Army Reserve Restructuring

[MilEME09]

Sorry to be Joe-Negative, but you don't create a battlegroup by mashing together a foot-borne rifle company with a light reconnaissance squadron with a handful of TAPVs. At the very best you are creating a stepping stone to something, but from where I sit on the outside looking in, any move of this sort should be accompanied by a fully developed plan with a specific end-state which is well thought out and well communicated.

If there is a plan and communication of what an end-state CARB is to be and where it fits into the overall defence plan, then I'm failing to see it. All I'm seeing is a knee-jerk reaction to some personnel/leadership issues that have been around for decades.

I feel a bit more positive about the logistics restructure which, to me, looks to be paralleling the American brigade/light support battalion/forward support company construct and the MBCT divisional sustainment brigade structure. I'm not sure if that is the eventual intent but it looks like it's doing that. What I don't see, so far, is an expansion of field logistics beyond service battalions - I don't see maintenance battalions or special troops battalions or ammunition transport battalions or POL companies etc etc. We're starting to talk divisions but are ignoring, IMHO, structuring the theatre level support structure that a division needs for MCO.

I'm actually a fan of ARes unit amalgamations into a battalion with discrete companies that reflect their prior unit affiliation. IMHO, it's the best way of retaining a force expansion/national mobilization base.

The two big enablers to a proper CARB that are missing for me is the replacement of weak ARes leadership at the CO/RSM level with proper RegF personnel who have had both the proper training and experience to command full-sized units (and that leaves out the bulk of the Class Bs) and the equipment and associated training program to make them effect and more than just a pool of augmentees.

Honestly, if the army has a vision it should be made public and not hidden away in the halls of Ottawa.

Eventually the CARBs end state will be taking the roles of the ARCG, TBG, and IRUs. As well there is mention of CARBs being deployable on expiditionary Ops but I havent seen how that would work. I agree with you, if we are creating a high readiness ARes unit, leadership needs improvement, training and equipment.

This will also need significant expansion of the ARes authorized strength in order to feed the CARBs. Plus much stronger job protection laws to protect the class A types.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Eventually the CARBs end state will be taking the roles of the ARCG, TBG, and IRUs. As well there is mention of CARBs being deployable on expiditionary Ops but I havent seen how that would work. I agree with you, if we are creating a high readiness ARes unit, leadership needs improvement, training and equipment.

This will also need significant expansion of the ARes authorized strength in order to feed the CARBs. Plus much stronger job protection laws to protect the class A types.

And mukluks.... don't forget the (apparently very scarce) mukluks etc

 

[DBNSG]

Almost every CBG is implementing tactical grouping with its infantry and armoured units. As the army makes the transition from ad hoc battlegroup ops to divisional ops, it has been identified that the reserve units need to be capable of deploying formed sub-units and operating effectively. With most units current authorized establishments being in the ballpart of 180-230, even at full strength, a reserve unit can't consistently put a coy in the field. By grouping units, it takes their authorized establishments to close to their reg force counterparts. This will let units start training with a company in the field sooner, while DND, the MND and PMO begin the process of actually increasing the authorized strength of the army.

In town halls over the last month or so with both a CBG Comd and a Div Comd, they both said the vision is that reserve units will have the same authorized establishment as their reg force counterparts. They also said that being un-tactically grouped was tied to two key metrics, the first being able to reliably and consistently put a company+ in the field for exercises (ballpark 150 all ranks), and second, approaching the size of a reg force battalion.

So at this time what reserve units are best able to attempt these battle groups? Who is the most healthy?

 

[markppcli]

Perfect. I can share my 1 TAPV and 6 golf carts amongst 450 dudes.

The reality is though that its much easier to equipment units when we have size, mission, and tasks assigned. Equipping the 60 plus maneuver units when they vary in size from 35 to 220 isnt going to be efficient.

 

[daftandbarmy]

So at this time what reserve units are best able to attempt these battle groups? Who is the most healthy?

I have no idea how 'healthy' each of these units is right now but, based on many years of experience in other units, I can guarantee you they will likely go through the swings and roundabouts of an inconsistent ARes leadership supply chain.

