that the GOC does for a product?

We are building a strategic national capability, which is important.

We are not building a productive industrial part of the national economy. It will always be a money sink.
The Westcoast yards survived, mainly on repair work, as very little of the government new work came out here. We had a good rep for doing repairs on time and on budget with the international ship industry.
 
I get it. Our major asset procurement contracts are always going to be complicated.

I just want the best product, on time and on budget.

To me, if that means we build off shore, or tack on our order to allied order then we should do it. And if Irving can build the best bang for our buck and on time then they should get the contract.
'on time' and 'on budget' though both depend on having a realistic schedule and budget from the start with float/contingency to allow for normal things, and you don't keep changing the requirements as you go. 'Value for money' is also incredibly subjective, so it's a hard one to answer.

You can't really set the schedule/budget until your requirements are set, so our whole process drives the initial TBS demand/plan to be a crazy ROM with an educated guess schedule, and then someone expects that to hold up 10 years later when we finally jump through the hoops to get into contract.

We licensed existing designs, changed them enough so that it's basically a redesign, and then went all surprised pikachu that a brand new shipyard took longer (which costs more) to build it.

If you want fast, buying something already under construction and not changing anything (ie like a Svalbard when it was actively under construction) is probably the best option. Even then we'd probably need to make some changes (like switching domestic power to normal NA 120/240 V, 60 Hz power). May not be cheaper, and supporting equipment with EU suppliers may be a challenge too.

ALso need the right type of contract and monitoring in place though; if we're doing some kind of cost plus, doesn't really incentivize efficiency, but if we're doing fixed price you can expect to get just the bare minimum to meet the spec, and you can meet SOLAS with cheap equipment if you don't have some kind of additional performance standards (like minimum hours between overhaul, availability targets, etc).

I'd be happier if we had a higher standard for what is 'good enough' and were more aggresive at making sure the ship actual meets the requirements (even if it means paying to fix it because we didn't write them well), but seems to be more political/operational concerns than quality driven at the moment, so no real surprise they are tied up with serious technical defects.
 
The Westcoast yards survived, mainly on repair work, as very little of the government new work came out here. We had a good rep for doing repairs on time and on budget with the international ship industry.
Interestingly enough, VSL (the repair yard) and VSY (the build yard) are independent companies with the same parent company. I don't think Canada really appreciated that during the bid evals, but VSL does do excellent work.

VSY has an insane build package that a mature yard would struggle with, but optimistic.
 
The schedule should be set by the contractor in negotiations with the GoC.

If we spend XXX dollars for such and such a product to begin delivery on such and such a date, then I as a Canadian tax payer expect that to be upheld.

Hit send too fast sorry

I also agree we shouldn't be letting for tender until we are set on what we want.

So why not just buy existing ships ? Some Arleigh Burkes for example.

We don't need the best, we need good value and quantity, IMHO.
 
The landing craft they have will only support ATV's and the crane may be rated at 20T but at what reach? At best might be a pickup or a BV 206 but would require a better landing craft, at which point your running out of deck space. The AOP's is a small but definite leap up for supporting small amphibious ops. Canada really needs a ice class landing ship likely run by a Canadian RFA.
S0, just an example, say something this size Small LHD with the hull designed for ice?
 
The schedule should be set by the contractor in negotiations with the GoC.

If we spend XXX dollars for such and such a product to begin delivery on such and such a date, then I as a Canadian tax payer expect that to be upheld.

Hit send too fast sorry

I also agree we shouldn't be letting for tender until we are set on what we want.

So why not just buy existing ships ? Some Arleigh Burkes for example.

We don't need the best, we need good value and quantity, IMHO.
The general challenge with USN ships is they use a completely different crewing model that has more people with much more specific but less general training. We have almost identical set ups to the RN, RAN, RNZN and other EU countries so lot more compatible.

The FREMM bid for example, didn't include any training, spares, IP, infrastructure or contingency (or inflation), so their non-tendered $30B bid was only a partial scope compared to CSC, and would have ballooned when all those real costs are added in.

The NSS structure was actually pretty reasonable for the framework of what we can do within the procurement system, but at the end of the day if political pressures over ride things like contract adherence it really doesn't matter what we do. I think if we properly implemented the vision that was there at the start, did things like performance monitoring, and also recognized/reduced the waste driven by our own bureaucracy, it has a pretty good chance of actually getting good ships.

From what I can tell, the designers at BAE can design a really good and capable ship, so if we stay out of their way CSC might potentially be great, but I think we'll likely probably try and get it to do too many conflicting things and just screw it up. For a ship that wasn't supposed to have major changes to a MOTS design, we were pretty quick to select a radar system that will require major and really significant engineering changes to be feasible, and will also have all kinds of other changes that will render it very different from a T26. Probably going to still be a good ship (lot of folks trainer by the people that built the CPF, that was fundamentally a really good design) but it's effectively a bespoke design.
 
