Not to burst anyone's bubble, but while we have ample space on some of our bases the logistics of having small countries (or any country) from Europe train here is very, very expensive for them and while practicing a sea bound reinforcement to Europe may be of value for North Americans' logistics training, it has zero value for Europeans.
Back to training Canadians in Latvia. Part of Latvia's burden for having the eFP there is to make training areas available. Latvia's army has only one mechanized brigade and four national guard brigades (roughly 10,000 folks). The NG is very lightly equipped. They can utilize the facilities year round.
At some 25,000 hectares for Selonia and roughly half that of Adazi, Latvia has a larger available training area than either Petawawa or Valcartier, each of which is home to a brigade or more troops.
I'm not sure how many of you are old enough to recall 4 CMBG and Reforger exercises. They generally didn't need much in the way of training areas. We'd do all of our prepratory training back home, then fly in, take over our equipment, pack a rail move to Graf, do some live fire for a few days just to shake out regimental fire discipline and control and then deployed away from the ranges into the countryside for a week to several weeks doing dry tactical manoeuvring. It was nothing like a GATES or BATUS battle run. What it did do was exercise the troops and leadership in the logistics and tactical deployments to our most likely combat area and familiarize our people with their potential AO and its population. (And as a bonus, as a wheeled instead of a tracked army, Canada's costs for manoeuvre damage will be much lower than it was back in the day)
I'm of the view that the CA can't maintain the rotational system of RegF units augmented by ResF individuals for much longer. It concentrates the burden of lengthy rotations on far too few of its soldiers, particulalry the middle rank levels. The army needs to preposition equipment and regularly practice shorter flyovers until we get the system down pat as a routine. If Canada did that it could up its game to a fuller brigade which begets the possibility of becoming the framework of a multinational division and thus regain some of the credibility as an army which has been lost in the last decade or so.
I'm also of the view that the regular army can't sustain itself at the current pace. It's already broken and one can argue as to whether it is beyond repair or not. It needs much larger support from the reserve force which demands that the reserve force undergo substantial improvement so that it can deploy sub-units and eventually, hybrid units (yup - I'm back on 30/70 stuff here). Part of that improvement requires a demonstrable purpose accompanied by access to equipment and adequate (at least) training. But we need to fit that into a life cycle for a reservist's multiple obligations to his family, his civilian employer and the reserves themselves. To me that means a structured training system including mandatory monthly training and an annual two week (16 days) concentration regardless of whether its in Canada or overseas. That probably equates to Latvia having to support two two-week cycles of probably three or four (two or three manoeuvre and one fires) hybrid battalions each. That's effectively four to six weeks in the summer where Canada ups its utilization of some of the range areas for short intervals.
When I do my napkin force number crunching I end up with a total force of 3 hybrid tank regiments, 5 cavalry regiments, 9 mechanized infantry battalions, 9 light infantry battalions and 6 close support artillery regiments (and those numbers fluctuate a bit as I'm refining this). At a rate of 6 manoeuvre and 2 fires battalions per year that means any given battalion cycles through every fourth year or so leaving three years to do preparatory training in Canada. At roughly 47 days of mandatory training per year, reservists in units deploying to Latvia will have had roughly 170 days of progressive, preparatory training which ought to include substantial live fire training in Canada.
Flyover units have little demand for infrastructure. There are the hangers and maintenance facilities for prepositioned equipment but quarters and the like can be either simple barrack blocks or even temporary canvas, because units will move to the field almost immediately upon arrival. How much infrastructure is needed beyond that (rail head, live fire area, manoeuvre areas etc) depend entirely on the scope of the exercise. If done properly, the impact on the existing Adazi and Selonia training areas will be quite light and easily programmed.
OTOH, a focus for a four-year cycle that ends with a deployment to exercise in Latvia would give a significant raison d'être for reservist recruiting and retention. RegF will be advantaged in not having to deploy for six months every few years but instead deploying for shorter flyover exercises throughout the year.
And don't bother telling me that this can't be done with the reserve force that we have. Of course it can't. It can't be done with the regular force that we have. What it is, together with a proper equipping program, is a plan and a path to having a significantly more credible army within the personnel structure that the CA is currently authorized to. It can even be done with existing equipment holdings by sharing equipment for training within hybrid battalions until such time as more equipment is acquired. The point is that the army, as a whole, needs to change. What a concept like this gives you is an army that has two brigades ready to deploy at any given time and six more brigades that are two at 45 days, two at 90 days and two at 120 days from being ready to deploy. Having the objective of doing the last part of that training in Latvia, or whatever country we commit to, is a part of giving a large part of the total army a purpose.