Sometimes things will be great with lots of well trained and experienced people in the leadership structure but, other times, you'll be left with one Major, an untrained 2Lt, and a handful of new MCpls.

And this is the point as, under the current terms of service and CAF management culture, we'll never be able to ensure a strong, well trained, and consistently fully staffed org chart for any A Res unit no matter how many tactical grouping iterations are initiated.

To assume away this reality and go forward regardless is folly, of course.

 

[Brad Sallows]

I can guarantee you they will likely go through the swings and roundabouts of an inconsistent ARes leadership supply chain.

How many other countries use this model, in which the leadership of the Res F (army, anyways) is left entirely to the circumstances and fortunes of each unit acting almost alone? Surely most have larger full-time cadres?

 

[daftandbarmy]

How many other countries use this model, in which the leadership of the Res F (army, anyways) is left entirely to the circumstances and fortunes of each unit acting almost alone? Surely most have larger full-time cadres?

We've copied the British model, which is equally unsustainable but (most importantly) a 'cheap' method of sustaining a broad national mobilization baseline.

 

[Kirkhill]

Perfect. I can share my 1 TAPV and 6 golf carts amongst 450 dudes.

I have no idea how 'healthy' each of these units is right now but, based on many years of experience in other units, I can guarantee you they will likely go through the swings and roundabouts of an inconsistent ARes leadership supply chain.

Sometimes things will be great with lots of well trained and experienced people in the leadership structure but, other times, you'll be left with one Major, an untrained 2Lt, and a handful of new MCpls.

And this is the point as, under the current terms of service and CAF management culture, we'll never be able to ensure a strong, well trained, and consistently fully staffed org chart for any A Res unit no matter how many tactical grouping iterations are initiated.

To assume away this reality and go forward regardless is folly, of course.

It would be a win just to get Prairie Fella's 450 all on parade on the same day with all the same $2000-worth of uniforms and $6000-worth of weapons and "ammunition" that was claimed was necessary to supply the 300,000.

$3,600,000 investment in those 450.

 

[Kirkhill]

Further to...

10 such units, one per regional "brigade" would cost $36,000,000.

3 per brigade would require sacrificing one F35.

What can the Navy buy for $100,000,000, let alone $36,000,000?

 

[PrairieFella]

The reality is though that its much easier to equipment units when we have size, mission, and tasks assigned. Equipping the 60 plus maneuver units when they vary in size from 35 to 220 isnt going to be efficient.

I agree - but colour me skeptical. Ive been becoming cynical about these reforms doing much of anything at all reserve side.

 

[FJAG]

How many other countries use this model, in which the leadership of the Res F (army, anyways) is left entirely to the circumstances and fortunes of each unit acting almost alone? Surely most have larger full-time cadres?

It varies greatly by country and the roles and missions assigned to them.

I've used the US and the UK as models. Both have units that have establishments as high as their regular force counterparts. That facilitates the internal promotion/development cycle because the pool of low and middle officer and NCO leadership to generate one CO and RSM is much larger for a 500 person battalion than a 150 person one. The UK has more reservists than Canada but far fewer units concentrated into a much smaller land mass. Their training lags behind ours but they are better but not fully equipped and many units are paired with regular force counterparts so as to "share" equipment. My gut tells me, based on the 1 Div line diagrams, that the CARB concept wants to follow that pairing model.

The USAR and ARNG also exists in full unit and formation structures with the advantage they are equipped almost to the full TO&E of the type of unit they are. They are heavily supported by full-timers. Most of these full-timers are Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) personnel which would best equate to our Class B's. The AGR, together with a pool of civilians, provide the full-time administration required to staff units, and training centres and maintain equipment. At any given time 9% of the USAR and ARNG are on AGR status.

The US Marines have a much smaller AGR component, however they place far more active duty (read RegF) Marines into Marine reserve formations. Roughly 15% of Marine organization are full-timers. One needs to remember that reservists in the US man very complex systems from armoured vehicles to missiles and aircraft.

I'm looking at some additional voluntary reserve models.

The reality is though that its much easier to equipment units when we have size, mission, and tasks assigned. Equipping the 60 plus maneuver units when they vary in size from 35 to 220 isnt going to be efficient.