S0, just an example, say something this size Small LHD with the hull designed for ice?
That size and class would be perfect, but I fear it would be to much ship to get through committee and to many crewing impacts. I was thinking this with mostly civilian crew/RFA type crew. One of these in these ice-strengthened in 80-120m length would give us lot of domestic ops capability, the good old "Humanitarian Relief Ops" card and allow the army to use more of it's equipment in ops. Things like AD systems, communications vehicles, medical stations and vehicles.

 
That size and class would be perfect, but I fear it would be to much ship to get through committee and to many crewing impacts. I was thinking this with mostly civilian crew/RFA type crew. One of these in these ice-strengthened in 80-120m length would give us lot of domestic ops capability, the good old "Humanitarian Relief Ops" card and allow the army to use more of it's equipment in ops. Things like AD systems, communications vehicles, medical stations and vehicles.

If the Helicopter facilities could be expanded to accommodate up to 2 chinooks in a hanger and to expand with the "humanitarian assistance" a larger medical/surgical capability would do the trick. Following their numbering system a 140 would do it. Oh, and lets order 4... 🙄 :LOL:
VARD 7 series 510 is very similar.
 
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The general challenge with USN ships is they use a completely different crewing model that has more people with much more specific but less general training. We have almost identical set ups to the RN, RAN, RNZN and other EU countries so lot more compatible.

The FREMM bid for example, didn't include any training, spares, IP, infrastructure or contingency (or inflation), so their non-tendered $30B bid was only a partial scope compared to CSC, and would have ballooned when all those real costs are added in.

The NSS structure was actually pretty reasonable for the framework of what we can do within the procurement system, but at the end of the day if political pressures over ride things like contract adherence it really doesn't matter what we do. I think if we properly implemented the vision that was there at the start, did things like performance monitoring, and also recognized/reduced the waste driven by our own bureaucracy, it has a pretty good chance of actually getting good ships.

From what I can tell, the designers at BAE can design a really good and capable ship, so if we stay out of their way CSC might potentially be great, but I think we'll likely probably try and get it to do too many conflicting things and just screw it up. For a ship that wasn't supposed to have major changes to a MOTS design, we were pretty quick to select a radar system that will require major and really significant engineering changes to be feasible, and will also have all kinds of other changes that will render it very different from a T26. Probably going to still be a good ship (lot of folks trainer by the people that built the CPF, that was fundamentally a really good design) but it's effectively a bespoke design.

Thanks @Navy_Pete I always enjoy your big picture input.
 
The general challenge with USN ships is they use a completely different crewing model that has more people with much more specific but less general training. We have almost identical set ups to the RN, RAN, RNZN and other EU countries so lot more compatible.

The FREMM bid for example, didn't include any training, spares, IP, infrastructure or contingency (or inflation), so their non-tendered $30B bid was only a partial scope compared to CSC, and would have ballooned when all those real costs are added in.
That is the kicker.....Plus at the time our FREMM bid was France and Naval group. The USN Fremm was Fincantieri.

OT: In my life Chrysler was better when managed from Milan than Paris. I hate Stallantis now very hard to work with.
 
From what I can tell, the designers at BAE can design a really good and capable ship, so if we stay out of their way CSC might potentially be great, but I think we'll likely probably try and get it to do too many conflicting things and just screw it up. For a ship that wasn't supposed to have major changes to a MOTS design, we were pretty quick to select a radar system that will require major and really significant engineering changes to be feasible, and will also have all kinds of other changes that will render it very different from a T26. Probably going to still be a good ship (lot of folks trainer by the people that built the CPF, that was fundamentally a really good design) but it's effectively a bespoke design.
We didn't select the radar, or most of the other equipment, LMC did. And it was the only radar to meet the requirements.

The requirements were set out, and the bids came in with industry deciding how they were going to meet them. The ship was was always going to have changes, they just said it needed to be based on an existing design to lower risk.
 
We didn't select the radar, or most of the other equipment, LMC did. And it was the only radar to meet the requirements.

The requirements were set out, and the bids came in with industry deciding how they were going to meet them. The ship was was always going to have changes, they just said it needed to be based on an existing design to lower risk.
If I understand it correctly the hull form does not change much and the machinery will be the same. That alone reduces risks considerably.
 
If I understand it correctly the hull form does not change much and the machinery will be the same. That alone reduces risks considerably.
I think that was the thinking.

I am reading the RAN is having problems with the CEAFAR high up on the Hunters.
 
I think that was the thinking.

I am reading the RAN is having problems with the CEAFAR high up on the Hunters.
As I understand it the Aussie are trying to cram way more into the hull than either us or the Brits, ours is 7,000ish DWT, theirs will be 9,000ish as I recall. Might be a bit of a dog.
 
As I understand it the Aussie are trying to cram way more into the hull than either us or the Brits, ours is 7,000ish DWT, theirs will be 9,000ish as I recall. Might be a bit of a dog.
Other than the CEAFAR I just don't where the in the increase is other than to off set the high mounted radar.

Oh still looks like they are sticking with the 32 MK41 VLS. Is that a big weight difference? Eight missiles more so I guess 10+ tonnes more in missiles. But RCN is getting the Sea Cepter in EXSL launchers over 2 CIWS.
 
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