From what I have gathered on the Inf net, the pioneer is returning to the Infantry battalions, albeit as individual skillsets within rifle companies. The creature we will call "pioneer" will not be the all-singing, all-dancing wonder we had back in the early 1990s: instead they will be more focused on the use of basic demolitions and some field construction tasks. Not as good as what we had, but a good start.
My fond hope is that once we've got the pioneers back as individuals, we'll realize we need a WO/Senior NCO to keep an eye on their training and skills. Then, we'll need somebody (MCpl) to look after their kit. Then, after a while, somebody will realize it might be more effective if these soldiers trained together as a group, to keep their specialist skills up. And, maybe, somebody will figure that it would be a good thing if we had a junior officer who undersood the unique skill set and how to best employ it to support te CO's concept of operations. Sound familiar?
(Oh, yeah...then somebody will want them to make drill canes and picture frames...forgot about that..)
The argument that the Sappers (God bless them...) would seriously be able to replace the Pioneer capability was always a pipedream. Not for any lack of capability on the part of our very fine combat engineers, but simply because they were not going to get (and never did get) any manning offsets to allow them to generate equivalents for the nine assault pioneer platoons that vanished. They still had to do all their usual Sapper stuff as directed by the Bde HQ, but now they had a whole new task. The BG cO who received a Sapper organization in support didn't "own" it: he borrowed it, and could lose it at any time.
The loss of the Pioneers was part of an institutionally-driven dismantling of the Inf Battalion capabilities that, IMHO, did terrible damage. Previous to this debacle, the TOE of a Canadian mech infantry battalion was, arguably, one the very most comprehensive and capable in the world. If all the people and the kit were there (rare), the integral assets of our Inf Bn covered all the Operational Functions very nicely. Seeing that all operations (especially those conducted in COIN) depend in the end on an effective Infantry, and that we were overwhelming an Infantry-centric Army, the butchery of the capabilities looks even harder to understand today than it did then.
Quite apart from the loss of the integral capabilities to the battalion was the damage done to the professional development of our WOs/Snr NCOs, who no longer had the opportunity to broaden and deepen their skill sets by serving in Pioneers, Mortars or Anti-Armour. These skills were not just confined to the time that an NCO was serving in Combat Support Company: when they rotated back to the rifle companies you got the benefit of their skills and knowledge for your company operations. Typically, by the time a WO became a CQMS or CSM, he had served in several cbt sp platoons, taken at least one advanced course in one of the specialties, and had probably taught the skill set several times either at the unit or at the School. All that was, to a great extent, lost when we lost those platoons.
IMHO, in 29 years of service in the RegF Inf, it was the worst mistake I have ever seen. My feeling is that, from the current CLS down, there is an understanding in the Army (largely as a result of the war in Afgh) that we have to fix what is broke. The question is, as always, how?
Cheers