I think equipment is the sine qua non of a reserve force. The equipment must be there in order for a reserve entity of any size to function properly not only for its training but also to be a viable component of a deployable force. I agree totally that the minimum size of any organization worth being equipped is the battalion. Properly maintaining that equipment is probably beyond most given battalions' capability and thus requires either higher formation or base-level full-time CSS support.

Our reserve force model which has undersized units, without equipment and without clear missions has been a failure for over a half a century. It performed adequately for Afghanistan because a) the entire army only fielded a force of roughly 2,000 folks at any given time; and b) deploying units had six months of predeployment training in order to integrate their reserve augmentees. There was, and is, no capability to expand the army by way of its reservists beyond the size of the 3 +1 RegF brigades. That is a monumental systemic failure.

 

[Brad Sallows]

We've copied the British model, which is equally unsustainable but (most importantly) a 'cheap' method of sustaining a broad national mobilization baseline.

Maybe we've tried, but we've failed. On a course long ago I spoke with a British TA major who explained that although he aspired to be a CO, many of those positions were filled by regular officers and a TA member had to be pretty good to be selected. (He did end up making the cut.)

We've done about as good a job as we have implementing their version of parliamentary democracy.

 

[FJAG]

On a course long ago I spoke with a British TA major who explained that although he aspired to be a CO, many of those positions were filled by regular officers and a TA member had to be pretty good to be selected

UK reserve officer training generally lags ours.

IMHO, a full-sized, equipped, mobilizable reserve unit (which ought to be the goal) cannot be commanded by a reserve officer. The mission aspects are simply too complex these days to be taught and practiced on a part-time basis (same for RSM) It needs a person who has had not only the book learning but the experience (primarily through exercises) to put that training into context.

My own prejudices also say that a reserve unit should not be commanded by a retire RegF officer. IMHO they are over the hill. Proper mobilizable units require a leader who still has skin in the game to rise in rank and be responsible and accountable to his superiors for the proper functioning of his unit.

IMHO, the highest rank that the vast majority of reserve members should reach is major and MWO. Some of the better ones could rise in rank within selected staff positions at senior headquarters where a surge requirement exists.

$0.02

 

[Kirkhill]

UK reserve officer training generally lags ours.

IMHO, a full-sized, equipped, mobilizable reserve unit (which ought to be the goal) cannot be commanded by a reserve officer. The mission aspects are simply too complex these days to be taught and practiced on a part-time basis (same for RSM) It needs a person who has had not only the book learning but the experience (primarily through exercises) to put that training into context.

My own prejudices also say that a reserve unit should not be commanded by a retire RegF officer. IMHO they are over the hill. Proper mobilizable units require a leader who still has skin in the game to rise in rank and be responsible and accountable to his superiors for the proper functioning of his unit.

IMHO, the highest rank that the vast majority of reserve members should reach is major and MWO. Some of the better ones could rise in rank within selected staff positions at senior headquarters where a surge requirement exists.

$0.02

You can't get there from here.

Not in any reasonable timeline.

I am as big a fan of the USARNG system as you. But the reason the US was able to field NG Armoured Brigades was a combination of a high level of regular support, including, as you say a strong regular cadre, in the unit structure, regular training for the new entries and, in my view, critically, a large proportion of component transfers between the regs and the reserve and NG components.

That has been the end result of decades of focus and multiple wars that employed a large part of the population. And that model doesn't seem sustainable even for them given they are standing down their heavy reserves and converting them all to rifles in jeeps.

We don't have a population enured to war, the depth of exposure from which or regs could learn, nor the support of the regs nor res by the government and people. And now they have the misfortune to be given the opportunity to get things right when it seems the world is changing the rules of the tactical game.

Take what you can get today and build on it. Get @PrairieFella 's 450 on parade and properly kitted out. Get them some comms and surveillance kit with some drones, add in enough Pickups to move them in 6 man teams, and a couple of 5 tonners to keep them fed and watered, and gassed up. Then you can start building them up with platoon, company and battalion support weapons. And plan on getting things rightish by 2030.

Then, if all goes well, you might start building towards that 480,000 government force envisaged in the CDS's December plan.

Eating elephants.